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Abstract 
 
Since the outset of the economic and social reforms in 1978, rural China has 
been undergoing fundamental changes in view of the relationship between the state, 
society and the individual. Social policy, not least pension policy for rural residents, 
has been an essential factor in this transformation process influencing the life chances 
of many peasants. This study deals with the relationship between social policy and 
individual life courses in the context of the Chinese reform process. By studying the 
rural pension policy, the study focuses on the power of social policy in shaping the 
life planning of social actors, testifying to the nexus between social institutions and 
human lives – first established by European life-course research for Western societies 
– in rural China. Main arguments of this study are that the introduction of the rural 
pension policy has led to the emergence of a modern “life course”, namely an 
institutionalized temporal structuration of the life span and related orientations of 
action on the part of Chinese peasants. Modern “life course” denotes the emergence 
of a temporal partition between work and retirement. The traditional idea of 
ceaseless toil until death is giving way to a conscious arrangement for a life phase 
after work. The institutionalization of a life course is a crucial aspect of 
modernization in which the state policy plays a pivotal role. Both social security and 
life course have become formative institutions in present-day rural China. 
 
In particular, this study integrates theoretical insights from European life-course 
research which emphasizes the close relationship between social security institutions 
and the life course. Based on expert interviews and biographical interviews with 
peasants conducted in selected areas of rural China, this study seeks to trace the 
institutional development of rural pensions and to identify the variety of ensuing 
life-course patterns by constructing a typology of individual life courses with regard 
to securing old age. Furthermore, in order to explore the interaction process between 
pension policy and the life course, this study constructs a second typology that 
elucidates the diversity of meaning peasants attach to the biographical significance of 
pensions in their individual life arrangements. The theoretical and methodological 
application of the life-course approach sheds new light on a neglected aspect of both 
the institutional and the individual dimension of the modernization process in rural 
China. 
 
Keywords 
China; Institutions; Life course; Rural pension; Social security 
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1. Orientation of the Study 
 
In terms of theory, the life course has defined a common field of inquiry by providing a 
framework that guides research on matters of problem identification and conceptual 
development. These problems have much to do with the impact of changing societies on 
developing lives. (Elder 1994: 5) 
 
This study deals with the relationship between social policy and individual life 
courses in the context of the Chinese modernization process. The study focuses on 
the framing power of social policy in shaping the life planning of social actors in 
order to explore the nexus between social institutions and human lives in China. 
Since the economic and social reforms launched in 1978, the transformation of all 
spheres of Chinese society has been under extensive study by scholars worldwide. 
Many of them turn their attention to the expansion of Chinese social policy, viewing 
it mainly as a consequence of social changes. The active endeavor of the state to 
extend social protection to more citizens is widely seen as a political response to the 
institutional transition from a planned to a market economy. Yet, the impact of the 
state social policy on society remains largely unnoticed. This is an often ignored but 
equally important point that refers to the framing effects of social policy with respect 
to life chances among different societal groups. This study aims to fill this research 
gap by exploring the institutional effects of social policy on the individual lives in 
order to shed new light on the study of Chinese social policy. At the same time, this 
study uses a concept of Western research on social change and social policy, the “life 
course”, which has only recently been applied in China research, but not yet to the 
realm of Chinese rural old-age security. This is the second research gap this study 
seeks to fill. As will be manifested in the later analysis, the introduction of rural 
pension schemes in the 1990s as a form of institution building offers researchers a 
unique opportunity to examine the relationship between social policy and life 
courses. This approach deepens our knowledge of changes in both institutions and 
individual lives in Chinese society. 
Based on fieldwork conducted in China, this study explores the impact of rural 
pension policy on the life course of the peasants. This study differs from previous 
works on Chinese social policy in that it does not focus merely on the description of 
institutions or policy analysis. By examining the extent to which the state pension 
policy influences the life course and retirement arrangements of the rural population, 
this research intends to make a contribution to the analysis of Chinese society in two 
interwoven dimensions. First, it attempts to offer a better understanding of the 
interaction between institutions and individual lives in rural China. In this way, the 
concept of the life course is used to model the macro-micro-link in the process of 
social transformation and social policy reform. Furthermore, it attempts to explore 
the modernization process in China from the angle of state social policy and the 
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individual life course, maintaining that these are two vital institutions of Chinese 
society. Particularly the last dimension has been neglected in previous studies on the 
modernization process in China. 
This chapter aims to delineate the major concerns and contributions of the study 
in three parts. The first part provides a brief review of the theoretical discussions on 
social transformation and social policy reforms in China in order to locate the 
significance of the life-course approach in China studies. The second part 
summarizes this study’s research questions and central theses. The last part 
introduces the structure of this study. 
 
1.1 Life Course in the Context of Social Transformation and Social 
Policy in Rural China 
Since the economic and social reforms in 1978, China has become a fast growing 
emerging market and it has been undergoing rapid changes in all spheres of society. 
In urban and rural sectors alike, the state has initiated a series of reform policies that 
have reconfigured the institutional frameworks of economic production and resource 
distribution, unleashing the potential influences of market and other societal sectors. 
Similar reforms are also under way in the realm of social policy, as the state perceives 
the growing social insecurity as a result of economic reforms and responds to them 
with innovative policies. The successive social policy reforms since the 1980s have 
fundamentally transformed the relationship between the state and society in their 
division of welfare responsibility. In this light, this work attempts to address a crucial 
institutional link in the Chinese modernization process; which has recast the 
relationship between the state, society and individuals. It departs from the theoretical 
perspective of life-course research and views the welfare state and life course as two 
interrelated institutions of modern society. By means of this theoretical approach, 
this work seeks to advance the research in two fields: China studies and life-course 
research in the broader context of new welfare state studies. 
This frame of reference encounters a fundamental question concerning the 
applicability of concepts such as welfare state and life course in China studies. 
Indeed, East Asian countries deliberately keep their social spending at a very low 
level in order to improve their ability to compete in the global economy. In addition, 
the general socioeconomic development in the East Asia region cannot keep pace 
with that of Western welfare states; and is therefore unable to sustain a 
comprehensive framework of state social policy. These facts offer a rationale for some 
scholars to cast doubt on the qualification of East Asian countries as welfare states. 
Among them, culturalist theorists (Rieger and Leibfried 1999), in particular, go 
further and emphasize the elementary differences between East Asian and European 
countries. Whereas the welfare provision of the former is based on the Confucian 
tradition that attaches importance to family care and paternalistic welfare, the latter 
construct state welfare on the basis of individual rights rooted in the tradition of the 
 9 
enlightenment and Christian charity. In short, the differences in welfare culture 
between East and West offer few grounds for the East Asian countries to be qualified 
as welfare states comparable to their Western counterparts. 
However, other researchers pose different viewpoints, which make room for an 
inquiry into the welfare state and life course in China. Under the influence of Esping-
Andersen’s work (1990), there have been numerous attempts to delineate the unique 
characteristics of the “East Asian welfare regime”. The active engagement of the East 
Asian states in the welfare of their citizens in the 1990s has appealed for more 
academic attention on the emerging new welfare states in this region. Despite 
different accounts of the development of the East Asian welfare states, evidence that 
social policy has been gaining importance is mounting even in the wake of the 
financial crisis in 1997 (Hort and Kuhnle 2000; also cf. Holliday 2000, 2005; Goodman 
et al. 1998). Walker and Wong (1996) also criticize the common notion of associating 
the term “welfare state” exclusively to the capitalist-democratic projects prevalent in 
the Western world. According to their views, this would narrow our vision in 
welfare state studies leaving other countries out of the picture. If the observers 
concentrate only on state provision, they will inevitably neglect the characteristics of 
East Asian states as regulators (also Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwong 1997). In a 
nutshell, these studies suggest broadening the applicability of the concept “welfare 
state” to non-Western countries. 
By the same token, applying the concept of “life course” in China studies 
promises new insights as well. For Kohli (1986a, 1986b), the major life-course 
theorist, the “life course” found in non-modern societies is organized alongside age-
stratified social status rather than temporalization of individual life phases as it is in 
modern Western societies. In the latter case, the welfare state has significantly 
contributed to the social structuration of life spans, which regulates individuals in a 
temporal sequence along their life courses (Kohli 1986a, 1986b; Meyer 1986, 1992). 
The crucial moment is the imprint of these institutional settings, as norms, in the 
minds of social actors that justifies their raison d’être. Life course is not simply the 
result of individual biographical choices but also the molding effect of state social 
policies. Life courses have become the interface between social actions and state 
institutional frameworks. In this vein, the concept of “life course” encompasses two 
meanings: in general, the life course is a social institution of the modern world which 
guides individuals to organize the temporal settings of their lives. In particular, the 
concept denotes the trajectories of individual lives as a result of agents’ choices and 
actions.1  
                                                 
1 This understanding of the concept is based on the European tradition of the life-course research, 
which focuses on the intersection between (welfare) state institutions and individual life courses. The 
institutional aspect of the life course is less noticed by American scholars, who concentrate more on 
the impact of historical and social structures on human lives. For a more systematic articulation, see 
chapter 3. Scholarly works addressing this transatlantic difference include: Marshall and Mueller 
(2001); Leisering (2003). 
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If the effects of the welfare state in the structuration of the life course prove 
universal, then it is logical to infer that the same framing effects of state social policy 
should be equally visible in emerging new welfare states. Investigating the rise of 
institutionalized life course patterns in China therefore implies the discovery of a key 
element of socio-cultural modernization in an East Asian country. This prospective 
research approach has seldom been adopted in the Chinese studies, not to mention 
Chinese social policy research (see Zhou 2004; Zhou and Hou 1999; Zhou and Moen 
2001; Zhou et al. 1996, 1997). In this light, this study attempts to explore a new area 
by explaining the interaction between social policy institutions and social actors as 
reflected in the latter’s life course patterns. It seeks to shed new light on how new 
social security institutions influence the lives of their clients, and how the latter 
secure old-age security in given institutional environments. This point is of particular 
importance because it addresses the biographical dimension of social actors with 
regard the idea of retirement. How they perceive the policy framework, reflect on 
their situations and deal with their old-age security is one of the central themes of 
this work.2 
For such an investigation, China is an ideal case because many innovative 
policies have been introduced to grapple with new challenges arising from social 
changes since 1978. Indeed, the development of Chinese social policy manifests the 
ambivalence of the welfare reforms. In the urban sector, major political efforts aim to 
weave a new social safety net for those laid-off workers coming to terms with new 
insecurity as a result of the massive restructuring of state-owned enterprises. In the 
rural counterpart, the collapse of communes, the diversification of rural economy 
and the aging population have equally put the traditional arrangement of rural social 
security into question. Especially the changing nature of rural families has profound 
implications for the traditional generational relationship (Chang 1993a, 1993b; Krieg 
and Schädler 1995; Chen 1996; Wong 1998). The state perceives the growing 
contingency confronting the urban and rural population and responds with 
innovative policies. The retreat of the state from the traditional socialist welfare 
framework is accompanied by its active involvement in new realms of social policy 
(e.g. social assistance, unemployment insurance, etc.). Among them, the introduction 
of a rural pension scheme at the beginning of the 1990s was a new endeavor to meet 
the growing need for public old-age support. Today, in some wealthier regions, local 
governments have even introduced contribution-free local pensions similar to the 
idea of “social pensions” (Leisering et al. 2006). Rural pension policy is an instructive 
example of a newly emerging welfare policy. The field of old-age security is of 
particular interest as China is experiencing demographic aging well before a 
comprehensive public pension scheme for rural residents has been established. The 
                                                 
2 The focus of this study on the institutional effects of state social policy on individual biography 
concurs with the emphasis of Western welfare state scholars who pay close attention to the impact of 
state social policy on society and the individual. For example see George and Wilding (1984); 
Kaufmann (1982); Leisering (2001); Pierson (1993). 
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establishment of pension schemes can be seen as a policy innovation in the context of 
rural China, which offers social scientists an ideal opportunity to observe a policy in 
its origin.  
Yet, interestingly, the partial success of the rural pension policy and its possible 
impact on rural old-age security and individual old-age arrangements in China has 
thus far attracted little attention of international researchers. Several studies have 
indeed investigated the situation of the elderly and highlighted the precarious nature 
of old-age security in rural China (e.g. Davis-Friedmann 1991; Ding and Chen 2005; 
Pang et al. 2004; Pei and Pillai 1999; Xu 2001), or suggested a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of rural welfare (Hebel 2003). But there is thus far no systematic 
examination of the development of rural pension policy. Only indigenous Chinese 
scholars have performed numerous analyses of the decade-long policy process. These 
studies, however, tend to be merely descriptive of rural China’s imminent problems 
and they ultimately rush to make policy proposals.3 There seems to be equally little 
effort among them to explain the interaction between pension policy and its client 
peasants with more sophisticated accounts.  
Only a small portion of the international literature has addressed this aspect 
from any theoretical perspectives. The focus is generally put on the political contexts 
and interest constellations in the central government (Gong 2003). Gong’s study 
illustrates how political actors have come to establish experimental pension schemes 
in rural areas, and how the policy direction has been altered in the midst of rapid 
political changes. The study done by Leisering and Gong (2002) makes the first 
attempt to explore the interactive aspect of rural pension policy with respect to the 
life course of the peasants. Given their contribution to explaining the political process 
as well as the social consequences of the rural pension policy, however, the crucial 
question of what impact the policy has upon the life course of the participant 
peasants remains only partially answered. This indicates a weak dimension in 
current research. 
Based on this observation, the emphasis of this work on institutional effects of 
social policy on individual lives is thus an attempt to close a gap in present works of 
rural China study and social policy research. In both research traditions, social policy 
implemented in rural China has thus far received scant attention, let alone its impact 
on the lives of rural residents. With its close examination of social policy and 
individual life course, this study aims to address two core elements of the 
modernization process highlighted by the life-course theorists (Kohli 1986a, 1986b; 
Mayer and Müller 1986; Mayer and Schöpflin 1989). Historically, the development of 
state social policy accompanies the emergence of the welfare state in Western 
countries in response to the emerging social questions of socioeconomic 
                                                 
3 Numerous Chinese articles and books discuss this theme, making it impossible to give a full account 
here. Nonetheless, my appraisal that, while not denying their respective contributions, they tend to be 
descriptive and suggestive remains valid. This view is also shared by some Chinese scholars (Peng 
and Song 2002). 
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modernization. Together with the mechanisms of market economy and political 
democracy, the welfare state has become a deeply-rooted institutional epitome in 
Western societies embodying the public responsibility for the well-being of their 
citizens. The institutional dominance of the welfare state has also exerted a profound 
influence on the lives of many. 
In sum, this study emphasizes the interaction between state social policy and 
individual life course against the backdrop of modernization process in China since 
1978. It seeks to highlight the institutionalization of two elements at the policy and 
individual levels. The basic assumption is that both social policy and life course are 
taking elementary shape in the context of rural China, as has been the case in the 
Western historical development. In which scope and to what extent social policy and 
life course are interrelated in rural China is the main theme of this study. And, as will 
be shown in later chapters, social policy, not least rural pension policy, has an 
immense influence on the perception and strategy of local peasants towards their 
old-age security. Despite the diverse socioeconomic developments and policy 
frameworks among the field sites, the idea of retirement has been gaining 
prominence in the biographical horizon of many Chinese rural residents. Retirement 
in a modern sense is emerging as a separate category of the life course in rural China. 
 
1.2 Research Questions and Overview of the Argument 
The emphasis on social policy and life course, as the two underpinnings of research, 
leads this study to focus on the interplay of state social policy and individual life 
course against the background of social transformation. The central theme of this 
work deals with the political nature of the rural pension policy as well as its social 
impact on “life course” and “retirement” as two core elements of modern Chinese 
society. The central aim is to explore the scope and extent of the impact of the rural 
pension policy upon the retirement idea and old-age arrangement of Chinese 
peasants. Research questions surrounding the rural pension policy are: how has the 
rural pension policy in China developed from its origin to the situation nowadays? 
What policy outcomes and implications does this development entail? Following the 
research logic, this study further poses questions regarding the social impact of the 
pension policy: are we witnessing the emergence of the modern “life course”? Can 
we identify a distinct category of “retirement” in the life planning of individual 
peasants? And, in this connection, there is a further inquiry about the policy impact 
on the generational relationship in the rural family: are there any changes within the 
interaction between generations in the family? 
Bearing these central questions in mind, the general assumption of this study is 
that the establishment of a pension scheme in rural China, even though it is still 
experimental and tentative, earmarks the starting point of the state’s response to the 
rapid transformation that has put traditional forms of old-age security in question. 
The new institution of old-age security has contributed to the emergence of 
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convergent life experience among the peasants, i.e. their biographical forms are 
moving towards a temporal division between work and retirement. This is reflected 
in the growing consciousness of the peasants regarding the significance of old-age 
security in their life courses, and their awareness to make economic preparations for 
it during their work phase. In addition, this study is also interested in observing 
whether the changing context of biographical horizon and life-stage planning has 
any impact on the role of the family, especially in regard to the relationship between 
generations. The supposition is that, with the rising significance of public pensions, 
the importance of the family will shift correspondingly from bearing financial 
responsibility to giving more care. As public pensions provide a bolster for the 
economic safety of the elderly, their children will rather spare their capacity for more 
emotional support and daily care. How and to what extent this change in the family 
relationship in rural China is proceeding is under scrutiny in this study. 
Following these starting points, the central thesis of this study is that the 
establishment of pension schemes has led to the emergence of the modern life course 
in rural China, although the individual mapping of the life course is subject to the 
given institutional settings of local pension schemes as well as household economic 
situations. Given the institutional diversity among different rural regions, a clear 
consciousness of retirement as a distinct phase in the life course can be observed 
among peasants in the survey fields where local pension policy has been successfully 
implemented. In contrast, in less developed rural regions where local governments 
are unable or unwilling to strengthen public responsibility for old-age security, 
peasants are more inclined to depend on traditional means such as family care and 
individual work. Their life courses are thus characterized by incessant toil without a 
clear distinction between work and retirement phases. Old age remains a high 
economic risk both for the elderly and their family. From this observation, one can 
infer that, by and large, institutionalization of the life course as manifested in the 
clear temporal division of one’s life span (especially between work and retirement) is 
beginning to take root in rural China. While the state pension institution regulates 
the realm of old-age security in rural areas, it also influences the manner in which 
peasants apprehend the relationship between state and society (especially market 
and family), work and retirement, as well as that of the family and the individual, 
thereby contributing to growing attentiveness among the peasants to the whole issue.  
This finding corresponds with the idea of the institutionalist approach in the 
life-course research that accentuates the link between institutional arrangements of 
the (welfare) state and the life courses of individual agency. As the state constructs 
political and legal frameworks regulating obligatory contributions and benefit 
entitlements, these given policy designs facilitate or constrain resources accessible to 
individual agency. In the case of rural old-age security, the most effective tool is the 
demarcation of the age limit in the pension scheme, which distinguishes the work 
phase from retirement and defines the criteria upon which one is to be included in or 
excluded from employment. Contribution subsidy from the state provides a further 
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incentive for the villagers to participate in the scheme because its size directly 
determines the individual share of financial burden. While the scope of local pension 
schemes influences the perception of the peasants towards the issue of old-age 
security, an equally important aspect is the burgeoning awareness of the significance 
of life planning and retirement in their minds. The emergence of a subjective horizon 
in respect to the temporal settings of one’s life is the decisive element of life-course 
institutionalization that drives individuals to make long-term life planning. Apparent 
in the field survey is the finding that the introduction of rural pension schemes has 
often raised local peasants’ interest in contemplating making more preparations for 
their old-age security, irrespective of their current age. If their terms are generously 
set, pension schemes can often attract and strengthen the willingness of local 
villagers to make more preparations for their old-age security. 
Another result of the study further supports the thesis suggested by the 
institutionalist life-course approach that the social policy of the state not only frames 
the patterns of individual lives but produces new inequality among them as well. 
Indeed, a central theme of this study addresses the unequal institutionalization of the 
life course, both in the sense of institutional regulation and individual biography. 
From the outset, the rural pension policy in China is designed by the central 
government to leave the existing regional inequality without any policy correction. 
As a result, the unequal financial strength of village collectives has given rise to very 
different local policies regarding contribution subsidy – with enormous effects on 
local policy outcomes in terms of coverage and benefit levels. This residualist policy 
approach has led to the immediate consequence that existing regional social 
inequality of peasants in their work phase is directly reproduced well into their later 
old-age phase. Old-age security and life course in rural China are subject to the local 
economy situation and pension policy that generate a huge cleavage in pension 
entitlements among the peasants of different regions.  
Given this policy framework, one notices a clear difference in consciousness 
among the peasants with respect to their old-age security and the idea of retirement. 
Villagers in well-off regions have benefited from strong regional economies that 
support generous local pension schemes. For them, the idea of retirement is a 
concrete reality, as public pensions have secured a financial basis for its fulfillment. 
In the best cases, generous pensions from public schemes have substantiated the 
division between work and retirement in the minds of the beneficiaries because they 
can plan their retirement without financial concern. Contrarily, peasants in less well-
off regions have to worry about the prospect of their old-age security, depending 
crucially on the extent of support they can expect from public pension schemes. 
These peasants’ notion of retirement remains vague because they lack sufficient 
material conditions even for their livelihood in the work phase. Nonetheless, an 
interesting finding of this study is that even among peasants in poor regions where 
no pension scheme has been introduced, individual preparation for old-age security 
is by no means a rare phenomenon. In circumstances of economic hardship, 
 15 
however, their efforts to realize long-term planning prove much more difficult, as 
poor households can only afford to maintain their present living costs. There is little 
room for personal saving, to say nothing of any investment for the future. Often the 
retirement idea comes about through increasing contact with friends from other 
richer regions or information from the media, but it is difficult to concretize the 
notion or plan under destitute conditions. Precisely this has generated a large gap 
between peasants of different regions in their subjective expectations and life 
planning regarding retirement. Indeed, the wish of poor peasants for more economic 
safety in old age is no less than those already drawing sufficient retirement benefits 
from public pension schemes. Yet weak state responsibility in old-age support has 
led to the shortfall of pension entitlements in poor villages, making long-term 
retirement planning practically impossible. Unequal pension entitlements among 
rich and poor regions have a large impact on the perception of the peasants towards 
present and future economic safety – with significant implications for the 
biographical orientation of individual agency.4  
With regard to the generational relationship, the field survey identifies 
continuity in internal family relationship. In most cases, co-habitation of parents and 
children (sons) remains the predominant form of rural family, irrespective of the 
amount of public pensions the elderly receive. Even when parents choose not to live 
together with their children, mutual support still prevails, and the interaction 
remains intensive. What the public pensions have changed is the perception of the 
elderly parents towards the financial aspect of their old-age security, i.e. they do not 
ask their children for any economic support whenever the circumstances permit. But 
even in these cases, their delight in their own financial independence does not 
diminish the desire of the elderly to keep close ties with their children. Public 
pensions are mostly deemed by the rural elderly in a functional sense, whereby the 
financial structure of the household is corroborated by an additional pillar. And in 
the case that pensions exceed the actual need, many elderly parents tend to support 
their children by shouldering part of the daily expenses. In this respect, public 
pensions have contributed to a more conscious idea of retirement among the elderly 
though their emotional bond with their children remains intact. Generational 
solidarity is still central to the family relationship. 
In sum, this study differs from other approaches in China studies in its 
exploration of the link between social policy and life course as two distinctive 
institutional components of modern Chinese society. As a frame of reference, both 
                                                 
4  In this respect, subjective orientations of retirement arrangements among rural residents are 
necessarily a contestation process, depending on a set of individual and environmental factors, though 
public pensions undoubtedly play a major role. The central thesis of this work, about the emergence of 
the modern life course in rural China, should be understood in this dynamic sense because it refers to 
a burgeoning process, not a completed result. The same phenomenon also appeared in the early 
history of European welfare states. The crystallization of old age as a unique phase in the modern life 
course has undergone a long span of social contestations, especially for self-employed farmers. See: 
Costa (1998); Ehmer (1990); Göckenjan (2000). 
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institutional arrangements and individual action in the realm of old-age security 
constitute the core subjects of analysis in this study. In the light of the institutionalist 
life-course approach, this research assumes and identifies the shaping power of state 
institutions on individual life courses, which gives rise to the emergence of the 
retirement idea in the minds of rural Chinese peasants. Departing from this 
assumption, this study views the introduction of public pension schemes in rural 
China as a propulsive force directing the attention of the peasants towards their old-
age security. Public pensions have awoken their awareness of retirement as well as 
their recognition of the necessity to make more prearrangements for this phase of 
life. Institutional frameworks of local pension schemes influence perceptions of the 
state’s role as well as individual’s biographical orientation towards old-age security. 
Therefore, one should take more heed of the relevance of rural pensions for the lives 
of Chinese peasants as manifested in their (variably) progressing institutionalization. 
 
1.3 Design and Composition of the Study 
In order to explore the dimensions set by the theoretical considerations, this study 
requires a combination of methods. To analyze the institutional design and 
development of rural pension policy, document analysis and expert interviews are 
used to gain a deeper insight into the nature and history of the policy. While 
document selection ranges from academic works to statutory or official documents, 
expert interviews are conducted with officials involved in the policy realm at the 
central or local government levels. This supplements the document analysis because 
a researcher can often gain valuable information from the perspective of insiders in 
the administrative body. By means of expert interviews with the responsible officials, 
the study is able to collect detailed data often unavailable from general academic 
works or published government documents. This is especially the case in respect to 
local pension schemes, where only responsible local officials are familiar with the 
overall implementation situation of respective localities. 
Furthermore, to explore the biographical dimension of the peasants, the study 
applies case studies and biographical research to illustrate the distinctive way in 
which Chinese peasants deal with the issue of retirement in the context of social 
transformation and rural pension policy. In its essence, the biographical method 
requires fewer cases yet deeper exploration in respect to the subjective dimension of 
individual agency. There is thus a methodological affinity between the case studies 
and biographical method. The application of the method of case study is a suitable 
approach for China studies, as researchers are often unable to include all regions in 
the study. Particularly in view of regional disparity and national complexity, case 
studies can offer better access to the existing variety by highlighting specific facets of 
the research subject (Ragin and Becker 1992). The biographical and case study 
methods have been chosen to sharpen the study’s focus on the actor’s perspective on 
life course and retirement. 
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To achieve the research goals outlined above, this study will begin with a 
section discussing current theoretical approaches in China studies as well as life 
course studies (chapter 2). The aim is to elaborate the insights of both fields in order 
to specify the research gap in current China studies. The literature review provides 
strong support for the application of life-course theories in the study of rural pension 
policy and its impact on the biographical dimension of old-age security. Chapter 3 
departs from this observation and portrays the development of different life-course 
theories in order to outline an integrated theoretical framework for analyzing the 
topic in concern. Chapter 4 follows this framework and delineates the methods in 
which the inquiry in this work proceeds.  
From chapter 5 onwards, the study presents its empirical findings, focusing on 
the institutional development of Chinese social policy in general and rural pension 
policy in particular. In addition to the institutional analysis of social policy and 
pensions, the empirical part also addresses the life course of the peasants in relation 
to the pension schemes, as well as their biographical dimension with regard to 
retirement after work. Following this analytical strategy, chapter 5 sketches the 
historical development and current trends in Chinese social policy. Special focus is 
put on the divisive nature of social policy in China, which has separated urban from 
rural areas since the 1950s. Only against this background can we grasp the intention 
of the Chinese government to establish a rural pension scheme for the peasants, and 
why it is still inferior to its urban counterpart in terms of policy scope and extent. 
After the theoretical and historical accounts, the empirical section goes further to an 
in depth analysis of the development of rural pension policy as well as its impact on 
the life course of peasants in selected field sites. An analysis of the policy 
development in chapter 6 demonstrates how the Chinese central government 
decided to establish a formal pension scheme for rural residents and how this policy 
changed its track in the course of time. This will help us better understand the 
background regarding the different effects on the life course of the peasants at the 
field sites. The following chapters (7 and 8) present the results of the empirical study 
in terms of the theoretical assumptions forwarded in the theoretical section. The final 
chapter (9) summarizes the overall findings and reflects on their implications for the 
theoretical discussion within which the research on social policy and life course are 
embedded. 
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2. Earlier Studies on Chinese Society, Social Policy and the 
Life Course 
2.1 Sociological Study of Social Change in China 
The key process of social change in China started with the transition from socialist 
redistribution to market mechanism. Almost all scholarly works focus on the (formal 
and informal) institutional changes set in motion by the economic and social reforms 
launched in 1978 and their impact on the society (e.g. Selden 1993; Solinger 1993; 
Brugger and Reglar 1994; Szelenyi et al. 1994; Lieberthal 1995; Walder 1995a). 
Sociologists and political scientists primarily focus on the changing mechanisms of 
social and political organization that constitute the Chinese society under 
communism. Their common starting point is to observe and interpret the origin, 
process and impact of social changes after the reforms. Their main observations focus 
on the essence, change and persistence of social institutions that influence other 
elements of social structure, which manifests the complex interaction between 
different institutions (mainly socialist and capitalist or hybrid forms).  
The following sections aim to sketch the theoretical accounts of these scholarly 
works.5 Their common concern is associated with the rise of the market mechanism 
in a communist regime and its social consequences for the Chinese society and social 
security. Researchers also seek to explain the scope of these social changes in the 
context of institutional change and structural transformation. Main foci of recent 
research concentrate on the following four aspects: 1) Institutional legacies of socialist 
arrangements, 2) origins of economic growth, 3) state and society, and 4) social 
consequences and welfare problems after reforms. 
 
2.1.1 Legacies of Socialist Institutional Arrangements 
Current academic works on Chinese society are explicitly or implicitly institutionally 
oriented. This is of no surprise given that Chinese society has been undergoing large-
scale institutional transition almost in all societal spheres (to a less extent in political 
sphere). Recent research findings univocally point to the applicability of the idea path 
dependency in the case of China whose developmental path differs from that of East 
Europe (McCormick and Unger 1996; Nee and Stark 1989; Pei 1994, 1996; Stark 1996; 
Stark and Bruszt 1998; Szelenyi et al. 1994; Szelenyi 1998; Walder 1995c; Wu 1994). 
While the reform path of the latter has been radical course in transition from 
socialism to market mechanism in the context of communist collapse, the experience 
of the former is a comparatively great success under the rule of communist party. 
The reform experiments within a socialist economy are embedded in the respective 
institutional structures, whereby political and social actors redefine and recombine 
                                                 
5 The following literature review has benefited from the introductory articles by Bian (2002/03); Stark 
and Nee (1989); Szelenyi et al. (1994); Wang (2000). 
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rules of resource distribution.6 From this perspective, the institutional legacies of 
state socialism with regard to social organization still influence the perception and 
interpretation of social actors partaking in current reform process in China. Ongoing 
social changes and welfare reforms proceed in a way that new institutions emerge 
under the constraint of existing ones. 
The first focus concerns the dualistic divide among urban and rural area as a 
result of the previous political decision. For example, scholars have noticed the 
relevant institutional structures prevailing in all spheres of society. Accounts from 
historical perspectives interpret the existing socialist economy as a social contract 
between communist party and its people (Chen 1999; Chu 1996; Lin et al. 2000). 
During the pre-reform era, in order to spurt rapid growth of heavy industry, workers 
in the urban area were provided with generous social security benefits by their work 
units, although the average wages were kept low. In contrast, rural residents were 
politically and socially disadvantaged by the idea that they could rely on land and 
family for the life support. In this vein, social changes in the course of economic 
reforms are interpreted as a modification of the initially arranged social contract. 
The second explanation effort concentrates on the main mechanism of this social 
contract, the household registration system (hukou), which has in practice 
demobilized rural residents for several decades (Cheng and Selden 1994, 1997; Shen 
1997). While urban residents were dependent on the work units (danwei) in their 
daily lives, their rural counterparts were organized under production teams and 
communes. A set of sociological research has been conducted to explore how these 
institutional arrangements have influenced social organization of the two worlds. 
The operation and function of danwei demonstrated that it was a place to distribute 
resources and exert social control over its members (Lü and Perry 1997; Zhou et al. 
1997). The employment status in danwei thus had highly symbolic and material 
significance for the urban residents. In this respect, danwei went well beyond its 
economic role and embodied the merit of work in socialist ideology. It also had the 
function of political control and social stratification. Moreover, recent scholarly 
findings indicate that the social structure of the new China under the socialist regime 
might not be as different as it often seemed. The social organization under 
communism was in some ways merely a new political order under the traditional 
social structure (Li 1991; Li and Li 2000; Walder 1986). The dependency relationship 
between workers and leading cadres was comparable with that of interpersonal ties 
in clan systems. 
Contrarily, rural regions have always been the main victims of this uneven 
developmental strategy of China. Scholars have long bemoaned the extremely 
unequal treatment that had led to an “urban bias” and rural hardship (Bo 1999; 
                                                 
6 The interpretation of this viewpoint is best expressed in Stark’s (1996: 995) formulation „Change, 
even fundamental change, of the social world is not the passage from one order to another but 
rearrangements in the patterns of how multiple orders are interwoven. Organizational innovation in 
this view is not replacement but recombination.“  
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Selden 1993; Tang 1999; Whyte 1981; You 1995; Zhou 1994). Relentless political 
movements have also hugely disrupted agricultural works and peasant lives (Chan et 
al. 1992; Unger 2002). Strict mobility prohibition and rigid membership in production 
teams and communes have actually cellularized rural society into numerous isolated 
and autarkic cells (Shue 1988, 1994). This organizational principle gave local cadres 
as mandataries of the central government a unique opportunity to implement 
commands from above and dispatch local resources to villagers. Similar to the urban 
sector, the socialist frameworks in Chinese villages have brought about a 
dependency relationship between peasants and local cadres. 
In this light, the third focal point of scholarly works refers to the fact that these 
institutional arrangements fundamentally influenced the way in which Chinese 
society developed. Despite the artificial isolation by the household registration 
system, local cadres in China practiced what scholars called clientelism in both urban 
and rural areas (Oi 1989; Walder 1986). “Organized dependency” and “principled 
particularism” constituted the major organizational principles of work society under 
socialist China (Walder 1986). These mechanisms enabled the central state to 
penetrate those social spheres in which individual and familial ties remained strong. 
Cadres in state-owned enterprises as well as in villages became the intermediate 
layer between the state and its citizens. With the state’s mandate, cadres were able to 
implement commands from the central government while represented and protected 
local interests in villages at the same time. The unique position of cadres has created 
a dependency relationship between them and their clients (village residents, workers 
in SOE). These institutional settings still prevailed even though market mechanism 
was introduced. Scholars’ observations point to a landscape of co-existence of 
various institutional orders that persisted in the course of reforms. The socialist 
institutional legacies have also influenced the developmental path of Chinese 
reforms. 
 
2.1.2 The Origins of Economic Growth in the Reform Era 
In view of the rapid economic growth in China, the first puzzle social scientists have 
attempted to comprehend is: what factors can account for this extraordinary 
economic achievement under a socialist regime? The fact that the rise of township 
and village enterprises (TVE) has greatly contributed to the economic growth also 
stimulates scholars to explore the institutional frameworks under which economic 
took off. This question is both interesting and confusing in the sense that the 
structure and operation of TVE in China are far more complex than one would 
expect. A body of scholarly research has attempted to answer this question with a set 
of different accounts based on empirical investigations. 
The first point refers to the essence of property rights associated with the TVE. 
According to the experience of Western capitalism, the efficiency of economic 
organizations largely depends on the clarity of property rights (i.e. privatization). 
However, what takes place in China has put this common view into question because 
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many TVEs are neither completely private nor public properties (Wu 1996, 2000). 
How, then, are China’s emerging market economy and the role of TVEs in the 
economic development to be explained given their ambiguous ownership? There 
seems to be an opaque link between market mechanism and state socialism. To 
explain this perplexing phenomenon, three main accounts come to the fore: market 
transition account, political economy account, and social network account.7 
 A body of research poses the market transition account, which posits an economic 
view of a planned and a market economy as two contrast types (Kornai 1992; Nee 
1989, 1991, 1996). The market economy is characterized by equal legal protection of 
private property, horizontal transactions, voluntary exchange and price calculations, 
whereas the planned economy entails public property, bureaucratic hierarchy, 
vertical transactions, and exchange by central command. In the course of market 
transition, the market transition account argues that private business emerged when 
the party-state released its control over the economy. When this transition went on, 
the redistributive mechanism of the state social socialism eventually gave way to the 
price mechanism of the market, which stimulated the growth of private 
entrepreneurs and producers. 
Yet, the failure of the market transition account becomes evident when other 
field works point to the resilience of the central planning and bureaucratic control 
after the economic reforms. The political economy account maintains that the economic 
reforms have transferred the distributive power over public resources from the 
central government to local bureaucrats (decentralization of power).8 While central 
economic coordination declined, local governments became the main political 
institutions with great influence on the economic activities in their regions. Local 
bureaucrats and cadres took advantage of their political positions by turning their 
power over goods into personal advantages. That is, political capital and 
redistribution power remained two influential resources in the transition process 
(Bian and Logan 1996; Wu 1998; Walder 2002). Private entrepreneurs without such 
status also sought to gain access to officially administered resources to improve their 
                                                 
7 In general, the first approach starts from the economic viewpoint of state vs. market and conceives 
the process of institutional transition in China as institutional replacement (state control by market 
competition). Economic growth is thus to be attributed to the successful introduction and operation of 
market mechanism. Political economy account, by contrary, emphasizes the persistent role of political 
system and actor in this transitional process that have actually incorporated market mechanism into a 
vague institutional framework between state and market (institutional reshuffling). The boundary 
between the both is not as clear-cut as the market transition account suggests. This viewpoint is also 
shared by the third approach, social network account, which proposes a more differentiated analytical 
perspective stressing regional varieties in China. The radius of influence of political actors differs so 
greatly from each other that a careful examination of regional characteristics in the economic activities 
is in order. 
8 This thesis should not overemphasize the power of local governments in Chinese political structures. 
Central government and administration remain authoritative with respect to important decisions. 
Analyses of political process and logic have dealt with the declining but still influential role of central 
government. For example see: Goldman and MacFarquhar (1999); Lieberthal (1995); Lieberthal and 
Lampton (1992); Shambaugh (2000); Shirk (1993). 
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business relationship (Liu 1992; Young 1995; Wank 1995, 1999; Zhang 2000). All these 
suggest that the bipolar idea of the market transition account has to be revised on the 
ground of regional institutional variations. The state and market co-evolve in this 
process embedded in the ongoing transition of institutional frameworks from state 
socialism to a hybrid form with complex reconfigurations (Duckett 2001a; Whiting 
2001; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou et al. 1997; Zhou 2000).  
In a similar vein, scholars emphasize the crucial role of local governments in 
local business relationship. For example, J. Oi (1992, 1995, 1998, 1999a) and A. Walder 
(1995b, 1998) propose the concept of local state corporatism to describe the ambiguous 
relationship between local governments and TVEs. In their views, cadres often 
directly managed a set of the most important enterprises in the regions which 
operate like local industrial corporations. The fiscal reforms of the central 
government had further led local officials to pursue regional and personal profits by 
managing TVEs. In other words, the entrepreneurial role of local officials provided 
the condition in favor of the robust economic growth in China. 
While Oi and Walder remind us of the political effects on economic 
performance, other scholars point out that their account may have left out other 
relevant factors which can better grasp the regional variety. The social network account 
points to the significance of socio-cultural forces which coordinate market and other 
social mechanisms. According to this account, the economic reform launched by the 
central government provided an opportunity to transform rural economy, but its 
development form depended largely on local networks and institutions that directed 
economic activities. The concept of local market socialism by N. Lin (1995) guides 
researchers to take heed of the institutional embeddedness of the economic reforms 
in local network. Empirical research on the TVEs in Southern China echoes this 
perspective and examines how various forms of property rights have been adopted 
by local clans and entrepreneurs to comply with the regulations of the central 
government (Chen 1999a, 2001). Furthermore, the findings about the clientelist 
network situated in local political and economic nexus help to illuminate the elusive 
yet decisive ties between local bureaucrats and businessmen that framed economic 
activities (Wank 1995, 1999; Yep 2000). Aside from regional variety, the emphasis of 
Oi and Walder on the role of local governments has also neglected the participation 
of rural villagers and workers (Pei 1998). In other words, scholars point out that the 
examination of institutional rearrangement and recombination in China has to take 
into account varieties of regional institutions and local social networks which 
influence the scope and extent of reform outcomes. 
In short, the above-mentioned analyses regarding origins of economic growth in 
China have witnessed the viability of the socialist institutional arrangements in the 
course of economic and social reforms. A crucial point is the complex interaction 
between old (socialist) and new (capitalist) institutions that has blurred the 
boundaries between the both. Various theoretical accounts lay emphasis on diverse 
aspects that have played a vital role in the transformation process. Scholars of 
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various accounts also remind us of the importance to keep alert to the gray zones 
located between diverse institutional arrangements. This transition has also 
enormous influence on the interrelation of state and society. 
 
2.1.3 Changing Relationship between State and Society 
The economic and social reforms have led scholars to question whether the notion of 
“strong state/weak society” still applies to current situations in China (cf. 
Rosenbaum 1992; Lieberthal 1995; Baum and Shevchenko 1999; Shambaugh 2000). 
The reason lies in the fact that, even when the reforms did not challenge the 
dominant rule of the Communist party, they have inevitably caused a rearrangement 
of the relationship between state and society in favor of the latter (Stark and Nee 
1989: 23). The research has offered different accounts for the phenomenon of the 
state’s declining power. 
Market transition account: According to this view, the transition from a planning 
to a market economy means the weakening potential of influence by the state 
bureaucrats regarding resource distribution. Instead, the market takes the lead and 
promotes more social mobility and social change (Nee 1989, 1991, 1996). Optimists 
view this change as a crucial reason for a further rise of civil society that would 
ultimately transform China into a democratic country. Marketization and 
privatization would eventually pave the way towards modernization (White 1993; 
White et al. 1996). They hold the rise of new entrepreneurship and well-being middle 
class as the herald for further pluralization and democratization. The social changes 
in the process of economic reforms have sown seeds for the emergence of a civil 
society. 
Political economy account: This theoretical stream posits a more skeptical attitude 
towards the dualistic interpretation of the market transition account. China’s 
departure from a central planning to a market economy has indeed set in motion the 
unintended consequence of eroding communist rule in economic and social spheres. 
But what lies in the core of the political economy account is its emphasis on the 
enduring influence of state bureaucrats even in the course of economic and social 
reforms. Its main thesis is that what prevails in the reform-era China is less the 
demise of the communist state than the reconfiguration of the relationship between 
state and society (Walder 1995c; Baum and Shevchenko 1999; Heberer and 
Taubmann 1998; Selden 1998; Qiu 1999). Corporatism is a central concept to describe 
the mutual adaptation and formation between state control and new social forces 
unleashed by the reforms. This concept acknowledges the diversification of socio-
economic changes, on the one hand, while paying attention to the persisting 
influence of the communist party-state, on the other hand. For example, Oi (1989) 
portrays the clientelist relationship between local cadres and peasants arising from 
the decentralization of political and fiscal power after the reforms. Shue (1988, 1994) 
argues further that the social organization set down by Mao has cellularized the 
society into numerous isolated and autarkic cells (e.g. urban work units and rural 
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collectivization). This institutional arrangement has given rise to “patron-client 
factionalism” that enables local cadres to resist the command of the central 
government in the name of local interests. Such mutual dependency is reinforced by 
the economic reforms even though new business entrepreneurs and middle class 
bourgeois have emerged. Local governments’ involvement in the economic activity 
takes shape through cadres’ indirect influence on entrepreneurs by means of their 
status and privilege to benefit those docile and cooperative businessmen, a 
phenomenon which David Wank (1995, 1999) calls “symbiotic clientelism”. 
In a similar manner, social network account adopts an economic sociological view 
and pays attention to the interwoven relationship between local cadres and 
traditional clans, which have greatly undermined the capacity of the central 
government. Empirical research reveals that in many regions of China, local elites 
play both the role of officials and owners of local enterprises, leading to various 
outcomes regarding economic development and local politics (Lin 1995; Lin and 
Chen 1999; Chen 1999a). Diverse social networks in various regions make the fact 
clear that the control ability of central party-state is limited and subject to the 
contexts of local politics. Observation of state capacity and social force should hence 
take local varieties into account. 
Despite the different perspectives offered by various approaches on the state-
society relationship, a consensus seems to be emerging well beyond a simplified 
dualistic interpretation of social changes in China. Transition to market is not a 
complete replacement of old institutions by new ones, but rather a reconfiguration of 
various institutional orders that leads to the “interpenetration” of different societal 
sectors (Baum and Shevchenko 1999; also Solinger 1993; Stark 1996; Selden 1998). 
Economic reforms have undoubtedly brought about a set of institutional changes, 
leaving more room for the emergence of a “civil society”, yet viewing these as 
evidences for the demise of the communist state order would misjudge current 
situations in China and overlook potential inner tensions in Chinese society 
(Goldman and MacFarquhar 1999; Nathan et al. 1999; Perry and Selden 2000). What 
China is currently experiencing is the interaction between the institutional legacies of 
the communist party-state and the rising institutional elements introduced by the 
economic reforms. The reconfiguration of competing institutional orders has set in 
motion numerous unintended consequences for Chinese society. 
 
2.1.4 Social Consequences of the Economic Reforms 
The Chinese society has by far experienced relatively smooth structural 
transformation. However, new forms of social exclusion and insecurity have 
emerged as economic, political and social spheres are undergoing a large-scale and 
in-depth restructuring process. The change of institutional mechanisms has led to 
renewed distribution of resources, which has profoundly influenced life chances of 
many people. While many have benefited from new economic opportunities and 
better incomes, a considerable part of the population is still excluded from all these 
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opportunity structures and face growing insecurity in their lives. This background 
raises concerns about the situation of social security and safety net in China and 
poses challenges to the state’s governance.  
The whole situation provides an ideal opportunity for social policy researchers 
to ponder on the relationship between social changes and social policy, as well as 
their impact on individual life chances. With regard to the rapid changes Chinese 
society has been undergoing, a number of scholarly works generally focuses on the 
analysis of social problems and their implications for the further development of 
social welfare. Social problems are seen as rooted in the context of the wide-ranging 
reforms, which have led to a rearrangement of social institutions and social welfare 
provision. Researchers interested in this question generally pay special attention to 
the impact of the dualistic development among urban and rural areas. 
Reform of state-owned enterprises and social problems: The first theme 
concerns social problems arising from the declining function of the socialist 
institutions in urban areas, and its impact on the vulnerable social groups. Among 
them the change of employment patterns is particularly crucial. Rationalization of 
the state-owned enterprises has led to growing unemployment and social insecurity 
(Hebel and Schucher 1999; Opper 1999; World Bank 1996; You 1998; Zhou et al. 1997). 
The plight of lay-offs in urban area becomes one of the central topics in scholarly 
works, as these unemployed workers constitute the main group of new urban 
poverty (Chan 1998; Hussain 2002; Leung and Wong 1999; Smyth 1998, 1999; 
Solinger 2002; Whyte 1999). While the waning function of danwei has led to rising 
unemployment, it also raises concern about the sustainability of the waning 
occupational welfare system (Chan and Chow 1992; Duckett 1997; Krieg and 
Schädler 1995; Lee 2000; Leung and Nann 1995; Lu 1996; Wong 1998; Wong and 
Macpherson 1995). Scholars also point to the unequal treatment of work units based 
on the age hierarchy in the process of welfare retrenchment. Older cohorts have 
benefited a lot from the occupational welfare system, whereas younger cohorts who 
enter work units later are those most susceptible to the cutback in welfare provision. 
This cohort inequality has also contributed to the segmentation of employment 
among different cohorts (Davis 1988; Davis-Friedmann 1991; Zhou et al. 1997; Zhou 
and Moen 2001). 
Reform of rural economy: The waning function of collective agriculture has 
equally triggered changes in the employment patterns of rural area. Scholars point 
out that, while labor forces has shifted from farming to industry and services, a large 
number of peasants have migrated, temporarily or permanently, to cities or better-off 
villages. Poor situations of migrants in these places also stand in the focus of research 
(CASS 2001a; Heberer and Taubmann 1998; Hussain 1999; Krieg and Schädler 1995; 
Knight and Song 1999; Solinger 1999; Wu 2000). This means that the rural areas, 
despite the rising average income in the process of economic growth, is 
institutionally less well prepared for the challenges of all these changes than the 
urban ones. On the one hand, the family is undergoing structural changes which 
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have eroded its role as a traditional welfare provider (Chang 1993a, 1993b; Chen 
1996; Krieg and Schädler 1995; Wong 1998). On the other hand, modest collective 
provision of social security is too weak to provide sufficient support for rural 
residents (Leisering and Gong 2002; West 1997; West and Wong 1995). Workers in 
urban areas are still better protected by their work units or private firms, despite 
their growing dissatisfaction with the retrenchment of occupational welfare 
packages. In contrast, what plagues rural regions in China is the institutional 
underdevelopment caused by the demise of collective communes, and no alternative 
collective provision of social security is in sight (Selden 1993, 1998, 1999). All these 
issues call for more active state engagement in social security provision. A necessary 
task is to extend the existing residual social safety net to more rural population.  
Uneven developments: In this context, a question that social researchers 
encounter is the impact of economic and social reforms on income distribution. In 
order to promote economic prosperity, the central idea of equality in socialism has 
now given way to market efficiency. Applying the data of official statistics and Gini-
coefficient, scholars have found mounting evidences indicating degrees of income 
inequality that rank among the highest ever encountered in any country (e.g. CASS 
2001b; Chen 1999b; Gustafsson and Zhong 2000; Khan and Riskin 2001; Li 2001; Lin 
and Li 1995; McKinley and Brenner 1999; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999; Riskin et al. 2001; 
Schüller 1996; World Bank 1997a). The “urban bias” and regional imbalance have led 
to growing disparities between urban and rural areas as well as coastal and inland 
regions. Based on the Western experience, many scholars advocate for more state 
involvement in the welfare arrangements for the rural residents. It is in this context 
that many studies of Chinese social welfare have mushroomed since the end of the 
1980s, a period in which social problems associated with economic reforms began 
emerging. 
Pressure of globalization: A common view is that the above three core 
problems will be further aggravated by China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2002, which means China’s pace of economic reforms will be 
accelerating, leaving much less room for gradual structural adaptation. Since joining 
the WTO is a recent phenomenon, academic works are beginning to assess its impact, 
mostly in economic sphere (Drysdale and Song 2000; Schüller 1999; Voegeli 2002). 
While economic liberalization is seen as a great opportunity to lift China’s economic 
growth, its negative impact on ill-managed SOE and bank system in the near future 
is expected. The ambivalence of China’s development in the trend of globalization 
lies in the fact that China’s prosperity depends on integration with world economy 
while this complicates further the whole situation for all societal sectors (Holbig 2002; 
Zhai and Wang 2002). The major impact on urban sector is the institutional transition 
of the SOEs, which is bound to accelerate with respect to rising competition from 
foreign business groups, further exacerbating the serious problem of unemployment 
of urban residents. The economic pillar of the rural sector, agricultural income, is 
sure to worsen since cheap and competitive agricultural commodities will erode the 
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revenue of local agriculture. In sum, the biggest challenge of joining the WTO and 
further integration into international economy for China will be how to spur further 
strong economic growth without additionally deteriorating current problems of 
unequal development. 
 
2.2 Current Research on Chinese Social Policy 
The growing academic interest in Chinese social policy goes hand in hand with the 
structural transformation of the Chinese society since the transition from planning to 
market economy. As the social transformation stretches to all parts of society, the 
challenges to the existing social security systems becomes evident. Questions such as 
how they change and towards what direction they are developing have thus 
attracted much attention from the scholars. The following sections sketch the overall 
tendency in scholarly research on Chinese social policy, and deal with the viewpoints 
of the analyses of old-age security. 
 
2.2.1 Research on Chinese Social Policy 
Similar to the research of social policy of the Third World, the study of the Chinese 
case is only at its beginning and lacks well-developed knowledge about the origin 
and development of Chinese social policy. In the 1980s, only the four tiger countries 
in East Asia have awoke scholarly interest in their rapid development (e.g. Berger 
and Hsiao 1988; Chow 1986; Midgley 1985; Zöllner 1983). In contrast, social policy in 
China received scant notice because it was long conceived as a socialist case different 
from the Western welfare state. Even studies of social policy in developing countries 
seldom took China into consideration despite the peculiarity that China established a 
formal social security system for urban residents at a fairly early stage. Before the 
1980s, few scholars took a look at the social security systems of the closed and 
mysterious country with notorious reputation of totalitarian rule and human right 
violation. Single works appeared sporadically but made no claims to perform a 
systematic analysis of the whole welfare systems (e.g. Davis-Friedmann 1978; 
Kallgren 1969; Roberts 1979; Sidel 1972; Wilenski 1977).  
As the Chinese society experienced changes after the economic reforms at the 
end of 1970s, welfare reforms began to take shape in the 1980s. Since then, China’s 
experience has attracted growing scholarly interest in this research agenda. Among 
them, the most representative work is that of John Dixon (1981), who made an 
ambitious attempt to depict the establishment and development of Chinese socialist 
welfare systems from 1949 to 1979. His work became the first document of social 
welfare development in China before the economic and social reforms. Later A. 
Walder’s work (1986) analyzed the function of Chinese work units as agencies of 
production, administration and welfare provision, pointing to the institutional core 
and organizational operation of the Chinese urban welfare system. Similar efforts 
were also made by researchers like Hussain (1989) and Saith (1987), who noticed the 
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problems of social security in the countryside. Davis (1988, 1989) indicated the 
problem of welfare reforms in urban area which had led to more inequality. 
Monographs concentrating on issues of social welfare in China also appeared (Chow 
1988; Wong and MacQuarries 1986). 
The last decade saw a boom in research on Chinese social policy. In addition to 
delineating the trend of welfare development, analysts have begun in recent years to 
explore in depth the connection of social policy with the general social background in 
the context of modernization. A general view is that changes of social structure have 
created problems that need to be solved by welfare reforms. Much like the argument 
of the functionalist account in the study of Western welfare states, some scholars 
view the building of new institutions or reforms of old ones as political responses to 
problems associated with industrialization and the economic reforms. This line of 
argument often suggests that, in the long run, the process of modernization will 
eventually pave the road to the establishment of welfare state institutions in China 
similar to the Western forerunners (Leisering and Gong 2002; Guan 1994; Krieg and 
Schädler 1995; Schädler 2001). A similar but less explicit viewpoint is expressed by 
other scholars who generally sketch the developmental trends of Chinese society and 
social policy in order to provide some practical suggestions (e.g. Aspalter 2001; Croll 
1999; Duckett 1997; Hu 1997; Jing 2001; Liu 1996; Schädler 2001; Tang 1999; Wang 
1999). The literature in this direction provides a good overview of current problems 
of and political responses to Chinese social policy, yet it lacks explanations from any 
elaborated theoretical perspectives.9 Therefore, despite their rich information, these 
works provide few insights and theoretical reflections on Chinese social policy as a 
whole. 
Another body of literature (mostly by Hong Kong scholars) pays more attention 
to the current development of Chinese social policy in the transition from socialist to 
pluralist welfare production. While the state sheds the burden of welfare provision and 
transfers it to other societal sectors such as market and family, apprehensive signs 
are emerging in this process as the egalitarian distribution stressed by the socialist 
regime is giving way to other mechanisms that have led to more inequality. The 
welfare pluralism and its significance for the development of social policy is thus the 
central theme (Chow 1995; Cook 2000; Lee 2000; Leung 1994; Leung and Nann 1995; 
Wong 1995, 1998; Wong and Flynn 2001). Although they are in favor of the idea of 
welfare pluralism, these scholars are generally worried about the declining role of 
the state in the institutional arrangements of collective welfare and the possible 
outcomes of social inequality. 
A third group of scholarly literature points to the stratification effects of Chinese 
welfare systems and their policy implications. Since the establishment of the 
                                                 
9 Social policy studies with strong policy suggestions are most outspoken in those by indigenous 
Chinese scholars. Their works are primarily oriented on practical application. Even comparative 
studies manifest strong interest in drawing lessons from abroad. Cf. for example: Fan and Wang 
(1998); Hu (1998); Tang (2001); Yang (2001); Zhang (2000). 
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communist regime, the individual’s entitlements to public welfare provision have 
always been coupled with his/her social and political status. Despite current 
endeavors of the state to include more population into public social security systems, 
the entitlements to welfare benefits remain differentiated depending on artificial 
categories of the systems. The divide of social security systems between urban and 
rural areas is itself a clear proof of the institutionalized unequal rights. It is no 
exaggeration that part of social inequality in China is the direct consequence of the 
stratified social security entitlements (Bo 1999; Cook 2000; Gu 2001; Knight and Song 
1999; Selden 1993, 1999; Selden and You 1997; You 1995). 
The unequal treatment of citizens in Chinese welfare system motivates 
researchers to explore its cultural root. Many stress the reliance of the residual 
Chinese welfare on family and community care (Chan and Chow 1992; Chang 1993a; 
Wong 1998). As the family plays a significant role in Chinese tradition in support of 
the individuals, there is little need to establish a collective welfare system. The 
cultural account explains this situation with reference to the East Asian countries and 
calls them “Confucian welfare states” (Jones 1990, 1993; also Rieger and Leibfried 
1999). In this view, because the concept of welfare as an individual eligibility is 
absent in traditional Chinese culture, public welfare provision plays a minimal role 
in order to give more room for community assistance and family support (Chan and 
Tsui 1997; Chow 1987).  
The reliance on community and family as two main bearers of welfare 
responsibility is also emphasized by the economic state account (Chen 1996, 2002). 
Claiming that the foremost interest of the Chinese state after 1949 was to promote 
economic prosperity, social welfare systems were thus deliberately assigned a 
residual function so that the state could transfer more rural resources to urban sector 
for economic growth.10 To achieve this end, the state established a generous urban 
social security system which provided statutory and occupation-based income 
support to urban workers. However, even in urban sector, community care remained 
an important tier of welfare provision. The “Chinese characteristics” lies in the fact 
that “the emphasis of Chinese community care is always on care by the community, 
particularly on care by the family based on the tradition of Chinese familism” (Chen 
1996: 7, italics in original). Social welfare is merely seen as an impediment to 
economic growth. 
Overall, in order to understand the form and function of social policy in China, 
one needs to pay attention to the social structure that underpins the social security 
system,11 as well as to the impact of the latter on the former.12 The challenges current 
                                                 
10 Though in different contexts, this line of argument is actually similar to the claim that East Asian 
newly industrialized countries are “productivist welfare capitalism”, i.e. the reluctant effort of the 
state to promote social welfare given the priority of economic development (Holliday 2000, 2005). 
11 The term “social welfare system” is used here in a loose sense in so far as structural differentiation 
of formal and informal social welfare institutions in China has not yet fully unfolded as Western 
countries have. 
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Chinese welfare institutions encounter are directly related to the problems resulting 
from the institutional and structural transformations. Except a few works, there 
seems to be little interest in exploring the interaction between these two dimensions 
(cf. Cook 2000; Herrmann-Pillath 1990; Hussain 1999; Wong 1998). As the literature 
review of the next section will demonstrate, this appraisal applies to research on 
social policy in general and old-age security in particular.  
 
2.2.2 Research on the East Asian Welfare Regime 
Concurrent with the growing number of studies on Chinese social policy, the theme 
about the place of Chinese social policy in the discussion about the East Asian 
welfare states has also drawn increasing attention. Inspired by the concept of 
“welfare regime” by G. Esping-Andersen (1990), whose typology of European 
welfare states has dominated recent discussion in relevant fields, scholars also begin 
their attempts to verify the thesis if there is a unique type of East Asian welfare 
regime. These discussions start with the dissatisfaction with Esping-Andersen’s 
negligence of other possible regime types, including the East Asian one. For example, 
Walker and Wong (1996) criticize the common association of “welfare state” with the 
capitalist-democratic projects prevalent in Western world, which has automatically 
put other countries out of the picture. If the observers merely concentrate on the 
state’s welfare provision, they will surely omit the peculiarities of East Asian states as 
regulators. Similar viewpoints point to the central characteristic of East Asian welfare 
regime in its emphasis on family welfare, status-segregated and residual social 
insurance systems as well as corporate occupational plans for core workers 
(Goodman and Peng 1996; Goodman et al. 1998; Gough 2000; Holliday 2000; Hort 
and Kuhnle 2000; Jacobs 1998; Kwon 1997; Tang 2000). Contributions in this area 
converge in respect to the historical development and institutional arrangements of 
East Asian welfare states, which significantly differ from that of their Western 
counterparts. 
One interesting question in this vein arises: does China belong to such an “East 
Asian welfare regime”? In contrast to the numerous attempts to identify Japan and 
other four tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea) as similar 
variants in this category, there has been thus far little research dealing with the 
question if the label “East Asian welfare regime” applies to China as well. Philion 
(1998) leans on Esping-Andersen and applies the term “Chinese welfare state 
regimes” to describe the relationship between social policy and class alliance in 
China. But this interpretation has actually narrowed Esping-Andersen’s regime 
concept to class mobilization without paying much attention to the historical and 
institutional frameworks of Chinese welfare mix. As a result, Philion’s usage of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 In this respect, Linda Wong (1998: 208-9) is right to point out that “… The creation of socialist 
economic relations has significantly influenced the contours of its benefit structure. By adjusting its 
functions and processes, the welfare system reacts to the environment and also exerts its impact. In 
this sense, the welfare system is both a dependent and independent variable in social change.”  
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regime concept becomes less appealing in terms of welfare state classification. G. 
White (1998) offers a more elaborated consideration of the Chinese experience in 
social policy development. His familiarity with the Chinese reform pathway leads 
him to take a cautious stance towards the attempt to label China as a member of East 
Asian welfare regime. While recognizing several similarities between China and her 
East Asian neighbors, White does not hesitate to point out the uniqueness of China’s 
welfare development that distinguishes it from other East Asian countries, nor does 
he agree with Jone’s (1990, 1993) culturalist account which roughly puts countries 
with similar cultural heritages in the same basket without a heedful consideration of 
their political and institutional differences. 
White’s argument points to a distinctive characteristic of the Chinese welfare 
system. In contrast to her East Asian neighbor countries, China set up at an early 
stage a comprehensive social security system offering generous welfare benefits only 
to a small portion of the population. The majority of the population was 
institutionally excluded from the formal social security system. This partly socialist, 
partly residualist welfare arrangement has not only influenced directly life chances of 
the people concerned but also their perception of social order.13 As the former review 
of current sociological studies on social change suggests, even though the strict 
segregation between city and countryside has been abolished, the developmental 
pathway of Chinese welfare is still under the influence of previous institutional 
frameworks. In other words, the similarities between China and her neighbors as 
regards welfare institutions certainly hold, for example the stress on family and 
community support, Confucian values or the split between social insurance and 
social assistance. Yet maintaining that these common elements suffice to take 
countries in East Asian region into one conceptual category is clearly another matter. 
The contribution of comparative perspective of social welfare, as the discussion on 
the East Asian welfare regime shows, lies in the insight into the institutional 
similarities as well as differences. The case of China manifests more institutional and 
ideological differences than similarities in comparison with other East Asian newly 
industrialized countries. 
This observation gives rise to an intriguing question: Is China a distinctive 
welfare regime? Part of the answer lies in the studies of Western welfare states as 
there is until now no consensus even in the discussion on Western welfare regimes. 
Scholars posit different opinions with regard to how many welfare regimes exist 
among advanced welfare states (overview: Arts and Gelissen 2002). While Esping-
Andersen (1999: 92) is reluctant to add more regimes in his typology and insists on 
methodological parsimony, many other scholars attempt to justify their claims of 
additional regime types, including those studying East Asian welfare states. By the 
same token, the dispute about whether there is a Chinese welfare regime at all 
                                                 
13 Jieh-Min Wu (2000) reports in his experience of field works the superiority mentality of urban 
residents towards their rural fellowmen.  
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manifests that it is more important to explore at first the distinctive features of the 
Chinese arrangements of social welfare before reaching the stage of typological 
comparison between China and other East Asian countries.  
 
2.2.3 Research on Old Age and Old-Age Security in China 
Research on Old Age: Research interest on old age in China is concerned with the 
phenomenon of demographic aging. Drastic change of age structure is the result of 
the one-child policy and prolonged life expectancy thanks to the relatively effective 
health care in the pre-reform era. The unprecedented speed of population aging is 
comparable with the industrialized countries. This problem has attracted numerous 
researchers to measure the scale and extent of its impact (Chow 1999; Cook 2000; Fan 
1999; Hu 1997; Hussain 1999; UNDP 1999; Wang 1999; West 1999; World Bank 
1997b). Their studies unanimously portray a gloomy future of aging development the 
Chinese are going to encounter. For example, World Bank (1997b: 14) estimates that 
the elderly (aged 60 and elder) will compose some 16% of the Chinese population by 
2020, approaching the 18.6% share in OECD countries in 1990. While most OECD 
countries spent 80 to 100 years to double the proportion of their old people to 18%, 
China will achieve this goal in only 34 years. 
The second direction in this field focuses on the impact of demographic aging 
on old-age security. Relevant studies use official statistics or interview results to 
explore how old age is perceived and secured (Adamchak 2001; Li 1998; Lin 1995; Pei 
and Pillai 1999; Yan 1997). Their conclusions point out that, although family remains 
the main bearer in old age, the unequal development of old-age security in urban 
and rural areas has a significant impact on how residents in both regions arrange 
their own old age. Whereas urban pensioners are able to retire earlier and participate 
in other part-time employment or leisure activities, villagers in rural areas have to 
work longer for their livelihood in old age. Yet the foreseeable population aging and 
family decline are for these researchers a strong rationale for more state involvement. 
Scholars are, however, divided on the extent of state welfare for the elderly. 
In this connection scholars also explore old age from any cultural perspectives 
to emphasize the traditional value of old age. It is located in the context of familial 
integrity and generational reciprocity. Family and kinship networks are thus the 
central providers of support for the elderly. Studies find that most Chinese still 
prefer to ask help from their relatives despite the existing support of the state. Both 
children and parents in Chinese families have generally an inclination to associate 
family with old-age support (Fuligni and Zhang 2004; Li et al. 2004; Zimmer and 
Kwong 2003). Even under the rule of Chinese Communist Party, this basic principle 
has not fundamentally changed, which persisted particularly in rural regions (Chan 
and Tsui 1997; Chow 1987; Davis-Friedmann 1991; Fei 1985; Wong 1998; Yuen-Tsang 
1997). One of the reasons for the urban-rural-divide in Chinese social policy lies in 
this underlying cultural value. In fact, the waning of the community care after the 
economic reform means that rural welfare responsibilities have shifted from the 
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communes to family and individual, and that the latter are expected to play a greater 
role in the near future. It is thus little surprise that in most cases, the rural elderly 
work ceaselessly even in their advanced age in order to secure their own economic 
situation and relieve their children’s responsibility for old-age care (Pang et al. 2004; 
Xu 2001; Yan 2003). This bolds ill for the rural family because the burden of old-age 
support will get heavier in view of the demographic aging, rural labor migration as 
well as declining incomes in agricultural economy. 
These scholarly works have rendered a strong rationale for more active state 
engagement. Old-age security in the whole welfare system is as significant in China 
as in other Western countries. But while the latter can better cope with the problem 
of population aging in their existing institutional frameworks of old-age security, the 
former is already confronted with the same problem well before a fully-fledged 
system of old-age security has been established. In addition, scholars point to the 
declining function of the collective agriculture as a minimal safety net, and the 
changing nature of family as a main bolster of old-age security (Croll 1987; Hussain 
1999; Lin 1995; Selden 1999; Yan 1997). These changes indicate the growing 
importance of state provision for the elderly. Findings of a research project 
conducted by the China Research Center on Aging (1994), which investigates the 
support systems for the elderly, also show signs of the increasingly important role of 
the state’s support in the perceptions of urban elderly towards their well-being (also 
Pei and Pillai 1999; Yan 1997). Acute aging problems and relevant political responses 
become the foci of recent studies of old-age security in China. 
Research on Old-Age Security: Similar to the research on general social policy, 
the field of old-age security was not noticed until the beginning of the 1990s. Many 
available studies on the formal system of old-age security in China demonstrate a 
strong descriptive character. The authors tend to describe imminent problems China 
encounters and they ultimately rush to make policy proposals (Chen et al. 2000; 
Darimont 2000; Fan 1999; Krieg and Schädler 2000; Smyth 2000; West 1999; Zhang et 
al. 2000). For example, they view aging as a central problem for which China is not 
well prepared. This ongoing demographic trend has generated an urgent need for 
the establishment of a full-fledged old-age security system. But the whole situation is 
exacerbated by the ill-functioning old-age security systems of the SOEs despite their 
recent reforms. Following the descriptions, these authors propose practical policies 
regarding financial sustainability of old-age security systems. Yet, even though these 
studies offer valuable information about current development of Chinese old-age 
security, few conclusions can be drawn to contribute to theoretical explanations of 
old-age pension policy. 
Studies of policy-oriented international organizations adopt a similar strategy. 
World Bank, United Nations and International Labor Organization (ILO) are the 
most prominent organizational actors in this area who have actively participated in 
global debate about pension reforms, and delivered numerous analyses of relevant 
problems and practical policy recommendations (e.g. Ghai 2000; Gruat and 
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Thompson 1997; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999; Rohregger 2001; UN 1997; World Bank 
1997a, 1997b). Since these works are mainly interested in active participation in 
policy-making, their conclusions are more practice-oriented and inclined to certain 
ideological standpoints of the respective organizations. As a result, these studies 
offer excellent analyses of relevant problems in old-age security in China, but little 
theoretical reflections with reference to the interaction between social policy and 
social change. 
Another body of scholars proposes a cultural account to interpret why state-
organized old-age security has not prospered despite the increasing need of the 
people. They argue that, in the traditional culture, caring for the frail elderly is the 
main responsibility of the children in household (Chen 1996, 2002; Darimont 2000; 
Fan 1999; Feldstein 1999; Guo 1994; Krieg and Schädler 1995; Lin 1990; Wong 1998; 
Yuan et al. 1992). This idea still dominates current discourses on Chinese social policy 
and old-age security. For example, Chan and Tsui (1997) incorporate various cultural 
origins of Chinese welfare thought (Confucianism, Taoism, etc.) into their article and 
advocate a welfare framework with “Chinese characteristics”, i.e. the combination of 
old welfare ideas with new communist ideologies. Especially in the domain of old-
age security, scholars of this account have a strong inclination to emphasize the role 
of traditional care providers such as community and family. 
In a similar manner, some researchers apply the idea of welfare pluralism, which 
denotes the synergic welfare production of various societal sectors, to describe 
current situation of Chinese old-age security (Chen 1996, 2002). This line of argument 
advocates the intensification of traditional arrangements that lay emphasis on 
community and family. Yet another line of scholars expresses their skepticism about 
the current strategy of the state to shift the burden merely on societal sectors in 
general and on family in particular. What they have in mind is rather a stronger state 
responsibility for the arrangements of collective welfare in view of the drastic social 
transformation in China (Chan and Chow 1992; Chang 1993a, 1993b; Tao and Drover 
1996; Wong 1995, 1998). Welfare pluralism denotes, in this sense, more state 
regulation in support of an optimal welfare mix than a laissez-faire social order that 
would only aggravate the burden of other societal sectors. Welfare pluralism does 
not necessarily mean the state’s retreat but rather its changing role from a welfare 
provider to a welfare regulator.14 
With regard to the measurement of old-age security, scholars adopt both the 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. While the former is greatly dependent 
on regularly published official statistics as a basis for further statistical inquiries, the 
later generally adopts case studies in which document collection and interviews are 
                                                 
14 Similar arguments have been well articulated in the discussions of Western welfare states. The idea 
of welfare pluralism is sometimes used in the sense of a state-free welfare production by other societal 
sectors (market, intermediary sector and informal sector), while overlooking the fact that the state still 
plays a crucial role in regulating pluralized welfare production. See the discussion of Leisering and 
Gong (2002); Shi (2000). 
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conducted together to obtain meaningful information. A general drawback in most of 
the above-mentioned literature is its “urban bias”, i.e. these authors tend to address 
in their works merely urban areas in China, leaving the rural regions totally 
unheeded even though these have undergone similarly drastic changes. Genuine 
sociological works aiming to analyze the problem of old-age security in rural area as 
a main subject are rare (except Krieg and Schädler 2000; Leisering and Gong 2002; 
Wong 1998). This is partly because many rural areas have no institutionalized old-
age pension systems at all. Yet even though pilot schemes of old-age security have 
been launched in several rich rural areas, their progress has not drawn as much 
scholarly attention as urban sectors, where statutory pension schemes have been 
developed for a long time. 
Overall, research in this area is highly insufficient in terms of its exploration of 
the complex relationship between aging and institutional organization of old-age 
security systems. So far, scholars are either interested in interpreting the structural 
need to establish better old-age security systems as a result of social changes, or seek 
to offer policy suggestions and blueprints. Old age and old-age security are taken for 
granted in many descriptive and analytical works. The social and biographical 
significance of old age and old-age security is, in contrast, totally set aside without 
any exploration (except Hebel 1997). Subjective interpretations and action 
orientations in respect to the institutional regulation of old-age security have thus far 
received little attention from experts in this area. This deficit has led to a narrow 
understanding of current old age and its security systems. This unsatisfactory state of 
research has much to do with the embryonic stage of research on old-age security in 
developing countries such as China. Yet, against this background, a preliminary 
exploration of this area appears particularly appealing and meaningful. Exploring 
social change and social policy with reference to the addressee of social policy, 
therefore, should promise new insights into the relationship between social policy 
and the individuals in China.  
 
2.3 Research on the Life-Course in Chinese Society and Social Policy 
Sociological life-course approach in Chinese context is still a field seldom noticed by 
scholars. Powerful as it is in explaining the dynamic connection between social 
changes and individual life chances, this approach has thus far only been applied to 
Western societies. The idea that social transformation and institutional changes shape 
individual life courses has received still little attention in Chinese study. Numerous 
social studies on China have concentrated on structural transformation in political, 
economic and social spheres. Using historical comparative perspectives with 
available official and survey data, they have highlighted the significance of 
institutional change for China’s economic growth, relationship between state and 
society as well as social stratification (e.g. Bian and Logan 1996; Nee 1989, 1991, 1996; 
Walder 1995b, 2002; Xie and Hannum 1996). However, these studies seldom focus on 
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individual life courses to examine how these have been influenced by changes of 
social structure. 
Only a small portion of researchers have begun explore this dimension from 
life-course perspectives. Among them, the Chinese scholar, Zhou Xueguang, has 
performed a lot of research in collaboration with his American colleagues. Using life 
histories of a sample of 5000 residents and their spouses in 20 cities collected in 1993 
and 1994, for example, Zhou and his research team have identified significant 
connections between job-career pathways and cohorts, illustrating how different 
cohorts in different historical and social contexts chose their jobs patterns (Zhou 
2004; Zhou et al. 1996, 1997; Zhou and Moen 2001). With the same database, Zhou 
and Hou (1999) further trace the unique experience of Chinese urban youths who 
were sent to rural areas during the Cultural Revolution (xiafang). In general, 
indigenous Chinese scholars have thus far barely noticed the application of life-
course approaches in social studies. Yet the research programs of Zhou in 
cooperation with some Chinese scholars in recent years have generated wide interest 
among them. A Chinese review article concerning the development and application 
of the American life-course approach by Li et al. (1999) reveals the first of such 
attempts in China.  
Zhou’s works are pioneering in the application of life-course perspectives in 
China research. While his approach mainly applies the quantitative methods to 
analyze changes in employment structures with special reference to cohort 
differences, aspects such as social construction of life courses and the biographical 
meaning of societal members remain unanswered questions. This negligence has 
much to do with his research questions and design, yet it indicates that there is still 
much room for using different life-course approaches in China research. The first 
attempt in this direction has been made by a German scholar Jutta Hebel (1997) who 
applies the idea of life-course institutionalization to interpret the significance of old 
age and retirement in transitional Chinese society. Leisering and Gong (2002) also 
forward similar theoretical interpretations. Yet, there are thus far only few empirical 
studies in this direction examining the applicability of these theoretical attempts with 
reference to China. For example, Hung and Chiu (2003) use life-course perspectives 
to examine the effects of the economic reforms on the cohort of the Cultural 
Revolution, indicating that this cohort has been particularly disadvantaged by the 
political turbulence during the Cultural Revolution and later by the rapid changes of 
labor market reforms. Li (2004) combines the idea of life course with the topic of 
residential mobility and investigates the case of Beijing. She finds out that there was 
a sharp increase in the residential mobility in the early reform period, which slowed 
down from the mid-1980s onwards. Overall, sporadic theoretical reflection and 
paucity of empirical studies indicate that research into the social significance of old 
age and life course remains a potential field. 
While the application of life-course approaches in China studies is still at its 
outset, there is by far no research in the field of Chinese social policy which examines 
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the relationship between social policy and individual life courses. The previous 
review of current works on Chinese social policy illustrates that most of them are 
more interested in practical policy suggestion than any theoretical reflection. The 
lopsided emphasis on policy suggestion has, however, directed scholarly attention to 
a linear thinking in terms of the problem-solution logic, thereby overlooking the 
complex relationship between social policy and its clients.  
 
2.4. Appraisal of Current Research on Chinese Society and Social Policy 
The above overview of current scholarly works on social change and social policy in 
China suggests several insufficiencies: 
1. Narrow understandings of social policy: A major finding is that the relationship 
between social change and social policy in China has not been thoroughly explored. 
Most sociological research discussed above is more interested in describing and 
explaining the transitional process from state socialism to market capitalism. Despite 
different perspectives they use to explain what mechanisms have affected social 
changes, their findings have highlighted the complex linkage of competing systemic 
logics and components that have altered the contour of current Chinese society. Yet, 
while these studies have delivered better understanding of Chinese social structures, 
the role of social policy in the reform era has received little attention. In contrary, 
almost all research on Chinese social policy refers to social changes during the reform 
era. But a general problem among them is that social transformation is often taken as 
a given condition that offers a rationale for reforming social policy, while the 
relationship between social change and social policy remains unheeded. This 
lopsided understanding has discounted the significance of social policy as an 
accessory of social change. 
2. Limited theoretical accounts: The second common insufficiency among studies 
of Chinese social policy is related to their theoretical concerns. Since these studies 
tend to interpret the rise of social policy against the background of social changes, it 
is tempting for them to offer a functionalist account which presumes the 
responsiveness of social policy to relevant social problems. This direction is not 
entirely wrong, but it has unfortunately left out other (institutional) factors that have 
equally contributed to the current development of Chinese social policy. In addition 
to such a functionalist account, there are numerous studies with practical policy 
concerns merely confined to the description of Chinese social policy with little 
interest in more elaborated theoretical reflection. Informative as they are, these works 
can help little to advance research on Chinese social policy. 
3. Absence of agency: Linear and oversimplified interpretations of social policy 
have inevitably led to a limited scope in the analysis of Chinese social policy. While 
the functionalist account attempts to link the necessity of social policy with the 
changing social situations, policy-oriented studies are merely interested in what 
institutional designs or reforms can best tackle certain social problems. As a 
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consequence, current research on Chinese social policy does not take heed of the 
influence of social policy on its clients, nor have the effects of changing social policy 
contexts on individual lives attracted much scholarly attention. Without the 
exploration of subjective perceptions and interpretations of the individuals in respect 
to the state’s welfare programs, the impact of social policy on the individuals and 
society remains an unknown area, which has greatly limited our understandings of 
the relationship between social change and social policy. 
4. Limited research methods: In general, works on Chinese social policy and old-
age security apply a few research methods to verify their theses. Due to the strict 
control of the state and insufficient statistical databank, scholars have to rely on the 
statistical information provided by the Chinese government (e.g. National Statistical 
Bureau) or think-tank research institutes (e.g. Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
CASS). For example, the Household Survey Data is collected once in a few years and 
published for research purposes. These data and others are published by the 
National Statistical Bureau, which are often the only basis of academic statistical 
analyses. As a result, most China studies also use aggregate or macro-data even 
though some of them refer to individual data (e.g. personal income, status, 
occupation etc.). In addition to official documents and indirect information (party-
controlled newspapers), expert interviews are also used to supplement the findings 
drawn from the above-mentioned methods. Social anthropologists have conducted 
ethnographic field works in their research in Chinese villages and applied numerous 
qualitative methods (e.g. Yan 1996; Gao 1999; Liu 2000). In contrast, biographical 
methods which can further our knowledge regarding forms of individual life courses 
in the context of social changes have thus far been little applied in research on 
Chinese social policy and old-age security.  
Against this backdrop, a research interested in how structural changes and 
institutional designs of old-age security influence the paths of rural peasants into 
diverse local pension schemes could yield fruitful results. The theoretical reflection 
and empirical analysis of this study follow this direction and attempt to manifest that 
life-course approaches can bring fresh insights into the research on Chinese social 
policy. As Zhou and Moen (2001: 573) indicate, social changes influence individual 
life courses through two processes: (1) change of opportunity structure and/or (2) 
change of mechanisms that affect opportunity. The impact is especially immense 
when the society is undergoing institutional transition. In this light, social policy can 
be seen as one of the mechanisms that affect individual life chances in social change. 
This perspective has rarely been noticed in China studies. Zhou and his colleagues 
have made the first successful attempt in this direction, yet many aspects in this 
respect remain unexplored. Among them, the subjective perceptions and 
interpretations of social agency towards social policy, as well as their biographical 
orientations merit specific attention. Precisely one of the central themes of this study 
deals with this biographical dimension of Chinese social policy. 
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3. The Theoretical Approach: Life Course and Social Policy 
3.1. Sociological Approaches of the Life Course 
The life course and age have become one of the central themes in modern sociology 
since the 1960s. The fact that human age is not only a biological but also a social 
phenomenon has almost become a conventional wisdom, yet viewpoints as to how 
age is socially organized vary among disciplines. Sociological scholars are generally 
keen to search for factors or mechanisms that influence the processes and 
consequences of social change. This also applies to the field of life-course approach, 
in which researchers devote themselves to exploring the relationship between social 
structures and their impact on the individual life course. Recognizing the framing 
force of social structure over individuals, students in this field share the common 
view that age and life course have become one of the structural characteristics of 
modern societies. Diversity exists only with regard to how this connection should be 
observed and measured. 
 
3.1.1. The Structural Functionalist Approach 
Structural functionalists made the earliest attempt in this direction.15 Influenced by 
the findings of anthropology, which viewed “age” as a natural substance of human 
being found in primitive societies, structural functionalists adopted concepts of their 
neighbor discipline like “age group” or “socialization” to describe the rather static 
social structure. Age groups were conceptualized as structurally organized division 
of labor in the society that organized its members with certain obligations in order to 
fulfill collective function. The transition between age groups came about through 
socialization process, in which society members learned to internalize new identities 
and with them new duties in a series of rituals. Age, then, implied life phases in 
which individuals were expected to play given role sets and carry with them due 
responsibilities and behavioral modules. In this vein, the structural functionalists 
tend to regard this structural organization of age groups as a universal principle 
among societies, a view that contrasts most to other schools of life course research. 
The most representative structural functionalist view of life course is that of 
Leonard D. Cain (1964), who also first suggested the usage of the term “life course”. 
In his eyes, age structure consists of a system of statuses that constitutes one 
important dimension of social structure.16 Society is seen as a set of age statuses each 
member is called upon to pass through by means of socialization and collective rites 
de passage. In this context, age is the structural dimension of differentiated statuses 
                                                 
15 The following articulation benefits a lot from the more detailed accounts of Elder (1991), Heinz and 
Krüger (2001); Marshall and Mueller (2001), Sackmann (1998), and Settersten (1999). 
16 Cain’s definition of the term „life course“ reveals his viewpoint: “…to refer primarily to those 
successive statuses individuals are called upon to occupy in various cultures and walks of life as a 
result of aging, and ‘age status’ refers to the system developed by a culture to give order and 
predictability to the course followed by individuals“ (Cain 1964: 278). 
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that individuals are supposed to move through. The key categories Cain proposes 
are 1) age status system; 2) socialization for passage into and out of age statuses; 3) 
formalized means to affect such changes in status, rites of passage; 4) age grading of 
people of similar ages into age statuses, and 5) establishment of interaction patterns 
among those of different age sets, or generational phenomena (Cain 1964: 287). As a 
result, the interaction of social structure and life course operates in a well-balanced 
equilibrium. Aging process begins with the entry into a system of age statuses and 
continues its path of age status changes until death.  
There are, however, two points criticized by other sociologists. The dominant 
role of the social structure in shaping individual life courses, as Cain suggests, leads 
inevitably to an “oversocialized conception of man”, which leaves the reverse effect 
of individual lives on social structure out of consideration (Wrong 1961). Seeing 
social structure merely as a set of age phases with numerous social expectations and 
norms which society members are bound to follow would fail to detect the 
contributions of those participating individuals. The static structural functionalist 
perspective is, therefore, unable to explain the dynamics of social change set in 
motion by individuals. In other words, critics maintain that the role of social actors 
and the impact of their actions on social development have not been taken into 
account.  
The other problem of the structural functionalist view concerns its thesis that 
age per se is a universal structuring principle of societies regardless of their 
distinctive developments and characteristics. According to this argument, principles 
of age structures and categories should prevail among primitive and modern 
societies, albeit distinct from one another. Other streams of the life course research 
have later challenged this view. Among them, especially the institutionalist 
perspective (e.g. Kohli 1986a, 1986b, discussed below) points to the role of social 
institutions in structuring the life course towards a standardized element of the 
modern society. A similar finding by Norbert Elias (1978) also highlights the long 
civilizing process Western societies have experienced in the course of modernization. 
Discipline of human behavior appears to be a core element of the modern society, 
which also contributes to the standardization of the life course. In this respect, age 
has become the product of modern institutionalization process that distinguishes the 
structural arrangement of modernity from pre-modern societies. 
Despite all these shortcomings, Cain and his contemporaries have undoubtedly 
directed scholarly attention to the salient role of social structure and social norms in 
the human aging process. The conceptualization of the age category as an element of 
social structure has also influenced the thinking of the subsequent life-course 
researchers. Among them the cohort concept which takes time as a factor of social 
change has gained particular prominence. With the cohort concept, life-course 
research has entered a new horizon. 
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3.1.2. The Cohort Approach 
The static view of structural functionalism on age as a point in the individual life 
cycle was soon questioned by the cohort perspective of Norman B. Ryder. In his 
famous article, Ryder (1965: 847) refers to the dimension of age as “a temporal 
location” and indicates its implication for the study of social change. By defining 
cohort as “the aggregate of individuals (within some population definition) who 
experienced the same event within the same time interval” (ibid: 845), Ryder 
connects the life course with the historical and social contexts in which individuals 
are located, thus making cohort an operational concept dependent on the temporal 
reference of the researcher.17 In this vein, social change can be more properly grasped 
by means of cohort identification and measurement. Since each cohort is viewed as a 
unique existence in the time horizon and social dimension, the impact of social 
change on certain cohorts and vice versa becomes the central frame of reference in 
the cohort perspective. Here Ryder echoes Mannheim’s idea of “generation as an 
actuality” that refers to the “co-presence in a historical and social region” as well as 
“participation in the common destiny” (Mannheim 1952 (1928): 303). Since Ryder’s 
cohort approach, life-course scholars have widely accepted Mannheim’s message 
that individual lives are embedded in the temporal and social context. 
The proposal of Ryder to temporalize human age has turned over the static 
view of structural functionalism and demanded the understanding of social structure 
in a dynamic sense. Not universal structural principles, but processes of social 
transition that change in historical time have become the central theme of different 
life-course approaches. In other words, Ryder has taken a further stride by 
emphasizing the significance of collective time from the position of earlier structural 
functionalism where only individual time (aging, socialization etc.) was considered. 
The temporalization of age study through the application of the cohort concept has 
led to the necessity of longitudinal data. Researchers have ever since noticed the 
distinction between individual and collective (historical and social) time in data 
collection. It is therefore no coincidence that longitudinal data collection first 
appeared in the course of the 1960s. 18  The emergence of longitudinal data has 
enabled researchers to examine the connection between social change and individual 
life courses. Ryder’s contribution lies in the inclusion of time and its dynamics in the 
research of social change and life course.  
Following the structural functionalism and Ryder’s suggestion, Matilda W. 
Riley and her colleagues (1972) developed a theory of age stratification, which 
furthered the progress of the life-course research. Social structure is seen in this 
                                                 
17 This is most evident as Ryder points out that, “each cohort has a distinctive composition and 
character reflecting the circumstances of its unique origination and history. The lifetime data for one 
cohort may be analysed and compared with those for other cohorts by all the procedures developed 
for a population in temporal cross-section” (ibid: 845). 
18 The first general panel data bank was the “Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics” (PSID) 
beginning in 1968. 
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theory as a system of age strata consisting of given roles and expectations. Individual 
members enter the age-stratified social system from birth and exit by death. At first 
sight, Riley’s idea of age stratification seems quite similar to the structural 
functionalism, yet what distinguishes her model is her emphasis on the reverse 
effects of individual participants on the social structure. The change of cohorts 
implies potential strains between generations that will eventually shake the existing 
social structure and lead to social change. In this respect, Riley revises the one-
dimensional version of the structural functionalism, which overemphasizes the 
socializing effects of structure on the life course. She suggests that the latter might 
change with time and thus influence the former (Riley 1979: 4f.). 
As far as social change is concerned, Riley indicates that socialization and role 
allocation are both key mechanisms to binding persons into social systems. Whereas 
socialization conveys necessary knowledge and content of social roles to their 
incumbents, role allocation functions to assign societal members to appropriate roles. 
Socialization and role allocation of cohorts are, however, subject to the corresponding 
differences in timing, an idea Riley adopts from Ryder. The “lack of synchronization 
between the sets of processes affecting people and those affecting roles” leads 
eventually to a potential tension between cohorts – a situation that Riley deems to be 
the source of social change (Riley et al. 1972: 442f.). It is therefore essential for 
researchers to elaborate the effects of timing difference on the process of socialization 
and role allocation for different cohorts. 
In sum, the cohort perspective has paved the path for the following life-course 
study because it has refreshed the scope of vision initially proposed by the structural 
functionalism. The recognition that we should pay more attention to the connection 
between individual life course and social structure, and that this context can only be 
properly discerned by way of dynamic analysis were not well known until the rise of 
the cohort perspective. As Elder (1991: 62) points out, “this connection between 
historical age and cohort, on the one hand, and social age in the life course, on the 
other, has alerted investigators to the variable meaning of life events in history.” The 
efforts of the life course scholars since then have been to collect longitudinal data to 
trace the change of individual events over time, and analyze dynamic data to 
examine the interaction between social structure and individual life course. The 
relationship between change in social structures and in personal lives has become a 
major focus of the life-course research. 
 
3.1.3. Elder’s Life-Course Approach  
The first successful attempt to link social change with human lives is the study 
Children of the Great Depression (1974, 19992) by Glen H. Elder, which has become the 
cornerstone of the life-course study. Using the longitudinal data available from the 
Oakland Growth Study (cohort 1920-21), Elder traces back the specific impact of 
income shortage and life hardship resulting from the Great Depression on the life 
experience and family developments of those cohorts in the United States. In this 
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way, Elder puts individual life courses in a broad context of historical and social 
circumstances, further elaborating the research ideas proposed by his academic 
predecessors.  
Under Elder’s influence, two concepts become central to the life-course study: 
transition and trajectory. Whereas the former refers to short-time changes or events 
between two states in the life course, the latter denotes lifetime developments or life 
experience across the entire life span or longer periods of life. By observing both 
transitions and trajectories, Elder reminded us of the contextual embeddedness of 
transitions in the life trajectory (Elder 1985: 31, 1994: 5). Moreover, Elder proposes 
some principles of the life course “paradigm”19 which have deeply influenced the 
direction of life-course studies ever since (Elder 1994, 1995): 
 
1. Time and place: Ryder’s idea of cohort effect finds resonance when Elder stresses 
historical effects on the life course. The factor “time” plays an enormous role in 
the life experience of different cohorts. 
2. Timing: Researchers ought to keep an eye on the occurrence time point as well as 
the sequence of life events. That is, the antecedents and consequences of life 
events make discernible differences, depending on when they occur in the life 
span. 
3. Linked lives: In addition to historical and social settings, one person’s location in 
networks of personal relationship also has an influence on her/his own life 
course. The interplay of actors’ orientations and results sheds light on the causes 
and effects of certain life events. 
4. Agency: Under the given opportunities and constraints of historical and social 
events, human actors construct their own life courses through their own choices. 
This appears to be a major explanation as to why the life course patterns within 
one cohort vary even though this encounters similar structural and timing 
characteristics. 
 
In other words, Elder’s approach lays emphasis on three levels: macro- (historical 
and social events), meso- (interpersonal relationship) and micro-level (actor’s 
decision). The life course interacts with various factors of all three levels, and the 
clarification of these processes is the mission of sociologists. Within this conceptual 
framework, the life-course study has made enormous progress since Elder’s work, 
largely because much more longitudinal data now become available, which makes 
dynamic approach of life-course research possible. Since the start of the “Michigan 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics” in 1968, many similar panel-data projects have 
                                                 
19 The term “paradigm” is by far only used by Elder himself, denoting his intention to establish a 
research domain within Sociology. 
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also been launched.20 Interdisciplinary life-course research has also gained wide-
range momentum among various fields (e.g. Sørensen et al. 1986; Moen et al. 1995; 
Marshall et al. 2001). 
While Elder has given strong impulses to life-course research, his concepts 
remain confined to the academic tradition of North America where the interplay of 
social structure and life course stands in the focus of research interests. The term 
“social structure” here refers more to family, occupation or education patterns than 
to secondary institutions such as social security systems. In general, American life-
course scholars tend to be more concerned about individual transitions throughout 
the life span and pay less attention to the role of social institutions in the structuring 
of the life course (Marshall and Mueller 2001: 33; also Leisering 2003). This much-
neglected aspect is crucial to the understanding of the influence of the welfare state 
on the life course. The development of the European (especially German and Swiss) 
life-course research fills this gap and casts more light on the relationship between the 
welfare state and life course. 
 
3.1.4. The Institutionalist Approach of the Life Course 
The growing interest in the life course spread to the European academic circles, 
especially German and Swiss social sciences at the end of the 1970s.21 Their research 
mainly centered on the theme of the life course as a distinctive dimension of social 
institutions. In this respect, the idea of the structural functionalism that social 
structure plays a vital role in constituting the life course of societal members found 
resonance among German scholars. Their special focus lay, however, in the 
significant characteristics of institutions of the welfare state and modern economic 
organization of labor. This demarcated the starting point of the German life-course 
research in difference to its American counterpart (Heinz and Krüger 2001; Leisering 
2003). Concern about individuals and the connections between individuals and 
institutions were central to this life-course approach. 
The German institutionalist perspective adopts a historical approach to interpret 
the evolution of the life course in the process of Western modernization. Along with 
the structural change, the life course itself has become a significant social institution 
that guides individuals about their ways of living in their lifetime. Kohli (1986a, 
                                                 
20 For instance, the German “Socio-Economic Panel” (SOEP), available for users from English-spoken 
countries as G-SOEP, started in 1984 and the British “Household Panel” in 1989. Household Panel for 
Europe as a whole began in recent years. 
21 In Germany, the most influential pioneers at that time were Martin Kohli, a Swiss scholar living in 
Germany, and René Levy, also a Swiss social scientist, who have undoubtedly contributed to the 
establishment of the German life-course perspective. Levy’s early contributions have not been 
recognized until the 1990s. See for example: (Levy, 1977; Kohli, 1978). The first user of quantitative 
data in the German life-course research is Karl U. Mayer, who developed a theoretical account of the 
welfare state and the life course (see next footnote), but mainly conducted quantitative life-course 
research. For his conceptualization of the term “life course” and an overview of life-course research 
see Mayer (2000, 2001a). The French scholar Daniel Bertaux is also a pioneer in this field. See Bertaux 
and Kohli (1984). 
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1986b) demonstrates this point most plausibly. He describes the historical process as 
a social change towards (a) temporalization, in which the life course burgeons as a 
social institution and thus a core dimension of social structure; (b) chronologization, in 
which the age becomes socially constructed. In this respect, the life course becomes 
gradually standardized and normalized; (c) individualization, in which individuals are 
decoupled from the traditional ties and duties associated with status, locality and 
family; (d) dominance of labor system, which organizes the life course according to the 
functional demands of the economic logic of capitalism; (e) co-existence of “position 
sequence” at a structural level and “orientation scheme” at a subjective biographical 
level. 
In other words, the central element of the institutionalization of the life course 
lies in the standardized sequence of phases alongside the life course, which 
corresponds with the structural requirements of the modern industrial society. The 
life course has been organized into three main phases that surround work: education, 
labor participation and retirement. The institutionalization of the life course is not 
only achieved by external force of social structure and institutional regulation, but it 
is also internalized in the consciousness of societal members who take a standardized 
life course for granted (Kohli 1986a, 1986b). In practice, actors orient themselves and 
plan their actions based on the normative module of the society. The legitimacy of 
standardized life course relies both on the external support of social structure and the 
internal unquestioning acceptance of social actors. The welfare state institutions have 
actively participated in this process and played a significant role in regulating the 
individual life course (Mayer 1991; Mayer and Müller 1986, 1988; Mayer and 
Schöpflin 1989). Since labor participation is the major way of income earning in the 
market society, one of the principal aims of the welfare institutions is to bridge the 
discontinuities coupled with disability to work: aging, accident or handicap. 
Corresponding mechanisms are social security measures such as pensions, social 
insurance as well as social assistance schedules. By offering comprehensive welfare 
programs, the welfare state ensures the well functioning of the market, which in turn 
bolsters the operation of the welfare system with abundant financial resources. 
Historically, the emergence of life-world perspective takes place in accordance 
with the crystallization of individuality in the Western society. Meyer et al. (1994; also 
Meyer and Jepperson 2000) argue that both social actors and their actions are 
endowed with meaning and legitimacy by cultural institutions in the course of 
rationalization. The modern individual is constituted in the Western society as a 
“Self” who is deemed to find its own meaning. The “Self” is given legal rights as well 
as eligibility for social security benefits in order to develop its own character (Meyer 
1986, 1992). The life course as such is institutionalized to integrate the requirements 
of the “Self” with those of social structure, on the one hand, and to provide clear 
orientation for individual actors, on the other hand. Therefore, the 
institutionalization of the life course is coupled with that of the “Self”, which 
demonstrates two dimensions of Western cultural program: the life course becomes 
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an institution which assists the individual in the adaptation to the requirements of 
modern society, whereas the “Self” is also institutionalized as a cultural ideal that 
each societal member is anticipated to pursue with effort. In this context, the 
institutionalized life course guarantees the individual freedom of choice coupled 
with responsibilities to plan and carry out one’s own life span thoughtfully (Beck 
1992). With their lives being well structurated by the institutional frameworks of 
modern society, the individuals are encouraged (nearly compelled) to 
simultaneously fulfill structural requirements of the institutionalized life course and 
design their own life trajectories. 
The institutionalization of the life course and the normalization of biographical 
orientation have greatly contributed to the emergence of a normal biography, the 
convergence of life-trajectory types among societal members in the modern society 
(Levy 1991, 1996). A standardized social timing tends to influence the way in which 
one actor organizes her/his life course and how other members perceive and 
evaluate it. Most telling is the fact that normal biography tends to be gender-
differentiated, revealing the way in which social structure and institutions regulate 
the life courses of male and female actors. From explicit law orders to implicit 
regulations of eligibility or entitlement for certain social right, life chances of 
members of different sexes become quite different. The institutionalist perspective of 
the life course points to the close connection between social institutions and the life 
course, and it also delineates the standardization and institutionalization of the 
modern life course.  
This viewpoint has, however, triggered much debate on the further 
development of the life course (Settersten 1999). Critics of the institutionalist school 
reckon that the life course is currently undergoing drastic change towards the erosion 
of the normal biography (Hinrichs 1989; Mückenberger 1985). For example, Held (1986: 
158) maintains that some groups of individuals in modern societies do not “enter into 
an age-graded, sequenced occupational structure [or] formally retire.” several 
scholars also convey similar messages indicating the changing nature of industrial 
organization has led to looser coupling of the life course with the economic sphere. 
The trend of the life course in advanced societies seems to be moving towards 
destandardization and deinstitutionalization (Buchmann 1989; Kohli 2000; Myles 
1990, 1992; O’Rand 1996). The term “Post-Fordism” suggests that the operation of 
industrial production may now be more appropriately characterized by a greater 
flexibility that demands highly qualified workforce. Less-skilled persons are thus 
exposed to a higher risk of unemployment, which makes their continuous labor 
participation more and more unlikely. The institutionalist view of tripartition of life 
into education, work and retirement has lost its luster in this respect, since the 
employment and retirement patterns have been drastically changing (Kohli et al. 
1991; Han and Moen 1999; Marshall et al. 2001; Schulz 2002). In the case of the USA, 
the age limit between work and retirement is in fact dissolving (Kohli 2000). This 
phenomenon has led to the pluralization of life arrangements among societal 
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members, which has largely undermined the premises of life-course 
institutionalization. 
In essence, the debate on the institutionalization or deinstitutionalization of life 
course has demonstrated different accounts of the ongoing life-course change. While 
Kohli and his associates stress the emerging moment of life-course sequences in the 
interplay of diverse structural elements in the modernization process, his critics 
maintain that new patterns are beginning to substitute the ideal type of Kohli’s 
institutionalization thesis. We can still discern a common denominator among 
adversary opinions, i.e. the fact that life course is an object of social structuring as 
regards the age and its social meaning. The dispute concentrates mainly on whether 
and to what extent the life course is institutionalized or deinstitutionalized, 
depending on how current economic sphere is changing. In a similar vein, another 
debate concerns whether there is still an institutionalized life course at all, or whether 
the life course is simply on the way towards destandardization even though its 
institutional effect remains salient (Settersten 1999). In other words, it seems that the 
trend is moving towards an institutionalization of de-standardized life courses, 
denoting the encouragement of pluralistic individual life styles through active and 
flexible public policy. 
Major viewpoints and contributions of the life-course approaches are 
summarized in the following table 3-1. Note that while the connection between 
standardized life experience and labor participation may be waning, the role of the 
welfare state in integrating individuals into the economic and social spheres remains 
very strong. The correlation between welfare state institutions and individual life 
courses has captured much attention in recent years, partly due to the boom in 
comparative study of welfare institutions. Research interests focus on the constitutive 
function of the state for the life organization of individuals. Therefore, the following 
section seeks to elucidate major lines of the institutionalist approach of the life course 
in order to outline a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis in this study. 
 
Table 3-1: Comparison of Life-Course Approaches 
 Major Concepts Features of the LC* Theoretical Advances 
Structural 
Functionalism 
Age Status Structuration of Age, 
Socialization 
LC as Functional Reflection 
of Social Structure 
Cohort 
Approach 
Cohort Temporalization of LC, 
Age Stratification 
Impact of Generational and 
Historical Experience 
Elder’s 
Approach 
Transition, Trajectory Embeddedness of LC in 
Timing & Social Context 
Linkage between LC, Social 
Structure and Time 
Institutionalist 
Approach 
Normal Biography, 
LC Institutionalization 
Institutional Regulation on 
Individual LC 
Emphasis on the Role of the 
(Welfare) State 
* Abbreviation of the term `Life Course´.  
Source: Author’s own Summary 
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3.2. Social Policy and the Life Course: An Institutionalist Approach 
One of the major contributions of the institutionalist perspective is its insight into the 
significant role of the modern welfare state in regulating individual life courses. This 
aspect has received less attention from the circle of north American scholars because 
of their greater concern with other areas of social structure like family, education, 
career path and so on (Marshall and Mueller 2001: 33). European researchers, by 
contrast, have devoted much more efforts to theorizing this connection in a broad 
context of welfare state study (Leisering 2003). The growing interest in this area goes 
hand in hand with rising attention to the welfare state institutions, a phenomenon 
which converges with the tendency in social sciences in recent years. Against this 
background, the next section begins with an exploration of commonalities of 
institutionalist research programs in various fields. 
 
3.2.1. The Emergence of the Institutionalist Paradigm in the Social Study 
The concept “institution” is a frequently used notion without consensus as regards 
its actual meaning. Almost every discipline in the social sciences applies this concept 
with various knowledge interests and vague denotations. This is even more obvious 
as the views of various “new institutionalisms” have gradually gained prominence 
within the social sciences in recent decades. There are, however, also attempts to 
clarify this conceptual ambiguity in order to search for research convergence among 
different disciplines (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Goodin 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Immergut 1998; Clemens and Cook 1999). As institutionalist account is central in our 
theoretical interpretation, recent developments among disciplines deserve more 
elaboration here. The aim of this section is to briefly outline the burgeoning contour 
of the institutionalist paradigm, which has also greatly contributed to the studies of 
the welfare state. 
The renaissance of institutionalism begins with the rise of new institutional 
economics. Dissatisfied with the premise of neoclassical orthodox that presupposes a 
rational agent acting in an ideally free market, scholars in this field believe that the 
prerequisites of neoclassical model largely rest on a set of (neglected) arrangements 
of economic institutions. The main function of these institutions lies in their 
reduction of transaction costs (most representative works: Coase 1937, 1960; North 
1990; Williamson 1975, 1985). As institutional structure constrains the realm of 
perceivable choices, it reduces the uncertainty economic actors have to face when 
they make decisions. Institutional structure, in this respect, becomes a facilitating as 
well as constraining environmental factor of economic actions. North (1990: 3) 
succinctly defines “institution” as follows: “… the rule of the game in a society or, 
more formally, … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social 
or economic.” The goal of the new institutionalism of economics is to explain the 
relevance of various forms of institutions (e.g. hierarchy, market, property right etc.) 
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as well as economic performance. Its contribution lies in the insight that the 
functioning of a “free market” is only possible under ordered institutional 
regulations. 
Similarly, disagreement with the utilitarian account has also given impulse to 
the rise of the Neo-institutionalism in the political science. In objection to viewing 
political phenomena simply as an aggregate of individual actions aiming to 
maximize utilities, the institutionalist account proposed by March and Olsen (1984, 
1989) emphasizes the (limited) cognitive and normative orientation of actors on 
ceremonies and rituals. Following their institutionalist account of organizational 
studies, March and Olsen point to bounded rationality, scarcity of time and 
information actors may encounter when they make decisions in political 
organizations. As a result, actors can only resort to standard rules and procedures 
(i.e. given institutional structure) that justify their decisions (logic of 
appropriateness). 
Intriguingly, while the “cultural” account of March and Olsen takes a strong 
stance against the utilitarian explanation, the latter still appeals a lot to many political 
scientists, who have supplemented institutionalist elements into the rational choice 
model (e.g. Immergut 1992; Bonoli 2000). In general, the behavioral assumptions of a 
rational actor still prevail, i.e. a set of preferences, instrumental maximization of 
these preferences as well as strategic options. What distinguishes the rational choice 
institutionalism from the new institutional economics is its consideration of the 
institutional constraints on collective actions. For instance, Mayntz and Scharpf 
(1995a) incorporate (organizational) actors into institutional settings, emphasizing 
that the latter may influence the first by distributing resources and defining 
negotiation rules. Institutional design becomes a mechanism of political governance 
which guides collective action towards intended policy goals. In a similar vein, 
Windhoff-Héritier (1991) also advocates the compatibility of the new institutionalism 
and the rational choice theory, and suggests viewing institutional environments both 
as opportunities and restrictions for actors pursuing their own interests. 
In sociology, the institutionalist approach traces its root to as old as its classic 
thinkers. 22  What we call sociological new institutionalism today was initially 
heralded in the field of organizational theory at the end of the 1970s (Scott 1987; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Until that time, sociologists generally followed Weber’s 
idea and viewed the bureaucratic structures in organizations as the product of the 
modern rationalization process that aims to accomplish the tasks more efficiently. 
According to Weber, the bureaucratic form of modern organizations displays high 
consistency of decisions and actions as well as rational choices among alternatives. 
This viewpoint is seriously challenged by Meyer and Rowan (1977), who point out 
that, with institutional rules incorporated in organizational structure, organizations 
                                                 
22 My explication is confined to the recent development in this field. For an overview of relevant 
classical thoughts, see: DiMaggio and Powell (1991); Nee (1998). 
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tend to follow them as a strategy of survival. Since then, notions such as irrationality 
in the decision-making process and the loosely coupled connection between decision 
and action have become a central concern of the new institutionalism in 
organizational studies. 23  The insight from the organization sociology lies in the 
“cognitive turn” that stresses the mutual reinforcement of actions and rules in 
organizational operations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 15ff.). Institutionalized 
routines and rules of organizations play a much greater role in the decision process 
than usually conceived. Each decision and action in organizations should not be 
merely attributed to personal competence and rationality but rather placed into the 
institutional framework, which offers rationale for organizational operations. 
The resurgence of institutions is also visible in the economic sociology. Seeing 
that economists merely interpret economic actions through the lens of market 
exchange, economic sociologists stress the significance of social structures in which 
economic actions come about.24 In their views, economic actions are a form of social 
actions situated in institutional contexts. In this sense, recent economic sociologists 
have revived the thought of Karl Polanyi (1944), who views the market as a part of 
the society (“embeddedness” as he calls it). The emergence of modern capitalism, as 
he describes with the example of English economic history, is a battleground of 
market rise and social protection. To bring in the concept of embeddedness, Polanyi 
urges us to notice the importance of social institutions in which market operates. 
This premise has led economic sociologists to criticize the one-dimensional 
perspective of orthodox economics that has entirely left out the influence of social 
institutions. This stance brings economic sociology quite close to the position of the 
new institutional economics discussed above. Indeed, the former has greatly 
benefited from the insight of the latter. Yet economic sociologists contend that the 
new institutional economics has neither taken proper account of personal networks 
in economic life (Granovetter 1985; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994; Barber 1995), nor 
taken heed of social norm constituted by institutional frameworks (Nee and Ingram 
1998; Weise 1989). In this respect, economic sociology lays great emphasis on the 
normative constraints of social institutions, an insight provided by the new 
institutional economics but put further by the economic sociology. 
Overall, the significance of institutions has drawn great attention in the social 
sciences. Scholars from various subfields have proposed somewhat different 
understandings of what institutions are and how they function in the society, a 
situation that has stimulated attempts to delineate the similarities and differences 
                                                 
23 For some representative works, see Brunsson (1989); Cohen et al. (1972); DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983); Orton and Weick (1990). 
24 The idea that economic actions are to be located in a broad social structure is in itself not an entirely 
new idea. Almost influential classical sociologists such as Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, and Emile 
Durkheim have contributed to the contour of sociological views of economy. The German historical 
school of the National Economy (Werner Sombart, Gustav von Schmoller, Max Weber, etc.) is also a 
pioneer in this respect. For an introduction in the recent development of economic sociology see 
Swedberg (1987, 1994); Swedberg and Granovetter (1992). 
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among various institutionalisms (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Goodin 1996; Hall and 
Taylor 1996). Despite all the differences, we can still, as a summary, identify several 
convergences emerging in recent years as paradigmatic guidelines in the social 
studies: 
 
1. Rejection of pure utilitarian explanations: All institutionalisms take a strong stance 
against the once dominant imagery of actors with clear preferences and 
rationality. Instead, the institutionalists emphasize the constructive role of higher-
order institutions in shaping individual interests and action. Differences among 
disciplines exist mainly in the extents of institutional constraints on actors. Even 
the rational-choice theory in sociology has reflected the reductionist 
interpretation of human actions and posed the thesis of “multiple self” (Elster 
1985). Attempts to integrate institutionalist and rational-choice approaches also 
abound (Immergut 1992; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995a; Windhoff-Héritier 1991; for 
an overview see Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998). 
2. Institutional constitution of actors: The premise of higher-order systems over 
individuals leads the institutionalists to claim that institutions constitute actors 
(Meyer et al. 1994; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This line of thought argues that the 
identity of actors is deeply rooted in the rationality inherent in the modernization 
process of the Western world. The whole cultural program refers to individuals as 
subjects with prescribed duties and rights. Identities of actors are generated from 
social organization of rules. This has been best illustrated by organizational 
studies showing the importance of rule-following and routine work in 
organizations (March 1994, chap. 2). Even between organizations, the 
phenomenon “institutional isomorphism” suggests that, under the pressure from 
their environments, organizations tend to imitate or mimic the strategies of other 
organizations in order to strengthen their identities and attain legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
3. Institutional constitution of interests: In spite of their stress on institutional effects, 
the institutionalist approach endeavors to address the problem of individual 
interests in its framework (DiMaggio 1988; Scott 1987). Social institutions 
constitute and organize individual and collective interests by recognizing 
particular interest groups or delegating political function to them, as discussed in 
the literatures on corporatism (Lehmbruch 1991; Streeck 1994; Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985). Historical institutionalism also illustrates the significant function 
political institutions play in the definition, mobilization and organization of 
interests (Immergut 1992, 1998; Steinmo et al. 1992). Different modes of interest 
intermediation lead to various political outcomes. 
4. Contextual embeddedness of social actions: Human agency is not only oriented on 
self-interests, but successful interactions of agents are regulated by given 
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institutional arrangements.25 This common view among various institutionalisms 
reveals that the institutionalist perspective is necessarily sensitive to 
configurations of factors surrounding human agency. Diversity among different 
institutionalisms exists merely as to what contexts are actually in play. Especially 
sociologists give more heed to the functions and outcomes of social institutions in 
organizing human interactions (Nee 1998; Nee and Ingram 1998). Without the 
support of environmental contexts, human interactions would become fragile, as 
interpersonal understandings would be associated with high costs.  
 
3.2.2. The Institutionalist Approach in the Study of the Western Welfare 
State  
The preference for the institutionalist account is also visible in welfare state studies. 
Indeed, the term “welfare state” already suggests that the inquiry into the essence 
and change of social policy would not succeed without a proper account of the state 
institutions. Among numerous attempts to explain the expansion of welfare states 
after the World War II, the importance of welfare institutions for the development of 
social policy has received wide recognition.26 As scholars from various fields study 
social policy, it is of little surprise that their ideas are also adopted in the welfare 
state research.  
The concept of “institution” is broadly used in diffuse meanings among social 
policy disciplines. Yet a common understanding refers it to the “formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organization 
structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). The central 
idea of the new-institutionalists is that institutions can and should be considered as 
an important independent variable in the analysis of social policy. As the similarities 
summarized above suggest, though power and interests of political and social actors 
exert great influence upon policy formation, it is the mediation of institutional setting 
that guide the their channel, thereby directing them to certain patterns of policy 
                                                 
25 The formulation of Emile Durkheim “the non-contractual basis of the contract” is a famous example. 
Niklas Luhmann, though hesitating to use the term “institution”, comes close to this point when he 
suggests the distinction between “personal trust” and “systemic trust” to indicate the significance of 
stable institutional environment for the (re-)production of impersonal trust. 
26 As this section intends to outline the emerging contour of the institutionalist approach, it inevitably 
leaves out the contributions of other equally important theories. Among them two explanations 
should be depicted here shortly. The first one, industrialism thesis, links the growth of the welfare 
state to the functional need generated by the development of industrial societies. This thesis claims 
that social problems resulting from economic growth have given rise to the state’s increasing 
intervention (e.g. Wilensky 1975). The second attempt comes from the so-called “power resources 
model”, which views the welfare state as a product of the struggle between social democracy and 
capitalists. The political struggle has determined the development of the welfare state (e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1985; Korpi 1989; Stephens 1979). The distinction between various theoretical accounts is, 
however, not necessarily mutually exclusive. In addition to these two accounts, there are also other 
approaches with more critical stances, such as Marxist and feminist critics of the welfare state. For a 
more detailed introduction of different accounts as well as critics of the welfare state, see Lessenich 
(2000); Myles and Quadagno (2002); Pierson (1998), (2000a); Skocpol and Amenta (1986). 
 54 
outcomes. Especially relevant for our context are the discussions that concentrate on 
1) how welfare state institutions arise, and 2) how they develop and expand, as well 
as 3) how they restructure themselves with regard to various challenges.  
1. Origins of the welfare state: In recent years, scholars have taken a more macro-
sociological view on the relationship between state and society in various countries 
and historical periods.27 Due to the social problems associated with the social change 
as a result of the industrialization process, institutional answer of the state to these 
problems gradually becomes inevitable. The active role of the state receives 
especially intense attention among analysts. With the famous formulation “bringing 
the state back in”, Skocpol (1985) advocates a state-centered research program which 
takes account of the political structure as well as organizational capacity of the state 
in the political process.28 She also proposes a research direction focusing on the 
feedback effect of state policy on society. Her approach has highlighted the 
significance of institutions arrangements in the social policy research. In her own 
exploration of the origins of American social policy, Skocpol (1992) argues that 
demands for maternalist social policies, mainly from women’s groups, played a 
crucial role in the political domain of social provision in the US during the first 
decade of the 20th century. Their efforts, either successful or failed, often left notable 
traces that influenced the following development of American social politics. 
Skocpol’s strategy is to identify the relationship between policy formation and 
patterns of interest constellation. In this way, she manifests the contingent character 
of the interplay between historical and institutional circumstances as well as actor 
constellations in the foundation of modern social policy. 
In a similar manner, Swaan (1988) gives a compelling illustration that the 
building of welfare state institutions has to be examined in historical and national 
contexts. The collectivization of care arrangements proceeds along with the state 
formation which has facilitated the civilizing of the whole society. In this process, 
various political and social elites have also contributed to the establishment of 
welfare institutions. Alber (1982) also argues that the legislation of German social 
insurance was the result of the strategy of political elites whose initial intention was 
to tame the working class. Baldwin (1990) demonstrates further that the laborist 
interpretation does not appropriately account for the politics of the welfare state. 
Instead, the middle classes as well as political parties (both conservative and liberal) 
have also greatly influenced the politics of welfare developments. 
While early scholars pay attention to the historical root of institutional building 
of the welfare state, a less noticed but equally important factor, namely the normative 
                                                 
27 Immergut (1998); Thelen and Steinmo (1992) offer an excellent overview of this account. 
28 The idea of Skocpol and her colleagues to take the state into account is understandable in the 
American context where the state plays a minimal role. By contrary, this point is in continental Europe 
not especially appealing because the role of the state has already long been part of theoretical 
accounts, which makes the emphasis redundant. Thanks to Prof. Lutz Leisering for pointing this point 
out. 
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basis of the welfare institutions, has claimed much attention recently. In tracing the 
institutional change of the welfare state, researchers also point to the resilience of the 
normative ideas of welfare institutions in their historical background. The interplay 
of ideas and institutions has from the outset influenced the emergence of the welfare 
state (Hall 1989; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996; Sachße 1994). The social ideas that 
actors have on the mind with reference to social problems of time are deeply rooted 
in the institutional idiosyncrasies of the welfare state.29 Often the “social question” at 
the time of modernization has dominated the intellectual minds as well as political 
discourses, becoming the main frame of reference for the welfare state development 
in the ensuing decades (Pinker 1979; Kaufmann 2003). Rieger (1992) also borrows the 
term “elective affinity” (Wahlverwandtschaft) from Max Weber to denote the close 
relationship between welfare state institutions and distinctive “social questions”. 
Welfare institutions are to a large extent the concrete embodiment of certain social 
ideas (social knowledge) that guide the collective actions of social and political 
actors. 
2. Expansion of the welfare state: Institutionalist scholars refer to the competition 
between the states as a motivation to expand welfare provisions. Even latecomers 
such as South-European welfare states were motivated to follow the developmental 
path of other pioneers (Castles 1995; Lessenich 1995b). International conventions or 
supranational institutions (e.g. European Union) may also have contributed to the 
growth of the welfare institutions among countries. 
Another explanation of expansion concerns the institutional momentum of the 
welfare state. As the popular term path dependence suggests, institutional legacies 
influence or shape the following development of welfare institutions by limiting the 
realm of possible normative and political choices (Pierson 1993, 2000a, 2000b). Once 
established, political institutions and social policies lay down the rules of interaction 
for the participants, which frame their strategic consideration as well as perceptions 
of political contexts. Well-developed welfare institutions follow their own system 
logic and dynamics by becoming a frame of reference for the orientation of 
subsequent political actions.  
Since Esping-Andersen’s (1990) path-breaking work about typologies of welfare 
capitalism, scholars have now been more aware of the diversity of welfare regimes 
embedded in given political institutions and social structures. This distinction is also 
essential for the understanding of the welfare politics in various fields. For example, 
Bonoli (2000) explores the impact of formal political institutions and decision-making 
procedures on European pension reforms. Adopting Pierson’s idea, Bonoli and his 
colleagues have developed a theory of welfare retrenchment in favor of 
                                                 
29 The historical relationship between the Christian (Catholic as well as Protestant) teaching as political 
ideology and the birth of the welfare state is a distinctive example (Kaufmann 1988; Kersbergen 1995; 
Manow 2002; Sachße 1994). It is also well known that the poor-relief institutions of the Christian 
organizations had provided social welfare to a large extent in the time before any social policy of the 
state came to being. 
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institutionalist accounts (Bonoli and Palier 2000; Bonoli et al. 2000). In a similar vein, 
Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) also explore diverse policy responses of different welfare 
regimes (Scandinavian, Continental and Anglo-Saxon welfare states) in the light of 
institutional adaptation to challenges of the global economy. Based on a set of criteria 
such as industrial relation systems, government institutions etc., their results 
demonstrate considerably different outcomes among welfare regimes in respect to 
their strategies under respective institutional constraints. These comparative studies 
of welfare state regimes have enriched our knowledge of how institutional 
frameworks influence the developmental pathways of the welfare state. 
3. Restructuring of the Welfare State: The term path dependence remains valid in this 
aspect. The resilience of welfare institutions can be best observed during the time of 
economic austerity and welfare retrenchment. Even in hard times, the welfare state 
does not completely capitulate to challenges but rather sought to take advantage of 
its own institutional characteristics to adapt itself to new circumstances (Pierson 
1994, 2001; Bonoli et al. 2000). Under the rubric “new politics of the welfare state”, 
recent studies in the welfare state deal with the strength of welfare state institutions 
in channeling subsequent political discourses as well as decisions (Pierson 1996). The 
institutional basis of the welfare state has also become self-reinforcing and resistant 
over time. Each attempt to cut welfare provision requires well-formulated political 
rhetoric to justify the retrenchment. Welfare reforms in Western countries, therefore, 
tend to be piecemeal because a large-scale overhaul of the entire welfare systems 
proves politically unfeasible. 
In the discussion of the restructuring of the welfare state, research attention has 
also been directed to the social consequences of the welfare state. The fact that 
welfare arrangements of the state are multi-faceted raises questions about interaction 
forms between state and society and their mutual effects. The ultimate goal to which 
modern welfare states devote themselves is the promotion of social welfare for all 
their citizens. Yet for all its political endeavors, the welfare state has still much to 
confront the dark side of its policies. The pioneer in this aspect is probably the 
German scholar Hans Achinger (1958), who characterizes social policy as “societal 
policy” (Gesellschaftspolitik) to remind us of the social impact of welfare state policies. 
In this respect, each state policy should always be viewed as an intervention in 
certain fields of social relationship and that, by attempting to influence them, the 
state administration has to keep alert to possible backlash triggered by previous 
institutional policies (Kaufmann 1982). While in praise of the contributions of the 
modern welfare state, one should always bear in mind that it is institutionally 
embedded in specific historical and social contexts, whereby the state takes an active 
role in establishing a framework for mixed welfare production. The intervention in 
societal sectors leads not only to their structural changes but also raises new 
problems associated with them. 
This point refers to the immanent ambivalence of the welfare state institutions: 
while they were initially designed to solve certain social problems, they have also 
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generated new problems that later policy makers have to deal with (George and 
Wilding 1984; Leisering 2001; Pierson 1993). This circumstance poses acute 
challenges to the sustainability of the welfare state, which is also the main reference 
point to most of the welfare state criticisms.30 However, recent reflections indicate 
that, despite all the drawbacks in connection with the state policies, modern welfare 
states have successfully established institutional frameworks for the provision of 
social welfare, which are capable of adapting themselves to changing societal 
environments. The key insight lies in the structural affinity of the welfare state with 
other social spheres of the modernity that any arguments to hold welfare state 
institutions alone responsible for new problems appear implausible (cf. Huf 1998; 
Kaufmann 1997; Pierson 1998; Rieger 1992). The crucial point concerns less the 
question about whether there is a crisis at all than how well the welfare state can 
respond to all-dimensional challenges. It is in this sense that the state theorist Renate 
Mayntz (also an institutionalist) views “management of the systemic 
interdependency of the society” as a central element of the state (Mayntz 1995: 155). 
This requires higher reflexivity of the state, i.e. more knowledge about political limits 
as well as social consequences of the state policy. Political learning of the state 
becomes a prerequisite for its successive policy-making. 
The demand for higher sensibility of the state towards its policy impact can be 
found in the discussion about the changing role of the state. The term second-order 
social policy suggests the reflexivity of contemporary state policies (Kaufmann 1998, 
cf. also Kaufmann 1991; Leisering 1992; Preuß 1994). By intervening in social fields to 
solve the traditional first-order social risks, i.e. invalidity, sickness, old age and 
unemployment, the state has also contributed to a higher complexity of its 
intervention objects, which in turn give rise to new problems that require more 
sophisticated political solutions. Second-order social policy, then, refers to the 
necessity to get on with legacies of previous policies. In a similar manner, welfare 
pluralism also calls for the rethinking of the state’s role as “from welfare to enabling 
state” (Gilbert 1993). The basic idea is the mobilization of all possible societal sectors 
relevant for the welfare production in order to realize a “welfare mix”. Within this 
framework, the state is not only involved in the welfare provision, but also in the 
(institutional) coordination of welfare production of all sides (Johnson 1987; Evers 
                                                 
30 The argument of the New Right, for instance, seeks to interpret the welfare state as interference in 
the sound market mechanism, which would otherwise reach equilibrium when the individuals are 
allowed to maximize their utilities. The necessary conclusion in this line is in favor of a minimal state. 
Another main critic, the Neo-Marxism, diagnoses the program of the welfare state as structurally 
contradictory to the capitalist system, for it has to appease to the conflicting interests of both capital 
and labor. Meanwhile, the provision of social welfare is due to encounter the dilemma of a rising 
desire for more welfare within limited economic resources. Therefore, the welfare state is structurally 
vulnerable to the fiscal and administrative crises. These two major criticisms of the welfare state are, of 
course, not entirely wrong, yet they have only emphasized certain aspects of the immanent 
ambivalence of the welfare state institutions, thereby oversimplifying the complex entanglements of 
welfare state policies and other societal sectors. For an overview, see: Lessenich (2000); Myles and 
Quadagno (2002); Pierson (1998); Skocpol and Amenta (1986). 
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1993; Evers and Olk 1996). The key message of these theoretical reflections is a much 
more active and flexible role of the state in political learning and engagement despite 
the ambivalent character of its policies. The main institutionalist accounts of the 
welfare state discussed above are summarized in the following table 3-2: 
 
Table 3-2: Institutionalist Accounts of the Welfare State 
Dimension Main theses Theoretical implications 
Origins of the 
Welfare State 
• Affinity of (social) ideas and welfare 
institutions 
• Historical contextualization of social 
conditions of the welfare state 
• Institutional uniqueness with 
reference to the “social question” 
 
• The origins of the modern welfare state 
are to be embedded in historical and 
social contexts  
• The interplay of normative and 
institutional frameworks needs careful 
examination 
Expansion of the 
Welfare State 
• State competition 
• Institutional momentum: policies 
make politics 
• Institutional variety of welfare 
regimes 
 
• The politics of the welfare state is 
shaped by its institutional legacies 
• Comparative research is vital to 
understanding the institutional 
dynamics of different welfare regimes 
Restructuring of 
the Welfare State 
• Social policy as societal policy 
(interplay of social policy and 
society) 
• Unintended consequences of social 
policy (ambivalence, Second-order 
social risk) 
• New politics of the welfare state 
• Second-order social policy with more 
complex institutional arrangements of 
the state (e.g. welfare mix) 
• Demand for more reflexivity of the 
state with reference to the impact of its 
previous policies 
Source: Author’s own summary 
 
The exuberance of the institutional accounts in the welfare state studies reflects the 
changing explaining emphasis from actors towards institutions. It signals different 
logics with which welfare states operate under changing social circumstances. In 
contrast with the “golden age” after the Second World War, welfare states are 
currently under pressure of restructuring itself to cope with problems from all 
directions. As Myles and Quadagno (2002: 52) succinctly indicate,  
 
“Slow growth, high unemployment, and hence stagnant or falling state revenues create a 
harsh climate for welfare state innovation but a favorable environment for the critics of 
social programs. Within this context, the political institutions that structure interest 
representation and decision making play a decisive role by defining the political 
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opportunity structure, restricting the menu of options available to political leaders and their 
supporters irrespective of political preference.” 
 
Moreover, the social consequences arising from previous institutional settings direct 
scholarly attention to the effects of policy feedback. Institutional intermediation of 
agent interests calls for more careful consideration of intersection of old and new 
politics in the welfare state. Given the resurrection of institutions in social policy 
studies, it is no coincidence that institutional factors also attract equal attention from 
the life-course scholars. They offer an insight into the institutional functioning of the 
welfare state that deeply influences individual life courses. This will be the main 
topic in the next section. 
 
3.2.3. Institutional Regulation of the Life Course by the Welfare State 
In his theoretical framework of the life-course institutionalization, Kohli (1986a: 288f.) 
noted the crucial role of state regulation in constructing age boundaries and age-
related duties for its citizens. For him, the involvement of the state is part of a 
comprehensive and extensive modernization process that leads to the 
institutionalization of the life course. Kohli’s account lays greater emphasis on the 
functional requisites of modern labor markets, which demand well-organized labor 
participation. The social security system exerts decisive social control to ensure 
smooth functioning of the economic sphere, which in turn renders financial resources 
for the state administration. State regulation is, in this respect, one of the central 
social mechanisms organizing work in modern society. In other words, Kohli has 
outlined a theoretical framework for the interplay of welfare state and life course, yet 
the question as to how exactly the former influences the latter remains largely 
unanswered. This becomes the point of departure for subsequent life-course studies 
in Europe. 
The institutionalist approaches reviewed in the previous two sections have 
direct implications for the consideration of the relationship between the welfare state 
and life course. The attention is directed towards the interplay of institutional 
regulations of the state and strategic actions of the individual. Main foci of the 
institutionalist life-course study are placed upon three aspects: 1) Essence of the 
welfare state as an institutional program aimed towards the individual (individual 
orientation). 2) Institutional forms of the state regulation of the life course (life-course 
policy). 3) Impact of social policy on the courses of personal lives and vice versa (social 
inclusion and exclusion). 
1). Individual Orientation: The welfare state is in itself a unique historical 
program of the Occident. For the first time in history, the state takes initiative to 
provide systematically collective goods for its citizens.31 This development has been 
                                                 
31 As early as 1968, Harry Girvetz (1968: 512) has already given a succinct definition of the term 
„welfare state“ as follows: “The welfare state is the institutional outcome of the assumption by a 
society of legal and therefore formal and explicit responsibility for the basic well-being of all of its 
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explicitly interpreted by the theory of societal differentiation (Schimank 1996). 
Modernization is seen as an evolution process of functional differentiation of the 
society system in which functional subsystems build their own identities and operate 
according to their own logics. Against this background, hierarchical forms of 
differentiation as a dominant societal form in the medieval period has been replaced 
in the course of modernization by a set of functional systems of a basically equal 
status with more independent functional specialty but greater interdependency at the 
same time.  
An essential phenomenon in this process is the rise of the state whose political 
influences stretch well into other domains of society (Marshall 1964; Luhmann 1990). 
The enhancement of state activities ranges from regulating the internal economy, 
collecting and mobilizing resources, to providing different sorts of goods and service. 
The most significant change is the rise of individualism as the point of reference of all 
welfare state institutions. The legal system of the welfare state provides an 
institutional framework for the state’s intervention in the social life of the individual. 
By replacing traditional association and community with the welfare institutions, the 
state has successfully employed its exclusive power to “single out the individual 
both as the object of state activity and as a distinctive, self-reliant actor” (Mayer and 
Schöpflin 1989: 193). Individuals are now entitled to access public goods and 
participate in the operation of all functional subsystems of the society. Each person 
obtains the right to receive public education, cast votes, and enjoy social welfare 
provided by the state independent of their social or wealth status.  
The previous discussion of the institutionalist perspective of the life course (J. 
W. Meyer) has showed that the rise of individualism and the welfare state is a unique 
historical phenomenon. The affinity of their historical emergence is the result of the 
Western cultural project meant to crystallize the individual as a social actor supposed 
to develop her/his own life program. The purpose of state welfare provision and 
coordination lies not in determining the life outcomes of their clients, but rather in 
offering resources and chances to be perceived and claimed by citizens. In this sense, 
the state intervention via social policy, though directed towards the individual, is 
necessarily indirect in the sense that it can only influence the material and social 
environments surrounding actors (Kaufmann 1982, 1994). 32  In this respect, the 
welfare state program can be conceived as an institutional framework set to facilitate 
or even encourage each person to pursue his/her individual life goals. Individuals 
are in principle free to choose their life styles, albeit within prescribed terms set by 
                                                                                                                                                        
members. Such a state emerges when a society or its decision-making groups become convinced that 
the welfare of the individual is too important to be left to custom or to informal arrangements and 
private understanding and is therefore a concern of government.” 
32 Here, once again, the ambivalent character of the welfare state is clearly visible, as the state does not 
actually possess any effective tool to force individuals to follow certain normative presumptions 
regarding how one is to lead his/her life. The influence of social policy is in this respect rather indirect 
and opaque. 
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the welfare state (Beck 1992). Individual freedom is only guaranteed on the grounds 
that corresponding obligations be simultaneously fulfilled.  
The state intervention in personal lives could not gain legitimacy without the 
broad consent of its citizens. Again, this point to the institutionalization effect of the 
welfare state institutions embedded in the structure of modern work society. From 
the beginning of their lives, citizens acquire knowledge and norm conveyed by the 
(mostly state) education system, which constitute their way of viewing the life world. 
Education obligation, entry into the labor market, family establishment, almost all 
life phases have been carefully organized by the welfare state so that its intervention 
becomes part of individual lives. State intervention is thus deemed as legitimate by 
the individuals. 
2). Life-Course Policy: The essence of modern social policy is closely connected 
with the organization of labor. One of the main functions of the welfare state is to 
compensate the negative outcome of labor commodification (Karl Marx) in order to 
cushion the structural inequality as a result of market force. Little wonder that 
Esping-Andersen (1990) borrows the idea from Karl Polanyi and views de-
commodification as a vital criterion for comparing different welfare regimes. At the 
same time, the welfare state also plays a constitutive role in structuring the social 
organization to guide the further development of economy and society (Huf 1998; 
Kaufmann 1997; Lessenich 1995a, 1995b). The state actively establishes institutions by 
dint of law regulation, financial subsidy and service provision aiming to fulfill 
economic, political, and social functions. On the other hand, the state also intervenes 
in personal lives by setting a social timetable for social activities regarding labor 
participation and welfare production.  
The state regulation of the life course is achieved primarily by structuring the 
temporal succession of life phases. Social policy is a temporal policy (Nowotny 1993: 
105ff.; Settersten 2003). The famous phrase “from cradle to grave” indicates the 
significance of the welfare state institutions for the organization of personal lives. 
Coupled with the systemic requirements of the modern work society, the welfare 
state explicitly regulates different phases of the life course, notably the tripartition of 
life into education, work and retirement.33 Need and potential risks associated with 
specific life phases are carefully handled with entitlements to social welfare products. 
For each phase of life course the state establishes various institutions to assist the 
individual to fit into the system of age stratification. The standardization and 
segmentation of life course through the welfare state have facilitated the stabilization 
of personal expectations towards the time horizon of future (Mayer and Müller 1988: 
52; also Kaufmann 1973). They frame and regulate transitions from one phase to the 
next as well. 
                                                 
33 Despite the critical observation that this division of the life course by the welfare state has lost its 
dominant meaning in current social structures, it remains a significant frame of reference for many 
individuals in their life planning. See: Kohli (1986a, 1986b, 1989). 
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The temporal aspect of the life-course policy is manifested in three core 
institutions that entail respective time dimensions: education, old-age pensions and 
the systems of risk management (Leisering 2003; Leisering and Leibfried 1999; 
Lessenich 1995a; Settersten 2003). First, the education system defines the age to enter 
or leave school and postpones the time point of labor-market participation. The 
prohibition of child labor and the obligation to receive education have contributed to 
institutionalizing the phase of childhood. Education is a public investment in the 
nourishment and formation of human capital to be applied in future development 
(prospective).  
Second, old-age pensions guarantee the basic income for the life after 
retirement, thereby regulating the life phase after work. In fact, the contour of the 
concept “retirement” did not emerge until the institutionalization of old-age 
pensions in the late nineteenth century. The gist of old-age pensions lies in the 
reward for the contributions one has made during his/her labor participation, and 
the amount of pensions depends largely on the extent of previous contributions. 
Therefore, old-age pensions are an entitlement system based on past attainments 
(retrospective). 
Third, the risk management system (e.g. social insurance, social assistance and 
social service) intends to lubricate the frictions or bridge the gaps in connection with 
the transitions in the phase of labor participation and family building. Its main 
function is to ensure continuous and smooth paths for individuals to take part in 
economic and social activities. Short-term interruptions in this phase such as 
sickness, temporary unemployment and accident injury are thus its main targets. The 
temporal dimension of the system of risk management refers to present. 
With the coverage of all time dimensions the welfare state regulates relevant 
activities alongside the whole path of personal lives. The structuration of the life 
course proceeds mainly by setting age norms, life phases, duration and trajectories 
(Henretta 2003; Leisering 2003; Leisering and Leibfried 1999). Education, pensions 
and risk management systems define the time of entry into or exit from various 
phases, and regulate the duration of relevant obligations as well as eligibilities. 
Accompanied with these institutions is the regulation of age limit (schooling, 
retirement age) that defines exactly when society members are entitled for claiming 
certain benefits. This state-organized welfare provisions based on phase-related 
categories also induce individuals to lead their lives alongside certain paths. The 
whole welfare system of the state operates within institutional arrangements to offer 
people a timetable accompanied by full welfare packages. 
Overall, life course is a concrete expression of the institutional arrangements of 
the welfare state. The temporal regulation of life course reveals the normative 
prescription of the welfare state as to what types of life experience are “normal”. The 
idea of normal biography (Levy 1996) in social policy has immense consequences for 
the individuals, as the welfare state rewards those who follow the prescribed paths 
while “punishing” others who do not. In this light, Leisering and Leibfried (1999: 33) 
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characterize social policy as an “implicit life-course policy” in order to emphasize its 
normative aspect. The welfare state organizes the relationship among social groups 
or categories such as sex, ethnicity or nationality etc. This raises concerns about the 
implicit impact of the state regulation of the life course because the welfare provision 
is unequally distributed among different social groups, which leads to the problem of 
social exclusion.  
3). Social inclusion and exclusion: The amelioration of opportunity structures for 
the individuals through social policy is tightly coupled with their responsibilities to 
organize their life spans. In the process of life-course institutionalization, social 
policy also presupposes a “normal biography” corresponding with the social notion 
of an ideal life. This implicit idea of normal biography has immense effects on the 
individuals in respect to how material resources and opportunity structures are 
organized to facilitate or constrain individual life chances. The orientation on such a 
normality directs the state to organize its policies according to different social 
categories such as gender, ethnicity etc., with considerable effects on the social 
groups concerned. 
For example, Leisering (2003) indicates that the school, a traditional service of 
the state, is a place where newcomers of the society (children) acquire not only 
knowledge but also relevant social norms and conventions. The “hidden curriculum” 
in education reproduces the existing distinctions of social categories. By the same 
token, the normative premise of social policy with regard to gender division of labor 
has also considerable consequences for the entitlements of both sexes to resources 
provided by the state. This point is exactly the concern of the feminist criticism on the 
welfare state (e.g. Allmendiger 1994; Daly 2000; O’Connor 1996; Orloff 1993). 
According to the critics in this stream, traditional social policy is so preoccupied by 
the ideal of male breadwinners that female contributions to household works and 
childrearing are largely taken for granted, leading to far less entitlements of women 
to welfare benefits than their male counterparts.  
In other words, the life-course orientation of social policy functions like a 
mechanism of social selection which favors and disadvantages different social 
groups. It is in this context that scholars identify the emergence of “welfare classes”; 
which is statutorily defined and privileged by the welfare state (Alber 1984; Lepsius 
1990: 128ff.; Leisering 1992). Social inclusion is always accompanied by social 
exclusion in the welfare state development. This dark side of the modern welfare 
state has not been well perceived and studied by students of social policy until 
recently (e.g. Korpi 2000; Lepsius 1990; Lessenich 2000). The life-course aspect of 
social policy has offered a deeper insight into this problematic field. Indeed, the 
“implicit life-course policy” can only become evident when its social consequences 
emerge in the course of time. One of the challenges the welfare state encounters is the 
growing discrepancy between its life-course hypothesis and social changes. 
In this vein, it becomes evident that the strength of the state life-course policy in 
the arrangement of temporality also tends to be its weakness (problem of time lag, 
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Settersten 2003). Presumptions about how the individual’s life course should proceed 
lose ground once the reality turns different. Current debates in the life-course 
studies, including the erosion of the normal biography (Hinrichs 1989; Mückenberger 
1985), Post-Fordist life course (Myles 1992) or destandardization and 
deinstitutionalization (Buchmann 1989; Kohli 2000; Myles 1990, 1992; O’Rand 1996), 
reflect the changing nature of life course which has not yet been properly dealt with 
by the welfare state institutions. The phrase “old institutions meet new challenges” is 
thus the central diagnosis of leading social policy scholars (e.g. Kaufmann 1997; 
Esping-Andersen 1999; Bonoli et al. 2000; Pierson 2001). Nevertheless, it does not 
necessarily mean the total capitulation of the welfare state to the advance of the free 
market. Instead, the welfare state faces an urgent task to discover new institutional 
arrangements that can better cope with new patterns of social risks resulting from life 
course changes. 
 
3.3. An Institutionalist Life-Course Framework for the Study of Chinese 
Social Policy 
Thus far, the analysis of the relationship between the welfare state and life course has 
focused on the development of advanced capitalist countries. Indeed, mainstream 
life-course studies on the welfare state concentrate mainly on the experience of 
developed welfare states without paying much attention to the rest of the world. The 
uneven development of social policy studies on advanced and developing countries 
has given rise to reflections on how to fill this research gap. With special reference to 
East Asia, a body of scholarship has made efforts to prove that, against the 
background of the rapid economic growth in the past decades, East Asian countries 
have been attempting to establish their welfare institutions sui generis. Encouraged by 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential analysis, much discussion has focused on 
whether there were more than three regimes, and whether specific countries could be 
properly categorized. Believing that East Asian countries differ a lot from their 
Western counterparts regarding social, economic and historical backgrounds, many 
scholars advocate the idea of a genuine and distinctive East Asian welfare regime 
(Goodman et al. 1998; Gough 2000; Holliday 2000; Jones 1993; Kwon 1997). Yet, other 
analysts either hesitate to follow this thought for the reason that this region shows 
little maturity and convergence (Esping-Andersen 1997, 1999), or make only tentative 
attempts to depict and explain the historical development of East Asian welfare 
states (Aspalter 2001, 2002; Goodman and Peng 1996; Hort and Kuhnle 2000; Jacobs 
1998; Tang 2000). In contrast to the research of mature Western welfare states, there 
exists little consensus as regards whether there is a distinct East Asian welfare regime 
at all and what kind of traits it possesses. Equally controversial is the question as to 
what factors can best account for their development. 
Still more awkward finds the scholarship of Chinese social policy regarding its 
location in the research map of welfare state studies. As a socialist country whose 
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economy has been thriving for recent two decades, China’s situation is too 
complicated for students of social policy to spontaneously parallel it with other East 
Asian newly industrialized countries (NIC), but also too important due to its 
geographical and historical position to ignore its existence. Moreover, the rapid 
transition of China triggered by the reforms since 1978 makes it a hybrid society 
consisting of different, if not contradictory, elements between capitalism and 
socialism. This distinctive development path is difficult to fit into the conceptual 
category of other East Asian NICs that follow Japan on the way of earlier capitalism 
development. Even the transition experience of East European countries from 
socialism to capitalism cannot offer instructive insights for China because of their 
diverse paths. 
Yet this also suggests that the Chinese experience of modernization has its 
historical uniqueness that merits a closer examination. The transition from a planned 
to a market economy has manifested astonishing economic accomplishments, on the 
one hand; but brought about a series of problems emerging in the course of systemic 
transformation, on the other hand. Social security systems coupled with the 
communist economic organizations are also undergoing drastic changes in this 
process. As the institutionalist perspective of the life course is concerned with the 
institutional arrangements of the state that frame and structure the individual life 
chances, it is of great interest to pose questions concerning the impact of these social 
and political changes on the life course of society members, as well as their 
significance for the ongoing social security reforms. The interplay of social security 
institutions and individual life courses against the background of social transformation is 
thus the central theme of this work. The mutual relationship is at best examined in 
realms where social security systems are to be established from the outset. In the case 
of China it is the rural sector that has long been ignored and sacrificed to sustain the 
relatively generous urban system. The development of rural pension policy provides 
an ideal opportunity to study the interactive process of social policy and life course. 
The dialog with the institutionalist approach above directs us to some 
preliminary conclusions regarding conceptualization and measurement of the 
welfare state and life course. First, a large body of institutionalist research lays 
emphasis on the framing power of welfare state institutions over the life course, 
which becomes an institutionalized element of modern societies (institution building). 
The institutionalization of the life course is a historical process in which other social 
forces also play an important role, such as the rise of the labor market or the 
emergence of individualism. To study the core mechanism of life course, one has to 
pay careful attention to the historical, social and political contexts in which it 
emerges.  
Second, one of the core insights of the institutionalist approach refers to the 
opaque or overt normative premises behind social policy, which can only be 
discerned by the examination of social inequality associated with the categorical 
distinction set by the state (social demarcation). Students of life-course studies should 
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take heed of the criteria set by the state policies and their impact on social groups 
(Settersten 2003). The temporal reference of life-course policies deserves equal 
attention as well because they reveal forms of political structuration of social time, 
which are highly relevant for the subjective perception and biographical planning of 
the individuals.  
Last but not least, the relationship between the welfare state and life course is a 
dynamic process of mutual adaptation. A study of life course in the welfare state 
cannot provide plausible conclusions without taking the interplay of the both into 
consideration. The normative framing of life-course policies and the subjective 
perception of the individuals deserve a closer examination (agency). This aim will 
contribute to our understanding of social policy, but it also poses a great challenge to 
research methods especially when reliable longitudinal data are scarce, as is often the 
case in the developing countries. How to integrate the research experience in 
advanced societies with the exploration of less-developed ones becomes a difficult 
but challenging task. 
Following the above account, two major analytical dimensions come into view 
for the research of old-age security and life course in rural China: institutional 
frameworks of rural pension policy as well as individual perception of situation and 
biographical orientation. The first analytical dimension refers to the institutional 
designs and variations in the process of policy implementation since 1991. As will be 
shown in the empirical part of this work, a closer look at the institutions of public 
pension schemes is of particular importance as they vary to a large extent from place 
to place, mainly depending on the financial conditions of local governments. 
Different institutional regulations have an enormous impact on the strategic 
responses of peasants because the extents of collective subsidy determine the 
division of financial responsibility among the central government, local government 
and individual peasants. The share of collective responsibility in local pension 
schemes becomes a decisive incentive or barrier for the willingness of individual 
peasants to participate in them. Diverse institutional designs among regions also 
result in very different participation paths of the local peasants – with an enormous 
discrepancy between individual pension entitlements.  
Institutional frameworks shape the general conditions under which individual 
peasants have to organize their current lives and future life planning. The decision 
(not) to participate in local pension schemes depends largely on how many resources 
are available in support of the additional savings for one’s old age. In this sense, 
institutional frameworks of local pension schemes also influence how individual 
peasants perceive the state’s endeavor to promote rural old-age security, which in 
turn affect their strategic responses regarding arrangements for their later life phases. 
In other words, peasants’ perceptions of the overall situation set a cognitive frame of 
reference in which their biographical planning takes place. It is in this respect that 
institutional regulations of local pension policies influence individual retirement 
arrangements most. Whereas peasants in rich regions often actively plan their lives 
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with the expectation of collective support, their counterparts in poor rural areas often 
find themselves stuck in a financial bottleneck where they can hardly make any 
significant plans for old-age security. The ability to do retirement planning and 
financial preparations divides peasants among regions of different financial 
strengths. To what scope and extent these vary from one another constitutes the 
second main element of the subsequent empirical analysis. The theoretical account 
and research logic of this study are illustrated in the following figure 3-1.  
 
Figure 3-1: Research Design of the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own account 
 
In sum, this chapter has outlined an analytical framework for understanding 
rural pension policy formation within the historical context of social transformation 
and social policy development. The focus aims to elucidate the historical, political 
and social logics of rural pension policy in the context of Chinese modernization. 
This analytical perspective also makes room for exploring subjective orientation of 
social agency with respect to their retirement and life planning. With the empirical 
analysis, this study seeks to demonstrate that the life course in rural China is 
changing towards temporalization and institutionalization set in motion by social 
changes and state (pension) policies. By incorporating these two key dimensions, this 
study echoes the gist of various life-course approaches that individual life courses 
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are embedded in wider historical, social and institutional contexts. For the following 
empirical study, this implies that the analysis of the institutional regulations in rural 
pension policy is as important as the inquiry into the biographical orientations of 
rural residents. The first analytical dimension thus pays attention to the dynamics of 
social policy development since the economic and social reforms in 1978 (chapter 5). 
The development of rural pension policy in the 1990s was part of this fundamental 
process, which earmarked the state’s involvement in the realm of rural old-age 
security (chapter 6). In order to explore the impact of social (pension) policy on the 
individual’s life course, the second analytical dimension focuses on how unequal 
frameworks between the regional pension policies influence peasants’ pathways into 
public pension schemes (chapter 7). Life chances of peasants vary to a large extent as 
a consequence of these different regulations, which in turn influence their subjective 
perceptions and orientations towards their old-age security. Retirement in rural China 
is subject to the interplay between institutional regulation of public pension schemes 
and biographical orientation of individual peasants (chapter 8). With regard to public 
pension schemes in respective localities, pathways and Retirement how villagers 
arrange their old-age security by dint of welfare mix (state, market and family) is of 
central importance in this study. 
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4. Research Design: Data and Methods 
The theoretical framework set out in the previous chapter indicates the potential of 
the institutionalist approach in the study of life courses in China. The main objects of 
this research are the introduction of pension schemes in rural China, as well as the 
biographical orientation of the participants regarding their retirement and life 
planning. With these two goals in mind, this study attempts to assess the impact of 
new pension schemes in different localities on the biographical construction of 
Chinese peasants. By using the institutionalist approach of life-course research, this 
study emphasizes the idea that the life course is itself a distinctive dimension of 
social institutions. That is, through the interplay of social change, state policy-making 
and individual action, life courses of societal members are structured in similar 
phases according to age demarcated by political or social standards. Life course thus 
becomes the interface between social actions and institutional frameworks. To 
achieve this goal, this study applies a mix of methods in order to obtain adequate 
data. For the part of rural pension policy analysis, this study applies document 
analysis and expert interview to obtain relevant information. For the second part of 
life course analysis, biographical interview is the main method of data collection. 
These will be elaborated in section 4.1. 
To be sure, even in the tradition of life-course theories, there is a range of 
different methods applied to approach individual life courses (cf. Giele and Elder 
1998). This study uses the biographical method as a major tool to explore the 
subjective dimension of life planning among rural peasants. Biographical method 
stands in close affinity with life-course research due to the latter’s interest in life 
histories of individual agency. Looking at individual biographies help to grasp 
individual attitudes and interpretations associated with life events and transitions. 
Since this study explores the link between rural pension policy and individual life 
planning, the qualitative research methods and especially the biographical method 
can best catch the desired information of this study. Biographical data collected 
through interviews are then analyzed and attributed to typologies constructed 
according to two dimensions of the life course: pathways to rural pension schemes as 
well as subjective perception and orientation of retirement. The procedure and 
rationale for data analysis with typology are articulated in section 4.2. 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
The inquiry into the interaction between social policy and individual life course leads 
this study to two interrelated dimensions: development of rural pension policy in 
China, on the one hand, and how social actors perceive the policy and develop the 
concept of retirement, on the other hand. To achieve both goals, a mix of research 
methods is used to gather adequate information. This study applies semi-
standardized expert interviews with the administration, as well as biographical 
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interviews with clients and surveys of relevant published documents. Documentary 
research includes a thorough reading of local, provincial, and national publications 
obtained from libraries and official statistical yearbooks. They offer a general 
overview of the development of the rural pension policy. Local official documents on 
the regulation of pension schemes are also valuable sources to gain first-hand 
insights into the practical situations of policy implementation. These are precious for 
grasping the central government’s intentions in rural pension policy and its 
implementation realities through local pension policies and schemes. 
The interviews were conducted between 2003 and 2005 with officials 
responsible for central or local rural pension schemes, as well as with peasants who 
have or have not participated in these schemes. Interviews with the officials were 
made to gather more information from the insider perspective of the policy. A major 
concern was to realize how policy details were made at the central level and how 
policies were implemented at local levels. Interview questions sought to understand 
the policy process at the central government as well as the variety of local 
implementation experience. To collect as much information by the officials as 
possible, the interviews were conducted in a problem-centered manner that 
generated a communicative environment for the interviewees to tell their experience 
and viewpoints (Witzel 1985; see also Bogner et al. 2002; Hermanns 2000). With 
prepared guidelines to hand, the researcher asked several questions aiming to 
stimulate the interest of the interviewed officials to tell more about the processes of 
the central and local rural pension policy (semi-standardized expert interview). In 
the whole process, the researcher steered the direction without intervening too much 
with the freedom of the interviewees as to what they wanted to report. All interviews 
with the central/local officials were written on protocols during the processes. In 
most cases the interviewed officials preferred that their answers be unrecorded. All 
interviews were made without the presence of a tape recorder because it would 
otherwise only arouse their suspicion and thwart the proceeding of the interviews. 
In interviews with the respondent peasants, novel on this research was that the 
selection of its interviewees covered not only the elderly but also younger rural 
residents in order to gain a deeper insight into the subjective perceptions and 
strategy responses of different cohorts to the issue of old-age security. Interview 
questions started from the theoretical viewpoints of the institutionalist life-course 
approach, seeking to explore the life course experience of the peasants as well as 
their biographical orientations of life planning. Though the interviews were equally 
conducted in a semi-structured form, a major difference between the interviews with 
the peasants and the expert interviews with the responsible officials was that the 
latter were embedded in the biography research. Biographical method has received 
increasing attention in the field of sociology, thanks partly to the rise of life-course 
research (Chamberlayne et al. 2000, 2002; Fuchs-Heinritz 1998; Smith 1998). At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the renaissance of the life-history method went hand in hand 
with the revival of biographical or narrative methodology (Bertaux and Kohli 1984). 
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Researchers of life histories use retrospective interview data to reconstruct social 
milieu of individual lives, seeking to unfold events and turning points that have 
given rise to transitions to other life stages. At the same time, use of supplementary 
materials is also a common practice to enrich the knowledge of individual lives 
(Clausen 1998). With the biographical method, life-course researchers learn about 
individual life histories through agent’s own perspectives. 
The gist of the biographical research is to view the individual as social agency 
living in certain historical and social contexts. Individual lives are shaped by 
historical and social events, leaving traces on trajectories of their life courses. In 
correspondence with this idea, interview questions posed to interviewees 
surrounded their personal experience in local pension schemes as well as their 
assessment of the whole program. Moreover, subjective planning of work and 
retirement as well as individual idea of life course stood as central themes in the 
interviews. Data on the individual life course were retrospectively collected through 
narratives about the personal interpretation and timing of important events. The 
researcher also registered life-history calendars revealing personal experience about 
retirement and life planning. All interviews were conducted in Chinese Mandarin, 
though in rare circumstances, local cadres helped facilitate the communication 
process as some peasants spoke only local dialects.  
The selection of field sites and expert/biographical cases was directed by the 
design of case studies. To take more account of regional disparity and national 
complexity, a case study can offer an access to the variety of the survey subject 
without losing the general perspective of the research theme (Ragin and Becker 
1992). Field survey was conducted in rural regions of Beijing, Shanghai and Qingdao, 
three economically prosperous localities in the reform era. Data gathered in three 
sites have enriched the scope and extent of the whole research as it can grasp more 
precisely the significance of regional differences in rural pension policy. Ideally, 
inclusion of less developed regions such as middle und western inland areas could 
yield still more insights in this respect, but the field work was confined to the above-
mentioned three rural regions mainly due to limited access of personal ties to other 
potential areas. Without the cooperation of local bureaucrats or cadres it would have 
been extremely difficult to enter any other field sites even though they could 
certainly add weight to the explanatory power of this study.34 Given this restriction, 
however, the field work was still consciously conducted in a comparative 
perspective, trying to explore how peasants perceived and reacted to local pension 
schemes in different circumstances. In this sense, the study is comparatively oriented 
although its observations are mostly gleaned from selected localities. Focusing on the 
interplay of political institutions and individual actions in the specific localities as 
well as evaluating theoretical propositions with the collected data have provided 
                                                 
34 To strengthen the argument power, this study also uses the method of secondary comparison with 
the work of Leisering and Gong (2002), which covers poor regions in the analysis. 
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insights into the interactive nature of social policy and individual agents in the 
context of social transformation. 
 
Figure 4-1: Location of Field Sites in China 
 
 
 
This work also makes a close examination of the regional differences between 
Beijing, Shanghai and Qingdao. Although they represent economically dynamic 
regions in China, there exist considerable developmental differences between them, 
especially in the case of rural pension policy. Whereas Shanghai can glance back at a 
history of continuous development and almost full coverage of its rural population, 
Beijing’s experience looks less rosy as its rural pension policy has thus far reached 
only one fourth of the rural population. Qingdao lags behind Shanghai and Beijing in 
this policy issue with a coverage rate of merely one tenth of the overall rural 
residents. The gap of policy achievements between these three sites epitomizes the 
status quo of the rural pension policy in China: the functioning of regional pension 
schemes depends much on the strength of local economy. These differences in policy 
implementation provide a rich background for a comparison of local rural policies as 
well as their impact on the lives of the residents. A detailed analysis is presented in 
the empirical part of this study (chapter 5-8). 
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The fieldwork has been inevitably shaped by the political context in China, 
where the Communist party retains tight control over the rural politics. Any field 
survey without the permission of the responsible officials would only complicate the 
progress, as peasants would refuse to do any interviews with outside strangers they 
did not trust in. In rural areas personal ties remain a central mechanism for daily 
interaction, and this is no exception for social scientists appearing as strangers in the 
field. Local cadres are like a two-sided blade in the field work: they help to narrow 
the distance between researchers and local villagers, while hindering the researchers 
from doing work according to strict methodological requirements. In view of this 
limit, the sampling process adopted the snowball method, i.e. sampling with the aid 
of local cadres or villagers in informal personal ties. Only in this way could the field 
work respond flexibly to diverse local situations. In certain circumstances, if the 
cadres were cooperative in the choice of respondents, sampling according to 
theoretical criteria was achieved in order to enhance the contrast between different 
samples. 
In the three field sites, a total of 36 biographical interviews with the peasants 
were conducted and recorded. Due to unsatisfactory quality in the interview process 
such as hesitation of the interviewees to questions or bad recording quality, 5 
interviews were excluded from the analysis. All remaining interviews were then 
transcribed in detail for data analysis. Differences in individual ability to express 
personal experience and opinions also influenced the quality of interview results. For 
that reason, focused analysis of certain cases that revealed more information became 
necessary. Nonetheless, the analysis did not leave out results from other samples 
since they remained a valuable source. Interview data were coded according to a list 
of previously designed codes derived from the theoretical framework. In the coding 
process major concepts were operationalized to constitute the basis of the analysis. 
The analysis paid special attention to the similarity and difference manifested in 
interview cases. Different ideas among respondents of various regions were also 
taken into account in order to highlight the impact of local regulations. In this 
manner, the study sought to trace the link between institutional frameworks of local 
pension schemes and planning of peasants for their retirement.  
In addition to the semi-standardized guidelines, the researcher prepared a short 
questionnaire concerning the general information of his/her family and job history. 
After the formal interview, the researcher asked each interviewee a few questions 
based on this questionnaire. Answers were then written on a protocol as an 
attachment to each interview. All interviews with the peasants were transcribed in 
detail. In the presentation of the results of the analysis, all cited passages originated 
from the answers of the interviewees. Citations were translated into English by the 
author. 
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4.2 Data Analysis  
Data collected in the field work are analytically classified into two parts. Results of 
document analysis and expert interviews are presented in the institutional analysis of 
the rural pension policy, which constitutes the first part of the empirical analysis 
(chapter 5 and 6). In this study, expert interviews help to check the information 
gathered from various sources of official documents or academic works. Though all 
expert interviews are documented as written protocols due to reluctance of the 
officials to have their words recorded on the tapes, the information they provide in 
the interviews still offers a very useful overlook on the past and current situation of 
the rural pension policy. The analytical goal is to delineate the historical 
development of the policy against the background of the overall changes in Chinese 
social policy. With the institutional analysis, the policy framework and implication 
for the life course and biographical orientation of the rural residents have become 
clear.  
Based on this policy analysis, a further step of the data analysis is to explore 
how the given central/local pension policies affect the biographical perception and 
action orientation of the peasants. This study approaches this dimension by means of 
type building, i.e. sorting out categories of different biographical patterns based on 
the data collected from the biographical interviews with the peasants. The goal is to 
depict different patterns of biographical orientation in association with given 
regional policy context. Type building helps the researcher construct a meaningful 
connection between institution, policy and individual life course. As this part 
constitutes the second core element of the empirical analysis (chapter 7 and 8), it 
merits a brief discussion about the methodology. 
 
4.2.1 Construction of Types  
This study applies the construction of (ideal) types as the main tool to analyze data 
materials collected from the biographical interviews with the peasants. One of the 
major tasks of the qualitative research is to figure out meaningful (sinnhaft) 
connections among existing social phenomena, especially when the research objects 
manifest heterogeneous natures.35 The construction of types has the advantage of 
highlighting the similarities and differences among data materials on the basis of the 
heuristic concepts derived from theoretical perspectives. A vital difference between 
the quantitative and qualitative research lies in the role of data: whereas the former 
seeks to collect representative data, the latter emphasizes the manifold natures of 
social phenomena and pays more attention to explore the diversity of data. Crucial 
for the qualitative research is thus to link collected data with one another in order to 
make sense of them. While different schools of qualitative research may dispute the 
                                                 
35
 Note that typology is not exclusively used in the qualitative research, but many quantitative 
research methods also seek to build types (or clusters) to explain the relationships between variables. 
As this study applies qualitative research methods, this section is confined to the discussion of type 
building in the literature of the qualitative methods. 
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strategies and procedures of the inquiry methods, one thing they certainly agree on is 
that qualitative research connects the parts to the whole and thus emphasizes the 
meaningful relationship among them (Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Flick et al. 2000). 
Categorization or type building is a vital step in the qualitative tradition as it is an 
ongoing process in which the researchers search for an order out of the seemingly 
manifold social world. Categorization is an attempt of the social scientists to bring 
possible and sensible connections into a mass of data collected in the field. A 
systematic comparison of cases is necessary to describe, analyze and explain social 
phenomena. 
The “grounded theory” by Glaser and Strauss (1967) is a renowned school in the 
qualitative tradition, which lays emphasis on the comparison and categorization of 
cases. Comparative analysis is for the grounded theorists an essential element in the 
whole research process. With the help of coding, researchers produce and revise 
categories that connect the raw data collected continuously in the field. In the words 
of the key figures in this tradition, categories are the “cornerstones” of a developing 
theory (Corbin and Strauss 1990: 420). Categories become the interface between 
theoretical reflection and empirical work. Typical for the procedure of the grounded 
theory research is the categorization of all data according to the theoretical concepts, 
which should ultimately lead to the discovery of general action structures 
(saturation). Theory development is a dynamic process, whereby categories are 
constantly checked with newly acquired data and revised when necessary. In itself, 
categorization is the process of mutual reflection between theory and practice. 
In German tradition, the notion that categorization of cases has gained 
prominence as well. In the 1980s, the school of narrative interview led by Schütze 
(1983) stresses the necessity to analyze the life sequence of all interviewees as 
detailed as possible in order to reconstruct their life courses. Comparison between 
cases can help researchers build types of life destinies. Inspired by this idea, W. 
Fischer and G. Rosenthal (1997) go further and underline the analysis of sequential 
structures of biographical self-presentation. All thematic and temporal structures of 
narrative stories are taken seriously as meaningful histories of the agents. The 
analysis of each interview case is, therefore, a necessary step to grasp the subjective 
interpretation and biographical meaning of social actors. Yet, the German stream of 
narrative interviews does not reveal how the analysis of each interview case should 
lead to general concepts with more explanatory power. Their main focus 
concentrates rather on the presentation of each narrative case than the elaboration of 
the overall structural contexts. 
In order to deal with the relationship between case analysis and generalization 
of theoretical concepts adequately, other German qualitative researchers attempt to 
grasp social reality with the construction of ideal types. Inspired by Max Weber’s 
idea, many have sought to construct typologies to describe and explain social reality 
(e.g. Kelle and Kluge 1999; Kluge 1999; Kuckartz 1995). Among them, Uta Gerhardt 
leans her methodology explicitly on Weber’s concept and applies it systematically in 
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several studies. For her as for Weber, ideal types are epitomes in pure form 
highlighting the relationships inherent in the research objectives. The construction of 
ideal types helps a social scientist interpret social world, not least by means of case 
interpretation and comparison. In this way, Gerhardt (1986, 1995, 1996) believes that 
a researcher can offer an adequate and meaningful causal explanation of social 
structures. To achieve this goal, Gerhardt (1986) suggests a detailed analysis of each 
case, which is the point of departure for the construction of ideal types. Ideal types 
represent the attribution effort of the researchers with regard to the contextual 
coherence or variation among different cases. Making constant comparison between 
ideal types and empirical materials can warrant the empirical relevance of the types. 
Researchers should always keep an eye on verifying the applicability of constructed 
ideal types in accordance with the data in the research process. 
Inspired by Gerhardt, M. Ludwig (1996) applies the concept of “career” to 
investigate the relationships between the institutional framework of the German 
social assistance scheme and the subjective strategies of social assistance recipients. 
By means of type building, Ludwig reconstructs a contingent poverty model that 
revises the traditional explanation of poverty circle. The method handbook by Kelle 
and Kluge (1999: 75ff.) also follow Gerhardt’s tips and explore how typologies can be 
made based on empirical data. They suggest three elements: development of 
categories based on analysis of each single case, comparison of different category 
systems, and finally outline of a typology or theory. In their view, single case 
analysis lays the cornerstone for further comparison between cases, which enables 
the researcher to reflect on the relationships between them. The task of the researcher 
in the practice is to design relevant dimensions for data comparison, followed by 
grouping of cases and analysis of their empirical regularity as well as contextual 
connection. Each constructed type should display distinctive characteristics attached 
to meaning dimensions pertaining to theoretical reflections. In this manner, the 
coupling between theoretical concepts and empirical data is secured throughout the 
whole process.  
In sum, the construction of types and their comparison are a core element of 
data analysis in the qualitative research. Since this study applies the qualitative life-
course approach and the biographical method, type building that constructs the life 
histories of peasants in respect to local pension schemes and retirement planning is 
an ideal tool for data analysis. The analytical strategy of this work follows the 
typology method developed by Gerhardt and others, seeking to highlight the macro-
micro link between social change, social policy and life course in rural China.  
 
4.2.2 Steps of Type Construction 
This study applies the notion of Kelle and Kluge (1999: 75-97) to view categorization 
and type building as an ongoing process in which researchers compare data cases 
with the assistance of criteria derived from theoretical concepts. The analytical 
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procedure of type building is as follows: case analysis, type construction, and type 
characterization. The analytical steps are illustrated in the following figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2: Steps of Type Construction in the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Analysis: The researcher analyzes all interview materials according to a 
previously designed scheme which originates from theoretical discussions of the 
study. In focus stand the life stories and events of the interviewed peasants with 
respect to family economic situation, individual employment history, financial 
arrangement between work and retirement, diverse sources of old-age income, and 
personal experience with the public pension schemes or private insurance. All events 
before and after participation in the pension schemes or private insurance are 
documented chronologically. The goal at this stage is to trace the temporal sequence 
of all events relating to the participation in local pension schemes or other equivalent 
private insurance schemes. Due to the diversity of local practice in pension policy, 
the analysis also pays attention to previous experience with different pension 
schemes or private insurance companies. All relevant events and experiences are 
descriptively specified for later analysis. 
In addition to the descriptive documentation of the temporal aspect of 
individual life events, the researcher also prepares a script for each interview case 
depicting the subjective significance of the public pension schemes from the 
perspective of the interviewees. The task is to analyze how the interviewed peasants 
define their problems with old-age security, how they interpret their personal 
situations and how they come to terms with them. At this stage, the researcher 
documents all relevant statements and remarks of the interviewees, and takes heed 
of possible citations for later article composition. The evaluation pays special 
attention to the significance of public pension schemes in the life planning of the 
peasants: how and why he/she came to the decision (not) to join the schemes, and 
1. Case Analysis 
2. Case Comparison 
Type Construction 
3. Characterization of Types 
31 peasant lives analyzed; 14 of them singled 
out for detailed analysis 
Life Course: 7 types of paths into retirement (Ch.7) 
Retirement: 4 types of biographical meaning of 
individual retirement (Ch. 8) 
Rudimentary institutionalization vs. consolidated 
institutionalization as conceptual integration of 
Life Course and Retirement (Ch. 8) 
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personal experience with responsible local cadres. The analysis also takes heed of the 
peasants’ preference for public pension schemes or private commercial insurance. At 
the same time, biographical aspects of the interviewees also receive equal notice. The 
individual’s interpretation of the life course before and after participation in the 
pension schemes or private insurance gives a hint to the subsequent preparations for 
old-age security, life planning as well as biographical relevance of public pension 
schemes or private insurance. Based on these preliminary analyses, the researcher 
makes tentative classifications for each interview case, assigning the statements of 
the interviewees to corresponding categories that lead to the construction of 
analytical types. 
Out of the overall 31 transcribed interview cases (5 excluded due to bad 
quality), 14 cases are chosen for detailed analysis. The choice of criteria follows the 
pragmatic strategy based on the motive of participation, duration, and continuity in 
the public pension schemes or private insurance ones. Also, participation in diverse 
regional pension schemes is a crucial criterion as it often reflects the influence of 
regional economic development on the financial situation of individual households. 
While typing these 14 different personal experiences in varied pension schemes, the 
analysis seeks to include as many sorts of life histories within diverse institutional 
environments as possible, with the aim of manifesting the spectrum of life courses 
from poor households to well-off ones. The rest 17 cases manifest similar 
characteristics that can be assigned to the types constructed on the basis of the 
original 14 “ideal” cases.36 The contrast of these 14 selected cases should illustrate the 
close interlocking between regional institutional conditions and individual life 
courses.  
Construction of types: In correspondence with the theoretical and 
methodological considerations, the researcher begins to build types alongside two 
dimensions: life history relating to participation in the pension schemes or private 
insurance, on the one hand, as well as subjective perception and interpretation of the 
peasants towards the pension schemes and their retirement, on the other hand. Core 
concepts originating from these two analytical dimensions are life course and 
retirement. Life course of pension scheme participants refers to their life histories 
before and after the participation in the public pension schemes. The contrast 
between constructed types is geared alongside two factors: sorts of pension scheme 
and reasons for participation. The first factor filters the interview cases into different 
types of participation in regional pension schemes, which gives a hint on the 
institutional framework of regional pension policy. Participants of respective local 
pension schemes are assigned to different groups with distinctive characteristics. The 
second factor further sorts out sub-groups indicating why and how the interviewed 
peasants have made the decision (not) to accede to the respective schemes. The 
                                                 
36 Note that this study does not aim to collect “representative” data according to the criteria of the 
quantitative methods. Again, the construction of types serves as a heuristic tool to manifest 
meaningful connection in social world and make sense of them.  
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juxtaposition of the two factors can highlight the connection between local pension 
institutions and individual life planning. All relevant dimensions have already been 
included in the interview guidelines so that answers of the interviewees can be 
attached to certain concepts in the coding procedure.  
The second analytical dimension, retirement, explores the biographical 
dimension of old-age security of the interviewees. Participation experience in local 
pension schemes and individual strategies in response to the situations receive 
particular attention. The dimension retirement refers to the subjective aspect of the 
peasants, underlining their perception of and response to the given circumstances. 
Inquiry goes into details of questions such as how the peasants think about their old-
age security and the existing public pension schemes, and which strategies they 
adopt to deal with these problems. The strategic choice between local pension, 
private insurance, family care or individual saving is of particular interest because it 
reveals the relative significance of each alternative for old age. In other words, the 
dimension retirement explores in particular the subjective assessment of the 
interviewed peasants with respect to their overall arrangements for old-age security. 
Based on the evaluations and strategies of the peasants, the researcher constructs 4 
types to denote the internal connection between subjective perception and individual 
orientation. The same 14 cases used for the detailed analysis of the dimension life 
course are examined this time from the perspective of the retirement dimension.  
Characterization of the types: The task at this stage is to develop abstract 
concepts that can synthesize the features of the constructed types. In this study, the 
constructed types of the two comparative dimensions, life course and retirement, are 
then linked together with features of social structures. From the intersection of life 
course and retirement, the analysis makes a leap forward by constructing two general 
types characterizing both the dimension of life course pathways to local pension 
schemes, and that of retirement in relation to individual life planning. The general 
types are constructed as umbrella categories encompassing both dimensions of life 
course and retirement. They can illustrate how peasants’ perception and biographical 
orientation are related to the institutional frameworks of local pension schemes. By 
developing general characterization, the analysis incorporates the idea of the 
institutionalist life-course approach that human actions are embedded in the 
institutional and social settings.  
In comparing the relationships between life course and retirement, one can 
identify the differences of individual perception towards retirement among 
participants of local pension schemes. The two general types are labeled as 
rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated institutionalization, referring to the 
central theoretical idea that life-course institutionalization is shaped by social policy 
(especially pension policy) of the state. As the empirical work has identified, while 
the idea of retirement is taking shape among peasants, its scope still varies a lot, 
depending on the how local institutional environment of old-age security is 
interpreted by individual agency. Rudimentary institutionalization refers to those 
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situations in which individuals have sensed the importance of old-age security, but 
are unable to make much for it due to limited available resources. Biographical 
orientation of retirement is remarkably constrained by fragmentary institutional 
support and individual poverty. By contrary, peasants in consolidated 
institutionalization have leapt forward in securing a stable income for old age largely 
with the aid of public pension schemes. The latter have opened a window of 
opportunity for individual peasants to think about their life planning and realize it – 
with significance consequence in respect to the concrete emergence of a retirement 
phase in their life courses. In other words, the distinction of rudimentary 
institutionalization and consolidated institutionalization helps identify the close 
relationship of structural constraints, institutional regulations and subjective 
meanings as well as decisions over time. 
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Part 2: Empirical Analysis 
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5. History of Chinese Social Policy after 1949: Two Worlds of 
Social Citizenship 
Social policy often reflects the way in which a society responds to structural changes 
and how it copes with social problems arising from them. The case of China is 
undoubtedly a good example for observing the development of social policy 
embedded in the context of social changes. Probably no other country manifests the 
relevance of social institutions for social policy so clearly like China, especially in the 
course of institutional transition in all spheres since 1979. The multifaceted transition 
from socialism to market economy has altered fundamentally institutional 
mechanisms organizing the relationship between work and welfare in society. In this 
vein, this chapter seeks to analyze the origins of Chinese social policy in the socialist 
era and their impact on the lives of citizens. On this basis, it then goes further to 
outline general social changes in the context of economic reforms that have 
substantially changed the role of the state in social welfare provision. This chapter 
seeks to offer an overview of general development of social policy reforms after 1978 
in order to set the background for analyzing the emergence of pension schemes for 
the peasants in the course of the 1980s until today (chapter 6). 
 
5.1 Social Policy before the Era of Reforms: A Brief Review 
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power after the civil war, China 
was still a destitute country fraught with destroyed economy and mass poverty. A 
key feature was the imbalanced development among regions: while coastal regions 
benefited from trade relationships with foreign countries, the vast hinterland 
remained underdeveloped and poverty-stricken. With the vast majority of the 
population still living on farming economy and the pressure for invigorating both 
urban and rural economy growing, the developmental strategy of the new 
government was to concentrate all available resources to promote heavy industry, a 
typical socialist approach towards modernization adopted from the Soviet Union 
(Chu, 1996). Furthermore, consumption was intentionally discouraged in the hope of 
shifting as much capital as possible to industrial sector in order to shorten the 
required developmental time. 
The strategic choice of the CCP originated partly from its experience in the 
battle with the Nationalist regime before 1949 that had lasted for over two decades 
(1927-49). Land reforms for peasants in liberated areas during that period 
strengthened the legitimacy of the Communist in rural areas, a decisive factor that 
has contributed to the success of the Communist revolution (Friedman et al. 1993; 
Selden 1993, 1995). After the successful reform experience in rural villages, the CCP 
was eager to build a socialist system in urban areas which would justify the 
correctness and superiority of its ideology. The imitation of the Soviet approach has 
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led to what Selden (1993) called “mobilized collectivism” both in urban as well as in 
rural regions: class struggle, mass mobilization, collectivization of economy, 
elimination of market mechanism, and equal distribution. The emergence of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOE or danwei system) and the gradual establishment of the 
people’s commune became two distinctive development models that have molded 
lives of the people. The structural principles of this dual system are illustrated in the 
following figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1: Dual System of Social Security in China before Economic Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own account 
 
One of the salient structural features was the restriction of citizen mobility. This 
movement control was achieved by the household registration system (hukou), which 
went far beyond a compulsory registration for all households. The personal data, i.e. 
where one was born and what sort of class background one inherited, became major 
determinants for one’s social identity and resource acquirement (Cheng and Selden 
1994, 1997). Whereas rural registration granted households access to agricultural land 
in collective production teams, urban registration guaranteed the entitlement for 
employment assignment to state-owned enterprises that assured comprehensive 
social security with high benefits. Registration as urban residents meant higher social 
identity as well as economic safety. By restricting mobility of citizens between urban 
and rural regions, the CCP has established a rigid social order that lasted until the 
start of economic reforms at the end of the 1970s. With the establishment of the hukou 
system, Chinese society is de facto divided into two separate worlds of social 
citizenship, an employment-based comprehensive social insurance system for urban 
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residents and a community-based residual social assistance system for rural 
population. 
 
5.1.1 The Urban System of Employment-based Welfare 
Urban welfare was from the onset guaranteed on the basis of enterprise welfare 
programs. Each individual work unit operated decentralized with regards to welfare 
provision. As a result, workers’ welfare depended entirely on each individual work 
unit that provided comprehensive, non-contributory and full-fledged welfare 
benefits. Working units have become the centerpiece of urban welfare that immerses 
deeply into urban life. As early as 1986 the American sociologist Andrew Walder 
(1986) described this phenomenon as “organized dependency” and “principled 
particularism”, denoting the dominant role of working units in resource distribution 
as well as the importance of patron-client relationship in attaining social status and 
promotion chances. The ubiquity of working units in Chinese cities developed to 
such an extent that they penetrated in the social relationship between urban residents 
and oriented their behavior (Li 1991; Li and Li 2000). Memberships in working units 
had thus highly symbolic meaning for the urban life because they represented social 
status as well as resource disposition. Manifold welfare provision of the enterprises 
for their employees has made the urban life realize the communist ideal “from cradle 
to grave”. 
In urban social policy, the Chinese government has established a system of full 
employment (the iron rice bowl), coupled with a comprehensive system of work-
related social benefits and guaranteed low-price food supply (Dixon 1981; Krieg and 
Schädler 1995; Leung and Nann 1995; Lü and Perry 1997). The development policy 
for the urban part was high employment, high welfare and low wages. Centerpiece 
of the urban welfare system was social insurance, which covered risks such as old 
age, sickness, work injury and maternity (later also unemployment).37 Each SOE was 
responsible for the financial expenses of social insurance for its employees, who 
enjoyed all the benefits without previous contribution payment. Each SOE had to 
spare 3% of the total enterprise wage bill and poured the money into a collective 
fund of labor insurance. Contribution collection was under the administration of the 
trade union in each enterprise under the umbrella of the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU). In case of financial difficulty of SOEs for the contribution 
payment, the state would bear the burden by means of tax revenues. Since SOEs 
belonged to the state, they were not responsible for their operation profits or losses, 
nor had their performances any correlation with the welfare benefits they had to pay 
to their employees.  
                                                 
37 Initially, there was no unemployment insurance, as jobless was viewed as the pathology of capitalist 
economy which would not exist in the communist system. For the same token, social assistance was 
also underdeveloped because poverty was thought to be associated only with very rare circumstances 
such as handicap or lack of family support. 
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The benefits for employees were comprehensive and generous given the overall 
low level of income at that time. Along with the insurance protection, employees of 
SOEs also retained other material benefits such as housing, food subsidies, and 
benefits for invalidity or death. Almost all service facilities were also run by SOEs 
that ranged from staff quarters, public schools, and kindergarten to hospitals and 
nurseries. Personal welfare services included mediating in family disputes, 
promoting one-child policy. As employment was the key access to abundant welfare 
benefits, it was centrally administered by the Personnel and Labor Department. It 
assigned all prospective employees to different work units, which had no disposition 
to decide recruitment or dismissal of their employees. Under the socialist system, 
employment was fixed life-long, ensuring everyone employment security as well as 
welfare packages. Furthermore, the system of automatic replacement (dingti) enabled 
children of the retiring employees to take their parents’ jobs, a job-guaranteeing 
policy which was not abolished until 1986. This job replacement system led to high 
dependency of employees on their work units, especially on the influence and 
control of the enterprise cadres. With this pertinent employment security which 
could be transferred to next generation, the state assured the loyalty of the urban 
working class, which stood firm as the bulwark of the state socialism. Workers in 
SOEs were provided with life-long security in exchange for their conformity and 
support of the state. 
 
5.1.2 The Rural System of Community-based Welfare 
In sharp contrast to their urban counterpart, social security provisions in rural areas 
were sparse and the whole collective welfare system was primitive. The welfare 
system in rural China was based on two pillars established since the CCP seized 
power after 1949: land reforms between 1947 and 1953 as well as collectivization in 
the 1950s (Dixon 1981; Krieg and Schädler 1995; Song 2003; You 1995). Land reforms 
were always the central element in CCP ideology, which took place soon after the 
CCP controlled the situation of civil war in China. With roughly equal distribution of 
land to each household, land reforms have eliminated one of the persisting causes of 
inequality in rural China. It has also contributed to relieving the severe destitution in 
the wake of the civil war. As the vast majority (over 80%) of the population still 
inhabited in rural areas, farming on the land was supposed to be the main source of 
their living. Each household was assigned a land plot serving as the main pillar of 
the household income.  
The developmental strategy of China was to transfer rural resources to urban 
sectors in support of industrialization, which was seen as the fastest route towards 
modernization. To achieve this goal, a main task of rural economy was to grow grain 
whose price was deliberately pressed for the purpose of resource transfer to urban 
sector as well as self-sufficiency in rural areas (Chu 1996; Knight and Song 1999; Lin 
et al. 2000). As early as 1953 a system of compulsory delivery of agricultural products 
at fixed prices was established. By means of this political monopoly of the crop prices, 
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the state took control of the pricing and marketing of agricultural products so as to 
extract capital for the development of heavy industry. 38 
Following the egalitarian land reforms during 1947-53, collectivization of 
agriculture by means of setting up mutual-aid teams and people’s commune were 
further steps to establishing an egalitarian rural society. The rural populations were 
organized into a three-tier structure with communes at the top, brigades in the 
middle, and production teams at the bottom. Primary responsibility for income 
support was placed on the peasants and rural collectives, while the state’s role in this 
respect was rather supplementary. The people’s commune constituted the rural 
social structure under the socialist rule. It consisted of teams and brigades, parallel to 
the natural villages (cun) and administrative villages (xiang). Rural cadres were 
recruited from local residents, who were aware of local interests and keen to ward 
them. Communes were explicitly conceived as highly self-contained entities with 
unified economic, political and social functions. The autarky of communes was 
further strengthened by the political barricade of hukou system that forbad mobility 
of the villagers to the outside world. Communes in rural China played the role of 
collective institutions comparable to work units in urban China.  
Apart from agriculture as the main source of income security, the major rural 
scheme was a means-tested social assistance scheme, aiming at relieving severe 
poverty and settling demobilized veterans. These programs were financed and 
administered solely by local communities. The main scheme was the “five-
guarantees” (wubao), which provided care for needy people, particularly frail elderly 
people, disabled and young orphans who had no sources of assistance at all. What 
originally consisted of food, fuel, clothing, education and burial has evolved 
gradually to more comprehensive benefits (Krieg and Schädler 1995: 169ff., 2000: 132). 
Since the wubao scheme was mainly financed with the incomes of production teams, 
the amount of benefits and the eligibility criteria depended on their financial strength, 
thus varying a lot among the communes. Under this condition, wubao recipients 
constituted only a very small portion of the cooperative members. Despite the 
attempt to extend rural welfare benefits to all residents, for example in the phase of 
“Great Leap Forward” at the end of the 1950s, the wubao scheme was the only system 
that actually remained and functioned. 
The other institutional framework of rural welfare was the cooperative health 
insurance system established in the 1950s, the so-called “Rural Cooperative Medical 
System” (RCMS), which was originated from voluntary self-aid medical care in some 
regions, later implemented in the whole nation during the Cultural Revolution 
(Bloom and Fang 2003; Liu 2004; Lu 1996; Zheng 2002). It aimed at providing an 
affordable medical care for rural residents, practiced by the so-called barefoot 
doctors who offered basic medical treatment, promoted primary medical knowledge, 
                                                 
38 Scholars estimated that the total sum of resource transferred in this way from the rural to urban area 
was at over 600 billion Yuan (Lin et al. 2000: 149). In other words, rural development has never been 
the chief concern of political elites before 1980. 
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and took sanitary measures. This health scheme was financed by the collection of 
premiums from individual members and collective welfare fund of the communes. 
Communes were the main institutional providers which employed medical workers, 
maintained health stations and hospitals. Due to large reliance on local financial 
capability, the RCMS was characterized by a variety of scope and extent in medical 
care among regions and collective units. Yet this community-based health scheme 
was deemed to be quite effective in accomplishing basic medical care for the vast 
majority of Chinese rural population. 
In addition to these formal arrangements, the central government also provided 
subsidies for poor region development to support provincial programs in education, 
healthcare, and other related human resource and infrastructure development. This 
sort of subsidies was managed by the State Development Planning Commission, 
which usually adopted top-down planning method according to the political priority 
and resource availability of the central government. Local needs were therefore 
subject to the strategic planning of the country. 
 
5.2 Social Aspects of the Reform Process  
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 
December 1978 marked the start of the reform process. During this session, the party 
sought to reassess the collectivist policies of the Maoist period and decided to take 
the path towards more involvement of the market mechanism while withdrawing 
the state from economic activities. In 1979 the second session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress ratified the party’s resolutions. The overall goal of the reforms was 
to achieve the four modernizations in industry, agriculture, science and technology, 
and national defense. The objective was to increase the gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output in two decades and to improve per capita income. Under Deng’s 
instruction, the CCP gradually revised its developmental policy and introduced a 
series of reform measures that has changed Chinese society irreversibly in the next 
decades. 
Since then, the Chinese society has experienced rapid structural transformations, 
but it has also encountered new social problems. Restructuring SOEs in the urban 
sector as well as reforming agricultural production in the rural sector have unleashed 
market force into economic and social spheres. While a proportion of the population 
(especially private entrepreneurs) has benefited from new economic opportunities 
and better incomes, still larger population groups (especially urban SOE layoffs and 
rural migrants) are excluded from these opportunity structures and left alone to face 
increasing insecurity. As a result, concerns about social stability in China arise, 
raising doubt about the governance capability of the state with respect to building a 
comprehensive social security system. The extent of social changes and their impact 
on social security systems in China are illustrated in the following figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2: Dual Development of Social Security Systems after Economic Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own account 
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achieve economic rationalization, the improvement of operation efficiency and labor 
productivity became inevitable, forcing SOEs to reduce redundant labor force and 
retrench welfare benefits. The retreat of the state’s control over the enterprise 
activities and the shedding of their responsibility for the well-being of their 
employees have led to an increasing number of urban layoffs. For the first time 
unemployment and the associated poverty emerged as the central insecurity 
problems in the socialist welfare framework. 
In the countryside the situation is even gloomier. The waning of the state’s 
control was accompanied by the decollectivization of agriculture, the collapse of 
people’s communes and the implementation of the household responsibility system. 
Rural residents were allocated the right to manage the land they worked on (but not 
the right to dispose of it), and permitted to pursuit higher profit for their income. 
This ambiguous property right of land has spurted high growth of rural income in 
the course of the 1980s. In the meantime, other income sources also emerged (e.g. 
employment in rural enterprises TVE) in the course of economic reforms. A 
fundamental implication was that the rural reforms have in effect limited the state’s 
control over migration, resulting in a mass flow of migration. Over the years millions 
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of rural residents migrated to wealthier regions in search of better jobs, thereby 
challenging the original rigid policy of mobility ban. As the function of the land in 
terms of economic production and social security decreased, the existing fragile rural 
system of social security had to adjust itself and took more reforms. 
 
5.2.1 Restructuring Urban Economy and Its Social Implications 
Urban reforms aim to transform the SOEs into market-oriented corporations. The 
first move began in 1978 by reinvigorating SOEs as the government granted them 
greater autonomy in production, distribution and management (Chow and Xu 2001; 
Smyth 1998; World Bank 1996; You 1998). SOEs were allowed to retain a certain part 
of profits for investment, welfare provision and bonus. After the state subtracted the 
quota, enterprises could retain funds for supplementary production and manage 
their own employees. The autonomy of SOEs was further bolstered in 1984 when the 
government moved on with experiment of various forms of management 
responsibility systems. Full autonomy of SOEs was not realized until 1988, when the 
National People’s Congress passed the “Law of State-owned Industrial Enterprises of 
the PRC”, which left all aspects of enterprise operation at managers’ own disposal. 
Since then, SOEs were viewed as individual economic organizations responsible for 
their own operation profits or losses. 
The reforms accelerated in the second half of the 1980s and reached their climax 
in 1993, when reforming the government-enterprise relationship and restructuring 
the internal managerial mechanism stood out as central measures to restructure SOEs. 
According to the reform idea, SOEs were supposed to transform into shareholding 
corporations with board of directors representing investors and managers running 
the business. Enterprises in bad form should either be closed down, declare 
bankruptcy, or ameliorate their operation results. The restructuring of SOEs and their 
affiliated occupational welfare system thus became a central target of the 
government to improve efficiency and performance in competition with the 
township and village enterprises (TVE).39 Liberalization of the labor market was first 
implemented at the enterprise level, whereby managers could decide independently 
about the amount of staff.  
However, the effort to disband SOEs from the planned economy has inevitably 
triggered massive dismissal of their redundant labor force. In tandem with the loss of 
job was the erosion of generous welfare benefits set to reduce the overstretching 
burden of SOEs. Redundant labor force has become a new group of paupers whose 
well-being posed a huge challenge for the existing social security system (Chan 1998; 
Hussain 2002; Smyth 1998, 1999; Solinger 2002; Whyte 1999). Concern about the 
waning function of danwei was compound with the skepticism about the 
sustainability of the withering occupational welfare system (Chan and Chow 1992; 
                                                 
39 For a more detailed description of reform measures towards rationalization of SOE, see Smyth (1998, 
1999); Wong and MacPherson (1995); World Bank (1996); You (1998). 
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Duckett 1997; Krieg and Schädler 1995; Lee 2000; Leung and Nann 1995; Lu 1996; 
Wong 1998; Wong and Macpherson 1995). Scholars also pointed to the unequal 
treatment of welfare retrenchment in work unit according to the age hierarchy. While 
older cohorts generally benefited a lot from the occupational welfare system, 
younger cohorts entering the work units later became those most susceptible to 
cutback in welfare provision. This cohort inequality has also contributed to the 
segregation of employment among different cohorts (Davis 1988; Zhou et al. 1997, 
2001). 
In association with the increase in job insecurity, there was growing concern 
about the urban poverty. Although paucity of systematic data and clear definition of 
poverty contributed to diverse estimates, scholars were gradually able to depict a 
rough scale of the urban poverty based on official statistical data and household 
survey.40 Khan and Riskin (2001: 38) indicated that, between 1988 and 1995, the 
estimated number of urban residents in poverty rose from 23.5 million to 28.1 million. 
This gloomy picture was also echoed by Cook (2000: 6), who drew official statistics 
and confirmed the aggravating income inequality among rich and poor urban 
households.  
Overall, urban areas in China are undergoing an overhaul of economic 
organizations and their financially overburdened welfare systems. This institutional 
transition has in general facilitated labor mobility and economic growth, yet 
concurrently led to problems of poverty associated with job insecurity. As a response 
to these exacerbating situations, the central government has initiated a series of 
welfare programs aiming to assist those excluded from traditional welfare benefits as 
a result of economic reforms. There are concerted efforts to transfer obligations from 
the enterprise to social insurance agencies and society (so-called socializing welfare; 
cf. Chen et al. 2000; Cook 2000; Croll 1999; Duckett 1997; Hu 1997; Krieg and Schädler 
1995; Liu 1996; Wong 1995). In comparison with its rural counterpart, welfare 
reforms for urban areas have been implemented more systematically and 
comprehensively due to their political weight in the overall framework of Chinese 
social security systems. 
 
5.2.2 Disparate Economic and Social Transformation in Rural Areas 
The tight control of the state over the rural peasants began to loosen with the advent 
of the reform process. The first breakthrough came with the introduction of the 
household responsibility system. It aimed to promote agriculture with a series of 
policies such as raising state procurement prices for farm produce, promoting 
sideline production as well as reviving rural markets and allowing the sale of grain 
outside peasants’ own residence (Heberer and Taubmann 1998; Selden 1999; Wong 
1998; Wong and MacPherson 1995). Institutional restructuring also accompanied 
                                                 
40 Athar Hussain attempts to tackle this measurement problem by adopting various definitions in 
order to gain a more comprehensive picture of urban poverty. See: Hussain (2002); also cf. Khan and 
Riskin (2001). 
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these economic reforms. In 1982 communes were abolished, and the administrative 
functions were transferred to township (zhen) or village governments (xiang). In the 
following years, a series of financial decentralization was enforced so that local 
governments have won more administrative and fiscal autonomy. 41  From 1984 
onwards, peasants were allowed to move into cities for work and business without 
changing their rural status. One year later, the state abolished its monopoly on grain 
procurement and switched to purchase on contract. All these measures have greatly 
revived the rural economy.  
The core mechanisms of the economic growth in rural China lay in the 
industrialization and the household responsibility system. By 1987 rural industry has 
already surpassed agriculture as the dominant source of total rural income. 
According to the data collected by Oi (1999a: 1), total output of rural enterprises 
surged almost ninefold from 1980 to 1987, and they contributed to almost one quarter 
of China’s total exports. The strong growth of rural industries has led to profound 
changes. Large amount of rural labor force transferred from agriculture to industry 
and service sectors, thereby altering the employment landscape from self- to wage 
employment and induced population migration from poor villages to rich regions 
(Hussain 1999: 6ff.; also Herberer and Taubmann 1998; Krieg and Schädler 1995; and 
critical analyses Knight and Song 1999; Solinger 1999; Wu 2000; Zhang 2003). Rural 
migration challenged the institutional structures and premises of providing different 
levels of service and support according to the residence and employment status. As 
migrant workers had no registration status in their workplaces, they were in fact 
excluded from any local social security systems, making them vulnerable to typical 
risks of modern life. Nor had their children any access to local health care and 
education (Fan 1999: 50; Tang 1999).  
The large wave of migration in China was propelled by the growing imbalance 
among regional development. The uneven development was most palpable between 
rural and urban areas. World Bank (1997a: 16) reported that rural incomes were only 
40 percent of urban incomes in 1995, down from 59 percent in 1983.42 McKinley and 
Brenner (1999: 6f.) calculated the change of Gini-ratio between 1988 and 1995 from 
0.382 to 0.452, or an 18% rise. Results of numerous studies also revealed similar 
trends (Khan and Riskin 2001; Knight and Song 1999; Nyberg and Rozelle 1999; 
Riskin et al. 2001). While the impact of income inequality in urban areas could be 
mitigated by the existing social security system, it was much harder for their rural 
counterparts to tackle these problems alone due to lack of a social safety net.  
                                                 
41 The relative autonomy of local government in the decision over local issues is seen in the eyes of 
some scholars as a key factor that has generated rapid rural industrialization in the last two decades. 
See: Oi (1995, 1998, 1999a); Walder (1995b, 1998). 
42 Rural residents did have initially profited from the reforms as their incomes rose rapidly, but these 
began to lag behind the increase pace of urban incomes after 1985. This trend reversed only once in 
1995.  
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In sum, all these issues emerge as factors that have undermined social stability. 
A difficult but necessary task is to extend existing residual social safety net for the 
rural population. Nevertheless, any determined political move for rural welfare 
extension at this stage appears unlikely, as the state intervention remains very 
fragmented. In recent years, the MOCA has initiated innovative experiments with 
insurance schemes in rural areas (see chapter 6). These include pension insurance 
schemes, as well as efforts by the Ministry of Health to reintroduce health 
prepayment schemes similar to the earlier cooperative medical schemes (Cook 2000; 
Wang 1996; Wong 1998; World Bank 1997b). Due to regional disparities, however, 
these programs were first introduced in more developed areas. A further extension 
of social security programs depends on the overall economic growth and the state’s 
resolution to distribute resources more evenly among its citizens. 
 
5.2.3 Demographic Transition 
A social phenomenon equally challenging to social welfare development in China is 
its rapidly aging population. Drastic change of age structure is a combination of the 
one-child policy and the prolonged life expectancy as a result of the relatively 
effective health care. The unprecedented speed of population aging comparable with 
industrialized countries has attracted numerous researchers to measure the scale and 
extent of its impact (Chow 1999; Cook 2000; Fan 1999; Hu 1997; Hussain 1999; UNDP 
1999; Wang 1999; West 1999; World Bank 1997b). Their studies unanimously portray 
a gloomy future of aging development the Chinese are going to encounter. For 
example, World Bank (1997b: 14) estimates that the elderly (aged 60 and elder) will 
compose some 16% of the Chinese population by 2020, approaching the 18.6% share 
in OECD countries in 1990. Whereas most OECD countries spent 80 to 100 years to 
double the proportion of their old people to 18%, China will achieve this goal in only 
34 years. Hussain (1999: 2-6) indicates the shrinking proportion of the population 
group aged from 15-29, which dropped from 47.3% in 1982 to 36.3% in 1998. The 
proportion of the age group 30-64, by contrast, increased in the same period from 
52.7% to 63.7%.  
The aggravating demographic development has two major implications for 
current social security systems. First, the foreseeable tendency of more dependent 
elderly indicates that priorities should be given to establishing more sustainable 
systems of pensions and health care in coming welfare reforms. These developments 
would certainly complicate the whole circumstance since the ongoing welfare 
reforms have already given rise to more contingencies for certain population groups. 
Second, the uneven dependency ratio in terms of both child and elderly dependency 
raises the question of burden distribution among societal sectors (state, market, and 
family), a crucial issue in designing new or reshaping old social security systems. 
Especially rural areas are far less well prepared for the demographic challenge than 
their urban counterparts. While family and land are hitherto two major pillars 
underpinning rural welfare, diminishing offspring will surely weaken the caring 
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function of families and thus that of the already fragmented rural social security 
systems. 43 
 
5.3 Reforms of Social Policy after 1979: General Development 
The onset of economic reforms marks the turning point for social policy development 
in China. The redirection from plan to market economy has fundamentally altered 
the role of societal sectors in the process of welfare production. The leading idea of 
development now emphasizes efficiency rather than equality. Deng’s slogan “let 
some people get rich first, let some areas get rich first” demonstrates vividly the 
maxim of the Chinese government. As a consequence, the exorbitant intervention of 
the state in the Maoist era is replaced by its successive retreat from all societal 
spheres: control of civil life is relaxed and autonomy of local areas and social groups 
reinvigorated. In the filed of social policy, the state is attempting to diversify welfare 
responsibilities among different societal sectors. This is especially obvious in the 
urban areas where traditional occupational welfare systems are overhauled in the 
hope to relieve the state’s burden and strengthen SOE’s efficiency. The trend is 
turning from ubiquitous care of the state to re-commodification of labor force and re-
emphasis of individual responsibility. 
Recalibration of policy aims and measures thus becomes a major task of Chinese 
welfare reforms. With regard to the policy clientele, there remains a clear tendency 
towards the urban bias. Though peasants and their village collectives enjoy more 
freedom than before, they still have to bear considerable responsibility for their own 
economic development and welfare provision. One significant consequence is the 
widening regional inequality, as poor areas receive few aids from the central 
government, therefore unable to escape the gridlock of underdevelopment. The 
urban areas, meanwhile, receive many aids from the state due to the central 
government’s policy orientation on urbanization and industrialization. 
Developmental imbalance is most evident between city and countryside, but also 
continues widening between coastal and inland areas. The following description 
seeks to depict social policy reforms in China following the vein of urban-rural 
divide. Note that it does not intend to give a comprehensive illustration of all policy 
reforms, as this task is almost impossible given the complexity of their overall 
development. The aim is rather to delineate the contour and direction of the reform 
process in order to locate rural pension schemes in corresponding contexts. 
 
5.3.1 Urban Welfare Reforms: “Socializing” Occupational Welfare 
For more than three decades after the establishment of the PRC, the urban system of 
employment-based welfare represented the superiority of socialism. Yet as the sum 
                                                 
43 Hussain (1999: 4) indicates that only 20% of the aged Chinese (over 60) receive pensions and merely 
a small proportion of these are in urban areas. The rest 80% aged people live in rural areas and 
depend largely on their children for financial support. 
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of workers eligible for pension benefits surged, financial pressure upon the system 
began looming. The rapid rise of retirees since the 1980s put additional burden on the 
state and collective enterprises at a time when they were also under pressure to 
competition with new private, foreign-funded firms as well as TVEs.44 The mounting 
yet uneven pressure on individual work units to pay the welfare benefits of their 
retirees was a direct threat to the effort to increase their productivity. In order to 
tackle these problems, the Chinese government adopted measures in three respects. 
First, the government set up in 1986 a special contract workers’ retirement pension 
system for state employees hired on labor contract basis. Meanwhile, the existing 
pension system for employees of SOEs was reformed. Second, China introduced for 
the first time since 1949 unemployment insurance for SOE employees. Third, in order 
to tackle increasing risk of poverty in urban areas, the government established a new 
social assistance scheme. These three steps reflected the policy effort to prepare SOEs 
and their employees for the institutional transition to market economy. These 
measures were incremental reforms focusing on promoting the independence and 
autonomy of SOEs as well as diversifying the burden of welfare costs among 
individuals, enterprises and the state. These three reform endeavors are sketched 
below.45 
 
Pension Reforms 
China started experiments of alternative pension options in the mid-1980s (Chow 
and Xu 2001; Lee 2000; Leung 1994; 2003; Selden and You 1997; Smyth 1999, 2000; 
West 1999; Whiteford 2003). With the initial experiments made in several cities in the 
early 1980s, all cities were encouraged to set up pooled funds for pensions in 1985. 
The state hoped that enterprises with different proportions of retirees could share 
their pension costs together. Furthermore, under the new contract workers’ scheme 
in 1986, both enterprises and contract employees were obliged to pay contributions 
to a funding pool.46 The new policy marked a farewell to the traditional socialist 
system of occupational welfare by a further stride towards mixed insurance. Yet the 
reform of 1986 only dealt with the contract employees and left out other types of 
                                                 
44
 According to the estimates of Selden and You (1997: 1661), the number of retirees increased tenfold 
from 3.1 million in 1978 to 30.9 million in 1995, including 24 million state sector and 6.2 million 
collective sector employees. Total insurance and welfare benefits rose from 7.8 billion Yuan in 1978 to 
236 billion Yuan in 1995, a net increase of 15.5% in the total wage bill in the SOEs. 
45 The following description leaves out intentionally the urban health insurance because it is less 
relevant for the connection between rationalization of the SOE and employment security of the urban 
workers. Also, the trend in the urban health reforms that the state imposes more responsibility onto 
enterprises and individuals corresponds largely to the development of other social insurance branches 
delineated in this chapter. For further discussion in this field, see Duckett (2001b, 2004); Zheng (2002). 
46 Based on the State Council Document 77 of 1986, Enterprises contribute 15 percent of contract 
employees’ total wages and contract employees make an individual contribution of no more than 3 
percent of their standard wages. Pension pooling covers the following items of benefits: pensions, 
medical fees, death compensation and funeral expenses, survivors’ payments and relief. 
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workers. The effect of financial pooling soon proved insufficient in coping with the 
mounting burden of coming pension expenditures. 
Against this backdrop, the State Council’s decided in 1991 to introduce a 
nationwide new system of old-age pensions for state-sector employees (guanyu qiye 
zhigong yanglao baoxian zhidu gaige de jueding). Envisaged was the introduction of a 
multi-tiered pension scheme for employees of state-owned and collectively-owned 
enterprises. According to the plan, all SOEs were due to set up contributory pension 
funds for their employees, and other types of enterprises such as collectively-owned 
enterprises, joint ventures, and urban private enterprises should follow suit. The 
financial structure of the basic tier was set based on actual pension expenditures, but 
the financial ability of employees should be taken into account as well. The state, 
SOE and individual employees were to share contributions to the pension insurance 
altogether (the state contributed by preferential tax treatment while the other two 
parties paid contributions on a monthly basis). The collected contributions were 
either deposited in a designated bank or partially invested in government bonds. In 
addition, bigger enterprises in sound financial conditions could establish their own 
supplementary pension schemes. An optional benefit based on individual savings 
was also encouraged. Employees could participate in programs according to their 
own financial capabilities.  
The year 1995 saw another major reform when the State Council (guanyu 
shenhua qiye zhigong yanglao baoxian zhidu gaige de tongzhi) decided to expand the new 
three-tier pension scheme to employees in non-state sectors. Following the decision 
of 1991, the document of 1995 further regulated that the basic part of the scheme was 
designated as a combination for basic old age insurance with personal accounts for 
individual workers (so-called shehui tongchou yu geren zhanghu). All workers owned a 
personal fund account portable throughout their working paths. Individual 
contribution rate was set at no more than 3 percent of his/her average wages in the 
previous year, which would rise by 1 percent every two years. The pension reform of 
1995 was an attempt to integrate unified fund and individual accounts. The 
establishment of individual accounts aimed at expanding the funding basis and 
reducing employers’ contribution as well as providing incentives for employees to 
contribute.  
Yet, as the reforms of SOEs speeded up in the course of the 1990s, it became 
clear that the pension scheme based on the State Council Document of 1995 was still 
incomplete. In July 1997, the State Council issued another document addressing 
problems of the current system (guanyu jianli tongyi de qiye zhigong jiben yanglao 
baoxian zhidu de jueding). The main objective was to unify pension systems to a state 
pension program. The 1997 reform substantially redistributed pension burdens 
among enterprises as well as between enterprises and employees. It reduced the 
replacement rate of pension benefits from 80 to below 60 percent, slashed the 
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contribution burden of enterprises but increased employees’ shares.47 The reform of 
1997 also urged local governments at various levels to establish subsistence 
allowance system in urban areas to provide minimum benefits to the poor including 
pensioners (Minimum Living Standard System, see below). In this way, it attempted 
to diversify the financial risk among various enterprises and strengthen the condition 
of the whole system. 
The effort to unify pension schemes and their local administration at the 
provincial level went further in 1998, as only 13 provincial localities had established 
unified social pooling by the end of 1997. To lubricate the transition process in the 
local systems, the State Council allowed local governments to establish a provincially 
unified adjustment mechanism at first, and then a provincially unified pension 
system by the end of 1998. In this way, social pooling provided all retired workers 
within that pooled social pensions. Yet overall, even after the 1997 reform, enormous 
regional variations persisted. This led the Chinese government to conduct 
experiments or pilot projects, among them notably the pilot plan launched in the 
Liaoning province in December 2000 (Zheng 2002: 91). The goal was to upgrade the 
old-age, medical care, and unemployment insurance programs of the state for urban 
employees. The plan included both components of social pooling and individual 
accounts, a further move to consolidate the three-tier pension system. 
Pension reforms in urban China are one of the core social policies that attempt 
to adjust traditional old-age security systems in line with the structural overhaul of 
SOEs. The central idea of the reform strategies is to establish a multi-pillar system in 
which funded individual savings account can supplement enterprise benefits. A 
balanced distribution of pension costs among the state, enterprises and individual 
workers becomes the financial paradigm underpinning the whole reform process. 
Due to decentralized political structure and lack of appropriate social insurance laws, 
however, the state fails to stipulate penalties for non-compliance (Béland and Yu 
2004; Chow and Xu 2001). Local labor departments (main body of implementation) 
often find it difficult to coerce enterprises to make contributions, especially those 
already struggling for survival. Furthermore, most of the contributions paid into the 
individual pension accounts are susceptible to administrative abuse, which directs it 
to pay for current pension expenditure instead of accumulating in independent 
investment funds. The advantage of personal pension accounts is further dented by 
the fragile financial system in China, a problem that puts the desired profitability of 
funded accounts to flank the pension system into question. Hence, despite the 
progress of pension reforms in urban China since the 1980s, their overall results are 
still far from successful.  
 
                                                 
47 Each enterprise should not contribute more than 20 percent of the total wages as social pension 
funding, while individual workers had to pay 11 percent of their wages into personal accounts. 
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Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment was supposed not existing before 1978. This circumstance changed 
when the economic reforms developed to a stage at which SOEs were allowed to lay 
off redundant workforce. With the number of laid-off workers mounting, it became 
clear that social policy for this group was needed to lubricate the transition process. 
Since 1978, China has been developing unemployment insurance in three steps 
(Chow and Xu 2001; Wong and Ngok 2006; Zheng 2002). The first locally based 
unemployment insurance scheme was established upon the requirement of the State 
Council in 1986 (guoying qiye zhigong daiye baoxian zhanxing tiaoli). It issued a 
document which reformed fundamentally the employment system: 1) establishing 
the contract labor system; 2) abolishing the practice of assigning workers to 
enterprises by the government while introducing open competition in recruitment 
policies; 3) allowing dismissal of employees with unsatisfactory work records; and 4) 
establishing unemployment insurance for SOEs. At the outset, the access to 
unemployment insurance was limited only to laid-off workers of SOEs. Participating 
SOEs had to contribute 1 percent of the total standard wage bill, while benefits 
included regular relief payments, medical payment, funeral expenses, and survivors’ 
compensation.48 Accumulated funds were also obliged to pay pensions to retirees of 
bankrupt enterprises, as well as offer training and financial assistance. Both the 
duration and level of benefits were calculated on the length of employment and the 
standard wages.  
The newly-established unemployment insurance faced soon a challenge as the 
mass dismissal became imminent during the 1990s. The government realized that 
further extension of the unemployment insurance was essential to assist an 
increasing number of involuntary laid-offs. The scheme, which initially covered only 
new recruitment in SOEs, was then successively extended to the increasing mass of 
formal employees dismissed by their work units. The State Council Document 110 
formally recognized this practice in 1993 (guoyou qiye zhigong daiye baoxian tiaoli), 
which expanded the coverage of the scheme from unemployed workers in SOEs to 
all types of unemployed workers. Whereas the duration of receiving the benefits 
remained unchanged, the benefit levels were adjusted from the previous 50-75 
percent of the standard wages to 120-150 percent of the social relief program (Zheng 
2002: 165). Local governments were given the discretion to define the exact 
contribution rate of enterprises. Furthermore, the reform of 1993 stressed the 
importance of reintegration in the labor market, thereby obliging the local 
governments to spare a certain amount of the funds for training programs or 
reemployment assistance.49 
                                                 
48 The standard wages were calculated as the worker’s average monthly wages over two years before 
leaving the enterprise. 
49 For a recent analysis of policies towards the unemployed and the function of the re-employment 
service center in Shanghai, see Wong and Ngok (2006). 
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In the course of the mid 1990s, it became evident that further measures should 
be taken to tackle the unemployment problem outside the state enterprises. The State 
Council issued in January of 1999 “Regulations on Unemployment Insurance” (shiye 
baoxian tiaoli), ruling that unemployment insurance be legalized and compulsory for 
all enterprises excluding governmental organs (State Council 1999). Local 
governments were even allowed to extend the coverage to employees in non-
governmental organizations and self-employed households. Contribution rates for 
enterprises were raised from previously 1 percent to 2 percent of the total wages, and 
employees were also demanded to make an individual contribution of 1 percent of 
the total wages (ibid: 167). By increasing enterprise contribution rate and including 
individual contribution of the employees, the reform sought to broaden the financial 
basis of the scheme.  
In order to curb benefit costs, the reform of 1999 differentiated the duration of 
benefits into three grades according to the number of years the beneficiary had 
contributed to the fund. A record of one-year contribution payment was the 
prerequisite for the eligibility. The maximal period of unemployment benefits was 24 
months when the beneficiary had over 10 years of contribution record, and 18 
months instead if the duration contribution payment was between 5-10 years, 12 
months only when previous contribution record was less than 5 years. A beneficiary 
could get 60-75 percent of the standard wages during the first 12 months of 
unemployment and 50 percent for another 12 months, the same rate as previously 
(ibid: 167). Yet if the unemployed worker’s eligible benefit fell below the standard 
minimum wages, local governments could determine the exact level of benefits based 
on individual situations to avoid falling into poverty. 
In sum, the implementation of the reform 1999 has broadened the coverage of 
the unemployment insurance as well as the funding basis of the scheme. The 
financing method has also been diversified to strengthen the viability of the scheme, 
though in practice the enterprises had to bear a large proportion of the funds based 
on the number of laid-off employees from them (shehuihua). Local governments were 
given greater responsibility for organizing the implementation of unemployment 
insurance at local level and setting up reemployment service centers that provided 
financial assistance and job introduction. With the institutionalization of the 
unemployment insurance, the central government has taken a further step towards 
diversification of welfare responsibilities among societal sectors. 
 
Minimum Living Standard Scheme 
Despite the efforts of the government to address the intensifying problems of 
unemployment and pension burden, more employees were unable to receive their 
pensions or wages from SOEs due to the problem of rising unemployment burden. 
Even the establishment of the unemployment insurance was not sufficient to cope 
with the urban poverty emerging as an urgent phenomenon (Liu and Wu 2006). To 
establish a social safety net in the cities, the government restructured the traditional 
 99 
social assistance program in 1993, aiming to extend its coverage, raise the level of 
benefits and secure financial commitments from local governments. This has led to 
the Regulations on the Minimum Living Standard System (MLSS; zuidi shenghuo 
baozhang) in 1999, which prescribed all city governments to include the social 
assistance expenses in city budgets (Hussain 2002; Leung and Wong 1999; Shang and 
Wu 2004; Zheng 2002). Before MLSS there were already several pilot schemes 
experimented at some localities, which offered experience and lessons for the final 
implementation across the country. Shanghai, for instance, was the first city to 
introduce the MLSS in 1993. Yet in contrast to many other reforms, the 
institutionalization of the MLSS has turned to be much more rapid than initially 
envisaged. The 1997 plenary meeting of the National People’s Congress gave strong 
support to the proposal of an MLSS, and at the end of 1998, 486 cities have 
established the MLSS.  
An obvious difference of the MLSS to the earlier form of urban poverty relief 
lies in its openness to those able to work with a household income below the local 
poverty line. In this respect, the scheme marks an important progress because it 
loosens the tight link between work and welfare dominant during the era of plan 
economy. The MLSS includes more poverty-stricken families and offered more cash 
benefits than traditional relief programs. The definition of eligibility for assistance in 
terms of income recognizes the inevitable unemployment as a consequence of 
economic reforms as well as the inability of local governments to provide job 
guarantee. It supplements the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1986 and 
also the living allowance for laid-off employees. 
The MLSS provides the last line of protection against urban poverty. The target 
groups of the new program are persons who fall into the following destitute 
situations: traditional recipients of social assistance (three no’s), families in financial 
difficulties due to unemployment, unemployed people not eligible for 
unemployment benefits and pensioners with modest pension incomes. Formally, the 
MLSS covers only the urban population. The assistance line is calculated according to 
the minimum standard of living often based on expenditure surveys of low-income 
households and the financial capacity of the local authority. At the subsistence level, 
the program offers cash and in-kind assistance, and covers merely basic food and 
clothing costs as well as fuel, rental, medical care and tuition expenses. The rates are 
adjusted according to inflation rates. 
The MLSS is operated at the community level. Administration at the city level is 
located at the city civil affairs bureau, which coordinates the work of the district 
office. District offices then check and monitor cases delivered by the street local street 
offices. Applications are to be submitted to the local street offices, which then check 
the documents and make recommendations for assistance. Civil affair officials of 
street offices are also responsible for identifying families in poverty. In the 
calculation of incomes, all sorts of household income of all members are to be 
included. They are also in charge of delivering benefits, keeping records and 
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reviewing regularly the situations of the recipients. Neighborhood cadres will visit 
recipients once in a month to check on their financial situations.  
The minimum standard varies from city to city, depending on the financial 
strength of local governments.50 The assistance level is based on the minimum cost of 
basic necessities in the city. The usual practice of the city governments is to survey 
the income and consumption patterns of families living in poverty, the results 
determine what the basic necessities are and the minimum costs needed. The benefit 
level is deliberately set lower than the minimum wages and the unemployment relief 
so that work incentives will not be dented. Both the district and the street office are 
obliged to assist recipients to search for jobs. Recipients who reject job introduction 
from employment agencies twice will be denied benefits. 
So far, the program is operated at the level of local governments. A specific 
national statute or policy coordination by the central government is not yet 
scheduled. This decentralized administration leaves much room for cities to 
implement the scheme according to their own circumstances, which results in a 
variety of benefit calculation and beneficiary definition among cities. The 
effectiveness of the MLSS becomes vulnerable to the discretion of local officials in 
charge of the civil affairs, who often respond to the shortage of funds by tightening 
the qualification for receiving assistance and thus reducing the numbers of potential 
beneficiaries. As a consequence, the coverage of the MLSS is actually very low. 
Among identified poor households, less than 30 percent of them have received 
assistance from the program, not to mention the fact that even more potential 
applicants remain unidentified (Hussain 2002: 61). To remedy these visible 
inadequacies, a further move towards standardization of the program by enacting 
national law and offering financial subsidies would certainly nudge more 
economically weak cities to strengthen the effectiveness of the MLSS. 
 
5.3.2 Rural Community Welfare: Fragmented Welfare Reforms 
Before 1978, the centerpiece of the social security system in the Chinese countryside 
was the land plot allocated to rural households. Farming income and family support 
were two main pillars of rural welfare. Collective support of in-kind subsidies only 
came sparsely from communes and production teams. This has only partly changed 
after the outset of the rural reforms. While pre-reform era required that agricultural 
outputs be collected together by production teams in communes which would then 
distribute the harvest among the members, the new rule granted each household the 
capacity to dispose of its own produce. The crop harvest of land plots as well as the 
incentive for increasing agricultural output ensured that incomes from farming 
                                                 
50 The most famous models originate from Shanghai, Wuhan and Chongqing, each introducing own 
system of the MLSS in the course of the 1990s respectively. Though the benefit level and entitlement 
condition vary among them, the basic principles sketched here apply to all. For a more thorough 
comparison, see Zheng (2002). 
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activities would suffice for living costs. Rural industries further provided new 
employment opportunities to attract rural labor force in pursuit of higher incomes. 
Yet, the far-reaching institutional transition from collectivization to household 
economy has inevitably disbanded the communes and shattered the main pillar of 
social security in rural China (Ash 2001; Cook 2000; Krieg and Schädler 1995; Oi 
1999b; You 1995). As communes used to be the administrative organ responsible for 
economic, social and welfare affairs, the shift to household farming has undermined 
the basis of collective welfare from underneath. Villagers in poor regions with weak 
economic strength were confronted with the problem of making sufficient revenues 
for their own welfare provision. Under the new circumstances, local cadres also 
found themselves more powerless in transferring village resources among 
households to achieve greater justice since peasants tended to resist giving up a 
portion of the harvest upon demand. In short: the household responsibility system 
has fundamentally changed the relationship between local cadres and villagers 
towards greater autonomy of the latter. 
As China never established a comprehensive social security system for rural 
citizens and left them instead in the protection of community safety net, the waning 
of communes after 1978 meant a fading role of collective welfare provision in rural 
areas. Traditionally established branches of health care and social assistance also 
underwent dramatic transformations, largely to the disadvantage of the poor. In 
many poor areas, community-based social security systems have de facto collapsed, 
and local administrations are no longer competent in maintaining basic social net for 
rural residents, leaving them exposed to enormous economic risk. Reform initiatives 
in recent years thus concentrated on reviving the responsibility of local governments 
and communities for developing social infrastructure and providing welfare benefits. 
Three areas are of particular interest: health reform, social assistance and old-age 
security. While the latter will be explored in detail in the next chapter, the following 
description is confined to the first two areas. 
 
Rural Health Reforms 
Since the onset of economic reforms in the early 1980s, the reform strategy of the 
central government has been liberalization of rural health sector, deliberately 
reducing its responsibility in the total spending by shifting the burden to local 
governments and individual households (again: shehuihua). However, the transition 
from collectivization to household economy has weakened the financial basis of the 
cooperative medical system, leading to the collapse of traditional rural collective 
medical systems (RCMS). Many villages have seen a rapid drop of health workers 
such as barefoot doctors, medical assistants and midwives (Cheung 2001; Lu 1996; 
Unger 2002). By 1986, only very few villages still owned cooperative medical systems. 
Policymakers were preoccupied at that time with the idea that as long as economic 
growth kept rolling, voluntary community financing schemes would eventually 
come into being. Along with the growing commercialization within the economy was 
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the limited access to health care, which was decided by individual ability to pay (Liu 
2004; Rösner 2004; Selden 1999; You 1995). The result was that rising cost of medical 
services was causing more and more rural poverty, and inadequate funding was 
driving clinics to increase fees and sell patients more drugs. Poor regions and their 
households were those groups most vulnerable to these changes, as user charges and 
high medical costs now deterred many who lacked sufficient income from getting 
proper medical treatment. How to rebuild a medical system accessible to rural 
population thus became one of the major issues in rural social policy in recent years. 
Under the sponsorship of the World Bank, the central government launched in 
1989-90 a rural health insurance experiment in Sichuan Province, which covered 26 
villages in two counties and 40,443 residents (World Bank 1997c: 49f.). The pilot 
scheme established a health cooperative insurance, which offered basic treatments in 
villages and major treatments in townships (xiaobing buchucun, dabing buchuzhen). 
Premiums were set at 1.5 percent of average income. Three insurance benefit plans 
were in practice with varying refund rates for inpatient and outpatient services. 
Insured patients were free to go to village and township clinics but could only visit 
county hospitals in emergencies or with transfer of the township health center. This 
pilot scheme has won widespread support among the rural residents – more than 90 
percent of households in the experiment areas voluntarily joined the program, and 95 
percent continued their membership after the first year.  
The example of Sichuan’s experiment demonstrates the attempt of local 
governments to switch rural medical system from the care to the insurance principle, 
a necessary response to the dismantling of the communes. Their reform goal aims at 
balancing financial responsibility between individuals and collective risk pooling. 
Based on the experience with pilot scheme of cooperative system, a new policy for 
financing rural healthcare was put forward in 1994, demanding the development of 
community-based schemes to fund and organize healthcare for the rural residents 
(World Bank 1997c: 51f.). The new policy stipulated that each community organized 
its own collective financing for basic healthcare, and funding would be gathered 
from government, collectives and individuals. It also acknowledged the unequal 
development of regional economy and required that schemes and benefit catalogs are 
set in accordance with local conditions and economic capacities. Above all, priority of 
the community-based scheme should be given to pre-emptive measures which could 
prevent disease dissemination.  
The success of reinstatement of cooperative healthcare services by the central 
government in the course of the 1990s remained limited, as most provincial and 
county governments found it difficult to set up community-financed schemes based 
on individual contributions.51 For an effective scheme to work, considerably higher 
contributions would be needed which the villagers either would not or could not 
                                                 
51 However, residents of well-developed rural regions still enjoy better protection of healthcare, as 
local governments take initiatives either to rebuild traditional community-based medical care or 
experiment their own models. For analysis in this respect, see: Huang (2004). 
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afford. As a result, local governments lacked political motivation and financial 
capability to establish cooperative healthcare systems due to weak financial support 
of the central government. This has been acknowledged by the central government, 
which issued a formal decision on further strengthening rural health work on 
October 29th, 2002 (Bloom and Fang 2003; Rösner 2004). The 2002 rural health policy 
guideline envisaged a new type of rural cooperative medical scheme (RCMS) and a 
program of medical aid for needy households. Based on the experience in local pilot 
projects, the new RCMS should provide basic hygiene and health protection for all 
rural residents. From 2003 onward, a system of tripartite funding (central 
government, village collectives and rural workers) would be set up to offer subsidies 
to members for medical treatment. 
The new RCMS was formally launched in the second half of 2003, making a 
detailed assessment of its eventual results at this stage impossible. Some scholars 
have, however, identified difficulties emerging in the implementation the schemes 
ranging from lack of sufficient funding from the central government to reluctance of 
many provincial governments to fully cooperate for fear of financial overburden (Liu 
2004; Rösner 2004). The voluntary nature of the schemes has also undermined the 
operation of the healthcare scheme because mostly poor and ill-healthy members are 
more inclined to join the scheme than richer and healthier ones. Many local 
governments have no option but to reduce the reimbursement payable to the 
participating members. Preliminary results reveal that, despite the intention of the 
central government to shift larger part of organizing and financial responsibility to 
local governments and individual peasants, the whole scheme would be unable to 
sustain without the assistance of the central government. Much will depend on the 
willingness of the central government to overtake the main financial responsibility 
and provide substantial financial support. After decades of commercialization, it is 
also high time for a stronger role of the state in the organization of healthcare in rural 
areas. 
 
Poverty Alleviation 
Traditionally, rural areas established poor relief programs to offer in-kind assistance 
(wubao), catastrophic aids or welfare facilities (mostly home for the aged). After the 
commencement of the economic reforms in 1978, this strategic orientation gradually 
gave way to promoting regional economic growth as a means of improving income 
situations of the poor. One of the main goals of economic reforms was to reduce the 
number of people living in (absolute) poverty. By means of rapid economic growth, 
the Chinese government hoped to uplift the average income and living standard of 
poor regions. This strategy worked: the number of people living in absolute poverty 
has dropped from 250 million in 1978 to merely 30 million in 2002. Yet the reduction 
of poverty numbers was only one side of the coin. Various studies have pointed out 
that income disparities among regions were growing at a staunching rate, not least 
due to diverse developmental paces among them (Knight and Song 1999; Riskin et al. 
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2001; World Bank 1997a, 2001). Among the population living in poverty, 80% were in 
the western and central provinces. How the wealth was to be distributed among 
population now became a central problem in China. In the domain of poor relief the 
central government turned to this issue and tried to balance the increasingly uneven 
development among regions. 
The year 1982 marked the starting point of this developmental approach to 
poverty alleviation. A comprehensive construction plan for the “Three-West” regions 
(mainly Gansu, Ningxia) was devised to animate the economy of poor western areas. 
As large-scale overarching policy packages required better coordination among 
different governmental departments, the State Council established a Leading Group 
Office for Poverty Reduction (LGPR) in 1986, which aimed to coordinate various 
poverty reduction measures at the local level, and to promote economic development 
in poor areas (Rozelle et al. 1998; World Bank 2001). The LGPR administered a new 
investment program allocating 4 billion Yuan per year to 300 nationally designated 
poor counties. Its executive agency, the Poor Area Development Office (PADO), has 
since then acted as the main advocate of rural poor. The administrative model of the 
State Council was soon adopted by the local governments and similar offices in 
charge of poverty reduction programs. The year 1986 also marked the start of the 
central government’s commitment to boosting economic development in poor areas, 
and most of the government’s subsidized loans were directed to poor households for 
improving agricultural production. The 8th Five Year Plan (1991-1995) confirmed the 
status of the LGPR and gave it further authority to manage domestic funding and 
international aids. 
The poverty reduction strategy gained further momentum through the 1994 
National Plan for Poverty Reduction (8-7 plan), which set the goal of lifting the bulk 
of the 80 million poor above the official poverty line in the next seven years to 2000 
(World Bank 2001: 41). The plan sought to (a) assist poor households with land 
improvement; (b) improve local infrastructure such as road construction, electricity 
provision, drinking water supply for poor villages; (c) extend primary education and 
provide basic preventive and curative health care; (d) improve management of 
poverty reduction funding; and (e) include and integrate support from all 
government ministries, coastal provinces and major municipalities, agencies as well 
as other organizations.  
After launching the 8-7 plan, the central government has mobilized all available 
agencies and organizations to alleviate the plight of poor regions. In a National 
Poverty Reduction Conference in September 1996, a new “poverty reduction 
responsibility system” was established in which the leaders of the western provinces 
and poor regions were authorized to be responsible for the poverty alleviation work 
in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, the conference reached the conclusion that 
assistance should be given directly to poor villages and households (fupin daohu), and 
that supervision of poverty reduction works should be intensified to improve 
management of funding. Then in 1999 a similar conference was held again to 
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consolidate the targets and measures of the 8-7 plan (ibid: 42). The central 
government used this opportunity to declare that increasing domestic investment 
and capital construction in the western provinces would be a key dimension to 
poverty reduction. It further confirmed the importance of micro-credits for poor 
households to improve agricultural production, aquaculture or animal husbandry. 
To achieve these ends, the central government emphasized the vital task of 
strengthening financial controls and auditing measure for all poverty funds. 
To fulfill the ambitious goal of poverty alleviation, the central government 
continued raising the amount of poverty funds used for sustaining economies of 
poor regions. While the overall sum of poverty funds during 1986 and 1993 
amounted to 41.93 billion Yuan, it doubled to 87.88 billion Yuan during 1994 and 
1999 (You 2000). Yet in real terms total poverty reduction program funding did not 
grow until the second half of the 1990s. The funding of the central government was 
supplemented by provincial and lower level poverty funds, which were required to 
provide matching funds in the amount of 30 – 50 percent of the national loan funds. 
But in reality the latter were often provided at a much lower scale due to weak fiscal 
conditions of many poor provinces. Many still depended on the financial support of 
the central government. 
Despite the continuous decline of the absolute number of poor population, the 
overall policy framework for poverty alleviation still lacks a comprehensive 
developmental strategy. The experience of the past decade suggests that economic 
growth of regions alone does not automatically translate into desired poverty 
reduction. The vital task of the Chinese government is thus to find a fine balance 
between economic growth and social justice that would eradicate more potential 
poverty. Even though great efforts are being made to promote economic growth of 
backward poor regions, the proportion of the rural sector’s share in public resources 
still lags behind, not least in social policy realms such as health care and education 
which could greatly improve the life chances of the poor population. Lopsided 
emphasis on the role of economic growth for poor alleviation would not sufficiently 
make up the gap widened by other imbalanced policies towards different sectors and 
social groups. 
 
5.4 Prospect of Chinese Social Policy with Respect to Old-Age Security 
for the Rural Citizens 
The above analysis has given a mixed picture of the general development of social 
policy in China. The unprecedented experience of institutional transition from state 
socialism to market economy has given China a unique opportunity to consolidate 
her overall economic strength and improve the lives of people. Now the majority of 
the Chinese populations do enjoy the fruit of economic growth, albeit at the price of 
exposing to more risks and contingencies of the market economy. At the same time, 
many social problems also emerge as a consequence of the large-scale reform 
 106 
process, manifested in the sharpening social inequality among regions and social 
groups. Though the Chinese government has embarked on a series of reforms to 
mitigate conflicts in various issues, the outlook that these may be settled in the near 
future remains bleak, not least because many social problems are intermingled with 
one another so that each single reform itself can only partly resolve the issue. But 
even so, incremental reform patchworks in the last 25 years have already altered the 
essence of Chinese social policy. 
The process of welfare reforms in China will undoubtedly continue its 
experimental approach towards new policy guidelines for forthcoming social issues. 
The above analysis of various reform efforts in both urban and rural sectors has 
manifested the adaptive nature of the political logic. Under the circumstance of 
regional disparity, each political move of the government towards welfare reforms 
has to take diversity into account and tends to be tentative. A typical procedure is to 
implement pilot schemes in chosen regions to assess their feasibility. Often this could 
last several months or even years, depending on the willingness of top policy-makers 
and priorities of political agenda. Only when it is deemed urgent and feasible would 
policy frameworks be formulated and enacted as laws. Otherwise pilot schemes 
would still operate on the basis of provisional regulation for years. Given the 
incremental characteristic of Chinese welfare reforms, access to social welfare 
benefits is bound to remain highly segmented and differentiated according to 
occupational groups and geographical regions. 
The role of the state remains vital despite the fact that it has successively 
retreated from the responsibility as welfare provider during the pre-reform era. The 
introduction of social pooling and individual accounts in various social policy realms 
signals the state’s intention to shed more responsibility onto the shoulder of 
enterprises and individual employees. Yet, a paradoxical phenomenon surfaces that 
the state is redefining its role in the welfare production to the direction of less 
involvement precisely in a phase when the contrary position of more public 
responsibility is badly in need. Market-oriented reforms in China are enforced at the 
expense of collapse in rural commune-provided safety net and erosion of urban 
enterprise-based social security. Here the massive task of building an appropriate 
social security system for all citizens in the market economy is inevitably the state’s 
sole responsibility in the near future. 
Against this background, a recent trend shows some encouraging signs. One 
can observe a continuous shift of the state’s policy concern from merely boosting 
economic growth to demanding more social justice. This is even evident if one takes 
note of the rhetoric of the central government (Wong 2004). For example, the 
promotion of the Confucian ideal of a “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui) reiterated in 
the 16th National Congress of the CCP in 2002, or “constructing a harmonious 
society” (jiangou yige hexie shehui) as the blueprint for social development signal the 
shift of developmental strategy in the minds of the government leaders. In 
September 2004, the State Council released for the first time a “White Book on 
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China’s Labor and Social Security” (State Council 2004), marking a new milestone in 
the development of Chinese social policy. As the foreword declares, “The Chinese 
government regards economic development as the basic prerequisite for improving 
people’s livelihood and effecting social security”, which reveals the turn of the 
strategic thought from development-centered to more balanced approach which 
would coordinate welfare and work in a more suitable manner. Economic growth is 
no more the only aim to be achieved; other goals have gained political credit as well. 
On the face of it, these declarations sound positive as they indicate a more active 
role of the state in social security. Yet at the same time, one reads in the same White 
Book, “Under the influence of China’s traditional culture, there is a time-honored 
tradition of provision by the family, security coming from self-reliance and help from 
the clan. In accordance with the characteristics of rural socio-economic development, 
the state’s social security measures in rural areas are different from those practiced in 
cities.” In view of the fact that rural residents make up more than a half of the overall 
population, this political proclamation looks modest. It indicates that the existing 
unequal political treatment between urban and rural residents may well endure. The 
development of the rural pension policy exactly reflects this situation. Traditionally, 
rural citizens are the silent majority whose interests are hardly considered in the 
Chinese politics. The state has barely devoted itself to the provision of welfare for the 
rural frail elderly, leaving them dependent on their own farming income or family 
support. Although the introduction of pension schemes at the beginning of the 1990s 
has given impulse to the development of rural welfare, it suffered a severe blow in 
1998 after the central government decided to suspend nationwide implementation as 
well as supervise ongoing pilot schemes. Over 20 years have passed since the 
initiatives of the MOCA, but the overall old-age security for the rural citizens is still 
in a morass, not least because the central government’s thought remains deeply 
rooted in the traditional view that the rural citizens should be able to stand on their 
own feet even when they get old. The laggardness of the development in rural social 
security in general and in rural old-age security in particular is the result of this 
biased perception towards rural citizens.  
Today, whether a unified rural pension scheme should be established for all 
rural residents is as controversial as 20 years ago, though the overall socio-economic 
changes have signaled the necessity of rethinking the overall direction. Yet current 
situation indicates that so long as the central government lacks the determination to 
give impulse to this issue, old-age security for the rural citizens will remain confined 
to local government’s jurisdiction and subject to their financial capacity. This is the 
topic of the next chapter, which will analyze more thoroughly the development of 
the rural pension policy. Special attention will be given to local situations of the field 
study: Qingdao, Beijing and Shanghai, in order to highlight the institutional diversity 
of pension schemes among these regions. 
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6. Institutions: Rural Pension Schemes (1986 - 2005) 
Before 1978, care of the elderly was the sole responsibility of the family in rural 
China, and the state did not introduce any old-age pension schemes. Yet the 
economic reforms since 1978 have brought about several fundamental changes that 
have given rise to the necessity for more state involvement in old-age security. The 
reforms of agricultural economy have brought rural peasants improvement in their 
income situation and living standard, though to a far lesser extent compared with 
urban areas. With the extension of average life expectancy and reduction of infant 
mortality, demographic patterns have gradually changed towards greater percentage 
of the elderly in the population. The one-child policy since 1978 has further 
accelerated the speed of demographic aging which, together with migration flow of 
youth workforce from rural to urban regions, has made old-age security in rural 
areas more and more a pressing issue the state could no more ignore. 
Even before 1978, some wealthier brigades have already established local 
pension schemes. These sporadic initiatives were funded locally and only limited to 
local villagers. The programs with regard to eligibility and benefit levels varied from 
village to village due to different local financial situations. In the late December of 
1978, the central government turned its attention to questions concerning agriculture 
and old-age security in rural areas. It encouraged the brigades and production teams 
in favorable financial condition to design innovative pension policies for their elderly 
members. Provincial governments were also delegated to explore the best old-age 
arrangements for local residents. 
In the course of the 1980s, many villages and townships prospered as a result of 
rapid development of TVEs. Improving fiscal conditions of local governments had 
laid a basis for designing old-age security schemes tailored to the need of local 
circumstances. Yet despite spontaneous initiatives of local governments, the overall 
coverage of these kinds of program remained low. By 1985, about 600,000 peasants 
enjoyed benefits of such pension schemes created in 22 provinces and municipalities 
(Zhang and Liu 2000: 36). The benefits provided by these schemes were also much 
lower than that offered by the labor insurance for urban workers. In some regions the 
schemes could afford a replacement rate of around 40% of the average male income 
from collective sources – niggardly low in contrast to the standard of urban workers 
(roughly 80 percent), but well above the subsistence levels set for the rural destitute 
or disabled. Nevertheless, local spontaneous policies to better support the elderly 
people were rather sporadic measures. Nationwide situation of old-age security in 
rural areas remained unstable and fragmentary. Even these pension programs were 
fragile as they lacked reliable financial bases. Much depended on the fiscal conditions 
of local governments: while benefits were dispatched normally in times of 
agricultural harvest or profitable collective enterprises, pensioners had also to bear 
the risk of benefit reduction or even deferral if they went badly. Furthermore, the 
entitlements to receive pension benefit were never guaranteed in the absence of 
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national statute or state intervention. To be included in local pension schemes was 
mainly associated with the criterion whether one’s own household was registered in 
economically wealthier villages.  
 
6.1 The Development of the Rural Pension Policy since 1986 
In the mid 1980s the central government became more concerned with the aging 
population in rural areas and started to consider the establishment of a pension 
insurance program for the rural aged.52 The change of attitude was partly motivated 
by the growing number of policy initiatives taken at the local level. The 7th Five-Year 
Plan (1986-90) stated that during the same period, an embryonic social security 
system should be shaped nationwide. This declared the willingness of the central 
government to strengthen its role in building rural social security. For the first time 
since 1949, the Chinese government has formally addressed this problem and 
committed itself to providing institutional frameworks of a rural pension scheme. 
 
The initial phase (1986-92) 
Against the background of the 7th Five-Year Plan, in 1987 the State Council approved 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) to be in charge of the experiments with social 
security in rural areas. As the main agent responsible for rural affairs, the MOCA 
was well aware that it was a unique opportunity to establish a rural social security 
system. Since launching the rural pension policy was an innovative move in the 
Chinese context, uncertainty prevailed in regard to which model would fit the status 
quo. The ministry took a cautious step and concluded from previous local 
experiences that providing comprehensive benefits solely from village collectives 
eventually would be unsustainable. To render a rural pension scheme viable, it was 
essential to take economic and financial situations of individual rural areas into 
account (Cui 1988). This view has since then taken shape and dominated the 
direction of the rural pension policy in the 1990s. 
Based on the reflections, the MOCA suggested the following features to the new 
rural pension system. 1. The terms of eligibility should be in line with conditions of 
local peasant transfer from farming work; 2. The benefit standards should be 
appropriate to the economic capacity of the collective and the villagers; 3. Financial 
responsibilities should be shared between the collective and the individual 
beneficiary, and the state would offer proper aid if needed; 4. The system should be 
managed by specialized institutions with supervision (MOCA 1986). 
From 1986 onward, there were several experiments with various pension 
insurance programs in several provinces under the direction of the MOCA. Most 
experiments were implemented on the village level by the village CCP branch and 
                                                 
52 For a succinct analysis of the rural pension policy development with respect to its ideational turn, 
see: Shi (2006). 
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village committee because economic situations among villages even within the same 
township varied. Villages were basic units for distributing land and other means of 
production – an institutional equivalence to former production brigade. The other 
experiments took the township as the unit of implementation for pension programs. 
In these cases, the township government organized and managed the programs that 
included all labor with household registration in the towns. This type of experiment 
worked better than the first one since township government had stable financial 
resources and administrative structure. However, due to uneven development of the 
rural economy, generalization of the preferable township-managed pension scheme 
experiments was impractical. 
At the outset of the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party addressed in its 8th 
Five-Year Plan (1991-95) the problem of insufficient social security for the peasants. 
In 1991 the State Council decided to delegate competence of social security affairs for 
urban and rural residents to the Ministry of Labor (MOL) and the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MOCA) respectively. This move gave the latter authority greater room for 
innovative policy initiatives. In April 1991, the MOCA launched a preliminary plan 
in Weihai (2 counties) and Yantai (3 counties), Shandong Province, to provide 
peasants with basic pension insurance. After a difficult yet successful start in Weihai 
and Yantai, the MOCA concluded at the end of 1991 that the time was right for 
further expansion of the pilot scheme. 
Major regulations of this original pilot scheme aimed to include all residents 
with rural residential status between 20 and 60, though participation in the scheme 
was primarily voluntary (MOCA 1992). Main source of funding was the 
contributions of individual participants, and in case of economic betterment, the 
subsidies from employers or local governments. Individuals may contribute between 
2 and 10 Yuan per month to be placed in a special bank account. The state granted 
tax exemption for contributions paid to the scheme. The scheme emphasized 
individual responsibility, leaving the participants to decide by themselves a proper 
contribution rate according to their own financial capabilities. The retirement age 
was set at 60, and participating rural residents arriving this age were eligible to 
receive annuities based on accumulated contributions and accrued interest in 
personal accounts. The program is thus in essence a voluntary, defined-contribution, 
and fully-funded savings plan. 
After initial success of policy experiment, the same pilot scheme was introduced 
to other regions in 1992. In October 1991, 52 counties were approved by the MOCA 
to carry out the experiment. By the mid 1992, 720 counties stood on the list of the 
MOCA. Over this period, the experiment was conducted in many localities, 
particularly in all suburban counties of Wuhan Municipality. Following the Wuhan 
experiment, the MOCA’s pilot scheme was rapidly extended to most counties of 
Jiangsu Province, where the economy grew and the population was aging rapidly. 
Other localities in the whole country soon followed suit. By December 1992, 950 
counties throughout the country were allowed to carry out the pilot pension 
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schemes, with more than 26 million farmers participating in the new old-age support 
system, which had accumulated pension funds of 0.8 billion Yuan. 
 
The expansion phase (1992-97) 
In response to the acceleration of nationwide implementation, the MOCA set up a 
department responsible for enacting draft, developing and enforcing plans for rural 
pension schemes. Yet despite efforts to promote this scheme in rural regions, the 
overall progress was slow. With respect to the numbers of participants as well as the 
accumulated sum of funds the result was not satisfactory at all. As the MOCA (1995) 
revealed in its report submitted to the State Council, around 5 million farmers were 
in the pension insurance scheme designed by respective local authorities, and the 
sum of accumulated funds reached 3.2 billion Yuan.53 Several factors played a role as 
impediments (Leisering and Gong 2002: 24): 
 
• The competition of commercial insurance companies. 
• Resistance of other ministries to the MOCA scheme. 
• The Third Plenum of the 14th Party Congress planned to establish a unified 
administrative authority. 
• The administrative costs of the program reduced the willing of local 
governments to introduce local schemes. 
 
To tackle these practical problems, the MOCA extended the original policy design 
and added new articles to supplement its insufficiencies. The main goal of the policy 
reform was to respond to the rising competition from the side of private insurance. 
All measures made the original design more elastic to adapt to diverse local 
circumstances, and the benefit level higher to appeal to the interest of the farmers. 
The incentive for local authorities to cooperate was also made more attractive as they 
were now permitted to gather 3% more fees for administrative costs. Table 6-1 
summarizes the policy changes.  
 
                                                 
53
 The sum of rural population in 1995 was reportedly 859.47 million. In other words, the coverage rate 
of the scheme in 1995 was less than 6 percent. 
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Table 6-1: Rural Pension Policy Changes between Original Design and Later 
Revision 
  
 The 1991 original design Later Changes 
 
Coverage ♦ All rural citizens with 
agricultural hukou between 20 
and 59 years 
 
 
• Children are covered 
• Special groups can be 
admitted before universal 
coverage 
Funding ♦ Individual Contributions, plus 
subsidies from employers or 
local communities; tax 
exemption for contributions 
♦ Choice of contribution rates, 
depending on individual 
capacities and desires 
 
• Pre-payment and retro-
payment of contributions 
allowed 
Fund investment ♦ Bank deposits and special 
government bonds 
♦ Local interests should also be 
served 
♦ Expected return rate was fixed 
at 8.8% per year 
 
• Support local economic 
development only 
• Return rates set by the 
MOCA annually, slightly 
above the interest rate of 
bank deposits 
Retirement age 
 
♦ 60 years (preferentially) • Reduced to 55 or even 50 
years 
Benefits ♦ Annuities depending on 
accumulated funds in 
individual accounts 
♦ Minimum 10-years of payment 
♦ Return rate of investment 
assumed 8.8% per year over the 
annuization period 
 
• Increased by 10% in 1994 
Administrative 
organizations 
♦ MOCA Pensions Department: 
general guidance and 
supervision 
♦ Provincial or city/county social 
insurance agencies: 
administration of funds and 
individual accounts 
♦ Administrative costs up to 3% of 
current contributions 
• At the beginning of a 
pension scheme in a 
county, an extra 3% of 
contribution is allowed for 
administrative costs 
Source: Leisering and Gong (2002): 25 
 
Yet, as the experiment got under way all over the country, the development of rural 
pension insurance gradually reached a bottleneck. A central problem lay in the lack 
of a statutory regulation that would have given the rural pension policy a clearer 
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status and direction. Since local governments were granted the autonomy to 
implement pilot schemes in accordance with local circumstances, problems such as 
power abuse by cadres in forcing peasants to join in the scheme or embezzlement of 
accumulated funds surfaced. This mismanagement has undermined the 
accountability of the administration. Questions concerning sustainability and 
practicability of rural pensions arose as some leaders in the central government 
began to worry about the whole situation and put the policy design itself into 
question. As early as 1992, the State Council urged the MOCA not to compel farmers 
to participate in the pension program. Even among peasants there was widespread 
suspicion regarding its sustainability, thanks to the past experiences of unstable state 
rural policy.54 
This context change matters to the policy development because the rural 
pension policy had yet to struggle for its place on the political agenda. Since the 
reform of the state-owned enterprises was the core element of the economic reforms, 
the significance of the urban sector outweighed that of the rural counterpart (You 
1995; Wong 1998). The rural pension policy was relegated to a relatively minor niche 
whose political weight depended on its compatibility with goals like promoting 
economic reforms or social stability. That was why the MOCA succeeded initially in 
gaining support for its policy initiatives. But once the rural pension policy was 
perceived to be contradictive to those primary goals, its significance in the Chinese 
welfare politics would fade, which made it harder for the MOCA to withstand 
opponent challenges. 
 
The backlash phase (1997-98) 
The financial crisis in East Asia in 1997 was the last straw that triggered policy 
reversal. For fear that the same shock would similarly damage the booming 
economic development, the central government began adopting stricter measures to 
avert financial risks in both rural and urban sectors. In late 1997 a rectification group 
on insurance industry was set up to review the commercial insurance industry. At 
the same time, the group also envisaged the insurance schemes initiated by several 
government bodies, including the rural pension schemes of the MOCA, the 
enterprise supplementary schemes of the MOL, and the co-operative schemes of the 
trade unions. Group members came mainly from different departments relevant to 
the issue, including the then State Planning Commission, the PBC, the MOF, the 
MOL and the MOCA. In itself, the commission consisted of all the major actors with 
conflicting ideas in the field of rural pension, but its agenda had already been set: 
instead of suggesting options to improve the rural pension policy, the group was 
designated to sort out potential risks associated with the insurance industry and the 
rural pension schemes. In April 1998 the internal rectification group claimed that 
                                                 
54
 Retrospective description of an official of the MOLSS in my interview in Beijing, September 2004. 
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there were several risks associated with the ongoing rural pension schemes 
(Leisering and Gong 2002). 
 
• Overestimating future benefit payment: The expected return rate was 
estimated at an unreasonably high level seeing that the interest rate for bank 
deposit had been reduced several times since May 1996. This would definitely 
squeeze future return of investing pension funds. The accumulated funds, as a 
result, were bound to be insufficient for meeting accrued liabilities in the 
future. 
• Risk in the investment of pension funds: According to the regulation of the 
MOCA, two major ways of investing pension funds were government bonds 
and preferential bank deposits. Unfortunately, this principle was violated by 
risky behavior of some localities in misappropriating the accumulated pension 
funds. 
• Misleading information for the farmers: While the scheme was labeled as 
social insurance by the MOCA, many localities exaggerated their campaigns 
by claiming that such a scheme would secure the basic living standards of old 
farmers. Another related problem also emerged in association with the 
mistaken information provided to the farmers that the scheme would be 
guaranteed by the state, whereas local cadres managed to convince the central 
government that the implementation of the scheme at the local level would be 
self-sufficient without further need for more state involvement. 
• Compulsory participation or so-called voluntary membership under guidance 
could generate discontent among farmers, leading eventually to social 
instability in the countryside. 
 
These conclusions triggered again internal debates among various ministries in the 
ensuing months, most of which concentrated on the future of the rural pension 
schemes as well as their possible alternatives.55 Opponents of the MOCA pension 
schemes advocated for the state’s support of private life insurance by means of 
preferential tax treatment. The government should, in their view, select qualified 
insurance companies and supervise their insurance products. In contrast, the MOCA 
and its supporters pointed to the imperfect market circumstances in China and the 
inevitable responsibility of the state to implement the rural pension schemes. Yet in 
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the political tide gradually turned against 
the MOCA as well as the overall idea of establishing a state rural pension system. 
In 1998 the State Council decided to reshuffle the functional division among its 
subordinate ministries. The administrative and supervisory responsibility for rural 
old-age security was entirely transferred from the MOCA to the newly-established 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS). This was a heavy blow to the 
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 Retrospective description of an official of the MOLSS in my interview in Beijing, September 2004. 
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MOCA, as its decade-long efforts to establish a social insurance scheme for rural old 
security were now de facto discredited. The shift from the MOCA to the MOLSS also 
meant marginalization of the running rural pension scheme since the forerunner of 
the MOLSS, the Ministry of Labor, was mainly in charge of labor insurance in the 
urban area. This political message signaled a downgrade of the rural pension policy 
on the political agenda. 
At the meantime, there were also divergent opinions in the central government 
as regards whether the establishment of rural pension insurance as such at this stage 
is appropriate at all (Leisering and Gong 2002: 29ff.). Officials from other ministries 
(MOF, PBC, etc.) responsible for economic and financial affairs generally raised 
doubt over the necessity of a state pension scheme for peasants. They argued that 
traditional means of subsistence (land, family) would suffice to meet the need for 
old-age security in the rural sector. They further maintained that decreasing 
agricultural return and family size did not necessarily lead to the declining function 
of family support. Even if the state was to be involved in the task, it should 
encourage a multi-pillar approach based on family support, community care as well 
as commercial life insurance. In short, they insisted that the state should restrict its 
role as much as possible.  
The MOCA and the new MOLSS, both central bodies in charge of social 
insurance and welfare affairs, insisted, on the contrary, that there were growing 
demands among peasants for a formal arrangement because of rapidly aging 
population as well as decreasing family function in the rural area. The MOLSS 
contended that the necessity for a formal old-age arrangement was eventually 
inevitable due to the changes in farmers’ traditional consciousness to obtain old-age 
support from their sons as well as the acceleration of rural urbanization. This new 
idea of the MOCA appealed to the SC initially, as the latter also viewed it as a proper 
response to the rapid change of rural development. But with the failure of the MOCA 
to keep policy implementation on track, the fundamentals of this policy idea were 
gradually eroded. These anomalies opened a window of opportunity for the 
opposition bureaucrats in the central government to create another category of 
problem definition. 
After one and a half year of fierce debates among various branches and the 
rectification group, the new State Council under the leadership of the premier Zhu 
Rongji made in July 1999 the final decision of repealing the rural pension scheme 
organized by the MOCA in most areas and commercializing it instead in the 
wealthier areas. The premier himself explained this policy shift with the argument 
that the overall circumstances in rural areas were far from mature for setting up a 
universal pension insurance scheme for peasants. In his speech titled “Accelerating 
the establishment of social security systems and ensuring the stability of the country” 
in May 2000, Zhu noted, 
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Social security for peasants should be different from that for urban residents. We have 
adopted the household responsibility system, of which the land is the basic production tool 
for the peasants and the basic protection for their lives. The old-age security of the peasants 
is based mainly on family protection, combined with community support. Wealthier regions 
can introduce commercial old-age insurance based on voluntary principle and individual 
savings. The rural pension scheme as it has been implemented in some villages in the past 
needs to be seriously rectified. (MOLSS 2001: 3) 
 
By “rectification” (zhengdun guifan) the new policy guideline denoted an immediate 
halt to the public pension insurance expansion and an overhaul of the administration 
of accumulated pension funds. The recalibration of policy direction was immediately 
interpreted by the subordinate administration in both central and local government 
as a sign of policy retrenchment in the field of rural pension insurance. Thereafter, 
the already established pension schemes in many areas suffered severe backlash as 
local cadres and peasants lost their confidence in the state’s determination to keep 
the policy on track.56 The pension schemes in many rural localities stopped their 
operation. As a result, both the coverage of insurance and the sum of funds 
accumulation slumped in the following years, as the following Table 6-2 illustrates. 
Only some regions with dynamic economic growth have kept their schemes 
above water since then. 57  Coastal provinces with dynamic economic growth 
outpaced inner western ones in this respect, among them especially the Shandong, 
Guangdong and Jiangsu Provinces, which had first launched such policy 
experiments and therefore gathered valuable experiences in their implementation. 
While Shandong stuck to the original institutional design developed by the MOCA in 
1992, Jiangsu and Guangdong elaborated a compound of MOCA regulations with 
own innovation of community support or enterprise subsidy (Peng and Song 2002). 
As their economies were bolstered by TVEs or foreign-capital enterprises, Jiangsu 
and Guangdong were able to collect more funds from the enterprises to finance its 
pension scheme. 
                                                 
56
 An official of the Beijing Bureau of Labor and Social Security expressed this view during my 
interview in June 2005. With the metaphor of “imperial sword” (shangfang baojian), she indicated the 
significance of the resolution of the central government to ensure the feasibility of the rural pension 
scheme at the local level. 
57
 The most representative pioneer among them is Shanghai city, where a new Township Insurance 
Program (TIP; zhenbao) has been introduced since 2004. It is designed as an interface between the 
social insurance program for urban residents and the pension scheme for rural residents. Information 
provided by an official of the Shanghai Bureau of Labor and Social Security, May 2005. 
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Table 6-2: Development of the MOCA Rural Pension Scheme since 1992 
 
 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of 
insured 
(million) 
 
 
26.0 
 
51.42 
 
65.94 
 
82.80  
 
80.25 
 
61.72  
 
59.95 
 
54.62 
 
54.28  
 
53.78 
Number of 
pensioners 
(million) 
 
 
- 
 
0.27 
 
0.32 
 
0.55 
 
- 
 
0.98 
 
1.08 
 
1.23 
 
1.98 
 
2.05 
Contribution 
collection 
(billion Yuan) 
 
 
- 
 
3.67 
 
4.41 
 
4.22 
 
3.14 
 
1.39 
 
1.71 
 
2.52 
 
3.60 
 
- 
Pension 
Expenditure 
(billion Yuan) 
 
 
- 
 
0.099 
 
0.18 
 
0.33 
 
0.54 
 
0.41 
 
0.52 
 
0.53 
 
1.50 
 
- 
Accumulated 
funds  
(billion Yuan) 
 
0.8 
 
5.95 
 
9.95 
 
14.03  
 
16.62 
 
19.55 
 
21.61 
 
23.32 
 
25.93 
 
28.50 
Note: Numbers have been rounded for simplicity. 
Sources: 1. Labor and Social Security Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
various years (after 1997), available at: http://www.molss.gov.cn/index_tongji.htm. 
2. Civil Affairs Development Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, various years 
(before 1997), available at: http://www.mca.gov.cn/wjylzx/index.asp. 
 
Beyond Rectification (1998 - ) 
Several years have passed since the decision of the central government to reverse the 
introduction of the rural pension scheme, yet the overall direction is still vague. The 
final decision to rectify the ongoing scheme did not give a clear answer to the basic 
question as regards which role the state should exactly play in the rural pension 
policy. Since 1998, the MOLSS has submitted, as demanded by the SC, two proposals 
concerning how the rural pension scheme could be rectified (MOLSS 2001; Zhao 
2002). The first one suggested further implementation of current pension schemes 
only in those rural areas with sufficient conditions. The second one proposed the 
overall commercialization of the rural pension provision. Both versions envisaged 
the changing role of the government from provider to regulator, but they 
encountered diverse responses from different branches in the central government: 
whereas the MOCA and the National Planning Commission stood on the side of the 
MOLSS, the MOF and the Insurance Supervision Commission remained firmly 
opposed to both proposals. The opponents did not agree to set up a new insurance 
institution, nor did they endorse any support for the institutional transition. The 
whole issue was set aside without further decision. Given the rectification order of 
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the SC, the MOLSS could only adopt fragmented policy measures compatible to the 
guidelines.58 
In sum, after more than a decade of political engagement, the progress of the 
rural pension policy in China is still constrained by the dominant idea that land, 
family, and market provision should remain the chief pillars of rural old-age 
security. Departing from this premise, many economically-minded bureaucrats argue 
that the state should play a residual role in rural old-age security. In view of the 
overall uneven development of rural areas, they deem it impossible to allocate more 
resources into rural old-age security. The bearers of new ideas, the MOLSS and the 
MOCA, have been striving to reverse this perception and appealing in vain for more 
sophisticated state provision in this domain. The internal problem of 
mismanagement and the external shock of the Asian financial crisis have created a 
context in favor of the residualist idea because it would incur the least responsibility 
and risk for the state. Leaders in the central government are cognitively locked to the 
residualist approach and look set to postpone the whole issue on the political 
agenda. 
 
6.2 New Pension Schemes for Landless Peasants  
The emergence of landless peasants is a recent phenomenon. Initially, the land 
reform after 1949 has successfully crumbled the monopoly of the landlords and 
distributed land equally to all peasants. Owning a plot of land has since then become 
the major means of subsistence for the Chinese peasants. It was also against this 
background that the Chinese government declined to establish a full-fledged social 
security system for farmers comparable to that for urban workers. Yet, economic and 
social reforms since 1978 have invalidated this implicit social contract. Rapid 
industrialization and urbanization are gradually blurring the traditional borderline 
of urban and rural areas, thereby attracting new investment and new population 
flowing into the cities. This process has given rise to a larger demand for land. As a 
result, local governments in prosperous regions are tempted to seize (or even evict) 
compulsorily farmers’ land for the purpose of industrial construction, green belts on 
the outskirt of cities or urban infrastructure. Urbanization and the use of farmland 
for non-agricultural purposes have been under way for some years. From 1990 to 
2002, non-agricultural construction for the whole country claimed 473,260,000 mu of 
land. This non-agricultural construction was concentrated on the outskirts of cities 
and in high population/small land and economically developed areas. Peasants in 
these areas cultivated on average less than 0.7 mu of land per person. According to 
                                                 
58
 The deputy director of the Department of Rural Social Insurance of the MOLSS, Zhao Dianguo 
reckons that current strategies of the MOLSS will be concentrated on further implementation of the 
rural pension scheme only in wealthier villages. Protection for vulnerable groups like landless 
peasants, migrant workers and rural peasants with only one child or two daughters will also be 
strengthened. Zhongguo shehui baozhang (China Social Security), (2004), 12: 21. 
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the calculations of researchers, alone in the 13 years since the 1990s, 66,300,000 
farmers employed in agriculture have lost their land.59  
Landless peasants are facing two difficulties: declining income in combination 
with rising living costs. As the land is the main source of economic income as well as 
daily food supply, it plays a crucial role in terms of economic and social protection 
for farmers. The dispossession of land also means disappearance of these protection 
functions. In most cases, landless peasants suffer reduction of available income, 
especially those who depend mainly on this source of income. Available 
investigations reveal that as many as 46% of landless peasants nationwide bemoan 
the deterioration of their income situations (Zhang 2004). Meanwhile, living costs are 
also surging as a result of urbanization. Food can only be purchased in the market 
now, and the living expenditures are soaring as many landless peasants have to 
move in modern apartments where various fees (heating, tap water, electricity and 
administrative expenses) are incurred. As a consequence, landless peasants are 
becoming one of the vulnerable groups in the process of urbanization. 
The problem of land seizure has much to do with the vague land ownership 
practiced in China. After 1978, China adopted a land use rights tenure system similar 
to the leasehold tenure system in Western countries. It regards land and buildings 
upon it as two separate entities (Chan 2003). Under the Land Administration Law, 
the state owns all urban land, whereas rural collectives own all rural land. Land 
users may use the land and dispose of the buildings and improvements on it, but the 
ownership of the land remains in the grip of the state or the rural collectives. In short, 
the right to use the land is distinguished from the right to own actually the land. To 
obtain the right to use the land, however, organizations or individuals have to pay 
the state certain amount of premium. Government agencies or SOEs, in contrast, may 
procure the land by means of administrative assignment of the government – at zero 
cost. 
While all land in China remains nominally state property, the right to use it has 
become tradable in urban sector since the early 1990s. The state retains the privilege 
of compulsory land requisition (zhengdi) once it deems that necessary. Yet in spite of 
the broad principles laid down by relevant regulations, local governments are 
authorized to make their own details of implementation. This openness in relevant 
regulations has offered loopholes for local officials and cadres to set their own rules. 
Generally, compensation for the seizure of farmland consists of the following items: 
land compensation, settlement subsidy payment, as well as improvements and crop 
compensation (Chan 2003). Yet the major problem lies in the dearth of clear rules that 
allow rural peasants obtain compensation in fair terms. “Relocation” compensation, 
if paid at all, is insufficient to cover the costs of city housing, or even to find a 
comparable home in the evicted families' original area.  
                                                 
59
 These figures are based on the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend in its article titled “Significant 
shift in focus of peasants' rights activism”, September 3rd, 2004. 
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Problems of rural development and land seizure have been particularly acute in 
recent years and caught intensive attention during the legislative sessions of the 
National People's Congress in 2004 and 2005. The emphasis of the legislators has 
turned from economic growth to social well-being. Delegates also discussed 
changing land development laws to make it harder for local governments to seize 
farmland to build factories, apartment compounds.60 Policymakers and experts have 
continuously pondered ways to solve the problem of landless peasants. There were 
efforts to manage land better, strictly control the eviction of land, raise compensation, 
and improve the social conditions of landless peasants, etc. Nonetheless, a uniform 
policy from the central government to cope with the employment and social security 
of landless peasants remains far from concrete.  
Several local governments have begun tackling this problem by introducing 
various modes of social protection for this vulnerable group. The most common 
method is a lump-sum payment (usually ranging from 30,000 to 50,000 Yuan) as 
compensation for land loss and income shortage (huobi anzhi). Vocational training 
and job introduction supplement the compensation package. The status of landless 
peasants will then be switched from rural to urban resident in hukou system, and 
those who can find jobs will be included in the urban social security system 
(including pension insurance). But the entitlement to urban social security is tightly 
coupled with the employment in urban enterprises, which means that those without 
it remain excluded. As a response to the loss of living basis, many local governments 
place landless peasants in rural collective units or township enterprises (zhaogong 
anzhi). Yet this measure transfers the responsibility and financial burden to 
individual enterprises without fundamentally solving the problem of low 
qualifications of landless peasants. Soon those working units or enterprises are 
unable to sustain such a heavy burden and compelled to dismiss those peasant 
workers. Unemployment and old age, again, become landless peasants’ own risks. 
In some well-off regions the local governments have recognized the 
shortcoming of lump-sum compensation, and introduced alternative policies to 
support the settlement and employment of landless peasants. A central idea of the 
policy is the so-called “land in exchange for social security” (tudi huan baozhang), as 
scholars in the CASS label it (Zhang and Tang 2004; also Lu 2003). The new initiative 
of the city Shanghai deserves high attention. At the end of 2003 Shanghai launched a 
new scheme called Township Insurance Program (xiao chengzhen baoxian, abbreviated 
as zhenbao) to provide landless peasants with much better protection (see section 
6.5.1). This new policy in Shanghai has thus far effectively solved the common 
problem of landless peasants. While well-off regions like Beijing or Shanghai have 
taken initiatives to arrange for the old-age security of the landless peasants, the 
overall nationwide situation remains unclear. Therefore, the development of pension 
schemes for landless peasants is still taking shape, which makes it difficult to give a 
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 “China Worries About Economic Surge That Skips the Poor”, The New York Times, March 4th, 2005. 
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final appraisal of the overall situation at this stage. However, how the central and 
local governments deal with this acute phenomenon will undoubtedly affect the (old-
age) lives of many rural households. 
 
6.3 The Pension Scheme in Rural Areas of Qingdao 
Qingdao followed Yantai’s lead and established a pilot pension scheme in 1992. Yet 
except some regions, the implementation of the scheme was from the start not well 
planned since the policy was unfamiliar to local officials. Weak legal framework 
further precluded the progress, causing incoherent implementation of the scheme 
among regions under the jurisdiction of Qingdao government. In 1997 the Qingdao 
government issued a provisional regulation over the implementation of the pension 
insurance for the rural region, which summarized the experiences collected in the 
past 5 years. The regulation stipulated that the highest competent authority was the 
Bureau of Labor and Social Protection of Qingdao, which administered the 
organization of the pension issues for the rural region and oversaw the 
implementation and financial stability of the scheme. Under its jurisdiction were 
subordinate authorities in districts and villages respectively, each responsible for 
promoting the pension scheme among rural residents. In the last decade, around 
50,000 (i.e. one tenth of the 5 million-odd rural population) participated in the 
scheme, with about 1500 among them being pensioners. 
The general difficulty of this pilot pension scheme lay in the regulation that 
individual farmers were to bear the most financial responsibility for their own 
pensions while the government offered few subsidies. (Lin 2003). This lopsided 
emphasis on individual responsibility has resulted in insufficient pension benefits for 
many participants in spite of their long-term contribution record in the scheme, not 
least because their accumulated capital was too little to accumulate enough pensions 
for old age. Secondly, the rural pension scheme was not transformed from a pilot 
scheme to an obligatory scheme that would cover all rural population. Little wonder 
that more than 90% of the rural population was not included in this scheme at all. 
The third problem of the scheme lay in its institutional instability since it was 
essentially a voluntary scheme aimed at promoting individual responsibility in old-
age security. Since the amount of subsidy depended largely on the economic 
wellness of his resident village, the financial sustainability of the pension scheme was 
thus vulnerable to shortfall of subsidy that could possibly happen in worse-off 
regions. Also the investment alternatives of collected fund remained very restricted, 
mostly in the form of bank deposit or government bond, so that their expected yield 
was unable to sustain the future demand for pension payments in less well-off 
villages. 
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6.3.1 A New Model in Chengyang District since 2003 
Chengyang is a new administration district set up in 1994.61  It is located right 
between urban and rural regions at northern suburb of Qingdao city. Chengyang has 
more than 430,000 residents, with about 377,000 registered as rural population. The 
sum of population aged over 60 is 65,000. 62  The new scheme introduced in 
Chengyang on July 1st, 2003 was a new attempt launched by the Qingdao 
government to strengthen old-age support of the farmers by piling up more financial 
stock in the old-age security. The new scheme was also a response to the land seizure 
problem arising from the process of urbanization. The disappearance of the 
traditional support for rural old age has become a compelling issue that needed to be 
dealt with.63 The official decision to raise governmental share in the new scheme 
reflected this idea. It was underpinned by the economic prosperity of Qingdao, 
which has greatly improved the local government’s fiscal ability.  
The legal framework for the new scheme in Chengyang is built upon six basic 
principles (Chengyang 2003a, 2003b):  
 
• The monetary compensations for land loss paid to the farmers by the 
government are to be used as a part of the financial bases of the new scheme. 
The maxim “land in exchange for security” (tudi huan baozhang) elucidates the 
idea of the new scheme that it is both compensation and substitute for the loss 
of land as a traditional means of old-age security.  
• The main financial burden of the scheme still rests on individual participants. 
Collective subsidy remains supplementary.  
• The scheme is obligatory, including all employees of the collectively-owned 
and private enterprises. The village collectives are furthermore required to 
take out a certain proportion of the compensations for land loss they receive 
from the higher authority. Revenues from economic growth of the villages 
should be poured into the established funds of the new scheme.  
• The scheme maintains the flexibility of financial responsibilities for 
participants so that villages and their residents are free to determine their own 
payment ratio and period based on their own economic conditions. 
• The principle of individual account remains valid in the new scheme. The 
pension amount is largely coupled with previous contributions and collective 
subsidies. The same applies to the proportion of pensions one can expect from 
the funds financed with collective subsidies. 
                                                 
61 Information provided in this analysis is based on several interviews with local officials in 2003. 
62 Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 39 as well as information provided by local officials in 
interviews. One should deal with the figures of rural population in China with caution because they 
do not necessarily mean that they are all farmers living on agricultural incomes. 
63 The local officials in charge of the new scheme emphasized this point during the interviews. 
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• The central government shall not share any financial burden of local pension 
schemes. Rather its policies aim to support them indirectly by means of tax 
exemption and return guarantee of the pension funds. 
 
The new scheme introduced in Chengyang is coupled with the socio-economic 
development of the region.64 Its main goal is to broaden the coverage rate while 
keeping the replacement rate low so that the most farmers can benefit from it. Yet the 
amount of subsidy provided by the village collectives depends largely on their own 
fiscal viability, which leads to a variety of pension levels between different villages. 
Basically, villages with the developmental stage of over 650 Yuan of GDP per capita 
are obliged to render subsidies for participating farmers. The level of subsidies varies 
according to the fiscal ability of villages, yet it should not be lower than 6% of the 
calculation basis (4459 Yuan for the year 2003). Revenues stemming from 
compensation payment for land seizure by the city government as well as rental 
incomes from land and factory leasing should be used primarily as subsidy for 
contribution payment. Collective subsidies will be credited automatically to personal 
accounts of the participating members. Village residents with income below this line 
are still allowed to join the scheme voluntarily, and subsidies from the village 
collectives can be paid later when their economic situations turn better. 
In order to cover most of the rural residents, the new scheme stipulates that, 
apart from students and those who have already joined the pension scheme for 
workers in urban areas, residents aged above 18 are eligible to participate in the 
scheme. 65  The payment of contributions is flexible according to personal and 
collective financial strength. It is calculated in percentage grades (e.g. 6%, 8%, 10% 
etc.) of the calculation basis (4459 Yuan for the year 2003, defined yearly by the 
Qingdao Bureau of Labor and Social Security), whereas villages and towns (jiedao 
and qu) subsidize certain percentages of the calculation basis. There is no fixed 
payment period and amount so that participants can adjust their contribution 
payments to personal economic situations. Even lump-sum payment of contributions 
for previous periods is allowed. For poor participants the government will overtake 
the financial responsibility to guarantee their pension entitlements. Collected 
contributions are either deposited in banks or invested in government bonds. The 
retirement age is set at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women. The amount of 
individual pensions is calculated proportional to previous contributions of 
individual participants. The guaranteed minimum pension is 87 Yuan monthly. For 
families with only one son or two daughters there is also bonus in the calculation of 
pension payment, a supplement provision for those pensioners who are unable to 
                                                 
64  The following introduction of institutional regulations is based on internal official documents 
concerning the implementation of the new pension scheme for the farmers as well as interviews with 
the responsible officials in Chengyang. 
65
 Note, however, that migrant workers who do not own residential status in Chengyang are excluded 
from the pension scheme. 
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rely on their children in their old age. Pensioners obtain their pensions directly 
remitted to their bank accounts. 
Since its successful start in 2003, the new scheme has hitherto spread to almost 
95% of the overall 230 villages in Chengyang district. Estimated more than 290,000 
farmers have participated in this scheme; among them roughly 15,000 have begun 
receiving pensions. The coverage rate of the new scheme thus reaches 75%. In view 
of this development, it is widely expected that the model in Chengyang could well be 
further implemented in other districts as well. 
 
6.4 The Pension Scheme in Rural Areas of Beijing 
Similar to Qingdao, Beijing’s rural economy has seen rapid development in terms of 
agricultural production as well as rural industries (TVE). With overall economic 
reforms under way, many villages and towns were gradually reaching a well-off 
stage, making them capable of building a basic institution of social security for their 
villagers. Except traditional poverty relief program like the five-guarantee scheme, 
better-off villages have begun taking initiative in exploring medical insurance suited 
for regional need. They also started to provide old-age allowance to their elderly 
members. The monthly amounts of allowance varied from village to village, 
depending on their financial capability. A survey in 1987 estimated that already 
47.8% of villages and towns around Beijing have begun granting old-age allowance 
to their residents (Beijing Government 1988: 9). But generally speaking, these policy 
initiatives were still in their initial phase and thus unable to sustain old-age security. 
In the meantime, TVEs located in Beijing rural areas have prospered in the 
process of rural industrialization, which enabled them to establish their own pension 
schemes for the employees. According to the same survey of 1987, such schemes in 
roughly 113 TVEs of Beijing covered about 7100 employees, and accumulated a 
funding amount of 582.5 thousand Yuan, (ibid: 25). Yet the ability to offer employee-
related welfare package was also apparently associated with local economic 
conditions. Whereas TVEs in well-off rural areas introduced enterprise pension 
schemes as early as 1978, their counterparts in regions with moderate economic 
strength could not afford them until the late 1980s. In even poorer areas this 
remained inconceivable. TVEs that were able to achieve this were mostly scattered in 
better-off rural regions (Chaoyang, Haidian), which have generally broader coverage 
and higher benefits for pensioners. 
After the beginning of the pilot pension schemes in Shangdong province, the 
Beijing government decided in 1991 to choose Daxing and Shunyi Districts as starting 
points for establishing the rural pension scheme, partly as a response to the gradual 
expansion of the enterprise pensions in TVE as well as public pensions of individual 
villages. The next year witnessed a further expansion of pension schemes to another 
5 districts or counties: Haidian, Shijingshan, Fangshan, Tongxian, and Yanqing. 
Available data indicate that the development of the schemes has been in due course 
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since then. In 1995 the Beijing government issued a document (No. 107), in response 
to the demand of the State Council (document No. 51 of 1995) ordering the 
acceleration of the implementation. It was the first official document of the Beijing 
government that aimed to regulate the policy. In the same year, 13 of the total 14 
districts, of which 145 towns, 1000 villages and 941 TVEs introduced the scheme.66 
There were totally 156,000 insured peasants, among them 800 odds have already 
begun receiving pensions. The development in rural Beijing from 1991 to 1995 
roughly corresponded to that of the whole nation. 
Even after the decision of the central government to suspend all relevant 
policies in 1998, Beijing’s rural pension scheme still operated without disruption, 
though it suffered slight backlash in overall progress. Until 1999, all 14 districts, of 
which 1640 towns and 3651 villages have established the pilot scheme for their 
residents. The number of participant peasants more than doubled to 344,000, of 
which 4500 eligible for pension claim (the average pension amount was 59 Yuan 
monthly). One year later (2000), the overall development of the rural pension scheme 
in Beijing reached its peak, where it could attract 380,000 peasants in the scheme, of 
whom around 10,000 were eligible for pension payment (total expense 7 million 
Yuan). From 2001 onwards, the whole progress stagnated, and the number of the 
insured peasants slipped to about 340,000 with 7700 pensioners. The next year saw 
further decline, with roughly 310,000 peasants remaining in the system. The year 
2003 marked then a turnaround in the development when the city government 
decided to strengthen its responsibility and launched a new pilot scheme in districts 
of Daxing and Tongzhou (see further introduction below). In 2004 the rural pension 
scheme was expanded to 1860 towns and 3722 villages, where 368,000 of 1.4 million 
rural labor force participated in the scheme (participation rate at 26.3%) and about 
18,000 received pensions (average pension 69 Yuan monthly). 
In general, the implementation of the rural pension scheme in Beijing followed 
the instruction of the MOCA and the SC. The city government of Beijing did not put 
the old-age security of the rural citizens specifically as a priority on its political 
agenda unless demanded by the central government. As a result, the rural pension 
scheme in Beijing faced the same difficulty as other regions: as the system itself has 
never been nationally institutionalized on a statutory basis, the implementation was 
very susceptible to political risk and policy instability. The responsible local officials 
and cadres were prone to check the political sentiment of the central government 
before taking any innovative initiatives for fear of policy reversal by the higher 
authority. Nearly 15 years after its start, the coverage of the rural pension scheme in 
                                                 
66 Data over the implementation and development of the pilot rural pension scheme in Beijing are 
incomplete, as is often the case in China where the responsible administration did not pay attention to 
the collection and compilation of the statistical data. My information source regarding the 
development of the pilot pension scheme in rural Beijing as provided in this section is the protocol 
written during my interview with the director of the Division for Rural Insurance in the Bureau of 
Labor and Social Security in Beijing, on June 1st of 2005. 
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Beijing is still far from comprehensive and the pensions remain too low to assure 
economic safety in old age. 
The regulatory doldrums are reflected in the low coverage rate of the pension 
scheme in rural Beijing (average 26.3% in 2004). The implementation of the MOCA 
pension scheme in rural Beijing manifests a highly fragmented character, depending 
on local subsidy policies of towns and villages. The Huairou district, for example, has 
a less generous subsidy policy. The district government makes a subsidy of totally 
500,000 Yuan each year, and each town administration tops up a further subsidy of 
50,000 Yuan for the pension scheme. On voluntary basis, the coverage rate of the 
scheme in Huairou district amounted to 21% of the rural labor force in 2004. Only in 
few localities like Dazhongfule village and Shuli village, all villagers have participated 
in the scheme thanks to the comparatively better subsidy of the village collectives 
(each villager pays 100 Yuan yearly and receives the same amount of subsidy). Yet in 
remote rural areas the scheme is not even implemented at all. 
In the meantime, the urbanization of the Beijing city is accelerating and 
demanding more land. Land seizure has become a common practice of local officials, 
causing rural social insecurity and contingency if the loss of land was not properly 
compensated. How to settle the livelihood of rural landless households has thus 
become a main concern of the Beijing government. To resolve this pressing issue, 
partly also as a response to the insufficient provision of the old pilot pension scheme 
implemented since 1992 and the need to maintain social stability of the capital, the 
Beijing government conducted an internal survey in 2003 investigating the real need 
of the rural citizens. This has given rise to a new round of policy offensive of pilot 
pension schemes launched in 2004. 
 
6.4.1 The New Pilot Pension Schemes since 2004 
The political sentiment in the central government has changed in recent years in 
favor of more policies for peasants. The 16th National Congress of the CCP in 2002 set 
the goal of “constructing a harmonious society” as the priority of developmental 
strategy, under which the role of social security, especially that of the rural areas, 
was deemed as a key factor to achieve that end. The National Congress further 
suggested that old-age security systems should be explored and established where 
affordable. This conclusion has given new impulse to the development of social 
policy in China as it sent a clear signal to the local governments that social security 
was on top of the political agenda. The Beijing government recognized this political 
trend towards social security and decided to bring about new momentum in rural 
old-age security. This has led to the new pilot schemes currently experimented in 
districts of Daxing and Tongzhou.  
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The Daxing pilot scheme67 
Daxing lies in the southern suburb of the Beijing city with a total area of 1030 km2. Its 
administrative jurisdiction covers 14 towns and 539 villages. In recent decades 
Daxing has profited a lot from the ongoing industrialization, which has sustained its 
yearly economic growth at a constant rate of 15%. In 2003 the average GDP in Daxing 
amounted to 10.24 billion Yuan, much to the benefit of the Daxing government, 
which could collect tax revenue of overall 934.97 million Yuan.68 The number of 
population of the Daxing district was 545,351, of which 348,406 were registered as 
rural residents (63.9%), whereas 196,945 were listed as non-agricultural residents (i.e. 
comparable to urban status, 36.1%). The average income of rural residents has 
reached 6099 Yuan, economically well-off among all rural areas surrounding Beijing. 
The rapid economic growth has also created new non-agricultural employment 
chances for rural residents in this district. Many of them either worked for companies 
located in the region or they made their own livings as self-employed (e.g. taxi 
driving). To meet the changing nature of employment patterns and the need for 
public policy support, the Daxing district has established MLSS scheme as well as 
rural cooperation medical scheme successively. 
As for the pilot pension scheme, Daxing introduced the MOCA model in the 
course of the 1990s. Even though it came to a decline in the last few years, the 
government has learnt the lesson that it had to bear more responsibility to support 
old-age security. The reform idea came up in 2003 and took shape in the 
announcement that the Daxing government planned to subsidize a yearly amount of 
15 million Yuan for those who participated in the pilot scheme. In addition, the 
government established a funded reserve that would ensure a dynamic adjustment 
of pensions in parallel with increases of per capita incomes or commodity prices. The 
regulation also stipulated that the minimum contribution would assure a future 
pension amount of no less than 120% of the rural social assistance (MLSS). By 
contrary, the maximum contribution would make the expected pension income no 
higher than the average wage income of the Beijing city in last year. These measures 
revised the shortcoming of the old MOCA pilot schemes that pensions accumulated 
on personal accounts were often too low. By setting a minimum pension amount to 
be accumulated in personal accounts, the Daxing scheme could at least guarantee a 
certain degree of living standard in old age. 
The targeted groups of the Daxing scheme are those rural residents aged 
between 16-60 and those with urban household status but work in agricultural sector. 
In its institutional design, the Daxing pilot scheme follows the basic idea of the 
MOCA scheme that each individual should accumulate his/her contributions in 
                                                 
67 The description of the regulations is based on the introduction brochure dispensed to the rural 
residents as well as the “Provisionary Regulation of Rural Old-Age Insurance of Daxing District” 
(Daxing qu nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian banfa) issued by the district government in March of 2004. 
68 The following figures refer to the year of 2003. Data based on the information of the” 2003 economy 
and social development” provided by the Daxing district government. 
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fully-funded personal accounts. The participation is voluntary, but the local 
administrations and (financially stronger) villages transfer subsidies directly to 
personal accounts of the insured. To take the instable nature of agricultural economy 
into account, contribution payment of each individual is collected at a quarter-
interval or even once in a year. A lump-sum contribution payment is also allowed if 
deemed necessary. The retirement age is set at 60 (for both sexes), while that for the 
disabled is lowered to 50 with lower pension entitlements correspondingly. Pensions 
are dispensed monthly to the eligible insured until their death, and their payment is 
calculated on the basis of the total amount of accumulated contributions as well as 
age. A minimum pension entitlement of 10 years is guaranteed, i.e. even if the 
insured pass away within 10 years after he/she begins receiving pensions, family 
members are eligible to claim the rest sum of the remaining pensions. To avoid any 
fund abuse that would dent the financial viability of the pension scheme, the district 
administration sets up a committee responsible for supervision of fund operation. 
A three-tiered old-age support is thus established, in which the individual bears 
the main responsibility of his/her own old-age security, whereas villages or towns 
and districts top up additional financial subsidies if possible. A visible improvement 
of the new scheme lies in the enlarged share of the financial responsibility of local 
governments. The district government also assumes its responsibility in regulating 
and supervising the operation of the insurance fund in order to strengthen the 
viability of the whole system. A further improvement lies in the installation of the 
automatic adjustment mechanism regarding minimum/maximum pensions so that a 
certain level of dynamic old-age income is guaranteed. 
 
The Tongzhou pilot scheme69 
Similar to Daxing, Tongzhou district (907 m2) has been developing rapidly in recent 
years. Located in the southeastern side of Beijing, Tongzhou has benefited a great 
deal from the prosperity of Beijing. Under its administrative jurisdiction are 11 towns 
and 482 villages. There are 597,500 residents, 438,400 of them are registered as rural 
population and 182,000 as rural labor force. In 2003 the average GDP in Tongzhou 
amounted to 10.45 billion Yuan, which brought the district government tax revenue 
of 840 million Yuan. The average income of the rural residents reached 6445 Yuan, 
slightly higher than their rural counterpart in Daxing (6099 Yuan). The financial 
strength of Tongzhou has enabled the district government to establish the MLSS 
scheme as well as rural cooperation medical scheme successively. As the city 
government intended to launch a new pilot pension scheme in 2003, the Tongzhou 
district government decided to take initiative and introduced them in a few selected 
towns and villages. 
                                                 
69 Unless otherwise noted, data in this section are based on the information of the ”2003 economy and 
social development” provided by the Tongzhou district government. 
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The political move of the Tongzhou district government was partly motivated 
by the ongoing trend of land seizure as a result of similar trends in recent decade. A 
current example is the enlargement of the “Beijing Economic and Technology 
Development Park” (Beijing jingji jishu kaifaqu) in Majuqiao town （马驹桥镇） , 
which has claimed the land of five villages, forcing nearly 4000 residents lose their 
land.70 The top issue of the Tongzhou district government was how to settle their 
lives and offer them new training or employment opportunities, and how to offer 
them social protection regarding medical care and old-age security. The response in 
2004 was the introduction of a pilot scheme in two villages of Majuqiao town 
targeted at the landless peasants. After a month of policy experiment, the scheme 
was then expanded throughout the whole town. The Tongzhou district government 
and all village collectives have dispensed a total subsidy of 215 million to support the 
financial need of the scheme. 
Eligible for participation in the scheme are those rural residents aged between 
16-59 for men and 16-49 for women.71 Landless peasants of these cohorts have to 
choose either to search for jobs by themselves or accept settlement arrangements by 
the town and village administration. In the first case, the village collective will 
subsidize each peasant in the new old-age security scheme, namely 80% of the 
contribution. Individual participants are to bear the remaining 20%. A lump-sum 
settlement subsidy of 20,000 Yuan are granted to the beneficiary while another 30,000 
Yuan are reserved as social insurance contributions (for old age, medical care). If a 
villager chooses the alternative option, the town and village administration will offer 
training programs and arrange suitable jobs. However, job arrangements are 
guaranteed only twice within the first 6 months. After two unsuccessful 
arrangements during that period, the candidates will receive the amount of 
settlement subsidy of 50,000 Yuan, but they are expected to live on their own feet 
without further cash or in-kind subsidies from the state. In both cases the 
participating peasants are entitled to receive a fixed amount of 300 Yuan pension 
monthly once they reach 60 (for men) or 55 (women). 
For those over these age limits, each village administration will pay 
contributions to the scheme so that they can receive 400 Yuan pensions for each 
month until death. The entitlement for 300 or 400 Yuan pension is guaranteed for at 
least 10 years, which means that in case of death, the surviving members of the 
family are still entitled to receive pension payments for the remaining years. Subsidy 
of the village for the contribution payment stems mainly from the revenues of land 
leasing to other users. By means of this financial support, the village administration 
                                                 
70 Report on the development of the Labor and Social Security of the Majuqiao town by its Bureau of 
Labor and Social Security. 
71 As the implementation of the new scheme in Tongzhou was just under way during the time of my 
field work, relevant regulations could only be read from the provisionary regulations of each village. 
Here the presentation of the regulations is based on the guidelines of the Dabai village in Majuqiao 
town in 2004 (Majuqiao Zhen Dabai Cun Shidi Nongmin Anzhi Zhengce Zhinan). 
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ensures that landless peasants also share in the revenues from land seizure. In this 
sense the new scheme in Tongzhou district adopts the idea similar to “land in 
exchange for security” (tudi huan baozhang) proposed by scholars (cf. section 6.2). 
In comparison with the pilot scheme in Daxing, the scheme in Tongzhou is 
limited in terms of its scope and extent. Whereas the former aims to cover more rural 
residents with public subsidies, the latter is merely set to compensate the land loss of 
the peasants without a comprehensive plan to provide sufficient social protection. 
Job training and reallocation program for landless peasants are only supposed to 
support them for the first 6 months after land loss, thereby constraining policy reach 
considerably. As my analysis of the interviews with the peasants in chapter 7 and 8 
will show, many peasants are de facto left to seek non-farming employment chances 
by themselves. Especially middle-aged landless peasants are the most vulnerable 
persons in this process because their past biographical profiles appear unattractive in 
the labor market. 
According to the information of the Beijing Bureau for Labor and Social 
Security, the pension scheme in Tongzhou has won 4700 new members and collected 
contributions amounting to 150 million Yuan. Following Tongzhou and Daxing’s 
suit, other districts in Beijing, such as Pinggu, Shunyi, Changping, are also planning 
similar plans to increase financial subsidies for individual participants in order to 
attract more rural residents join in the pension scheme.72 The Beijing city government 
has declared the goal of improving old-age security for the rural elderly in the near 
future. It remains to be seen whether these new policy initiatives would provide 
more old-age security for local peasants. 
 
6.5 The Pension Scheme in Rural Areas of Shanghai 
Shanghai is a leading figure in the field of Chinese social policy. With her strong 
economic growth and advantageous fiscal situation, Shanghai is able to explore 
relatively advanced and large-scale programs aimed at tackling challenges of rapid 
urbanization and industrialization. Social policy measures implemented in Shanghai 
often attract much attention from other regions. For instance, the new social 
assistance scheme, Minimum Living Standard System (MLSS), was initially 
experimented in Shanghai, and then expanded to all Chinese cities in 1999 upon the 
demand of the central government (Hussain 2002; Leung and Wong 1999; Shang and 
Wu 2004; Zheng 2002). This shows that policies experimented in Shanghai are highly 
significant for the future development of social security in China.73  
                                                 
72 However, remote rural districts such as Huairou, Yanqing, and Miyun still suffer weak economic 
developments due to their geographic locations and strong concentration on agricultural economy. 
They still have difficulty launching new pilot schemes. Information is based on the protocol written 
during my interview with the director of the Division for Rural Insurance in the Bureau of Labor and 
Social Security in Beijing, on June 1st of 2005. 
73 I am indebted to Yao Yu for reminding me of this point. 
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As early as the 1970s, rural communes in Shanghai have already paid pensions 
to their elderly members, though the allowances remained very low and unstable.74 
In the course of the 1980s, as the impact of economic reform and demographic policy 
on the old-age security in the rural areas emerged, Shanghai set out to explore 
possible policies. After conducting field surveys over the need of the rural residents 
for old-age security, the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs concluded that Shanghai 
has already reached the phase of economic development that could sustain a public 
pension scheme. The city government decided in 1987 to introduce a pilot scheme in 
the then Jiading County (esp. Nanxiang town and Malu town). The basic idea was to 
collect contributions from both the TVEs (10% of pre-tax payroll) and their 
employees (5% of average wages in local town), payable to the authority of rural 
social security. The contributions of employees were collected into individual 
accounts, whereas contributions from TVEs were poured into social pooling. 10% of 
the social pooling funds were used to subsidize individual accounts, while the rest 
were directed to pay the pensions for old peasants. Entitled to join the pilot scheme 
were all peasants and employees of the TVEs. In essence, the pilot scheme was a 
combination of pay-as-you-go and funded account in order to cater to the need of 
both elderly and younger rural residents. Since its start, almost all eligible persons 
have joined in the pilot scheme.  
This successful start has encouraged the responsible local government. In 1991, 
Shanghai extended the pilot scheme to the whole Jiading County, then to the whole 
rural area successively in the following year, with 6 counties and 38 towns or villages 
embarking on this scheme. The year 1995 saw further progress as a total of 846,300 
peasants in 9 counties, 152 towns and villages were covered by the scheme. In 1996, 
the Shanghai government issued the «Provision of Rural Pension Insurance in 
Shanghai», which formalized the status of the pilot scheme and gave thrust for 
further expansion. At the end of 1998, the scheme extended to 10 counties, 200 towns 
and villages, with 1,240,000 peasants as its members (coverage rate 89%). The 
accumulated funds have reached 2 billion Yuan, and a total of 0.63 billion Yuan 
pensions were payable to 310,000 pensioners. The expansion of the scheme 
accelerated in recent years, leading to a coverage rate of over 90% (1.1 million 
peasants) in 10 counties and 128 towns or villages.75 The overall accumulated funds 
peaked up to 5 billion Yuan. 
Today, the rural pension scheme is well developed in Shanghai. Accumulated 
funds are centrally administered by the county-level administration and invested in 
                                                 
74 Unless otherwise noted, the following description and data are based on the interview with the 
responsible official of the Bureau of Labor and Social Security in Shanghai, on April 26th of 2005. 
Further information originates from the campaign pamphlet of the rural old-age insurance issued by 
the Shanghai Bureau of Civil Affairs (1996). 
75 The decrease of the absolute number of participants is less the result of regress than the outcome of 
the introduction of a new township insurance (zhenbao, to be introduced below) beginning in 2004. 
Many of the previous members of the rural pension insurance were switched to the new township 
insurance scheme. 
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government bonds or deposited in bank accounts. The contribution administration 
and pension expenditure of the scheme are under strict supervision of the city 
government. Fund abuse or corruption as is often the case in other regions is 
inexistent here. Contributions from enterprises are paid monthly, while peasants are 
freer to pay them quarterly. Those unable to afford it are classified as poor 
households, whose contributions will be paid by the social assistance program of the 
civil affair authority as well as subsidies of the villages. Retirement age begins at 60 
for all peasants, whereas rural residents working in non-agricultural sectors are 
eligible for pensions at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women respectively. In 2004 
the average pension income was 86 Yuan.76 
The basic idea of the rural pension scheme in Shanghai is a multi-pillar 
protection: the main pillar is based on individual payment (self help), while subsidies 
by the rural collectives pile up the second pillar of old-age security. In this way, 
family and social support are interwoven in the institutional framework of the public 
pension scheme. Despite the fact that the average pension incomes of rural residents 
remain low, the rural pension scheme implemented in Shanghai has at least achieved 
the goal of broad coverage. Pensions from public schemes have already become an 
indispensable part of old-age income sources for the peasants in rural Shanghai. 
As the pace of urbanization accelerated in the last decade, the county and 
township governments were driven to seize farmers’ land. These new circumstances 
have led Shanghai government to rethink whether it still made sense to maintain the 
urban-rural divide in the field of social security, not least because this traditional 
institutional design failed to meet the diversified need emerging in changing 
economic and social contexts. The policy response was the new Township Insurance 
Program introduced in 2004. 
 
6.5.1 The Introduction of the Township Insurance Program in 2004 
The new Township Insurance Program (TIP; zhenbao) is designed as an interface 
between the social insurance program for urban residents and the traditional pension 
scheme for rural residents.77 It seeks to offer a new framework in response to the 
blurring boundary between urban and rural areas in Shanghai. This initiative is 
highly significant because it heralds the first move to establish a unified welfare 
system both for urban and rural residents. The TIP in Shanghai is designed as a 
smaller-scale urban social insurance program. Major social risks such as old age, 
sickness, unemployment, work injury and motherhood are covered by this new 
scheme. Entitled to join this program are enterprises in the suburb towns of Shanghai 
                                                 
76 In comparison: the average pension benefit of the urban pension insurance in 2004 ranges around 
370 to 555 Yuan. The pension benefit of the rural pension scheme is only equal to 13.5% - 21.6% of the 
level offered by its urban counterpart. 
77 Description in this section over the policy details of the Township Insurance Program is based on 
the “Overview of the Township Insurance Program” issued by the Shanghai Bureau of Labor and 
Social Security (2004). See also the evaluation report by Zhang (2004).  
 133 
and their employees as well as persons approved by the city government to join in 
(such as landless peasants). Enterprises in the rural areas originally covered by the 
rural pension scheme are encouraged to switch to the new TIP in due time, while 
urban enterprises and their employees designated for the urban social insurance 
program should continue their membership without any change. The central idea of 
the TIP adopts the prevalent thought in current social policy reforms of China, 
namely a combination of personal account and social pooling. Contributions are paid 
monthly by enterprises, calculated on the basis of 60% of average pre-tax payroll in 
Shanghai city (as benchmark, 2033 Yuan in 2004), of which 25% (i.e. 508 Yuan in 
2004) are payable to the Bureau of Labor and Social Security and the Bureau of 
Medical Insurance of the city.78 In case of job switches, previous contribution records 
in the urban social insurance, rural pension scheme or TIP will be recognized and 
converted commensurably to the new insurance scheme whichever applies 
(portability). Collected contributions are used to pay insurance benefits, and the 
remaining revenues will be accumulated and managed by the authority at the city 
level, which will be further overseen by authorities of labor and social security as 
well as medical insurance.  
With regard to the benefits, the TIP has the following regulations79:  
 
1. Pension: Insured persons arriving 60 (men) or 55 (women) with a contribution 
record of no less than 15 years (monthly contribution payment no less than 5 
years) are eligible to receive pensions from the TIP.80 Pensions are calculated 
according to one’s own contribution record. Basic pension (with a record of 15) 
is granted at 20% of the monthly average wages of Shanghai workers. With 
additional one year of contribution the pension will increase at 0.5%, with a 
ceiling of maximal 30% of the monthly average wages of workers. Therefore, 
pensions will be raised annually in proportion to the average wages. 
2. Medical Treatment: In principle, the TIP covers only serious diseases of 
outpatient services as well as hospitalization treatment of inpatient services. 
Benchmark of benefit approval for the first treatment in one year is fixed at 12% 
of the monthly average wages of Shanghai workers; for the subsequent 
treatments it is set at 6%. Once the cost of medical treatment exceeds the 
benchmark, the TIP will cover 70% of the total charges (for pensioners it is set at 
80%). The patient has to shoulder the remaining fees. However, the maximal 
                                                 
78 The 25% contribution rate includes 17% for pension insurance, 5% for medical insurance, 2% for 
unemployment insurance, 0.5% for work injury and another 0.5% for motherhood insurance. See: 
«Provisional Regulation of TIP in Shanghai» of 18th October 2003 (Shanghai xiao chengzhen shehui 
baoxian zhanxing banfa). 
79 The following description is based on the information of the «Provisional Regulation of TIP in 
Shanghai» of 18th October 2003 (Shanghai xiao chengzhen shehui baoxian zhanxing banfa). 
80 Insured persons who have reached the age limit but lack enough contribution records are allowed to 
pay contributions until the minimum condition is fulfilled. 
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coverage of the TIP for medical treatment in one year is set at 2.4 times the 
monthly average wages of workers. 
3. Unemployment: Laid-off employees insured in the TIP are entitled to claim 
unemployment benefits when they have at least a year of previous contribution 
record for the scheme. Yet different from other branches of the TIP, the 
entitlement for unemployment benefit is additionally coupled with the status as 
urban residents. The duration of benefit grants depend on the past contribution 
record. With only one year of contribution payment, the unemployed can receive 
one month of benefit. Benefit claims for additional months are subject to longer 
contribution records. Maximal duration of benefit exceeds, however, no more 
than 24 months. The amount of unemployment grant is computed in accordance 
with the duration of contribution payment and the age of the claimant, but its 
maximal sum is supposed to be as much as the minimal wage standard of 
Shanghai city.  
4. Motherhood: Female insured persons are eligible to claim motherhood benefit 
after the birth or miscarriage. Those with at least one year of contribution record 
can receive motherhood benefit commensurable to 60% of the average wages of 
Shanghai workers of the previous year. Otherwise the benefit is lowered to the 
level of minimal wages. 
 
In addition, enterprises and employees in sound financial condition can also join in 
the supplementary social insurance. Whereas calculation basis of the contribution for 
enterprises is oriented on the total wage sum of their employees of the previous year, 
individual worker’s contribution rate is set according to his/her total wage income of 
last year. The ratio of contribution payment between enterprises and their employees 
is regulated on a voluntary basis. All contributions paid by enterprises and 
employees will be tallied into individual accounts. In this way, supplementary social 
insurance functions as a second pillar of social protection for individual workers. 
With the element of supplementary social insurance, the TIP attempts to make basic 
social protection affordable for all areas of Shanghai while wealthier regions can still 
render their residents higher benefits with a supplementary social insurance. 
The institutional design of the TIP is comparably much better than the rural 
pension scheme as its pension benefit level grows in tandem with the wage increase 
in Shanghai. In addition, it covers almost all major risks like the urban social 
insurance, yet at a lower and therefore more affordable level. It is thus no wonder 
that the TIP has soon won popularity soon after its start. Alone in the first year since 
its outset in 2004, the TIP covered 750,000 rural residents, 510,000 of them were 
landless peasants and the remaining 240,000 employees of township and village 
enterprises or self-employed. The Shanghai government expected the number to 
reach 1 million at the end of 2005 and still more in the next few years.81  
                                                 
81 Figures are provided by the Bureau of Labor and Social Security in Shanghai. 
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6.6 The Uneven Development of the Rural Pension Schemes 
The rural pension policy in China is characterized by a high degree of instability. In 
the last 15 years since the introduction of pilot schemes in some regions, the state has 
been unable to establish a stable institutional framework for rural old-age security. A 
closer look at the political process reveals that the rise of the rural pension scheme 
and its eventual failure to make consistent progress towards a comprehensive system 
is a result of conflicting ideas among bureaucrats with respect to what kind of social 
welfare the rural elderly really need. This is demonstrated in the wobbly attitude of 
the central government towards the direction of the rural pension scheme in the 
political process. Particularly in critical times of external shock (Asian financial crisis) 
and internal political problem (alleged mismanagement of the rural pension scheme), 
carriers of new ideas (MOCA, MOLSS) advocating for greater state responsibility in 
this area failed to persuade the top leaders to favor their standpoint. As a result, the 
rural pension policy returned again to the dominant paradigm of minimal state 
provision for the rural old-age security. The fluctuations in this policy realm in the 
last 15 years vividly illustrate the predominance of the policy idea that peasants can 
still rely on their land and family, supplemented by the private commercial 
insurance, in their old age. Given this alleged self-reliance of the rural residents, the 
state declines to establish a comprehensive rural pension scheme. 
This analysis does not intend to judge the normative “correctness” of the 
arguments in the political debate, nor should it be interpreted as an advocacy for a 
universal rural pension scheme. While recognizing the plausibility of the argument 
in favor of the state’s limited role in the rural pension policy, the aim is rather to 
illuminate the dominance of the residualist idea exhibited in the opinions of 
oppositional political elites. It is understandable to point out the problems emerging 
during implementation, yet to conclude that the rural areas are unsuitable for more 
state involvement discloses the cognitive habit of the Chinese policymakers to 
downplay the significance of social policy for the rural residents. The failure to 
establish a sound rural pension system cannot be attributed solely to the insufficient 
infrastructure of the rural areas, but other causes are equally to blame, among them 
particularly the dearth of a well-elaborated statutory framework at the outset. But 
instead of acknowledging that point, the policymakers choose to hold the MOCA 
and the MOLSS responsible for miscalculating the whole rural circumstances; and for 
that they decide that the policy should be rolled back. 
This cognitive habit of the central government has profound implications for the 
development of the rural pension policy in China. In times of rising uncertainty 
triggered by the Asian financial crisis, the policymakers chose to embrace the 
traditional idea of leaving the rural peasants alone in their old age. Without a clear 
resolution of the top leaders, the MOLSS has in effect very little leeway for more 
innovative policies that would eventually expand public responsibility for rural old-
age security. Given the proclaimed retreat of the state, old-age security in rural China 
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hinges, once again, on private insurance market and family support. Only in 
wealthier regions can the rural elderly expect more financial aids from local 
governments. The central government endeavors to continue its strategy of rapid 
economic development, in the hope that this would ultimately uplift rural areas out 
of poverty and thus improve rural old-age security. Yet in view of the changing 
nature of family relationship as well as the uneven distribution inherent in economic 
reforms, averting the risk of old age remains a risky private matter for many 
residents in rural China. 
The weak role of the central state in the implementation of the rural pension 
policy also implies the significance of regional economic circumstances for the 
success of local pension schemes. Financial strength of local governments and 
individual households constrains the extent of contribution collection and benefit 
expense of the respective pension schemes. In other words, the unequal development 
between different regions leads to the uneven development of local pension schemes. 
Even in a region where the rural pension scheme functions relatively well, one can 
still notice various developments among villages in the same region, not least due to 
their unequal fiscal conditions. The policy guideline of the state to take local 
conditions into account in the implementation entails that the development of the 
rural pension policy in China is bound to be fragmented and residual, as many rural 
regions are in effect unable to introduce a well-functioning pension scheme for their 
residents at all. The institutional framework of the rural pension policy results in the 
reproduction of economic inequality in the old age. Existing income cleavages in the 
work phase continue to persist in the retirement phase. Since there is no endeavor 
within the rural pension policy to redistribute wealth both among regions and 
individuals, it reinforces the unequal outcomes of local development in the reform 
process. 
 
 137 
7. Life Course: Paths into the Pension Schemes  
This chapter builds ideal types based on the interview data collected during the field 
work in Qingdao, Bejing and Shanghai. The goal is to depict the manifold paths of 
the investigated rural households into local pension schemes. As the rural pension 
policy adopts the principle of voluntary participation and implementation according 
to local circumstances, one can observe a variety of pension schemes designed for 
different groups and different conditions. Regulations of the schemes vary from 
village to village, which have very different implications for the participants. 
Shanghai and Beijing form an interesting contrast in this respect. As has been 
analyzed in Chapter 6, the development of the rural pension policy in Shanghai has 
been a continuous process since its introduction in 1986, whereas that of Beijing has 
encountered more difficulties that hampered the progress of the whole policy until 
today. To take this factor into account, a closer look at the life courses of the insured 
peasants and their diverse passages into rural pension schemes becomes necessary. 
Because only by making this distinction can we capture the essence of regional 
diversity and social inequality inherent in the development of the rural pension 
policy. 
The aim here, then, is to highlight these different entry paths on the basis of 
biographical interviews. A semi-structured interview guideline allows the researcher 
to ask questions surrounding personal experience and assessments of the rural 
pension schemes. These previously prepared questions provide a starting point for 
the interviewees to tell their life stories. During the narrative process the researcher 
asks spontaneous questions in relation to the themes being told in order to gain a 
more complete picture of each life story. In such interviews the respondents narrate 
their previous work experience and current economic situations. To understand their 
familiar relationships and their implications for the care of the elderly, questions 
about the composition of their households as well as the activities of the members are 
also posed to the interviewees. Retrospective narratives about personal experience 
with the public pension schemes (if any) should help the researcher to trace the 
interaction between structural changes, institutional regulations and personal 
choices. In addition to the interest of the researcher on background histories of the 
interviewees, a central concern penetrates the whole interviews: why and how have 
the respondents in different cases joined in various pension schemes? Answers to 
this question should give us a hint on the processes of participation as well as the 
causes for such decisions. They can also shed light on the influences of structural and 
institutional factors on the individual entry into the pension schemes. 
In this light, two analytical dimensions stand out: types of pension scheme and 
reasons for participation. In view of the versatile pension schemes for different 
groups of peasants, the researcher needs to sort out first whether the interviewees 
have participated in any scheme, and if so, in which kind of pension scheme. As local 
practices vary to a large extent from each other, detailed inquiry about the 
 138 
institutional framework of local schemes offers information of their actual 
implementation. In addition to this, many village collectives also grant cash benefits 
to the elderly or subsidies to the scheme participants. Therefore, the interviews also 
focus on the collective financial aid which has equal influence on the behavior of risk 
aversion among the rural residents. Crucial for the researcher is also the timing of the 
program implementation, namely when the schemes or collective benefits are 
introduced. Or more exactly: when did the respondent join in the scheme or begin to 
receive the grants? This information can deliver insight into the manifold 
development of local practice with regard to the issue of old-age security. It also 
deepens our understanding of the events that trigger transition in personal life 
courses. 
The inquiry about the current situation of the interviewees’ participation in local 
schemes is accompanied by further questions about the reasons for the participation. 
The decision to take up the scheme may look simple at first glance, yet by closer 
examination it is often the result of personal consideration over the financial situation 
of the household. Deliberation about the priority of individual old-age security is 
often weighed against other factors such as economic condition of the household or 
the investment in education of the next generation. Whether to take up the scheme or 
not reflects an individual’s subjective assessment of current situations as well as 
middle-term goals. At the same time, collective subsidies or benefits matter as well as 
they provide material incentives for the villagers in assessing whether it pays off to 
participate in the schemes. Research on the causes and motives of participation will 
thus shed more light on the process aspect of life transitions.  
The following construction of ideal types (Figure 7-1) is oriented on the 
comparative portrayal of the various participation routes between Shanghai and 
Beijing. The information offered by cases in Qingdao is limited, as they refer mainly 
to village cadres. However, they are still incorporated into the type “rural pensions 
for cadres” to enrich the whole analysis. The types are ranked from “no pension” on 
the left side, through “rural pension” and “township insurance program” in the 
middle to “urban pension” on the right. This sequence is set to address the inherently 
unequal results of various pension schemes. Whereas the insured peasants in the 
urban pension insurance (interviewed in Shanghai) receive or expect to receive 
exuberant pensions, one can still find numerous peasants (interviewed in Beijing) 
excluded from any social protection with respect to old-age security. The middle 
variants of rural pension and township insurance program refer to different degrees 
of pension entitlements depending on the institutional design of the respective 
schemes. But in general, the township insurance program is superior to the rural 
pension schemes in terms of better pension benefits, yet inferior to the urban pension 
insurance, which offers even better pensions. By means of this sequence we can gain 
a deeper insight into the diverse landscape of various pension schemes currently co-
existing in rural China. 
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Figure 7-1: Paths into Old-Age Pension Schemes in Rural China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Seven Paths to Local Pension Schemes 
Type 1: No Pension due to Poverty 
Typical for this group of households is their generally lower income status as well as 
lower economic development of the villages where they live. As the analysis of the 
rural pension policy (chapter 6) shows, rural pension schemes are still absent in 
many rural areas or they cover only a small portion of the rural residents. Very few 
places (e.g. Shanghai) are able to include almost all rural residents in the pension 
programs. Rural households in poor regions typically work on farms and are 
beholden to the instable incomes of agricultural activities, as crops and their sales are 
susceptible to the fluctuations of the agricultural market. The economic situations of 
the households living on agricultural economy are mostly modest, and their incomes 
hardly allow them to think much about future plans, not to mention their own old 
age. In most cases of rural Beijing, the average monthly income is roughly 1000 Yuan 
- only sufficient for basic living needs. It remains a luxury to secure old age from now 
on. For the present, the most compelling concern is the risk of sickness, especially 
when inflicted by serious illness, which would mean financial blackout and economic 
hardship. Even cooperative medical systems implemented in villages, despite their 
virtually modest subsidies for the real medical expenses, are still expensive and 
inaccessible for some households with extremely tight budgets.  
Individual households of this type can barely expect any financial subsidy from 
local villages. In the outskirts of rural Beijing where land seizure has not yet taken 
place, the general economic growth is still constrained by the predominantly 
agricultural economy with low return. The average monthly income per capita is 
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around 600 – 700 Yuan. Agricultural economy generates little income growth for 
rural households because the market prices of many agricultural products fluctuate 
frequently, leading even to income loss if they fall sharply under the production cost. 
As corn, vegetables and wheat are the main crops in northern China, their harvest 
can hardly bring huge revenues for the households. The average arable land per 
person is about 1 mu, making more efficient land usage by large-scale agriculture 
impossible. There are generally a few village-owned enterprises producing primary 
industrial materials such as iron plates or carpentry, yet their products have lower 
added value, making them unable to generate greater revenues for the villages. As a 
result of the general difficulty of village economy, rural pension schemes have never 
taken root. Each household is left alone to care for its elderly families. 
The case of Mr. Nie represents the ideal type of this group. The economic 
situation of his household reflects the basic difficulty of poor rural households in 
averting the old-age risk. 
 
Case 2: Mr. Nie is the father of 2 children in a 4-person-household in Houjianping village 
 

of Tongzhou district, Beijing. The main income resource is the revenue of 
farming activities. The Nie family has a farm of around 4 mu, where Mr. Nie cultivates wheat 
and corn. In their backyard Mr. Nie also breeds 2 pigs to supplement the household 
economy. During his spare time he takes piecework orders and works as a building worker. 
Yet the income from farming and side job is not always constant, as both are subject to 
weather conditions. He earns roughly 900 Yuan per month. Since the village he lives in has 
not introduced the rural pension scheme, he has never heard of it. The only existing 
protection program is the cooperative medical program, but Mr. Nie still declines to join it 
owing to his modest economic condition. 
 
The reliance of the Beijing household economy on agricultural profits is the major 
reason why rural households have been unable to catch up with the rapid economic 
growth in recent years. Small per capita farm area and declining profitability of 
agricultural products are accompanied by rising cost of manual labor, chemical 
fertilizer and pesticide. In many cases of harvest, peasants are even at the risk of 
making losses because the market prices of crops fall far below the planting costs. 
The state has begun subsidizing farming since 2003 (100 Yuan per mu annually in 
Beijing), yet that is still too little to have any significant effect on the income 
improvement of the rural households. 
Because both children go to schools, Mr. Nie has to collect money for their 
tuition fees, a heavy burden for the tight budget of the household. For the second 
daughter, for instance, Mr. Nie has to pay a tuition fee of 6400 Yuan a year alone, not 
to mention other costs (meal, traffic, learning materials). The elder daughter is 
preparing for the entrance examination to universities. In case she gets the entrance 
admission, Mr. Nie expects that he has to bear more expenses for the tuition fee. For 
the time being, it is impossible for him to save any money for the future. 
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… I don’t even think about it (saving) now! Why? Because my condition is far behind it, 
isn’t it? Even though I earn so little money, to breed the family for the whole year I still have 
to work hard. Otherwise I would not be able to achieve it. I cannot do any saving now. 
(Case 2, 04/10/04) 
 
The tight financial condition forces Mr. Nie to bear the risk of sickness even though 
there is a cooperative medical program in the village, which requires an annual 
participation fee of 60 Yuan for a 4-person-household. Though village cadres have 
visited him persuading him to take up the scheme, Mr. Nie has made up his mind 
not to follow their advice. Worrying that the income would not be able to cover 
expenses of the tuition fees, Mr. Nie has decided not to join in the cooperative 
medical program in order to save the money for other purposes. At the age of over 
40, Mr. Nie thinks he is still healthy enough that he can take the risk of sickness. He 
would not change his decision until his financial situation has improved. 
For their old age, therefore, Mr. Nie thinks that he can only depend on himself 
or his children. But the basic difficulty is that, even when they do have the spare 
economic capacity to make additional security arrangements for their old age, the 
void of any public pension program forces them not to think much about their old 
age security. This does not mean that old-age security is not important at all. Quite 
the contrary, even in the minds of those rural households the importance of old-age 
security has not been ignored, nor do they take the traditional way of dependence on 
family and children for granted. In the hope of abating the burden of their children to 
take care of them in their old age, the middle-aged interviewees express their wish to 
join the public old-age security system whatever available. As Mr. Nie says, 
 
I cannot join the rural social insurance schemes because my (economic) condition has not 
yet reached that stage, my situation does not allow it at all! Had I the money, I would join in 
the (social) insurance so that I would be protected when I got old. But without the condition, 
how can you join in the scheme? …I would like to exchange my land for social security. 
First of all, you have the pension offered by the government, and, in addition, subsidies for 
land seizure. The government means it, it sets standard with regard to how much money for 
how much land. You can deposit the money in the bank or you can join other insurances, 
enough for your expenses, right? It is tiring to cultivate one’s own land plot without any 
protection. In the case of public social security you have got the protection. The scale of 
social security will vary, but rather towards better direction. The society is improving, isn’t 
it? (Case 2, 04/10/04) 
 
Expectation of dependence on the children does not necessarily lead the peasants to 
wish for more offspring. Aware of the expensive cost associated with raising a child, 
almost all households in this type prefer having 1-2 children irrespective of sons or 
daughters. In addition to legal prohibition of more than two children, economic 
burden is the main argument against bearing more children. But at the same time, 
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they also express their concern over heavy burden their children would have to bear 
with respect to caring for their parents in their old age. No household would be 
happy with the idea that they would have to rely heavily on their children, yet in the 
absence of sufficient public support, households of this type have no other choice. 
 
I have only two daughters, and they have to fend for me in my old age, otherwise who else? 
It would be better if the state really sets up a subsidized pension scheme that could support 
your old-age security…It is good if the children can fend for you, but if not, you cannot 
expect them to do it because they cannot even take good care of themselves…Everyone 
wishes that the children would become the elite in society, but what if they do not? 
Nowadays there are so many jobless youth, so who dares say how the children would 
become? (Case 2, 04/10/04) 
 
The absence of a public old-age pension scheme has generally given rise to the wish 
for more state involvement. As the prospect of income improvement by agricultural 
activity remains dim, households of this type can only hope for more state subsidy to 
cover the gap needed for their old-age security. Interestingly, the dearth of a state 
old-age security system has dampened the enthusiasm among the peasants for 
economic security in old age, yet stirred up the hope that the very same state would 
eventually take the responsibility to assist rural residents in averting the risk of old 
age. Disappointment towards the state arises because the peasants are more and 
more aware of their subordinate status in the public welfare system, either through 
mass media or increasing contact with the urban life. This has generated a discontent 
or even resentful feeling among those who have not been able to take a share in the 
cake of rapid economic growth. But despite the frustration over the current situation, 
the peasants still have a strong confidence in the ability of the state to establish a 
stable system. Even peasants of type 1 show the willingness to join public pension 
schemes (if any). Asked whether commercial insurance would appeal more to their 
needs than social insurance implemented by the state, Mr. Nie expresses his 
preference for the latter because he believes the state institution would provide more 
stability and guarantee. “The social protection by the government is more reliable than the 
commercial insurance. The businessman would not make deals that make losses. The public 
scheme is able to do this.” (Case 2, 04/10/04) 
What characterizes the ideal type of rural households of “no pension”? Poverty 
and scarcity of financial resources are the key features. As the rural pension policy 
follows the principle of self-reliance, the participation of poorer rural households in 
pension schemes is practically out of question. This is especially the case when the 
overall economic conditions of the villages are so weak that any financial support 
from them is impossible. Whereas there is no public support for the individual old-
age security, these peasants are also unable to join the commercial pension insurance. 
Households of this type can only hope to escape from poverty and old-age risk with 
more state involvement that would allocate more public resources into the regions. 
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Yet the outlook of this aspect remains bleak given the dominant policy direction. 
Since these households have always been living in poverty, they are rather fatalistic 
and prone to accept the status quo. Obedient adaptation to adverse circumstances 
(nilai shunshou) is the central idea they hold true in their minds. Past experiences 
before the economic reforms in 1978 have taught them not to expect much from the 
state because they know that even complaint would not change much. The difference 
in the provision of state social security between urban and rural residents is nothing 
new, but the peasants have learnt to keep silent about that unequal treatment. What 
one can do is rather to stick to one’s own land plot and family, which have always 
been the main pillars of living maintenance as well as old-age security.  
 
Type 2: Village Pension Allowances 
The rural pension described here is different from the original program launched by 
the MOCA. It is mainly a cash benefit granted by the village administration 
irrespective of individual contributions. They are exclusively local benefits only 
restricted to registered villagers. In our case studies, these villages are located in the 
farther outskirt of Beijing and thus unable to achieve stronger economic growth due 
to unfavorable location. The financial strength of the village collectives is weaker 
than those located in the vicinity of downtown Beijing, which benefit from the rapid 
trend of urbanization. Rural households of this type have generally lower income as 
most of them still live on agricultural economy. The overall situation has hindered 
the introduction of the MOCA scheme. Neither has the individual household spare 
financial capacity for accumulating sufficient old-age pensions in individual accounts, 
nor are the village collectives able to provide villagers with substantial subsidies. To 
make up for the institutional vacuum, the village administration focuses the available 
resources only on those most in need. Rural pensions are thus granted in form of 
limited cash benefits for the elderly. 
As far as the village welfare for local elderly is concerned, there exists among 
villages a variety of programs and subsidies. The discussion here concentrates on the 
cases investigated during my field work in Beijing, mainly in Huairou district whose 
economic strength is relatively weak among rural regions around Beijing city (see 
chapter 6). In many villages, a common practice is to grant cash or in-kind benefits to 
the local elderly, conditional on the financial strength of the village collectives. The 
Miaocheng village（庙城村）in my survey, for example, introduced the MOCA rural 
pension scheme at the beginning of the 1990s but failed to keep the scheme on track 
because the village collective was unable to grant sufficient subsidy. Only a few years 
later the scheme ceased to operate as individual peasants could not afford 
contribution payment without any village subvention. As an alternative the village 
collective began granting each elderly above 60 a cash benefit of 100 Yuan monthly in 
2003. It was made possible because of the compensation payments by the district 
government for the policy of land seizure. The village collective also provided each 
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villager with a yearly quota of in-kind benefits such as rice, wheat flour and salad oil, 
a program still in practice until today. 
These benefits are coupled with personal status as a local villager, and the 
amount depends on the financial conditions of the villages. In essence, it is 
equivalent to the subsidies many villages grant to their members in local rural 
pension schemes. The only difference is that villages in this ideal type make use of 
the money for direct benefits instead of setting up a pension scheme and granting 
subsidies. Since pension allowances of this kind are low, they can hardly provide any 
remarkable protection against poverty in old age. Nor is the provision of such 
benefits stable as it is conditional upon the financial state of the villages. As a result, 
elderly recipients in this type still have to rely on their own land and family as main 
underpinnings. 
 
Case 11: Ms. Li is 60 years old, living with her husband, son and daughter-in-law together in 
a household in Miaocheng village（庙城村）of Huairou district in Beijing. The old 
couple gets from the village collective a land plot of 4 mu on which economic crops are 
grown. For the usage of the plot they have to pay 100-odd Yuan yearly to the village. They 
have planted different sorts of fruit trees such as peach, plum and date, in the hope that the 
harvest in the next few years would improve the household economy. Since her son cannot 
find a suitable job with higher wages in downtown Beijing, he moves back to the village, 
living with his parents and helping them in the husbandry. The daughter-in-law and the 
granddaughter (15 years old) also live together with the old couple. The daughter-in-law 
works in a company near the village, and her income is used to support her own parents. She 
gives Ms. Li only occasionally some allowances for daily use.  
 
In order to make a living, Ms. Li’s husband works for the production team and earns 
a monthly salary of 450 Yuan. The 5-person-household has a total monthly income of 
650 Yuan, together with the in-kind benefits granted by the village collective. Not 
only are savings impossible, but they are also encumbered with debts for the 
investment in planting fruit trees. For it Ms. Li has already invested more than 
100,000 Yuan, in the hope that the future profit of the fruit harvest would outstrip the 
cost and improve the household economic situation. But until then the family still 
has to wait for a few years because the growth of a peach tree to ripeness takes at 
least 3 years. The investment has actually exceeded the financial capacity of the 
household but Ms. Li deems it as a necessary step to improve future conditions. The 
whole family lives in a very straitened economic circumstance. 
Ms. Li has been receiving a monthly pension allowance of 100 Yuan from the 
village administration since she reached 60 in 2004. Her husband began claiming the 
same benefit in 2003. This benefit program was set out in 2003 as the village financial 
situation had benefited from land seizure in the last few years. The administration 
decided to distribute the compensation payments from the district government in the 
form of a monthly pension allowance. To launch the program, the village 
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administration had propagated this measure with loudspeakers. The villagers were 
told that this new welfare program envisaged a monthly pension of 100 Yuan for 
each villager over 60. Each month the entitled claimants were informed to receive 
pension payments by the administration. 
A similar welfare program regarding medical care was also introduced a few 
years ago. Initially each villager had to pay 30 Yuan of contribution to the 
cooperative medical program, while the village subsidized 15 Yuan for each 
contribution payment. Under such a medical program, villagers are entitled to obtain 
a certain percentage of their previous medical treatment payments rebated. Now the 
village overtakes the financial responsibility of the cooperative medical care and pays 
the overall contributions for the villagers. That is, villagers like Ms. Li are exempt 
from contribution payment but remain entitled to enjoy the refund subsidy of the 
program in case of sickness and incurred medical treatment. Pension allowance and 
contribution subsidy of medical care constitute the two programmatic pillars of the 
Miaocheng village. 
Ms. Li is pleased with the pension allowance of the village. After all, 100 Yuan 
more in income means a lot for the debt-inflicted household. As her son and 
daughter-in-law are unable to earn much more income for the whole household, Ms. 
Li is happy that she does not have to ask the young couple for 100 Yuan a month but 
gets the amount from the village. The more the elderly can obtain from the state, the 
less they are to ask their children for support. After all, her son and daughter-in-law 
make little money, which makes them unable to support the old-age security of Ms. 
Li and her husband.  
 
100 bucks, to be honest, are not enough for your living. Have you seen how much one 
kilogram of pork costs? If you buy vegetables and fruits additionally, how much would they 
cost! So it (the pension) is a cost sharing; they let you join in the scheme and take care of you. 
Without the money, where do you have the income in the village? (Case 11, 31/03/05) 
 
Despite the joy over the receipt of pension allowances, Ms. Li is aware of the obvious 
policy divide leading to unequal treatment of the elderly between urban and rural 
areas. Rural elderly are simply unable to access the benefits that many urban retirees 
enjoy. After all, the village pension allowance of 100 Yuan is not comparable with 
urban pensions, often at the level of several hundred Yuan. She believes that, even 
though the family and children should bear the burden of rural old-age security, the 
state cannot dodge the responsibility for the rural elderly. 
 
…As regards the urban workers, they have occupational pensions when they get old. 
Shouldn’t the peasants also share some of such benefits? Speaking of eliminating (urban-
rural) divide, it is not deleted at all! … Who gives the peasants money? We have no 
pensions! (Case 11, 31/03/05) 
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While Ms. Li can practically expect no support from the state, she cannot afford any 
additional private commercial insurance, either. As the state and market fail to be 
reliable pillars of old-age security, Ms. Li can only count on her son and daughter-in-
law. 
 
… In the rural villages people will not make comparison if they are not your relatives. 
About his own parents, he (the son) will not forget them when he gets better off. … My son 
and daughter-in-law are no lazy bones … the daughter-in-law goes to work now. If I have 
no money, she would ask me whether she should give me some money, more or less. (Case 
11, 31/03/05) 
 
The children are often the last resort of the rural elderly. But in their minds they 
would prefer not to become an economic burden for their family. Working even 
though in one’s old age becomes a necessity rather than an option because there is 
not even sufficient material condition for the living in old age, to say the least of the 
retirement. As the household economy is still in debt, no additional savings can be 
made for the future. 100 Yuan of pension benefit helps relieve, but cannot ultimately 
change the critical situation. Ms. Li is upset with the absence of the state’s support 
because she thinks she has dedicated most of her life-long efforts to the country but 
gained almost nothing in return. She has sought to appeal to the village or even 
township administration for more financial assistance, with no avail. They turned 
their backs on her, saying that the time to arrange a job opportunity for her was gone. 
After exhausting all possible channels of personal network, Ms. Li hopes that the 
investment in fruit tree planting would generate enough revenues to help overcome 
current financial impasse. With 650 Yuan a month and those in-kind benefits, the 
whole family can still scratch along. 
What characterizes the ideal type of pensions as rural welfare? If one compares 
this type with type 1, the obvious distinction lies in the better financial situation of 
the village collective in type 2. Whereas the village collective in type 1 is too poor to 
grant any subsidy to its villagers, the financial strength of the village in type 2 is in a 
better shape that allows a more generous subsidy measure to benefit the villagers. A 
pension allowance of 100 Yuan monthly is significant to those rural households with 
a monthly income of less than 1000 Yuan. The distribution of in-kind benefits also 
helps ease their financial strains. The case of Ms. Li elucidates this situation. While 
the general condition of the whole household remains critical, the pension allowance 
of monthly 200 Yuan (for Ms. Li and her husband) has certainly buttressed the 
financial basis. Yet despite the positive function of the pension allowance, its weak 
protection against possible contingencies in old age is still conspicuous. The case of 
Ms. Li’s old-age security stands on fragile basis because the whole household 
economy depends heavily on the work income of her husband and the village 
pension allowance. An upward social mobility of the next generation is not in sight 
as Ms. Li’s son still works as a peasant due to his low qualification. The financial 
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situation is further shadowed by heavy debts incurred by the investment in the 
planting of the fruit trees. Seen in this light, the economic situation of the whole 
family is too precarious to be a solid tier of old-age security. Even the receipt of 
pension allowance from the village cannot averse the economic risk with which rural 
households of type 2 are confronted. 
 
Type 3: Rural Pensions as Compensation for Land Seizure 
This type refers mainly to landless peasants who are included in pension schemes 
established by local governments as a compensation for the land seizure. Rapid 
urbanization and urbanization have generated a strong demand for the land, which 
can only be met by encroachment of arable farmland originally used for agricultural 
economy. While seizing farmland for other developmental purposes, local 
governments are under pressure to compensate landless peasants for their loss of 
subsistence means. Rural pension schemes are one of such policy responses aiming to 
provide landless peasants with institutional protection against old-age risk.  
There is thus far no nationwide unified regulation of how such schemes should 
be established, which results in very different local policies. For this reason, the 
analysis here refers to the interview results with the landless peasants in Beijing 
because these cases still offer a glimpse of current situations. A basic characteristic of 
such pension schemes is that individual contributions to the schemes are collected 
from cash compensation benefits landless peasants receive from local governments. 
In Beijing, for instance, the total sum is fixed at 50,000 Yuan for each villager, 
including a lump-sum settlement subsidy of 20,000 Yuan and another 30,000 Yuan as 
social insurance contributions (for old age and medical care). Towns and villages also 
offer additional subsidies in support of individual contribution payments. Even 
though the village administration offers training programs and arranges suitable 
jobs, the service is offered only twice within the first 6 months (for policy details see 
Chapter 6). The participating peasants are entitled to receive a fixed amount of 
pensions (300 Yuan monthly) once they reach 60 (men) or 55 (women). But the 
regulation of the scheme demands a compulsory participation irrespective of 
personal situations. This has caused misfit between institutional designs and 
individual needs, as shown in the cases later.  
Even though the Beijing government has launched a pension scheme 
specifically for the landless peasants, the situations of the latter as a whole remain 
precarious, as many of them only worked on the farm or in low-skilled village 
sectors before. With the land being seized and all rural residents being forced to 
make their livings through paid employment, problems of subsistence emerge 
because they lack suitable qualifications for any new employment. This has resulted 
in social exclusion in the form of involuntary unemployment and loss of subsistence. 
Effective social security and labor reintegration policies seem to be the only means 
which can overcome this bottleneck. But unfortunately, the cases surveyed in rural 
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Beijing indicate the opposite side: a patchwork of uncoordinated policies provides 
only petty assistance for those in economic distress. 
 
Case 7: Ms. Sun is 47 years old, lives with her husband and parents-in-law in Beiwu village
 
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, Majuqiao town
 
	

, Tongzhou district
 

. Her daughter 
studies mathematics at the Tsing-Hua University in Beijing city. Ms. Zhu had not worked on 
the farm even before the land seizure took place. She made her living mainly by doing small 
business, with which she could just get along somehow. Now that the parents-in-law are frail 
and in need of care, she stays at home to keep the house and take care of them. Ms. Sun’s 
husband works in a state-owned coal enterprise in Tongzhou district. With a monthly 
income of more than 1000 Yuan to cover all expenses, the whole family is under economic 
strain. 
 
As the household economy mainly depends on the income of her husband, the 
family has to overcome current financial impasse. Since living in modern apartments 
incurs extra living expenses for landless peasants, Ms. Sun has practically very little 
leeway to save any money for other purposes. Her (few) savings stem from her 
previous work incomes. Fortunately the daughter will soon graduate from the 
university and look for a job to earn money, which would certainly help the family 
pass current financial bottleneck. The tight financial situation of the household does 
not allow Ms. Sun to buy any private commercial insurance for herself or her families 
despite its advantages. 
Before the start of the land seizure, Ms. Sun owned together with her family a 
farm of less than 1 mu area, distributed by the village collective as a means of 
subsistence. The land plot was taken away by the district and town governments in 
2002, which put forward the Tongzhou pension scheme for landless peasants later in 
2004. Although Ms. Sun did not live on agricultural incomes, she was also included 
in the scheme because of her peasant status. Her husband is an urban worker, and 
enjoys the social protection of the urban social insurance. According to the regulation 
of the pension scheme for landless peasants, Ms. Sun was entitled to claim a total 
sum of 50,000 Yuan as a lump-sum compensation benefit. The town government took 
9,000 from that benefit away for contribution payment into the new pension scheme. 
She received 41,000 in the end. 
When the scheme was started, the cadres campaigned with loudspeakers that 
the budget for the scheme had been approved and transferred to the village 
administration. However, many villagers refused to cooperate at first, viewing the 
subsidy of the whole scheme as too little. Since the compensation for the land loss as 
well as the amount of the expected pensions were too low for them to cover the basic 
living expenses, many worried that signing such an agreement would mean future 
hardship. But, in the end, they had no choice but to take the offer as there was no 
sign of further improvement, and it was still better to participate in the scheme than 
nothing. The overall implementation was rather unscrupulous in terms of policy 
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explanation and programmatic arrangement. The policy had been put into force well 
before relevant regulations were formulated. Since the district or town government 
did not issue documents of regulation details, the village cadres could not exactly 
answer the questions of the landless peasants. Especially those peasants over the age 
of 50 were merely asked to sign a declaration that they have received the placement 
benefit and agreed to seek employment alone. 
 
…In detail they asked us to sign the document. As regards the labor force arrangements, 
they told us that there were currently no good jobs to be introduced. Nor would they make 
any arrangements for peasants in our age. So it was just like a deal once and for all: we took 
directly 41,000 Yuan, filled out an application form of self-reliance, and then we got the 
cash. After that we received a blank deposit booklet, with that we could receive a pension of 
300 Yuan a month when we reach 55. (Case 7, 14/10/04) 
 
Ms. Sun is worried about the future prospect of her old-age security. The fixed 
pension of 300 Yuan a month after the age of 55 is in fact quite modest, given that 
living expenses in rural Beijing have sharply risen in recent years. When it comes to 
social security of the landless peasants, Ms. Sun is disappointed by the fact that the 
local governments have not coordinated many details at all. Especially for middle-
aged or elder persons like her, it is extremely difficult to find any alternative jobs as a 
source of living subsistence because private employers prefer younger workforce. In 
the absence of a state policy to integrate elder people into the labor market, a well-
designed social security program is of particular importance. But even in this respect, 
the overall policy framework for landless peasants has not been well elaborated. 
 
When I asked them (cadres) questions about policy details, they said that the policy 
document has not yet been issued. But this is quite irresponsible to the peasants because 
many people’s future livings are at stake… They said we would join in the pension scheme 
temporarily, and then participate in social insurance schemes covering old age, medical care 
and unemployment once concrete policies were made. (Case 7, 14/10/04) 
 
In this circumstance, Ms. Sun hopes that she could have a stable financial situation in 
her old age, but she is almost unable to afford it. She envies the urban residents for 
their entitlements to receive pensions in old age. In the case of rural old-age security, 
this would be only possible when the state took more responsibility for individual 
peasants. Otherwise rural households under poorer economic conditions can only 
resort to resources available to them, namely their own families. Unfortunately, as it 
stands, the pension scheme for landless peasants in Beijing seems to indicate exactly 
this direction. The state has established a policy framework which is unable to offer 
real protections for those vulnerable to social risks arising from the process of land 
seizure. Especially the case of sickness of any members would be a nightmare for the 
whole family because it would aggravate further the already weak economic 
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situation. In view of the exorbitant prices of the medical care, many rural residents 
are unable to seek medical treatment for serious illness. As a result, landless 
households in rural Beijing are particularly susceptible to life exigencies since the 
local government fails to establish a safety net that can offset the negative 
consequences of land appropriation. 
This reliance on each household’s own ability to manage the whole situation is 
especially clear if we look at another case, in which the household can better cope 
with the insufficient support of the public scheme mainly because it has a stable 
income source out of non-agricultural activities. For such a case, the inadequate 
policy design of social security for landless peasants matters less.  
 
Case 6: Ms. Zhong is 29 years old, the wife of a car salesman and the mother of a son. The 
three-person-household lives in Beiwu village
 
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, 
Tongzhou district
 

. As her husband earnings are well above village average, and 
the son is still young, she stays at home as a housewife. Ms. Zhong never works on the farm, 
nor does her husband. The parents-in-law are peasants working on the farm. Ms. Zhu has a 
junior high school degree because she is grown up in a family mainly engaged in doing 
business. After graduation from the school she helped the family in the business, and 
worked later for an insurance company for two years until she got married to her husband. 
Before the pension scheme for landless peasants was introduced in the Beiwu village, Ms. 
Zhong had never had any experience with the rural pension scheme. 
 
Since Ms. Zhong does not live on agricultural incomes, she has no longer any land 
plot registered under her or her husband’s name. However, they are still included in 
the new pension scheme for landless peasants because their household is registered 
in the village. The land seizure was enforced in 2002 with a supplementary 
regulation issued by the Beijing government regarding how the land and the housing 
above it was to be compensated. Ms. Zhong revealed that the compensation terms 
were worse than in other cases, which led to discontent among the villagers of Beiwu 
village. There were protest attempts, yet the local government soon arrested some 
protestors and enforced the land seizure without further improvement of the terms. 
In the end, villagers who lost their land had no choice but to accept the compensation. 
As far as the protection function of the current scheme is concerned, Ms. Zhong 
thinks that the benefits are too low because the fixed monthly amount of 300 Yuan 
pensions is unable to meet the real need in one’s old age at all. The lump-sum 
payment of totally 50,000 Yuan is also far below the expected daily expenses. She 
points to the increasing expenses in association with the loss of land since peasants 
have to buy food instead of obtaining it from farming. Living in modern apartments 
equipped with central heating and tap water also incurs additional living expenses. 
Even the reallocation of the landless peasants in local labor market proves flawed, as 
many middle-aged villagers have difficulty in finding any non-agricultural 
employment. Higher age, low education and qualification make them unattractive to 
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most of the employers. The training courses designed by the town and village 
administration, such as computer course or floriculture, often fail to match the real 
requirement of the labor market. As a result, middle-aged peasants have become a 
vulnerable group in the new circumstances because their traditional subsistence basis 
is deprived without corresponding measures that can make up this loss. 
Above all, she is not satisfied at all with the implementation process. The whole 
process was rather reckless in terms of the policy regulation and implementation. 
Not only the villagers but the cadre themselves were also not well informed in 
advance so that the latter could hardly explain exact policy details. In addition, the 
whole policy framework was laid down and implemented in a top-down way 
without any previous consultation with the clients in concern. Nor were the villagers 
allowed to negotiate with the local government about the terms of compensation and 
social security benefit. 
 
… It was enforced by the government. It enacted a statutory clause, and then the cadres of 
the five villages put it into force. We have no idea of how the regulations, for example, 
regarding the division of age groups, were made. You just get there and sign the agreement, 
that’s all. … I asked the cadres if I could take a look at the regulation document, but they 
replied that there was none available. They reckoned that this was an order from the higher 
authority, saying it was time to establish such an insurance scheme. And we were supposed 
to sign the agreement. (Case 6, 14/10/04) 
 
The whole policy process was enforced without any reference to the opinions of the 
villagers. What was meant to help the landless peasants turned out to be a coercive 
measure that they could not resist. Because of this policy insufficiency, many landless 
peasants in Beijing are in fact left alone to fight for their economic survival. 
Economically better off than most of her co-villagers, Ms. Zhong is less concerned 
about how much she can get from the scheme. By and large, she is pleased with the 
idea of establishing a social security program in care of the landless peasants. After 
all, a social security scheme of the state would ensure a better protection. 
 
I think it’s good to have a (social) protection because without that, you would get no cent 
when you become old. 50,000 Yuan is, after all, a fixed sum. If you buy this and that, then 
you’ll have no money left. The contribution rate of the scheme is not much, and no matter it 
is supposed to be deposit or supplement, I think it’s OK. Because you receive 300 Yuan 
monthly after 55, at least you can buy food or breakfast with that. (Case 6, 14/10/04) 
 
In addition the pension scheme for landless peasants, Ms. Zhong and her husband 
have bought products of private commercial insurance. Both are medical care 
insurance aiming to prevent the insured from sudden incurrence of large medical 
cost as a result of severe sickness. Ms. Zhong also bought an insurance product as a 
preparation for the future education expenses of her son. The parents-in-law receive 
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pensions from the local scheme because their ages are beyond the retirement age. For 
this reason they do not purchase any further private insurance. With the combination 
of public pensions and private insurance, Ms. Zhong hopes to improve the financial 
situations of the household and secure it against major economic risks.  
In sum, the ideal type of the path to the pension scheme for landless peasants is 
characterized by changes of individual life forms by the state land policy. In the case 
of Beijing, many landless peasants are compensated merely with a lump-sum 
payment as well as a social security scheme covering old age and sickness. However, 
these benefits help little since they have not taken real living expenses into account. 
With highly insufficient benefits, the disadvantaged peasants have in effect very little 
leeway for long-term planning after the land seizure. Even measures of labor 
reintegration prove highly deficient in terms of fragmentary policy coordination as 
well as insufficient arrangement of job-training courses. As a result, land 
encroachment has virtually forced the peasants to turn from self-employed to 
market-dependent workforce with poor skill qualifications. These factors altogether 
have put many peasants, among them especially the middle-aged, in an extremely 
precarious situation of permanent exclusion from the labor market. Landless 
peasants are in fact left in the lurch where they have to manage a way out of 
difficulty by themselves. The path to joining in the pension scheme is associated with 
a coercive state policy against which the affected peasants are unable to resist. But 
they have to bear the negative consequences of land deprivation and possible 
unemployment.  
 
Type 4: Rural Pensions from Local Pension Schemes 
This type of pension scheme participants is the dominant group in the rural pension 
schemes. It covers all those rural residents who can afford and are willing to join in 
local schemes. Many of the participants still work on their land and live on incomes 
from agricultural products. With the rural economy gradually diversifying, many 
have a sideline (mostly as self-employed) to increase their income. Nonetheless, 
peasants of this type are generally less well-off than those already working in non-
agricultural sectors, though better than the peasants of the type 1. Apart from the 
maintenance of daily lives, their income situations are normally sufficient for them to 
pay contributions into the rural pension schemes. 
In all cases the paths to joining in the schemes are similar. Cadres make the 
announcement about the introduction of the schemes in the villages by means of 
loudspeakers or house visit. Peasants of this type usually take up the schemes once 
they are convinced of their advantages. The regulation of flexible contribution 
collection allows the insured peasants to pay their contributions irregularly. In most 
cases, the participants pay their contributions according to their own economic 
conditions. They have, therefore, very different records of insurance history. As the 
regulations vary from village to village, not least on the part of village subsidies, the 
amount of individual accumulated pensions often differ from one another. In 
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wealthier villages, insured peasants can expect much higher pensions. The extent of 
subsidies from village collectives influences participants’ behavior and their 
subjective evaluation towards the local schemes.  
The participation in the rural pension schemes does not really warrant 
economic safety in one’s old age. Since the principle is based on voluntary 
participation, individual saving, and fully-funded method, the level of accumulated 
pensions is directly related to individual economic ability. In most cases the expected 
pension income is no more than a tiny allowance for the old age. This means that 
most of the insured peasants still have to rely on other sources of old-age income, 
among them not least the support of the family. It is thus little wonder that, in spite 
of the implementation of the pension schemes, many rural residents still wish to live 
together with their children in their old age. Living with children is a normal 
biography for many rural elderly even though they participate in local pension 
schemes. 
In addition to family care, many rural residents also seek other possibilities to 
ensure a secure old age. Private commercial insurance, for instance, often becomes an 
alternative to secure oneself against potential life exigencies. Due to lack of a well-
organized medical care system, medical insurance or work injury insurance are the 
most common products bought by the rural peasants. Life insurance is considered 
mostly in combination with other insurance goals such as medical care or accident 
compensation. Rural pension, family support, and private insurance constitute the 
chief pillars of old-age security for this type of peasants. 
As differences between regional economic strength directly influence the extent 
of respective collective subsidies in local pension schemes, a closer look at the cases 
in rural Beijing and rural Shanghai can elucidate this aspect. Whereas rural Shanghai 
has a strong tradition of growing collective subvention in the pension schemes, 
peasants in Beijing have to reckon with the fact that they are expected to pay for the 
most part of the contributions. 
 
Case 17: Ms. Zhang is 38 years old and works as the accountant in the village administration 
of the Langfasi village
 
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in Huangcun town
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, Daxing district
 
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, Beijing. As a college graduate, Ms. Zhang has been village accountant since she began to 
work. Her income amounts to 900 Yuan a month. Her husband works as a mechanic for the 
Beijing Movie Production Company in the city, with a monthly income of 900 Yuan. The 
couple has a daughter who goes to a junior high school. Ms. Zhang’s father-in-law lives in 
the household and depends on the support of the children (Ms. Zhang’s husband and his 
sisters). With the total income of monthly 2000 Yuan, the economic condition of the 
household is not particularly well-off. 
 
The village’s economy has been undergoing fundamental changes in recent years. 
The deterioration of the natural environment (void of underground water) has made 
agriculture impossible even though the village still possesses of some arable fields. 
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Since the village administration does not establish any collective enterprises that can 
utilize the fallow fields effectively, it rents them to private companies or persons for 
other commercial usages as an alternative. For the same reason, residents of the 
Langfasi village have to seek employment in other sectors (as migrant workers) or 
live on self-employment activities (shops, guesthouses or groceries). The average 
monthly income of the villagers amounts to roughly 1000 Yuan. As a whole, the 
economic situation of the Langfasi village is not well-off in rural Beijing 
The village was affected by the land seizure policy quite early, which began in 
the 1980s and proceeded throughout the following decade. A series of land 
appropriation for different usages was enforced: the construction of a military police 
base in 1985 was followed by urban expansion in 1993, together with the construction 
of circular superhighway as well as greenbelt zones in 2003. The land seizure was 
implemented well before any social security programs for the landless peasants have 
been established. The compensation payment for each mu of land in 1985 was merely 
5000 Yuan. Even in 2003 landless peasants obtained a compensation payment of over 
20,000 Yuan for each mu, without any further arrangements or benefits for their 
future livings. Nor were there any job training courses to assist the landless peasants 
concerned enter the labor market. They were simply left alone to fend for themselves. 
These negative experiences have generated discontent among the villagers and their 
distrust towards the state rural policy. 
In the Daxing district, the MOCA pension scheme was once introduced at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but it ceased to operate further owing to policy reversal of the 
Beijing government. Ms. Zhang participated in the scheme then and paid 400 Yuan to 
the scheme, only to realize later that the scheme stalled because the Daxing district 
government was reluctant to keep the scheme on track. There was no announcement 
regarding how the policy would further develop, nor did the administration take 
stock of the accumulated fund and refund collected contribution to individual 
participants. It was not until 2004 that the district government re-launched a new 
pension scheme subsidized by the district, town and village administration 
altogether (see Chapter 6). In addition to the subsidies from the Daxing district and 
town government, the village collective bears 50% of the payable contributions for 
the mothers with single child in the village. In this manner, the village corresponds to 
the policy of the Daxing district of boosting the willingness of the villagers to join in 
the new scheme. Since Ms. Zhang herself served in the village administration office, 
she was well informed in advance and has chosen to join in the scheme. 
Yet the overall policy progress was sluggish, not least because private 
commercial insurance also introduced various products to attract rural customers. 
Thanks to the bumpy implementation of the MOCA pension scheme in the past, 
private commercial insurance has been gaining ground in recent years. In the face of 
absence of the public scheme, many villagers concluded contracts with private 
insurance companies in the course of the 1990s for supplementary support. They also 
viewed the sustainability of the new public scheme since 2004 with reservation, 
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seeing that the state policies (land seizure, pensions etc.) in the past wobbled all the 
time. Wait-and-see turns out to be a common response of the villagers to the new 
pension scheme. Ms. Zhang explains this hesitant attitude among the villagers. 
 
…It depends on how the social pension insurance will develop in the near future. If there 
are no further policy changes, the social pension insurance can provide more protection 
than the commercial insurance. What worries me is future policy changes … I always feel 
that the duration of the pension insurance is too long. Even though I am now 40, I will still 
have to pay 20 years of contributions before I reach 60. With 500 Yuan a year for the 
contribution, how much am I due to pay! No one can imagine how it would become after 20 
years. (Case 17, 12/04/05) 
 
Their unpleasant experiences with the past state policy have made the villagers 
extremely cautious towards the introduction of any new policies. Especially when it 
comes to a long-term political promise such as the pension provision, widespread 
suspicion persists with regard to its policy stability. The general skepticism is directly 
related to the reckless policy of forced land seizure described above. As for herself, 
Ms. Zhang prefers the public pension scheme even though she is not sure about its 
future outcomes. She deems it as an investment in her old age since the village 
collective also bears a half of the contribution for her participation. She expects to 
receive a pension of monthly 400 Yuan from the scheme when she retires – a sum 
actually unable to assure a secure old age. Similar to her co-villagers, Ms. Zhong has 
also bought a commercial medical insurance tailored for her needs. According to the 
contract, she is obliged to pay 1000 Yuan annually to the insurance company for a 
period of 10 years. In case of grave sickness the insurer would pay a lump-sum 
benefit of 50,000 Yuan. If the insured lives fit and sound until 70, the company would 
reimburse all the premiums to the insured once and for all. Her husband has signed a 
similar insurance contract. Their motives for purchasing such commercial insurance 
were to relieve the burden of her daughter in case of illness. 
 
… If I keep healthy until 70, the insurer will give me all of my premiums back, just for the 
sake of safety. But if I do fall ill seriously, they will pay me 50,000 Yuan. This could alleviate 
my child’s burden. After all we have now only one child, right? Peasants in rural villages 
are different from urban workers. The latter have medical insurance but we villagers have 
not. (Case 17, 12/04/05) 
 
The village administration has endeavored to stimulate the interest of the villagers in 
the pension scheme, yet its overall financial capacity is limited due to the fact that the 
regional economy does not lift up. The disposable budget can only allow the village 
administration to subsidize one member in each household. Therefore, they decide to 
give priority to the mothers of households with only one child in order to offset the 
shrinking function of family support. Other households are still welcomed to 
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participate in the scheme that regulates a fixed rate of subsidy from district and town 
governments, but they cannot expect any direct subvention from the village 
collective. In addition to the subvention in the new pension scheme, the village 
collective grants cash benefits of monthly 200 Yuan to each elderly, together with in-
kind benefits to each villager in form of crops and salad oil to ensure their basic 
subsistence. 
The overall modest situation of the state pension policy towards the peasants is 
perceived by many in the village with discontent. There is a sense of relative 
deprivation when they learn from the media or personal experience that the state 
treats the rural residents worse than their urban fellows. Given that the Daxing 
pension scheme can only provide a proportion of pensions, and the village subsidy is 
limited to certain villagers, economic security in old age is still a remote dream for 
many residents in the Langfasi village. Even Ms. Zhong herself is not quite sure 
about her old-age security. 
 
I participate in this scheme in the hope that I can have some economic security until then, 
provided that the policy does not change. If it does, there is nothing we can do about it. The 
main purpose of my participation is for the security in old age and nothing else. The 
problem is that the pensions are too low. (Case 17, 12/04/05) 
 
The case of Ms. Zhang has demonstrated the general difficulties confronting the 
residents in rural Beijing. The new pension scheme of the Daxing district aims to 
address the old-age security of the rural peasants, but its institutional framework still 
assumes greater individual responsibility. Although the district, town governments 
and village administration grant a fixed amount of subsidy respectively, their 
supportive function in the composition of expected pensions remains limited. At 
least for most of the villagers in the Langfasi village, the public subvention is still too 
few to offer any incentive for active participation. Distrust towards the new scheme 
also persists, thanks to the general disappointment of the villagers in the state rural 
policy in the past. A more widespread acceptance of private commercial insurance 
well before the introduction of the new public scheme also makes little room for the 
latter to claim wide credence. These factors altogether have discounted the actual 
success of the new policy initiative. 
As a consequence of these unfavorable conditions, the new pension scheme has 
in effect done little to buttress old-age security of the rural residents in Daxing 
district. From this developmental difficulty, one can infer that the situations in other 
rural regions around Beijing should be even worse, especially those where pension 
schemes have not been introduced yet. Without a substantial expansion of the state 
involvement, the rural residents in Beijing remain stuck to their children for their old 
age. Yet the overall situation may become more fragile in the face of the declining 
function of the family (one child pro couple) as well as the precarious nature of the 
labor market. While land and family can no more fulfill the traditional security 
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function, the local government has just begun taking rudimentary initiatives that can 
hardly fill the widening gap. Old-age security of the peasants in rural Beijing is thus 
still vulnerable to life contingencies. 
In contrast to Beijing, rural areas in Shanghai can glance back at a continuous 
history of the pension policy. Solid development of the past two decades in 
combination with growing financial ability of the local government have paved the 
way towards broader coverage and better benefits. Peasants in rural Shanghai are 
generally included in the local pension scheme that grants reasonable pensions for 
their old age. The future prospect is rosy, too, as many insured peasants are expected 
to switch to the newly-introduced Township Insurance Program (TIP) as a policy for 
the landless peasants. Old-age security in rural Shanghai is in good shape, and the 
rural elderly no longer rely on their children for economic support. 
 
Case 27: Mr. Fan is 58 years old (born in 1947) and works as head of a production team 
(totally 14) in the Wuxing village
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, Shanghai. Due to economic difficulty of his parents, he began to learn 
farming skills and worked on the farm at the age of 15. Since then, he has been in charge of 
various village affairs mainly associated with production teams (bookkeeping, team leader). 
In addition to these missions, Mr. Fan also worked on the farm all the time. Currently, Mr. 
Fan lives with his mother, wife, daughter, and son-in-law. The young couple has a five-year-
old son. Mr. Fan’s wife keeps the house and takes care of the son as well as Mr. Fan’s mother 
so that the young couple can go to work. 
 
Mr. Fan works no more because the village administration has asked him to retire 
from his position earlier. For that Mr. Fan receives 300 Yuan monthly from the village 
as a temporary pension, for he has not yet reached the formal retirement age of 60. 
He also receives a monthly subsidy of 300 Yuan from the village. In addition, he 
earns an income of about 1000 Yuan monthly from the rental of his apartment 
because there are strong demands for accommodation by many migrants working in 
the village. A part of the arable farmland in the village has already been taken away 
by the local governments for other construction purposes. The production team of 
Mr. Fan still owns a few fields, but the village leases them to migrants and charges a 
certain amount of rents because the revenues are much higher than agricultural 
profits. Each villager is allowed to own a small plot of land on which one can plant 
agricultural products. Mr. Fan maintains only a small plot of land for planting 
vegetables or crops for personal use. As a village member, he can take a slice of that 
collective leasing income, roughly 1300 Yuan a year.  
Mr. Fan’s wife is luckier as she has already switched to the urban social 
insurance after the land seizure. Thanks to the rapid development of the whole 
Shanghai area, many villages have benefited from the compensation payment for the 
land seizure. Before the introduction of the TIP in 2004, landless peasants were 
automatically included into the urban social insurance, though it was the discretion 
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of each village to decide how the compensation benefits were to be distributed 
among villagers, or who was entitled to join in the urban social insurance. Mr. Fan’s 
daughter and the son-in-law currently work in private companies, with a total 
monthly income of about 2500 Yuan. As the both have only the degree of junior high 
school, they are unable to find better jobs. Mr. Fan’s mother is 85 years old and 
receives a pension of 200 Yuan monthly from the rural pension scheme. In addition, 
the Wuxing village grants a cash benefit of 70 Yuan each month to the elderly 
villagers. Therefore, the total sum of 270 Yuan is sufficient for her monthly expenses 
as she lives with the families. As a whole, Mr. Fan thinks that the income situation of 
his family is not particularly good in comparison to other households in rural 
Shanghai. 
Similar to other villagers in Shanghai, Mr. Fan has a decade-long record of 
insurance in the local pension scheme. The Wuxing village introduced the scheme in 
line with the policy guidelines of the Shanghai city government at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Mr. Fan joined in the scheme together with the vast majority of his fellow 
villagers after the official announcement. The yearly contribution has risen 
continuously since then, from 50 Yuan at the outset to 480 Yuan today. Mr. Fan 
estimates that he can receive a monthly pension of more than 200 Yuan when he 
reaches 60, plus 70 Yuan of village allowance, which will continuously increase in 
pace with the growth of local economy. Looking back at the initial decision of 
participation in the rural pension scheme, Mr. Fan is convinced that this would 
support his old-age security. 
 
Why did I join in the pension scheme? It is the trend to do so. With the protection of the 
pension scheme, my later life is secured against economic shortage…Here in the village 
almost all have joined in the scheme. (Case 27, 12/05/05) 
 
Mr. Fan also expects that the Wuxing village would soon follow the policy of other 
rural regions in Shanghai and introduce the TIP, which would grant much higher 
pensions than the current pension scheme. The land seizure policy in Shanghai has it 
that all landless peasants be included in the new scheme automatically. But for the 
time being, he has to count on the current scheme for the life after retirement. Mr. 
Fan’s economic condition does not allow him to take up private commercial 
insurance products, nor is he much interested in that because he believes that 
pensions from the rural scheme should suffice. His daughter gives him 300 – 400 
Yuan each month according to her own financial situation. By and large, Mr. Fan is 
aware that he may not lead a rich life, but his participation in the rural pension 
scheme as well as his work income would ensure a stable economic safety in his old 
age. He does not expect to live merely on pension incomes, but hopes to continue 
working in order to secure an additional stable income. 
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In the next few years, I think, I will look for some jobs if my health condition permits. It is 
hard to find jobs nowadays, you know, so it’s better to do some works, if any. With a 
monthly income of more than 1000 Yuan of both of us (together with wife), we will make it. 
With that amount, we are able to pay the expenses, and I can begin to enjoy the leisure, 
that’s it. (Case 27, 12/05/05) 
 
In addition to the pension scheme, the rural cooperative medical system also works 
well. With a contribution payment of 160 Yuan a year, the insured peasants are 
entitled to apply for the reimbursement of up to 80% of the medical treatment 
expenses. Mr. Fan points out that this cooperative medical system is even more 
generous than that in the TIP, which generally provides less percentage of medical 
cost refund. As a whole, Mr. Fan is satisfied with the public schemes covering 
medical care and old-age security. 
The stable operation of the rural pension scheme and the imminent introduction 
of the TIP in Shanghai have offered a solid basis of old-age security for the rural 
population. Even though living with children is still a common option for the rural 
elderly, they are financially more independent because they can expect a certain 
amount of rural pensions. Living with the children is a general practice of family 
solidarity, which can help the elderly better cope with inconveniences in their old 
age. Yet expectation of financial dependency on the next generation has become an 
anachronism in rural Shanghai. 
 
The traditional idea of raising children in care of one’s old age (yanger fanglao) is of little 
utility…In Shanghai who is still dependent on the children? Everybody depends on himself, 
or on public pensions. Saving money now is to prepare for the expenses in one’s old age. 
(Case 27, 12/05/05) 
 
To rely less on children means to rely more on public schemes. It is thus little 
surprise that the rural residents in Shanghai generally expect a greater responsibility 
of the state in rural old-age security. No villager in rural Shanghai would come to the 
idea that old-age security is mainly the responsibility of one’s own or of the family. 
The institutionalization of the rural pension scheme has led to greater trust and 
expectation among the rural residents towards the role of the state. The robust 
growth of the regional economy has enabled the village collective to shoulder a 
larger share of financial responsibility of old-age security for each villager. Rapid 
regional development has also contributed to more dynamic income growth as 
individual villagers have more opportunities to find better-paid employment. As a 
whole, rural residents in Shanghai live in a better economic condition, and with that 
they have also greater ability to accumulate more financial resources for their old 
age. 
What characterizes the cases of Ms. Zhang and Mr. Fan as an ideal type of entry 
paths to the rural pension scheme? The most distinctive characteristic is that the 
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institutional variety among villages has huge influences on the participation 
behavior of the peasants. In Shanghai, the majority of the rural residents can keep a 
stable record of contribution payment for more than a decade. With the regional 
economy continue growing, financial subsidies from the village collectives are 
playing a greater role in rural old-age security. As a result, rural residents in 
Shanghai can enjoy higher pensions in their retirement. In Beijing the picture is 
gloomier because the overall institutional framework is just in its beginning phase. 
Even in those areas where newly designed schemes have been introduced, the 
residents still have to assume greater financial responsibility for their old age. Given 
the relatively weaker regional economy and the still wobbly institutional structures 
of public old-age schemes, many residents in rural Beijing can rely on nothing but 
their own toil and the support of their children. 
The comparison between cases in Beijing and Shanghai has evidently exhibited 
the core dilemma of public rural pension schemes. By leaving each region alone for 
the whole issue, the central government has actually kept regional divide in old-age 
security intact. Since local governments and individual insured peasants are assumed 
to bear the most part of the contribution payments, it is little wonder that only those 
residents in wealthier regions can benefit from the fruit of market reforms and 
economic growth. In contrast, peasants of poorer regions are destined to rely more 
on themselves. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of rural Beijing, where 
many peasants like Ms. Zhang are almost left alone to prepare for their own 
economic security in their old age. The situation in rural Beijing is astonishing 
because Beijing is the capital of the PR China, and one would expect that its rural 
areas should benefit from the special political status and economic advantage. Even 
rural pension policy in such rural areas comes off so badly that one can expect much 
worse situations in other still poorer regions. Unless the central government changes 
its policy track and strengthen its role in the rural pension policy, the cleavage of old-
age security between rich and poor regions will persist in the future. 
 
Type 5: Rural Cadre Pensions  
Village cadres are local party functionaries delegated to carry out policies made by 
the higher authorities or the party apparatus. They are central figures in the rural 
politics. They are the lowest-rank enforcers of state policies but they have also the 
power to allocate collective resources in relevant village affairs. In the case of rural 
pension schemes, the distribution of village financial resources is often made to the 
advantage of cadres. As a result, cadres are often those who are economically better 
off and politically privileged as party members. They are more capable of bearing the 
financial burden of contribution payment in the scheme, and therefore more inclined 
to join it. Often it is also desired by the state that cadres act as an exemplary 
personality for the state policy. Cadres are thus a special privilege group that merits 
attention in the rural pension policy. 
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Since their introduction the pilot pension schemes have seen uneven 
developments among villages both in Qingdao and Beijing, which reflects the 
outcome of different economic situations and political implementation among 
different counties and villages (see chapter 6). This is a phenomenon often observed 
in the field. Paucity of data precludes detailed information regarding how these 
differences look like, as local authorities at the township and village level seldom 
make systematic statistics or reveal detailed information to outsiders. Yet interviews 
with the involved cadres reveal some traces of the implementation. For instance, in 
one village in Pingdu (Qingdao) with 649 residents, there are only six persons (four 
are cadres and the other two relatives of them!) participating in the scheme simply 
because the economic conditions of the villagers do not allow extra burden of 
contribution payments. Even the cadre we interviewed in this village expected to 
obtain pensions of roughly 50-60 Yuan monthly in his old age, whereas in other 
villages the expected pension income could reach 300 Yuan monthly. 
The second marked phenomenon is the privilege cadres enjoy in the scheme. 
For example, all interviewed cadres in Qingdao initially joined in the pension scheme 
in different years (1994-1999) because they had the duty to promote policy of the 
government, and their participation in the scheme was supposed to manifest the 
advantage to other village residents. Their active membership in the scheme is 
rewarded with higher subsidy of the villages, which accounts for around 70-80% of 
the individual contribution paid to the scheme. Yet the amounts of subsidy vary from 
village to village, depending on the financial situation of each village. In extreme 
cases, cadres in some villages have to bear the financial responsibility alone without 
any subsidy from the village collective or the local government.82 In Beijing the 
pension scheme specifically designed for cadres was introduced in 1986. Since then, 
all cadres have been automatically included in this public scheme. In addition to 
individual contributions, different levels of the government (central, province, 
municipal, township and village) also shoulder a proportion of the financial expenses 
for cadre pension expenses. The retirement age is set at 60. Working as cadres for at 
least five years in a row is required to be entitled for any pensions. The calculation of 
the payable pension benefit is based on the individual working record as a village 
cadre. Maximally 70 percent of the average wages in the last 3 working years before 
retirement can be paid to those who have a long service history as cadres. 
The case of Mr. Zhu in Beijing represents the typical case. 
 
Case 12: Mr. Zhu is a retired cadre at the age of 64. He lives together with his wife and his 
father in Miaocheng village 
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, Huairou district. His wife is a peasant still working 
on her little land plot (1 mu). His daughter works for a company located in the Beijing city. 
                                                 
82 It is worth mentioning that the new pension scheme introduced in Chengyang (Qingdao) attempts 
to tackle this problem and provides that the collective has to bear larger proportion of contribution 
payment for its residents. Also the privileged status of cadres has been cancelled. For a detailed 
description, see chapter 6. 
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As a village cadre, Mr. Zhu has worked at different positions of the village (head of 
production teams, party secretary) since the 1980s. In 2001 Mr. Zhu retired from his position 
as a party secretary in the village. He is currently working as a doorkeeper of a computer 
room in the village administration building.83 The job was offered by the current village 
administration as an arrangement for the retired cadres. He works daily from 1:30 pm to 10 
pm and receives a monthly salary of 450 Yuan from the village office.  
 
Because of his previous career as a cadre in the village, Mr. Zhu’s past economic 
situation was stable thanks to the steady official income. Though he also had to work 
on the assigned land plot, he could at least earn the wage income and claim other 
welfare benefits (in kind) only accessible to the village cadres. The overall financial 
condition of the household during the 1980s and 1990s, though, was not particularly 
wealthy as the village economy as a whole did not grow very rapidly. Even cadre 
salaries were set at a very low level. At the beginning of the 1980s they were 
nominally only a few hundred Yuan monthly, which then continuously rose to the 
amount of 13,000 Yuan a month. According to Mr. Zhu, a major part of his 
disposable income at that time was used to finance the education expenses of his 
daughter who has now got her university degree. During that time, saving money 
was impossible. Now as the daughter begins working and earning a living income, 
Mr. Zhu can dispose of his pensions solely for his current living expenses. 
Mr. Zhu participated in the cadre pension insurance introduced in 1986. The 
annual contribution consisted of financial subsidies from the central government, 
county government, township government, village as well as individual payments. 
The retirement age was set at 60. After his retirement in 2001, Mr. Zhu receives a 
monthly pension of approximately 650 Yuan from the cadre pension scheme, which 
is paid once in the year as an annuity. In April of 2004, for example, he received a 
lump-sum pension payment of 8000-odd Yuan for that fiscal year. With this sum of 
pensions, Mr. Zhu lives a lot better off compared with his co-villagers, who can only 
expect a monthly pension allowance of 100 Yuan from the village pension program. 
Mr. Zhu is satisfied with the pension income from the cadre pension insurance. For 
him, 650 Yuan a month can at least cover basic expenses in his old age. He does not 
have to ask his working daughter for any further support except that she gives him 
some allowances voluntarily. 
 
I told her (daughter) that when she begins earning money, she should first learn to live on 
her own feet. The point is to make good preparations for possible expenses so that she 
doesn’t need to ask me for money. …I don’t expect to get money from her. If we (Mr. Zhu, 
wife and father) live thriftily, we can live well with my pension income. She can dispose of 
the money she earns by herself. If she wants to give me some, I will take it, too. Actually my 
daughter has begun doing so since last year. (Case 12, 31/03/05) 
                                                 
83 In Chinese villages, it is quite often that peasants remain at work even though they have “retired”. 
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The only problem with the pension is its fixation at a certain percentage of one’s 
previous wages without annual dynamic adjustment. That is, Mr. Zhu has always 
been receiving 650 Yuan monthly since his retirement without any rise in nominal 
terms. The pensions in real terms sink, as a result, because commodity prices rise 
each year. Another problem is that the total amount of payable pensions for the 
whole year is transferred to Mr. Zhu’s bank account only once in the year, without a 
clear regulation as to in which month of the year the payment will be made. This 
irregularity makes Mr. Zhu feel uncertain about the situation because he cannot 
know exactly in which month he will receive the pensions for the whole year. Mr. 
Zhu also complains about the stagnation of the pension level at 650 Yuan monthly. 
 
…You see, I have been a cadre for so many years. As regards the pensions, I don’t think it 
should be called pensions (tuixiujin) at all. 650 Yuan, once and for all, it has always been the 
same amount for many years. In my opinion this is quite inadequate for the village. Look at 
the urban workers, my father is also an urban retiree, and their pensions can be raised little 
by little. I have read it in today’s newspaper; the wages of the urban workers are 28,000 
Yuan annually. Look how much I have here! (Case 12, 31/03/05) 
 
Even though Mr. Zhu benefits from the institutional arrangements of the village 
cadre pension scheme, his pension benefits remain low in comparison with that of 
urban workers, but still well above the local standard. Even for rural cadres, urban-
rural divide still plays a significant role in the calculation of pension benefits for rural 
cadres.  
In addition to the pensions from the cadre pension scheme, Mr. Zhu also 
receives 100 Yuan monthly from the Miaocheng village, a sort of welfare allowance 
for all rural elderly over 60 in the village. This allowance program began in 2002 as 
the village administration decided to spare a part of the village budget for the elderly 
welfare. This village welfare policy is possible thanks to the compensation payments 
obtained from a real estate company (Wantong) in the last few years, which had 
reached an agreement with the Huairou district government to encroach farming 
land in the Miaocheng village. The seizure process began in the early 1990s when Mr. 
Zhu was still the party secretary in the village. The total 800-odd mu arable farms in 
the village were seized by the Huairou district government successively according to 
the agreement. Currently, residents of the Miaocheng village are allowed to own a 
half mu of field to plant crops or vegetables for their own meals. However, it is still 
an open question whether this welfare policy will endure as it depends largely on the 
fiscal situation of the village and the compensation revenues of the land seizure. But 
even without the elderly allowance, Mr. Zhu can still do well for his old-age security 
with the cadre pensions. 
Mr. Zhu sees a potential risk for his old-age security in the underdevelopment 
of the rural medical care. Although the Miaocheng village has long implemented a 
cooperative medical scheme in which each individual participant pays 30 Yuan a 
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year into the scheme. In case of illness, 15-20 percent of the medical treatment cost 
can be refunded by the scheme. Despite this subsidy, Mr. Zhu points to the huge cost 
incurred by the treatment of serious illness. 
 
… Be honest, if you have cancer or some incurable illness, you cannot afford the medical 
treatment. Take a simple example: if you got cancer and applied for the partial refund, how 
much would you get back? 20%, but how much expenses do you have to pay in advance? 
The peasants are unable to afford it. So this kind of medical insurance is unqualified to be 
called insurance, it can insure against nothing! (Case 12, 31/03/05) 
 
The increasing medical expenses stand in sharp contrast to the small proportion of 
cost sharing in the rural cooperative medical scheme. Serious illness has become a 
poverty trap for many rural households. Many rural elderly living with their 
children would rather suffer the agony than seek medical care for fear that the latter 
would cause the household financial situation to collapse. Even for village cadres 
who can rely on a relatively stable pension income in their old age, falling ill 
(seriously) would still pull their old-age security to the bottom. 
What characterizes the ideal type of the path to rural cadre pension scheme? 
Two features stand out. The bright side is the better position of cadres in the 
entitlement to rural old-age security. As early as the 1980s, well before the central 
government launched the rural pension schemes, rural cadres in Beijing were already 
allowed to join the cadre pension scheme that guaranteed an income replacement 
rate of at least 20% to maximal 70% in accordance with the duration of service. A 
large part of the financial responsibility for this scheme is shared together by 
different levels of governments. Individual cadres only have to bear a small portion 
of their contributions. In comparison with his villagers, rural cadres are a lot better 
positioned for their old-age security. The flip side of the coin is that rural cadres, 
despite their privileged status, remain vulnerable to other contingencies in their old 
age because of insufficient institutional frameworks. The fixed income replacement 
rate of the cadre pension without regular dynamic adjustment to inflation or wage 
growth also erodes long-term value of the pensions. Given the regional inequality 
and fragmentary infrastructure of social security, the rural cadre pension scheme is 
still far from providing solid economic security in old age.  
 
Type 6: Pensions from the Township Insurance Program (zhenbao) 
This type refers to an increasingly marked trend in rural Shanghai to include more 
and more peasants in the newly-established Township Insurance Program (TIP; 
zhenbao) after 2004. This new program is designed as an interface between the social 
insurance program for urban residents and the pension scheme for rural residents. Its 
implementation is the policy response of Shanghai government to the blurring 
boundary between urban and rural areas. The new TIP can be seen as the first step to 
bridge the gap of social protection between urban and rural citizens. This is achieved 
 165 
by a wide coverage of major risks as well as a relatively generous benefit package in 
each category (For policy details see Chapter 6). The TIP can thus appeal to many 
enterprises and individuals as it provides a better protection than the traditional 
rural social security schemes, while demanding less contribution payments from the 
enterprises than the urban social insurance scheme. In the context of rapid 
urbanization, one of the major goals of the TIP is to address the social protection of 
landless peasants whose land has been seized by Shanghai government for other 
urban construction purposes. In only a few years following its introduction, the TIP 
has already covered many landless peasants. 
This practice in Shanghai differs a lot from that in Beijing. In the latter the policy 
towards landless peasants is characterized by insufficient social protection and 
reckless policy implementation. As a result, loss of land in combination with 
fragmentary protection has put many landless peasants in a much more precarious 
position than before. Shanghai is in this respect an opposite example. With the 
significantly better protection of the TIP, landless peasants’ situations are well 
positioned against the risk of life exigencies. In many cases the switch from the rural 
pension scheme to the TIP means a fundamental improvement of expected benefits 
in old age. The case of Mr. Qian is a typical case. 
 
Case 29: Mr. Qian is a 54-year-old peasant in Tanghang village
 
fifl

of Jiading district
 
ffi

in Shanghai. He lives currently with his wife and his mother. His daughter, son-
in-law and granddaughter live in Jiading town, not far away from their house. All family 
members except Mr. Qian’s mother, wife and his grandchild are employed. Mr. Qian himself 
works as an assistant at the village administration and earns 800 Yuan a month. His daughter 
is teacher at an elementary school in Jiading town, whereas the son-in-law works for a police 
station. As the young couple bought an apartment in Jiading town and moved there not long 
ago, Mr. Qian’s wife also moved to them to help housekeeping. 
 
In addition to the work income of 800 Yuan, Mr. Qian takes advantage of the strong 
demand of the migrant workers for accommodation and rents out several apartments 
to earn rental revenues. Mr. Qian says it is a very common commercial activity 
among the villagers, which brings them hundreds of thousands of extra income, 
though most of the apartments for rent were built illegally as their construction had 
not been registered officially. Building such illegal apartments for rental purpose has 
become a major source of income for many villages in rural Shanghai, thanks to the 
rapid industrialization and regional development which have attracted enormous 
numbers of peasants from other regions seeking employment here. Mr. Qian also 
profits from such a trend and makes additional money from house renting. 
Before Mr. Qian’s bought the new apartment in Jiading, all family members had 
lived together. With the real estate market in Shanghai booming and many new 
houses being built, Mr. Qian decided to buy an apartment for the young couple, 
partly to help shorten their commutation time between workplaces and home. When 
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the young couple had saved enough money, they bought a new apartment recently. 
Buying apartments is a common form of investment in rural Shanghai. Since Mr. 
Qian lives well with his own income, he never asks his daughter and son-in-law for 
additional financial support. Instead of giving the father monthly allowance, the 
young couple gives him some cigarettes or liquors at festivals. The housekeeping 
assistance of his wife is also voluntary without nominal payments. Among the family 
members there exists strong solidarity relationship. 
Before switching to the TIP, Mr. Qian has been in the traditional rural pension 
scheme for more than a decade. Just as many rural areas in Shanghai, the Tanghang 
village launched the pension scheme in 1989 initially for village cadres and 
employees of TVE. Three years later the scheme was also accessible to all villagers. 
The scheme was implemented on the basis of individual account and voluntary 
participation. At the outset, the village cadres campaigned among the villagers for 
the advantage of the scheme in order to attract their attention. Mr. Qian was 
persuaded and participated in the scheme in 1992 with an initial contribution of 5 
Yuan monthly. It rose in the following years to the current rate of 20 Yuan monthly. 
Convinced that it was worthy to be in the scheme in order to have an additional 
source of old-age security, his parents and wife also followed suit and joined in the 
scheme. The scheme has since then been operating quite well without disruption. 
Mr. Qian’s participation in the rural pension scheme ended in 2004 with the 
introduction of the TIP in Tanghang village. When the district and town 
governments took away a large portion of farmland of the Tanghang village, the 
production team to which Mr. Qian belonged decided to register all its members to 
the TIP. The participation in the scheme did not incur further expenses for the 
peasants because the district and town governments financed their contributions to 
the scheme. By switching to the TIP, Mr. Qian’s resident status has also been changed 
from peasant to urban resident (nongzhuanju). In addition, the production team also 
received a lump-sum payment for the crops (600 Yuan for each mu) as well as a 
regular payment of rent for the seized land (yearly 1000 Yuan for each mu). Mr. Qian 
notes that this is a good deal for the peasants because the compensation payment is 
higher than the revenue of agricultural harvest. The benefits of the TIP also 
outstripped that of the traditional rural pension scheme: whereas the latter grants a 
monthly pension of 165 Yuan, pensioners of the TIP can receive a monthly pension of 
more than 500 Yuan. With this sum plus work and rental incomes, Mr. Qian is happy 
that he does not have to worry about economic shortage in his old age.  
Despite the comprehensive protection of the TIP, the risk of sickness remains 
the biggest problem for the economic situation of the rural residents. The soaring cost 
of medical treatment could often pull the finance of the whole family downwards to 
adversity; even for wealthier rural regions such as rural Shanghai this is no rarity. 
Although the TIP grants a certain percentage of financial subsidies for the incurred 
medical expenditures, the regulation sets a ceiling for the refund of medical cost.  
 
 167 
The medical treatment … if you are sick, then you’re over, the whole family is over. The 
medical treatments nowadays are horribly expensive, and I don’t know why. If you go to 
see a doctor, either you are ok or you are in trouble with big diseases. Hundreds of 
thousands of money will be thrown into the gap. Now this is the biggest problem. (Case 29, 
16/05/05) 
 
Yet in spite of this regulatory gap, Mr. Qian has no intention to turn to private 
commercial insurance for additional support. His long experience with the rural 
pension scheme makes Mr. Qian skeptical about the credence of the private 
commercial insurance. Although his daughter has bought an insurance product for 
the granddaughter, Mr. Qian himself refuses to follow suit because he has no 
confidence in the protection function of the private insurance provision. It is for him 
a kind of business which ultimately pursues maximal profit out of the premiums of 
the insured customers. By contrast, social security schemes of the state are not 
oriented on maximal profit making because their primary goal is to secure the 
peasants against life contingencies. The distrust towards private commercial 
insurance is also an expression of his contentment with the overall institutional 
arrangements that the local governments in rural Shanghai have made for the social 
protection of rural residents. Institutional continuity of the rural pension scheme and 
better protection of the TIP have contributed to a positive assessment of the rural 
residents over the prospect of their old-age lives. 
But retirement in the sense of retreat from all work activities is for Mr. Qian 
only a notional concept rather than a real situation. In rural China the peasants have 
not changed much in the thought that one should keep on working in old age even 
though one has abundant savings. Ceaseless toil has become a work ethic for many 
peasants in rural areas. A common idea is that, after all, one has worked hard on the 
farm for the whole life, there seems to be no reason to drop that habit even if one 
does not have to work any more. 
 
If you keep healthy, and you have noting to do, it would be a trouble just to stay home. 
When you have no hard work at home, you just drink alcoholics, watch television. That will 
be very boring. So it depends on individual health condition. If you are more than 60 and 
still fit, it doesn’t matter if you keep working. (Case 29, 16/05/05) 
 
Mr. Qian has bought two houses with his savings to improve the living conditions. In 
the short run, he plans to buy a car and other consumption goods for growing living 
standard. Since he no longer needs to look for any formal employment for living 
purpose, he comes up with the idea of building a stall in order to raise some pigs or 
chicken for sale. Now at the age of 54, he begins thinking of setting out a breeding 
business. He is gathering current market information and looking for a suitable site 
for this business. As he does not need to worry about the condition of his 
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household’s economy, running a breeding business would match his own hobby and 
deliver additional revenues. 
What characterizes the type of pensions from the TIP? The above description 
shows great satisfaction of the participants with their status quo as well as 
confidence in their old-age security. General betterment of the village economy offers 
the villagers many opportunities to raise their incomes, e.g. rental revenues. Stronger 
financial strength of the village collective also makes it possible to grant more 
subsidies to the villagers in all aspects of village welfare. So even without the 
introduction of the TIP, the villagers in this type would still lead a much wealthier 
life than in many other regions. The process of land seizure by local governments 
makes the whole situation even better. Although land seizure in this region is a very 
frequent practice, the compensation terms are often set generously so that landless 
peasants have in effect nothing to complain about. Even peasants who still work on 
assigned land plots look forward to taking a share in the compensation of the land 
seizure policy and hope for the acceleration of the whole process. In contrary to type 
3, the villagers welcome land seizure in Shanghai because it can improve rather than 
impoverish their economic situations. According to the given policy of the Shanghai 
government, the category divide of rural-urban residents in the household 
registration system will soon be abolished in the next few years. Until then all 
residents in rural areas will be included in the TIP and thus entitled to greater social 
protection. 
The participation in the TIP and the change of resident status from rural peasant 
to urban resident are innovative policies towards landless peasants. The change of 
resident status is a move towards the legal recognition of social rights of rural 
residents. It avoids hereby the traditionally discriminating treatment in social 
protection towards rural residents. The TIP provides the insured residents with a 
much higher level of social protection than the traditional rural pension scheme. 
Whereas the latter merely yields relatively low pensions according to one’s 
contribution record, the former covers almost all major risks and grants significantly 
higher benefits and pensions to the insured residents. With better social protection of 
the TIP (except for medical care), landless peasants are relieved of economic pressure 
associated with land seizure. The prospect of more pensions also makes them 
confident of reliable old-age security. In most cases, insured residents can achieve 
economic independency without further needs for additional support from their 
children. Living with children together is to a large extent an emotional tie rather 
than an economic necessity of the family. With the introduction of the TIP the 
traditional bond of rural old-age security on family has given way to reliance on 
public systems. 
 
Type 7: Urban Pensions: Some Lucky Cases 
There are a few cases among rural residents who have benefited from the urban 
pension insurance scheme. Their resident status is still rural peasant, but under some 
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lucky circumstances they have the chance to join the urban social insurance scheme. 
This type of peasants is the most fortunate group because they can enjoy the same 
social protection level as the urban residents. Established in 1951, urban social 
insurance covers all major risks: old age, work injury, medical care, motherhood and 
later unemployment (in 1986). Since the late 1980s, the central government has been 
attempting to “socialize” the whole scheme, i.e. transfer more financial responsibility 
to enterprises and individual workers. The recalibration of social insurance scheme 
has generally resulted in declining benefits and entitlements (for detail see Chapter 5). 
The traditional “iron rice bowl” is undergoing such a fundamental retrenchment that 
the urban workers are facing rising insecurity. Nonetheless, urban social insurance 
scheme is, as a whole, still much better than the TIP or other rural schemes in terms 
of risk coverage and benefit level. Especially for rural residents, the participation in 
the urban scheme is definitely a plus because of its relatively generous benefits.  
However, the participation of the rural residents in the urban social insurance 
scheme is rather a coincidence than normality. The opportunities emerge mostly in 
non-agricultural employment patterns: self employment or employment in foreign 
companies where the participation in the scheme is permitted. This is only possible 
in regions with prospering economy where cheap rural labor force is strongly 
demanded. Multi-faceted rural development has contributed to a greater 
occupational mobility of rural residents. Rural labor force is flowing into new 
industry sectors in order to seek higher incomes. One can thus identify a variety of 
paths into different old-age pension schemes, including the urban insurance scheme 
discussed here. It should be little wonder that these cases are found only in Shanghai 
during my field work, as the urban-rural divide there is eroding as a consequence of 
urbanization and industrialization.  
 
Case 22: Ms. Ge is 52 years old and a retired pensioner in Cangchang village
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. Because she did not even graduate from the elementary school 
she has only worked on her farm (more than 4 mu area) in the most part of her work 
biography. In rural Shanghai, most of the peasants planted cotton, wheat and rice as main 
crops. At home Ms. Ge also grew mushrooms to earn additional income. At the age of 32, she 
began her work as a manual labor at a collectively-owned factory, but still kept cultivating 
crops in her spare time. 10 years later, the factory was sold to a private businessman, so Ms. 
Ge changed her job to a Japanese factory where she worked another 8 years. Then she retired 
and stayed home to help housekeeping and take care of the granddaughter until today.  
As her parents-in-law have passed away, Ms. Ge lives with her husband, son, 
daughter-in-law and the granddaughter in the household. Ms. Ge’s another daughter 
is married and lives with her husband in another household. Ms. Ge’s husband used 
to work together with her on the farm, and took a second job working as a 
construction worker. Both Ms. Ge’s son and daughter-in-law work for private 
companies and earn a monthly income of 1100 – 1200 Yuan respectively. In addition 
to regular work, Ms. Ge also rents out the first floor of her house to a telephone shop 
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and earns a rental income of 1000 Yuan monthly. As a retired pensioner in the urban 
social insurance scheme, Ms. Ge receives a pension income of 702 Yuan monthly, 
well above rural pensions. As a whole, the household is economically well-off 
because it disposes of different incomes. 
Ms. Ge’s participation in the urban social insurance was the result of several 
coincidental factors. Just like other rural peasants, she joined in the rural pension 
scheme initially introduced in rural Shanghai in 1992. During her employment in the 
collectively-owned factory, she paid a yearly contribution of 60 Yuan while the 
employer also paid a subsidy to the scheme. After 2 years of insurance record, Ms. 
Ge did not continue her contribution payment because the factory refused to grant 
employer subsidies further. When the factory was privatized 8 years later, Ms. Ge 
changed her job to a Japanese factory. This time she had the chance to participate in 
the urban social insurance scheme according to the regulation. Ms. Ge has profited 
from her 8-year employment in the Japanese factory because she kept paying 
contributions together with the employer to the urban scheme. In the time during her 
employment in the Japanese factory, the land of the Cangchang village was 
gradually taken away by the town and district governments. The latter regulated that 
the landless peasants be included successively in the newly-established TIP. Both 
local governments paid for the landless peasants a lump-sum contribution of 25 
years to the scheme irrespective of their individual insurance records. Since Ms. Ge 
has paid 8 years of contribution to the urban insurance scheme, the additional 25-
year contribution payments to the TIP were completely converted to her record in the 
urban scheme. This favorable calculation entitled Ms. Ge to receive a monthly 
pension of 702 Yuan from the urban scheme, which started in April 2005.  
The generous pensions from the urban scheme ensure that Ms. Ge needs no 
more any financial support from her children. This is a situation she had never 
thought of before she joined the urban insurance scheme. Before the local 
governments took her land away, she had worked very hard to maintain the 
household economy. Besides the job in the factory, she also continued her work on 
the farm. But now, with a stable rental income, she is optimistic about her old-age 
security. Retirement is for her a reality rather than dream because she has won the 
material basis.  
 
No matter how well the children treat you, they are not as good as the state protection. If the 
children are benevolent, they will give you money. But if they don’t have additional money, 
there would be conflict if you still turned to them for support. With the assistance of the 
state, I can do it by myself. I am happy with my own money. (Case 22, 28/04/05) 
 
For the same reason, Ms. Ge does not intend to buy products of private commercial 
insurance. Because of her older age, the insurance premium would be too high for 
her to get a reasonable return in the future. She came to the idea of buying private 
insurance when she was young. But the financial burden of raising 2 children at that 
 171 
time did not permit any additional expenses. Though Ms. Ge is not insured in the 
private commercial insurance, her children do take advantage of their younger age 
and purchase various sorts of commercial insurance products for additional support 
(invalidity and medical care). Private insurance is for rural residents who can afford 
it always a safeguard against potential risks of economic predicament. 
The only potential risk lies in the case of serious illness. With respect to medical 
care, Ms. Ge is confident in the village scheme. The cooperative medical scheme in 
the village regulates that each villager has to bear at least 700 Yuan of yearly medical 
treatment cost in case it incurs. For the expenses over 700, the scheme would bear 
90% of the part and refund the money to the villagers. Yet Ms. Ge is aware that, in 
case of serious illness, the scheme would not undertake the overall incurred cost. In 
this case Ms. Ge would still have to ask her children for financial support. 
 
If you have no serious illness, the children do not have to pay for the medical treatment. 
There is no burden if you have no serious illness. But if you do, they have to look after you, 
they will have burden. (Case 22, 28/04/05) 
 
Irrespective of this potential risk, Ms. Ge is very happy about current situation that 
she has a regular pension income sufficient for her daily expenses. The children are 
both working and earning decent incomes. Apart from housekeeping, Ms. Ge thinks 
she would plant some vegetables on the fields near the river, but rather as a leisure 
activity than work for living subsistence. In her opinion, the most common leisure 
activity of the rural elderly is to continue working on the farms because they have 
done so throughout their lives. 
Another case for the urban pension is also found in rural Shanghai. Similar to 
Ms. Ge, the second case has benefited from the participation in the urban insurance, 
though its contribution requirement is also higher than the rural scheme. For the 
rural resident this can be a temporary financial burden. Much depends on the current 
income composition of the household members.  
 
Case 24: Ms Zhao is 45 years old and lives in Cangchang village
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. After graduating from the senior high school, she has worked for a towel factory 
for 15 years. Since the wages were low, she decided with her husband in 1993 to open a 
grocery store at the first floor of their dwelling house. Since then, Ms. Zhao has become an 
individual self-employed (geti gongshanghu). In her household, Ms. Zhao lives with her 
husband, son and parents-in-law. The latter work no more and live on the support of their 
children. 
 
Ms. Zhao’s husband works in the civil guard of the town and earns a monthly 
income of 850 Yuan. Her son has found a job as a driver in a factory after his 
graduation from school, with a monthly income of 1000 Yuan. The business of the 
grocery store run well before, but is turning worse right now due to increasing 
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competition from other new stores in the village. The monthly revenue of the store 
ranges from 700-1000 Yuan a month. In addition to these, Ms. Zhao also rents two 
apartments to earn monthly rents of 550 Yuan. As a whole, Ms. Zhao thinks that the 
economic situation of her household is worse than the village average. 
The land seizure was enforced a decade ago. Most of the land of the Cangchang 
village was transferred to private enterprises for the construction of factories. 
According to the local policy, these companies should pay regular cash 
compensation to the town and village governments, who then distribute the payment 
further to villagers with rural resident status (currently 3000 Yuan a year). At the 
same time, all landless peasants are registered as urban residents. Their employment 
in the village entitles their participation in the urban insurance scheme, irrespective 
of their employment types. Both Ms. Zhao’s husband and son are therefore included 
in the urban scheme. Since Ms. Zhao retains her rural resident status, she is the only 
“peasant” in the household who is entitled to receive the benefits of the urban 
scheme. She could have chosen to become an urban resident, but declined to do so 
because it would change little as she was already in the urban scheme. 
When Ms. Zhao registered herself as self-employed, the policy still allowed her 
to join the urban insurance scheme. It changed later, but Ms. Zhao took advantage of 
the chance and participated in the urban scheme in 1993. Her decision was based on 
the belief that the overall institutional framework of the urban scheme was much 
better than that of the rural one. 
 
At that time, I thought my old age would be secured by the urban scheme, definitely better 
than the rural scheme. In the past, the peasants received only 100 Yuan a month, now their 
pensions increase 20 Yuan a year. So I thought then that I would come out better with the 
urban scheme than with the rural one. (Case 24, 29/04/05) 
 
In the urban scheme, Ms. Zhao chose the lowest level of contribution and paid 48 
Yuan a month initially, which rose continuously to a current level of 586 Yuan a 
month. With an income of monthly 1000 Yuan from the business of the grocery store, 
the contribution burden of 586 Yuan is certainly hard to bear. This is especially true 
for Ms. Zhao as she is self-employed and has to shoulder the contribution alone. If 
she were an employee in other economic sectors, she would obtain a certain amount 
of subsidy from her employer. However, since her husband and son are both 
working and earning additional incomes, Ms. Zhao feels it still worthwhile keeping 
her membership in the urban scheme. After all, staying in the urban scheme offers so 
many economic advantages that other alternatives can hardly outstrip. 
With regard to the medical treatment, Ms. Zhao has little to worry about. Since 
the urban scheme also covers medical treatment, she always goes to Shanghai city to 
see the doctor. In the scheme the insured are granted 400 Yuan of medical treatment. 
If the medical cost exceeds 400 Yuan, the patient has to bear it all to the top of 1800 
Yuan. Only when the cost rises beyond 1800 will the scheme take up 90% of the 
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exceeding part of the cost. Even though the insured are expected to bear more cost in 
case of serious illness, the scheme still helps absorb the most part of the financial 
burden. 
 
The feeling is that when we get old, the government can help us sustain our old age. We no 
longer need to worry that we may not have money when we get old. This thought alone is 
good enough. One day when we get old, we can live on our own feet and do not need to ask 
money from the children. (Case 24, 29/04/05) 
 
Ms. Zhao’s parents-in-law live with them together. Their resident status has also 
been changed to urban resident in the process of forced land appropriation. Since the 
town and village have a specific welfare program for the elderly, they receive from 
that a regular cash benefit of 360 Yuan monthly. Together with the compensation 
benefit from the land seizure (3000 Yuan a year), the both elderly can live well 
without further need for financial support of their children. Since Ms. Zhao’s son is 
not yet married, she concentrates all the financial resources on the preparation for his 
future wedding and career. It is very common practice in rural areas that the primary 
goal of peasants’ savings is to help children’s future development, even though they 
may not need or expect any substantial support of the children in their old age. 
Family support is understood in the sense of reciprocal assistance between 
generations. The public pensions have replaced the financial function of the family, 
yet the latter remains a stronghold for informal care and emotional support. 
In sum, the type of path into urban pensions is the best chance that many rural 
residents can only dream of. Because of its rarity, only 2 cases in Shanghai are 
identified during my field work. The participation in the urban scheme in both cases 
is the result of employment in foreign company or self-employed as owner of grocery 
store. These are rather lucky cases, as the peasants happen to seize the chance opened 
by the statutory regulation. It is well known that the urban social insurance scheme 
offers much higher benefits for broad coverage of risks. This is also reflected in the 
much higher pensions in the two cases of this type. Although the contribution 
payment to the urban insurance scheme in one case is a heavy burden for the insured 
peasant, she has no intention to switch to the rural pension scheme because she 
knows it is an investment in the future. With pensions from the urban scheme, one 
can enjoy an old-age life free from economic stress and potential conflict with the 
children. Strong confidence in the prospect of one’s retirement as well as financial 
independence from the children characterizes this type. This stands particularity in 
contrast to the type 1, in which peasants expect no public pensions at all and look to 
their futures with uncertainty. Type 7 shows that only in very rare and lucky 
circumstances can the rural peasants access the benefit of urban social insurance. 
Most of them still have to rely more or less on their own savings or the support of the 
children. 
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7.2 The Manifold Paths into Rural Pension Schemes in Comparison  
In this chapter ideal types are constructed to illustrate the life course patterns of rural 
residents who have (or have not) participated in rural pension schemes. By means of 
type construction, a clearer picture emerges revealing the current development of 
pension schemes and their biographical implications for rural peasants. The 
changing lives of many rural peasants are reflected in the versatile sorts of economic 
activities in non-agricultural realms. In the face of declining revenues of the 
agricultural economy, many peasants have sought ways out of farming and looked 
for other employment with higher incomes.84 The rush pace of land seizure enforced 
by local governments is accelerating or, to put it more precisely, aggravating this 
process. Those still willing to stay on their farmland are now compelled to seek 
employment in non-agricultural sectors. Rapid changes of employment patterns 
among the peasants are putting pressure on the local governments to design new 
pension schemes in addition to the original one primarily tailored for the need of 
traditional peasants. As a result, differentiated institutional frameworks of rural 
pension schemes emerge. This circumstance poses the point of departure for the 
analysis in this chapter. 
Despite the plurality of rural pension schemes, the basic logic of rural pension 
policy still persists in all variants. The rectification decision of the central government 
in 1998 has constrained the extent and scale of the overall state involvement, which 
means that local governments and peasants are to undertake the major share of 
contribution to the schemes. By keeping itself away from the major responsibility, the 
central government has virtually reproduced the already existing regional inequality 
in its rural pension schemes (see the analysis in chapter 6). While peasants in rich 
regions benefit from growing pension entitlements as a result of the increasing 
support of local governments, their fellow villagers in poor areas are supposed to 
arrange all the issues by themselves. The sequence of ideal types (from 1 to 7) in this 
chapter reflects precisely this inherent inequality. 
In this light, peasants of type 1 actually represent the majority of rural 
population in China since the coverage of current rural pension schemes remains 
very low. The development of village economy in this type is severely restricted by 
its dependence on husbandry that yields low revenues. Stagnation of crop prices is 
compounded with the rise of energy and fertilizer cost in recent years. The reliance 
on agriculture not only leads the households to a generally modest financial 
situation, but also results in weaker fiscal strength of the village collective. Both 
villages and individual peasants are drawn into the bog of poverty from which they 
can barely escape. Under the unfavorable circumstances, the introduction of any 
form of pension schemes appears very unlikely, as individual households cannot 
                                                 
84 The massive migration currently taking place in China can be grasped against this background, 
though this category is not included in the analysis of this chapter. Rural migrants generally do not 
participate in any rural pension schemes because they seldom live in the villages of their origin. 
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even afford personal contribution payments, nor are the village collectives able to 
provide substantial aids that could fill this gap. Unrealistic still is the idea of making 
any arrangements of private commercial insurance when the households are still 
worrying about where to earn the money for children’s tuition fees. Given these 
generally adverse conditions, averting old-age risk is for the individuals still a matter 
without urgent priority because they have yet to struggle for basic subsistence. Yet 
interestingly, the inability to make retirement arrangements does not imply weak 
awareness of the agents over the issue. By contrast, it indicates their hidden want of 
old-age security warranted by the state! The latter fails precisely in this respect 
because it eschews public responsibility where poor peasants badly require. Peasants 
of type 1 are the greatest group among rural population desolated to fend for their 
lives in old age. 
Type 2 refers to cases in a somewhat better position than type 1. Rural 
households in this type generally dwell in equally remote and less-developed 
villages where the process of rural industrialization has just taken off. The fiscal 
condition of the village collectives has benefited from this process, which enables the 
village administration to set up rudimentary programs of old-age support. A 
conventional form is to grant cash benefits to the elderly and in-kind items to almost 
all villagers. Rural elderly in this category obtain such old-age allowances 
irrespective of their previous work or contribution records. In spite of the generally 
low amount, these village allowances avail the local elderly and those households 
with elderly members. Yet, constrained by the developmental scale of regional 
economy, most villagers of type 2 still live in poverty since they remain dependent 
on the agricultural incomes. Even though the village administration can spare 
additional financial capacity for such local welfare programs, their overall effects on 
poverty alleviation in old age are pretty limited. Here, one cannot equate capability 
to grant cash or in-kind benefits with ability for large-scale subsidy as required in 
most rural pension schemes. Normally, there are no public pension schemes in the 
villages of type 2, which means that the villagers still have to rely on themselves 
apart from some benefits of the village. Old-age security is for peasants in type 2 as 
precarious as in type 1. 
Another form of old-age insecurity can be seen in the lives of landless peasants 
who have become one of the most vulnerable groups in rural China. Without a legal 
right of their land, peasants are particularly susceptible to the whims of developers 
and local governments. The negative impact of land seizure policy on the lives of 
landless peasants is most evident in cases of type 3 observed in rural Beijing. Many 
peasants are struck by this policy which forces them to give their land up and 
thereby lose their means of subsistence. Often they are exposed to the risk of 
unemployment due to the fact that they have never been trained to learn additional 
skills. The cases in type 3 have shown that lack of generous compensation benefits 
and policy coordination has offset the goodwill of local governments to give the 
landless peasants a helping hand. Even the lump-sum compensation benefits and the 
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promised pensions at a fixed amount prove to be of little help for the already 
imminent mishap, as living expenses in the region have risen sharply in recent years 
which cannot be covered with that amount. Without a well-designed framework to 
meet the demand of landless peasants, their living subsistence is extent subject to the 
force of labor market where they are disadvantaged. Job-training courses are 
supposed to give the target group a second chance to learn new skills tailored to the 
requirement of the labor market. However, half-hearted job introductions as well as 
incomplete course offers have also undermined the desired policy effect. As a result, 
landless peasants in type 3 are virtually left in the lurch despite the political euphoria 
of local governments to settle the problems of landless peasants. Similar to type 2, 
landless peasants in type 3 can indeed expect a certain amount of old-age pensions 
from the scheme, yet much depends on whether they or their families can get out of 
the problem by finding suitable jobs. For many of them this seems to be pretty 
unlikely. 
Type 4 aims to describe the paths of peasants into classical rural pension 
schemes launched by the MOCA. Since its formal introduction in 1992, the scheme 
has been modified by local governments in various forms to fit local circumstances. 
But, as a whole, its basic principles of voluntary participation and individual funded 
accounts are followed in all local schemes. Since local governments and village 
collectives assume the part of collective responsibility, their financial states will 
determine the extent of public support for each participant peasant. Following this 
logic, one can notice explicit disparity among regional rural pension schemes with 
regard to the subsidy and benefit levels. Whereas peasants in wealthy regions have 
more job opportunities to gain higher incomes, their villages and towns also benefit 
from this prosperous trend and possess of larger collective property and budget. This 
implies double advantages for the accumulation of personal old-age pensions. For 
poorer regions it is exactly the opposite situation: both village collective and 
individual peasant are still plagued by regional underdevelopment, therefore unable 
to secure pensions at a satisfactory level. What one observes is a polarizing trend that 
divides rich and poor well onto the old-age security. This inherent inequality has also 
significantly influenced how local peasants perceive public pension schemes. For 
instance, while almost all peasants in Shanghai perceive the state as an important 
safeguard for their old-age security, their fellows in rural Beijing still feel uncertain 
about this point and prefer individual arrangements such as private commercial 
insurance or family support. The delineation of type 4 reveals the essential fact that 
economic development and financial support of local governments play a crucial role 
in the outcomes of old-age security in rural China. 
In Chinese villages there is a group of peasants who are less susceptible to such 
hardship due to their special status. Type 5 seeks to sketch these cases. As the 
executive agents at the bottom of the Chinese administration body, village cadres in 
many areas own certain privileges granted by the state as a reward for their work. In 
the pension issue, for example, local governments often introduce a pension scheme 
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especially tailored for the cadres and functionaries at all administration levels. In 
contrast to the state’s reluctance to get involved in the financial burden of other rural 
pension schemes, it actively bears the most responsibility of the scheme for cadres. 
Multipartite participation (central government, district and town governments, 
cadres themselves) in the contribution payment characterizes the operation of the 
scheme. With the strong support of the state, the pension scheme grants quite 
generous pension benefits to the participants, including village cadres. Therefore, 
even in less wealthy villages, cadres still own access to resources or subsidies that 
uphold their social security in general and old-age pensions in particular. Yet 
intriguingly, despite the general advantages village cadres claim, their status in the 
scheme remains subject to the urban-rural-divide inherent in Chinese social policy. 
Although the income replacement rate of cadre pensions is set at a high level (60-
70%), a dynamic adjustment of pensions in pace with economic growth as is 
practiced in the urban insurance schemes is not existent. In addition, the generally 
lower incomes of village cadres than their urban colleagues also lead to less pension 
entitlements. As a whole, village cadres can claim much better pension benefits than 
their co-villagers but they are still inferior to that of urban cadres. 
Type 6 outlines a new group of rural pension beneficiaries who have benefited 
from vigorous regional economy and generous land seizure policy in rural Shanghai. 
As the land prices in Shanghai have soared rapidly thanks to booming economy, 
local governments in Shanghai can demand high compensation payment from 
private developers. The new scheme TIP (zhenbao) came into force in 2004 as a 
political response to the increasing scale of land seizure as well as the emergence of 
various employment types in urbanized areas. Since local governments contribute to 
the new scheme almost exclusively with the compensation premiums, individual 
peasants are automatically included in the scheme without additional financial 
burdens. For rural landless peasants, the participation in the TIP is an upgrade of 
personal old-age security in terms of generous benefit entitlements than the 
traditional pension scheme. For the first time in China rural peasants in a region can 
count on the support of a public scheme in their old age. As the urbanization in 
Shanghai is expanding, the scheme is expected to cover more and more peasants in 
the near future. With the implementation of the new scheme, Shanghai has 
undoubtedly outpaced other regions in its social protection for the rural peasants. 
The prospect of their economic safety in old age looks pretty bright. 
Type 7 documents some rare cases in which rural peasants have been able to 
join the urban social insurance. The luck of the peasants in this type to claim higher 
pensions from the scheme is rather a personal coincidence than ordinary policy 
regulation. In the illustrated cases, employment in a factory of a Japanese company 
or self-employment as a grocery owner have opened the door to the urban social 
insurance scheme in due time. The peasants in these cases have seized the unique 
chance and taken up the scheme. For them, the entitlement to draw urban pensions 
means a guarantee of old-age security because the amount of payable pensions lies 
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well above that of any other rural pension schemes. Apparently, their choice to join 
in was also based on this knowledge, as they are sensitive towards the disparities of 
social security between urban and rural residents. As both interviewees reckoned in 
the interview, they were quite aware of the far better entitlements in the urban 
scheme and did not hesitate to join it. With the handsome amount of urban pensions, 
peasants of this type are confident that they can lead a carefree life in their old age. 
Yet, this type should be viewed as an exception rather than normality. It reflects the 
sheer contrast of old-age security between urban and rural residents.  
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8. Biography and Retirement of Peasants between Passive 
Obedience and Active Planning 
The last chapter has described peasants’ diverse paths into the rural pension 
schemes. These path differences are the result of the policy design by the central 
government that envisages from the outset the reservation of regional gap. 
According to this policy idea, many local governments have introduced since 1992 a 
variety of pension programs according to their local circumstances, which targeted at 
different categories of rural residents. Manifold institutional frameworks concerning 
the combination of financial responsibilities among the central government, local 
governments and individual peasants have led to a huge gap of old-age protection 
between rich and poor regions. Regional disparities also have a profound impact on 
the participation paths of the peasants into various schemes. Whereas peasants in 
rich regions can assume stronger protection from local governments for their old age, 
their fellows in poor ones still have to worry about the bread for the next meal. 
Under these circumstances, an important question arises as to how the peasants 
interpret their situations and, above all, how they react to these situations according 
to their judgments. The interplay between social structures, political institutions and 
social actions is one of the major foci of the institutionalist life-course approach. 
In this vein, this chapter goes further to analyze the interpretative dimension of 
social actions of the peasants. The analysis concentrates mainly on their subjective 
perception of individual situations as well as strategic planning of old-age security. 
The crucial question here is: how do the peasants interpret and assess the 
institutional frameworks of the rural pension schemes (if any)? In this context, a 
further question is: under the (non-)given institutions of old-age security, how do the 
peasants plan their future lives? And how do they perceive the retirement under the 
given institutional environment? By means of ideal type construction this chapter 
seeks to address these research questions. In the construction of the subjective 
interpretations and strategic responses, the analysis aims to shed more light on the 
life planning of the peasants. Thus far, except a few studies such as Leisering and 
Gong (2002), this aspect has not been systematically addressed in current literature 
on the development of the rural pension policy. Most of the studies only focus on the 
political processes and outcomes without further exploring the subjective 
interpretations and action orientations of the rural residents. The exploration of this 
aspect could further deepen our understanding of the interaction between social 
policy and individual peasant as well as its implication for the future development of 
old-age security in rural China. 
The approach of type construction also seeks to highlight the biographical 
relevance of social institutions for individual actions. Either institutional 
underdevelopment (low provision of public pensions) or regional disparity (unequal 
subsidy of pensions) should be examined in the context of personal life experience. 
Public pension institutions are a part of the given circumstances which individual 
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peasants have to take into account while planning their future lives. In the process of 
subjective interpretation and planning, peasants have to find a matching point, 
whereby institutional frameworks of public pension schemes can assist personal 
arrangements of old-age security. Peasants’ perceptions of individual situations in 
relation to public pension institutions shape their action orientations in the field of 
old-age security. The exploration of biographical significance which the individual 
peasants assign to existing public pension institutions should give a hint as to how 
the latter frame individual contexts of the overall arrangements for old-age security. 
What elements does the concept of retirement entail? In itself, retirement is 
strictly defined by formal institutions of old-age security. When the age limit is 
reached, the individuals are entitled to claim pension benefits from the scheme. 
Recipients of pensions are supposed to cease his/her employment and live on 
pension incomes. Institutions define de jure the timing of individual’s retreat from the 
work sphere of the society. In addition to this formal definition, however, retirement 
encompasses another dimension of subjective perception of social agency. Individual 
evaluations and decisions of the timing to cease work may vary to a large degree 
from the institutionally demarcated time point. Crucial for our analysis is this 
subjective dimension that entails the situation interpretations and strategic responses 
of individual peasants. Retirement implies an active arrangement of individual 
agency with respect to both definition and management of life situations. How 
individuals come to terms with the perceived hardship (or complacency) determines 
what responses they would make and what outcomes these would bring about. In 
this light, the analytical concept of retirement will be elucidated alongside the 
exploration of the relationship between institutional and biographical contexts. Here 
the concept of retirement refers less to institutionally defined age limit than to the 
patterns of strategic responses to given conditions and subjective planning of 
individual old-age security. Some peasants have already come to the idea of 
retirement for a long time, while others may well just begin to think about it or have 
no plan yet. In all cases retirement is a concept embedded in the construction of ideal 
types to highlight the developmental process of individual subjective orientations.  
To this end, four major types are built, as the figure 8-1 illustrates. The next 
section will begin analyzing the characteristics of each ideal type with detailed study 
of some typical cases. After the analysis of all types this chapter goes further with a 
systematic comparison of them in order to accentuate their theoretical implications. 
Finally, types of retirement are brought in relation to types of life course presented in 
chapter 7, with the aim to demonstrate how and to what extent the 
institutionalization of the life course in current rural China is taking shape. 
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Figure 8-1: Retirement and Life Planning in Surveyed Rural Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Four Types of Retirement and Life Planning 
Type 1: Fatalists 
Peasants of this group live in poor regions where neither public rural pension 
scheme nor village subsidy is in place to help local residents avert the risk of old age. 
Based on the data collected in the field work, this group refers to poor peasants in 
remote rural Beijing. As agriculture is the major economic source both for the villages 
and their residents, the overall development of regional economy grows slowly 
because agricultural products yield lower revenues. The double weakness (i.e. village 
and individual) becomes a vicious circle of poverty: whereas individual households 
are already afflicted with chronic economic shortage, regional and village economy 
suffer equally from the underdeveloped infrastructure, thereby unable to spurt more 
growth which would bring about more wealth. These villages are in such a plight 
that they lack additional capacity to afford any financial subsidy for old-age security 
of their villagers. The inability of the village collectives to provide financial aid 
constitutes a poor precondition for the individual villagers to make any 
arrangements for their future. Without significant support of the central or local 
governments, peasants in these poor villages must live on their modest farming 
incomes. 
Under these circumstances, a central characteristic of this type is the incapability 
of the peasants to overcome poverty and life difficulty. Subjective perception tends to 
be negative towards the given conditions and possibilities of escape from the 
deadlock, which results in a mixed sense of hopelessness and disappointment. 
Fatalists describe exactly the case of locked-in poverty: the individual peasants assess 
the overall situation from a passive perspective, and they also fail to map out a 
blueprint that could help them escape from the destitution. Subjective inertia has 
aggravated the existing poverty as no willingness and endeavor are strived to 
ameliorate the whole situation. As a result, old-age security becomes a remote dream 
that they can only yearn for but hardly grasp in the hand. Pessimism about the future 
is part of the traits one can find in this group. 
Life Planning 
Policy Losers (Landless 
Peasants in Beijing) Fatalists Strategic Participants Active Planners 
Passive Obedience Acitve Planning 
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To demonstrate more precisely the core elements of this type, four facets of 
subjective interpretations and strategic responses are applied here: handling 
biographical problems, dealing with financial stringency, perception of state policy 
towards the peasants, the perspective of old-age security. 
Mr. Wu, resident of the Houjianping village
 

in Tongzhou district of 
Beijing, represents the typical case.  
 
Case 3: Mr. Wu is 51 years old, plants vegetables and pear trees on his 4 mu farm. His wife 
died 2 years ago. Mr. Wu married this year a new wife with urban resident status because 
she was an urban worker. Now the couple works together on the farm. The two daughters 
have finished their school education. The elder daughter is newly wed, while the younger 
one works for a private company. Mr. Wu lives mainly on his income from the agricultural 
activity, though price fluctuations in the market influence remarkably how much he can 
earn.  
 
As a peasant, Mr. Wu earns his income from farming. The experience with the 
instability of agricultural incomes due to cyclical variation of market prices for farm 
products has made him skeptical about the possibility of life improvement. He also 
doubts the willingness of the state to assist the life of rural residents. In view of the 
stagnant income growth in the past years, he questions the possibility of any 
significant improvement of the household economic situation and the prospect of his 
personal old-age security. The agricultural income as the main pillar of the 
household economy has become a biographical problem for Mr. Wu because he is 
aware of its susceptibility to price instability of agricultural market. With a small 
farm of 4 mu area, there is not much room for doing large-scale farming that would 
improve the technical efficiency or productivity. In other words, the peasants in rural 
Beijing are destined to lead a very modest life if they have no other income sources 
than agriculture. For Mr. Wu it is exactly the situation: as a middle-aged peasant who 
has been working for his whole life on the fields, there are no other vocational 
alternatives he could possibly turn to because he has only learned the farming skill. 
Unlike younger people who can join the mass flow of migrant workers swarming 
into cities in search of better jobs, the lives of middle-aged peasants are characterized 
by the inability to improve income situation by having other profitable jobs. With the 
instable, mostly low income of agricultural economy, peasants’ lives are vulnerable 
to sudden contingencies such as illness or work injury. 
 
In rural villages you are unable to cure serious illness. If you get sick and need to undergo 
operations, all will cost hundreds of thousands Yuan, and you are simply unable to afford 
them… Don’t even think about it! (Case 3, 04/10/04) 
 
In other words, the fragile household economy is problematic for Mr. Wu because it 
is actually susceptible to suffering of income shortage (e.g. market price falling) or 
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unexpected incidents. He manages to cope with such tight financial situations by 
abstaining from consumption in order to do more savings. Given the lean income 
source, though, Mr. Wu has a very narrow margin for such savings. For the wedding 
of his elderly daughter, for example, Mr. Wu has prepared very few articles as her 
dowry. As Mr. Wu and his wife remain healthy, they can still get by on their 
incomes. But in case of financial stringency, he will have to borrow money from 
relatives or close friends in other rural regions. Mr. Wu has a sister and a brother, 
and they are persons who may help if he really gets into difficulty. But borrowing 
money would only come into question when he has exhausted all other possibilities. 
In case of serious illness, Mr. Wu would give in and wait for the outcome of the fate 
because he knows he would be unable to afford the cost of medical treatment. 
The exigency in personal economic condition has negatively influenced the 
perception of Mr. Wu towards the role of the state in its rural policy. He believes that 
the state has thus far done very little for the peasants. Even though the local 
governments have begun granting financial subsidies to rural peasants, their overall 
proportion in the whole public budget remains very fractional. Despite the rapid 
growth of nationwide economy, the rural villages have thus far benefited very little 
from it. For example, the government grants a yearly subsidy of 100 Yuan for one mu 
of farmland, yet this policy has little effect in uplifting peasants’ incomes due to the 
fact that the production cost is rising even more rapidly. Cost increase in fertilizer 
and other materials has outnumbered the public subsidy, thereby offsetting its 
original goal to bolster peasants’ incomes. 
 
As a peasant, if you merely depend on the government, you cannot survive… Even though 
you have the land, you have to invest more in it and therefore spend money. You have to 
use fertilizer on the fields well before they can yield any harvest. When you put your 
investment in the farming and you get nothing back, then you lose money. (Case 3, 
04/10/04) 
 
With regard to the social security for the peasants, Mr. Wu indicates that the state has 
done almost nothing. This policy misery has worsened their living conditions. Until 
the interview, Mr. Wu reckons that he has never heard of any public rural pension 
scheme being planned in the village, nor does he know how such kind of scheme 
would function. However, as the economic and social reforms have been enforced all 
over the society, Mr. Wu believes that it is high time for the central government to 
address the rural problems. After all, as the highest authority, the government has 
the responsibility to do something for the citizens. But for the time being, he has not 
the slightest idea about the implementation of any rural social security programs in 
rural areas. 
 
We don’t have any old-age insurance or commercial insurance in this village. Even when we 
have nothing left, the village cadres will not care about you. You will be offered the five-
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guarantees (wubao), that’s the lowest security. Nowadays whatever sort of social security 
would not even reach the rural areas. (Case 3, 04/10/04) 
 
The policy vacuum of the state has not, however, undermined the confidence of Mr. 
Wu in the quality of possible public pension schemes. The current problem lies not in 
the inability but the reluctance of the central government to do more for the peasants. 
Once it changes its mind and establishes a public pension scheme, Mr. Wu will 
definitely favor it over commercial insurance. He believes that the latter is mainly 
operating towards profit maximization rather than security protection. No 
commercial company would do profit-losing business, but the government could 
absorb the loss and keep its scheme operating. After all, the primary goal of public 
pension schemes is to secure peasants’ old age against economic hardship. The 
skeptical attitude towards the commercial insurance has much to do with the 
underdevelopment of the insurance market in this area, where private insurance 
companies have just begun their commercial activities. One reason for the late 
market development lies in the fact that most weak-income households in the 
Houjianping village are still unable to afford any kind of commercial insurance. As 
the private commercial companies have yet to establish their reputation, peasants in 
the Houjianping village still have more sympathy for the public schemes (if any). 
 
The peasants are quite unfamiliar with the commercial insurance, nor with the public one. 
But the government will subsidize the public pension insurance. As to the commercial 
insurance, I cannot comprehend what is exactly inside it, nor do I understand its concept… 
The public scheme is supervised by the government, for example, by Beijing city 
government, Tongzhou district government, or town government. But who is in charge of 
the commercial insurance? You can know nothing! (Case 3, 04/10/04) 
 
In view of the void of all other external resources for the support of the peasants, Mr. 
Wu recognizes the necessity of self-reliance for his own old age. He belongs to the 
group of peasants who have no other alternatives than to rely on traditional means of 
old-age security: land and family. With the revenues from agricultural economy 
fluctuating or even declining, Mr. Wu knows that his ability to assure a sound basis 
for old-age security is very limited. Partial dependence on his daughters becomes 
inevitable, though he hesitates to acknowledge that point. 
 
In my old age I will have to rely on myself. Of course, I have to depend on the support of 
my children, but I cannot fully rely on them. It is good if they have time to come to see you, 
but what if they don’t? If they have economic resources, then I will get money from them. 
But if they themselves live in a less comfortable condition, you have to worry about them! 
(Case 3, 04/10/04) 
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Retirement is for Mr. Wu an ideal way of elderly life which he would like to enjoy, 
but he knows quite well that he cannot have it. As his wife receives urban pensions, 
Mr. Wu comes to realize the urban-rural divide in Chinese social security. The 
laggard development in rural social protection has generated a sense of resentment 
and helplessness in the mind of Mr. Wu. But he responds to the preferential 
treatment of urban workers with silent obedience to the status quo. He does not 
think that he can change the whole situation alone. Now, in his midlife, he has no 
desire to take the risk of seeking other employment chances. As his daughters have 
grown up, he has at least accomplished an important task as a father. He prefers to 
stick to his own land and live on it as a traditional Chinese peasant. 
 
I would like to retire but I do not know what the government is doing. Who doesn’t want to 
lead a life like urban workers? Having sufficient living allowances, training one’s own body, 
taking care of the grandchildren, taking trips, who doesn’t desire for the joy of the socialist 
family? But you simply can’t afford them. It’s not just a matter of thinking. (Case 3, 
04/10/04) 
 
In sum, Mr. Wu manages to lead a better life but the overall efforts are limited by his 
reliance on farming as the main economic source. The fluctuating crop prices are 
compounded by rising production cost, which has led to low yield of agricultural 
revenues. Meager subsidy from the government helps little to bolster the income of 
the peasants. For many peasants like Mr. Wu, the overall financial conditions do not 
allow any generous consumption, let alone preparation for old-age security. The 
failure of the central and local governments to introduce a public pension scheme has 
further dampened his hope for any further support of the state. There exists a stark 
gap between expectation and reality: the want of individual peasant towards more 
state engagement is frustrated by the sheer absence of any public scheme. The 
deliberate restraint of the state from rural old-age security has led Mr. Wu to believe 
that he would have to depend on his own work or children in order to prepare for 
his own economic safety for his later life phase. 
Why has old-age security become a biographical problem for the group of the 
fatalists? There are both structural and individual reasons. First of all, the general 
underdevelopment of local economy has provided a weak background for individual 
households to improve their income situation. As a predominant economic activity in 
the village, farming can hardly bring about any considerable revenues for these rural 
households. Low investment of the state for regional development is the second 
factor responsible for the stagnant situation. Fragmentary village infrastructure, 
insufficient subsidy for the agriculture, lack of public social security schemes (except 
five-guarantees and cooperative medical scheme) have contributed to a precarious 
background for the life course of the peasants in this group. Biological features (age) 
and marginal qualifications of individual peasants have further constrained the 
alternatives for any significant improvement of life conditions. The interplay of 
 186 
structural and personal factors has narrowed the perception horizon of individual 
peasants with respect to the prospect of their life planning for later phases. Old-age 
security is still confined to the conventional pillars: land and family. But even the 
peasants have recognized the declining function of these two sources, knowing that 
they may not offer any solid backup for old-age security. 
The overall unfavorable conditions have led individual peasants to make very 
modest assessment of the prospect of their current lives and future old-age security. 
Aware that nothing can be done to alter the adversity, peasants in this group look at 
everything with skepticism. As Mr. Wu puts it, “turn the face to the yellow earth and 
the back to the heaven” (mian chao huangtu bei chao tian). As a traditional peasant, he 
can only keep working on his fields, in the hope that the harvest would continue year 
for year. Peasants in this group are still bound to their land, and they perceive it as 
the only reliable pillar for the time being. Helplessness and subjective 
circumscription characterize the passive fatalists because they deem it impossible to 
challenge the status quo by affirmative actions. What they can do is to hope for better 
income through agriculture or, in best cases, more state involvement in rural 
development and social security. As the latter looks unlikely in the near future, 
fatalist peasants can only continue working hard on their land and live with families, 
in the faint hope that they can avert their fragile old-age security. 
 
Type 2: Policy Losers 
Peasants in this group are forced to change their ways of economic subsistence due 
to coercive land policies of the local governments. They belong to a growing mass of 
landless peasants whose land is encroached by local bureaucrats and private 
investors for other developmental purposes. For these policy losers many things are 
at stake, especially the livelihood of the family. The problem of land seizure is the 
result of the ambiguous property rights for the land. This gives local bureaucrats and 
cadres much room for setting their land policy arbitrarily. In the name of collective 
welfare the land can be easily taken away without corresponding in-kind 
compensation or cash payment commensurable with the land’s real values. In most 
situations, landless peasants are inadequately treated as though they could live well 
without their land. Some local governments, though, have launched new policy 
initiatives and established new social security schemes for landless farmers. Yet 
except a few places like rural Shanghai, these schemes remain so ill-designed and 
poorly implemented that they can barely come up to the need of the farmers 
concerned. As a result, the well-meant goals of the policy are largely undermined by 
flawed institutional frameworks and defective policy implementation. 
What characterizes a typical case of policy loser? The impact of land seizure on 
the lives of landless peasants differs depending on the socioeconomic conditions of 
individual peasants. Younger peasants have better chances to overcome the life 
severity as they can seek alternative employment to compensate for income loss in 
farming. A lot of rural residents in the villages adjoining to Beijing city, for example, 
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have long been working in non-agricultural sectors. For them, how the land policy is 
enforced matters less. By contrast, elder or middle-aged peasants have the same 
problem as the case of passive fatalist: difficulty of integration in the labor market 
owing to their poor qualifications. Their previous long experience in agriculture or 
low-wage employment helps little to improve their prospect of getting new jobs in 
non-agricultural sectors. This general problem makes them prone to falling into the 
poverty trap. Once the compensatory payment or social security scheme fails to meet 
their real needs, economic insecurity as a result of exclusion from the labor market 
emerges.  
The biographical dimension of life planning is significantly constrained by the 
given policy frameworks and the individual socioeconomic conditions. In difference 
to the fatalist in type 1, peasants in type 2 are willing to adopt possible strategies that 
would help them out of the difficulty. Attending public job-training courses, for 
instance, could considerably improve the qualifications of the landless peasants. 
Many of them would like to learn new skills, knowing that this is the best way to find 
a job. The problem lies, however, in the poor quality of training courses offered by 
the local governments, which can barely match the demand of the labor market. It is 
precisely the ill-designed policy frameworks that have considerably constrained the 
individual capacity to improve their lives. The disjunction between land seizure 
policy and life planning of landless peasants has become the major cause of mishap 
for them. Since landless peasants are not allowed to form any interest groups in 
Chinese politics that could possibly protect their rights, they are bound to lose 
ground against the reckless devouring of local governments. 
Mr. Liu (case 16) represents the typical case of policy loser. As the village is 
located in the suburb rural area, the Beijing government has begun taking away large 
acres of land since the mid-1980s. Land seizure at that time was enforced in a fairly 
reckless way that the interests of the peasants were simply ruled out. 
 
Case 16: Mr. Liu used to be working on his 3 mu fields in the Langfasi village 
 
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
in 
Huangcun town
 
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
, Daxing district
 


, Beijing. With the income from 
husbandry he was able to feed his four-person household. This changed suddenly in 1985 
and 1986 when the Beijing government ruled to seize over 100 mu of land from the Langfasi 
village to found a base for military police. Mr. Liu lost the most part of his land (2.9 mu).  
 
In the mid-1980s, the state was notionally in control of the land of the whole nation 
according to the ideology of the communism. As the only landowner, the state saw it 
legitimate to take any land away for whatever desirable policy aims. Compensation 
corresponding to the real value of the land never came to the minds of the 
policymakers until lately. The accelerating urbanization of the late 1980s soon bore 
on the rising demand for more rural land. In 1993 the Beijing government encroached 
again on another 100-odd mu of arable land for town expansion, followed by the 
third wave of land seizure in 2003 of over 200 mu of land for road construction. 
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Initially, the Langfasi village owned more than 1000 mu of land, only to see it shrink 
successively to roughly 500 mu. Due to shortage of underground water for irrigation, 
most villagers have given up farming activity and sought to earn their incomes 
through employment in other economic sectors. The village collective rents the 
disposable land to private companies or persons in order to finance its 
administration as well as collective welfare programs. 
When Mr. Liu’s land was seized in 1986, the Beijing government granted him a 
lump-sum compensation payment of 60,000 Yuan without any further measures for 
job assignment. Nor has the government made any effort to offer job-training courses 
for landless peasants. With his families in need of catering, Mr. Liu had to seek other 
job opportunities in non-agricultural sectors. With luck the village collective offered 
him a job as an assistant in the village administration. Together with the collective in-
kind benefits of flour and salad oil for every villager, the whole family can still make 
a living. Nowadays, as the Langfasi village does not belong to any part of the 
industry parks designated by the Beijing government, most villagers who seek 
better-paid jobs have to move to the city or other downtown areas. Those staying in 
the village or adjacent areas can only do small business or similar self-employed 
economic activities. Without a strong regional and collective economic development, 
the average income of the villagers is as low as around 1000 Yuan a month. The 
prospect for income growth depends essentially on whether the village could benefit 
from the ongoing urbanization in rural Beijing. 
The impetuous land seizure is perceived by many villagers, including Mr. Liu, 
as a negligence of the state’s promise to keep its land policy unchanged for decades. 
Since the introduction of the household responsibility system at the beginning of the 
1980s, the Beijing government has given the peasants a pledge to maintain the 
stability of the land policy. Yet the growing need for the rural land has tempted it to 
breach the implicit agreement and encroach the land whenever necessary, thereby 
eroding the confidence of the peasants in the credibility of the state policy. Frequent 
land seizure at the expense of the peasants has also given rise to increasing 
disgruntlement among the victims, complaining that no proper placement policy or 
compensation benefits were planned. 
 
The government said that the land distributed to peasants would remain unchanged for 60 
years. But it has changed within only a few years. Therefore, the peasant feels insecure in 
this respect. I used to have a lot of land, but almost all has been seized. The new fifth 
circular highway is built on our seized land. (Case 16, 12/04/05) 
 
The lump-sum compensation of 60,000 Yuan Mr. Liu received from the government 
could only cover the expenses for a few years. Now as he has run out of that money, 
Mr. Liu can only rely on his own working income. As a peasant, it is extremely 
difficult for him to find a suitable job in the private economic sector. Without the job 
at the village administration, he would face the similar fate as his landless co-
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villagers who make a living as self-employed such as taxi drivers or grocery owners. 
Yet these are toilsome jobs which can only maintain a basic income level. The only 
additional living support comes from the village collective that grants in-kind 
benefits to each villager and cash allowances to the elderly. The dearth of an 
overarching policy of the central and local governments towards landless peasants 
has generally worsened their living conditions. 
 
The state seizes the land on which the village depends. With the land being seized, the 
village has no land left. Land is the only asset the village disposes of. The state should 
arrange jobs for all those whose land is seized. But it has done nothing. (Case 16, 12/04/05) 
 
Given the unfavorable circumstance, Mr. Liu feels uncertain about himself and his 
family. With the job at the village administration, he can still manage to keep the 
financial situation of the family in balance at the moment. But in the middle and long 
term, much still depends on the accomplishments of his child. In rural China it is 
commonplace to emphasize the education of the next generation because all peasants 
know that this is the only way to escape from the adversity. Only with a higher 
education degree can one attain higher career achievements and social status – and 
with them higher incomes. Many rural households, including the Liu family, have 
put their hope upon their children in the anticipation of a better life in the future. 
Even under financial difficulty the rural peasants would still invest as much as 
possible on the children’s education. 
With regard to his old-age security, Mr. Liu thinks he has no choice but to work 
longer. As he has to feed his family with his current work, there is little room in his 
current economic situation to do more savings for his own old age. Retirement is for 
him the privilege of urban residents who can enjoy generous pension benefits. Even 
family may not provide sufficient support for his old-age security, seeing that one-
child policy in rural areas has directly exacerbated the burden of the children to 
support their parents. He is well aware that the presupposed caring function of the 
family is in decline so that his old-age security can barely rely on it. 
 
In rural areas, if both affined households have one child respectively, then the two children 
will have to fend for four elderly. Generally, the rural elderly have no sources of old-age 
security. Better-off villages will grant more generous pension benefits but poorer ones 
cannot afford them. With two children taking care of four elderly, their burden is too heavy. 
This stands in sharp contrast to urban residents who have pensions. The burden of their 
children is significantly smaller. (Case 16, 12/04/05) 
 
The new pension scheme introduced in Daxing district since 2004 has provided 
possible support for the rural elderly. In the eyes of Mr. Liu, the scheme could indeed 
meet the growing need of the peasants for public pensions. But given the instability 
of state policies in the past, the question remains as to its sustainability. He also raises 
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doubt about the expected amount of pensions to be claimed in one’s old age since the 
subsidies from the district, town and village administrations are too few to close the 
gap needed for a better pension entitlement. With his own financial capability he 
would be unable to pay so much contribution. The participation in the scheme is for 
him rather an income supplement than a main source of economic security. “Until 
then it doesn’t work with 200 Yuan a month. Even now 200 Yuan are very few; this 
sum cannot even be called money. With 200 Yuan, what can you buy now?” (Case 16, 
12/04/05) His difficulty reflects the general severity landless peasants face even 
though new pension schemes in Daxing have been put in practice. The Daxing 
scheme has indeed envisaged more financial subsidies from different levels of local 
governments, yet their overall amount still fails to buttress the main burden of 
contribution payment if an insured peasant is to accumulate enough pensions in 
his/her individual account.  
All in all, landless peasants become policy losers because they are forced to give 
up their land from which their major income used to stem; and enter a labor market 
for which they have little preparation. Without a fully-fledged policy framework that 
could help them bypass the difficult transition phase, landless peasants have become 
de facto an extremely vulnerable group standing on the brink of social exclusion. The 
core problem lies in the inadequate policy that encroaches on the land without 
proper compensation or placement measures. Lack of property right over the land 
and weak position of peasants have further made it harder for peasants to resist the 
unfavorable condition offered by local bureaucrats who enforce the land policy. The 
result is that these peasants are bound to lose in the whole process. 
The case of Mr. Liu illustrates clearly the pessimistic perception of status quo as 
well as limited action orientations of landless peasants with respect to individual 
economic improvement and old-age security. Landless peasants are forced by the 
state policy to manage a new life form characterized by more employment insecurity 
and life contingencies. The stringent land seizure policy has considerably constrained 
the repertoire of possible alternatives which Mr. Liu can turn to for sufficient living 
maintenance. Under this circumstance, personal relationship network stands out as 
the decisive factor for the strategic choice of peasants’ actions. Relatives, friends and 
even village cadres are the central figures landless peasants will strategically turn to 
for help. Whether one can manage well through the policy-induced crisis depends on 
how he/she takes advantage of personal networks in the search for alternative 
employment opportunities. For households with children who have already finished 
their education and begun working, the situation is less dramatic as working 
children can feed back part of their income to support the family. Yet unless the local 
governments provide significant institutional underpinning, landless peasants 
generally have great difficulty finding suitable jobs. This problem hits middle-aged 
groups especially hard because they are discriminated in the labor market. As a 
result, low payment and hard work characterize the employment pattern of many 
landless peasants. They are policy losers because they lose their basic subsistence 
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means (land) and, correspondingly, the prospect of their current lives and future old-
age security. 
 
Type 3: Strategic Participants 
Strategic participants refer to those peasants who have participated in local pension 
schemes in order to secure a part of his/her old-age incomes. In contrast to those 
poor peasants without any old-age protection (type 1) and landless peasants (type 2), 
peasants in this group still plow their fields to maintain their living, or work in non-
agricultural sectors to earn higher incomes. Their general economic condition allows 
them to spare a part of their overall budgets to pay contributions into local pension 
schemes. Even when the general condition is tight, strategic participants still manage 
to join local pension schemes whenever possible. In this light, strategic participants 
can be said to be partial winners in rural China who have benefited from public 
pension schemes. This does not necessarily mean that they can draw sizeable 
incomes that enable them to lead affluent lives. But unlike peasants in type 1 und 
type 2 whose capabilities to arrange lives are constrained by socioeconomic status or 
state policy, strategic participants come off well in that they have, at least under 
given circumstances, more leeway to decide how they arrange lives and old-age 
security. Peasants in this group deal with their life planning actively and take 
advantage of all possible resources to sustain future economic need in old age. 
The most distinctive characteristic of this peasant group is a clear definition of 
the biographical dimension as well as a priority of individual interests. Local pension 
schemes are perceived by strategic participants as one of such resources to improve 
the prospect of their old-age security. Even though peasants in this type are well 
aware that the expected pensions from these schemes will not cover a great slice of 
future need, participation is still regarded as an additional safeguard against possible 
shortfall in later income sources. In these cases, retirement is deemed as a phase of 
invalidity, whereby one has to rely on existing resources to lead decent lives. Public 
pension schemes have become a supplement to existing sources such as children or 
private commercial insurance. To achieve this end, strategic participants manage 
their current economic activities with a view on the preparation for the phase of late 
life.  
 
Case 14: Ms. Dong is a farmer of a four-person household in the Er village 
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, Beijing. She represents the ideal 
type of strategic participation. She takes up the pension scheme partly because it is a state 
policy, but mainly because she perceives it as a supplementary pillar for her old-age security. 
Drawing a sum of expected pensions from the scheme becomes her partial strategy to avert 
the economic risk of old age. 
 
Ms. Dong plows on the land plot of more than 3 mu assigned by the village collective. 
The main crops are wheat and rice, but Mr. Dong reckons that peasants can hardly 
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make high profits with these agricultural products. Crops are for her household the 
main source of food, and only when they have remaining crops will they sell them to 
earn cash income. At current market price the average income of the villagers 
amounts to roughly 4700 Yuan a year. Ms. Dong’s husband works as a doorman for a 
private enterprise in the village and earns additionally 500 Yuan a month. The elder 
daughter has graduated from school and got a job as a car saleswoman from a 
private company. She earns 2000 Yuan a month, which has significantly improved 
the financial situation of the household. But as the daughter is going to get married, 
Ms. Dong realizes that she can no longer depend on the income of the daughter after 
her wedding. Ms. Dong’s son still goes to school but she expects that he would soon 
graduate and starts to work. 
Under current financial conditions, Ms. Dong is doing some savings mainly for 
the wedding expenses of her son in the future. In villages it still costs a few thousand 
Yuan for the wedding ceremony of a son. In traditional villages Ms. Dong believes 
that the elderly still have to depend on their children because the local governments 
do not dispose of sufficient financial capability to shore up all the necessary costs for 
rural old-age security. In her view, the current initiative of the Daxing district 
government to introduce a new pension scheme is a positive step, seeing that the 
children have to bear more and more caring burden in the future. In her view, family 
and public schemes should jointly bear the increasing responsibility because only so 
can rural old-age security stand on solid grounds. “… Without social insurance, two 
children would have to take care of four elderly in the future… How many elderly a young 
man would have to feed! We still have to join in the insurance.”(Case 14, 14/04/05)  
Her willingness to participate in the pension scheme traces back to her 
observation long ago of the urban-rural divide. Seeing that urban residents can enjoy 
full protection by public social insurance schemes, she has wondered for a long time 
why rural peasants should be excluded from the public welfare provision. She noted 
that the development of public rural pensions could not keep pace with the peasants’ 
real demands. Although the existing urban-rural gap has drawn her attention, there 
was nothing she could do except waiting for the introduction of a rural pension 
scheme. Now that the Daxing district government has finally taken this step, she 
takes up the scheme without any hesitation. 
 
I thought of that before. At that time, I was wondering why we didn’t have any social 
insurance comparable to the urban one. … You see that urban elderly madams retire at 60 
and receive 800 to 1000 Yuan of pensions. There are a few of them who have bought houses 
in our village. They retire from the urban enterprises and live well with monthly pensions of 
over 1000 Yuan. In villages we don’t have high expectations, 900 Yuan a month would 
suffice absolutely, right? What we desire is this modest benefit. (Case 14, 14/04/05) 
 
Despite the positive progress in this policy field, Ms. Dong is well aware that the 
existing urban-rural divide will not disappear in short time. Compared with the 
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growing incomes of urban residents in the course of the reforms, peasants like her 
still have to work hard on their fields in order to make a basic living. “You see that it is 
not new for urban residents to draw a monthly pension of more than 1000 Yuan. Here we 
cannot even earn that sum with one mu of land in one year. There is a great gap between their 
lives and ours!” (Case 14, 14/04/05) However, she notices that the central government 
has adopted a series of policies in favor of the rural peasants, such as the abolition of 
the agricultural tax as well as the extension of agricultural subsidies. As a peasant, 
Ms. Dong is grateful that the state has at least set out to improve the lives of rural 
residents. In spite of the gap between urban and rural residents, peasants have 
learned to cherish any policy improvement in recent years. Ms. Dong believes that 
more rural policies will be introduced to improve the overall conditions of the village 
in the near future. 
The faith in the state’s ability to uplift rural development also motivates her to 
prefer public pensions to private commercial insurance. For her, the state introduces 
the scheme primarily for the welfare of peasants, whereas commercial schemes aim 
instead at profit making. This difference is also reflected in the institutional design, 
as the state’s scheme allows more flexible contribution payment according to insured 
peasants’ own financial situations. Commercial insurance requests, by contrast, 
regular contribution payment as a prerequisite for ongoing insurance protection. 
 
After you join in the commercial insurance, your contributions will not be refunded. If you 
have paid the contribution for this year, then you are not allowed to defer the same 
payment next year. In social insurance you can do this. If I have money this year, I can pay 
contributions for three years once. Even if I have no money later, I can still continue my 
membership. Besides, the social insurance does not charge the administration fee, nor does 
it discount any benefits. (Case 14, 14/04/05) 
 
Yet, despite the steadiness of the state pension scheme, its overall protection function 
remains feeble, seeing that local governments only bear a small slice of overall 
financial responsibility. For rural peasants, then, the only way out of the economic 
bottleneck is to put the hope upon their next generation. Providing their children 
with all possible support to receive higher education has become a common practice 
of rural households. Preparing the children for a better future is also a strategy to 
assure the quality of one’s old-age security. To help children attain higher 
socioeconomic status is seen as an effective way to escape from the poverty of rural 
society. Even for strategic participants, the introduction of local pension schemes has 
not changed this fact at all; it has just offered another strategy for the aversion of old-
age risk. 
 
As regards my two children, no matter how bad their school records are, they should attain 
the highest degree whatever possible. Don’t stay in villages because you have no future here. 
The work here is arduous and dirty, and you cannot make much money. (Case 14, 14/04/05)  
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Ms. Dong has thought of retirement but she knows that this is impossible under 
current situations. The expected pension payment of the Daxing pension scheme is 
too low to cover the expected expenses for life in old age. She plans to improve her 
pension entitlement to a higher level by paying more contributions into the scheme 
when her economic condition allows it. By doing this she hopes to live as much 
independently as possible in her old age. Although she expects to live with her son 
when she gets old, she admits that if he earns a higher income, he might buy a house 
and move out. In addition, she is not absolutely sure that her children would support 
her old age when she really gets old. But living with her son is still the most 
preferable alternative form of old-age security. “If I receive enough pensions for my own 
need, I don’t have to ask my children for additional money. But I would still live with them.” 
(Case 14, 14/04/05) In other words, drawing public pensions and living with 
children are two main pillars of her retirement. The Daxing pension scheme weighs 
much as a strategic choice in her planning of later life. 
Another case, Mr. Xu in Wuxing village
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of Shanghai, reflects similar thoughts among 
strategic participants. As Shanghai has long introduced the rural pension scheme, 
almost all peasants are nowadays included in the scheme. The scheme came to the 
Wuxing village in 1996 when the Pudong New District government decided to 
implement it throughout all rural areas in the whole district. The payable 
contribution for one year has risen from initially 300 to 480 Yuan now. As Mr. Xu 
was the leader of a production team, he was delegated by the village collective to 
campaign for the scheme. Therefore, he learned a lot about the advantage of the 
scheme and decided to join it. Now at the age of 50 he expects to claim pensions from 
the scheme in 10 years. With the rapid development of the Pudong New District, all 
rural areas in the district are scheduled to transform their ongoing pension schemes 
to the Township Insurance Program (TIP) in 2007. In view of that given policy, Mr. 
Xu thinks that his pensions will surely be raised to a higher level in the near future. 
The Wuxing village has benefited from the prosperity of Shanghai in recent 
decades. With income from the leasing of collective land, the village can afford to 
grant 270 Yuan allowance to each elderly villager, and is set to raise it in the next few 
years. Together with the rural pension scheme, Mr. Xu believes that he can at least 
receive a pension amounting to 400-500 Yuan a month when he retires. That does not 
suffice, however, for the real living expenses in rural Shanghai, but it can cover a 
large part. For Mr. Xu, this provides at least a basic subsistence. The rural pension 
scheme of the state is, in his eyes, a useful alternative to secure his old-age security. 
“No matter how much I can get in the future, I am sure to receive a fixed amount of payment 
when I retire. Whether this amount can really secure my basic living, well, having it is better 
than having not.” (Case 28, 12/05/05) Participation in the scheme is clearly a 
convenient strategy to prepare for his later life phase. Aware that the protection level 
still ranks lower in comparison with other schemes such as urban social insurance, 
Mr. Xu is nonetheless satisfied with it given that peasants enjoyed much less social 
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protection in the past. In addition, if one takes account of the regional disparity, there 
is little to complain about the pension entitlements in rural Shanghai. 
Yet, the only snag is the insufficient support for medical treatment. Although 
the cooperative medical system operates well in rural Shanghai, a fully-fledged 
medical care system for rural residents remains far from complete. In view of the 
increasing probability of illness in one’s old age, relying on public pensions alone 
would be too risky. For that reason, Mr. Xu is still plowing together with his wife on 
the fields of more than 1 mu, in the hope to save more money for their later lives. In 
addition to the monthly income of 1000 Yuan that Mr. Xu earns, his wife also works 
in a small shop and earns 800 Yuan a month. More savings should make up for the 
possible income shortage in his old age. For Mr. Xu, private commercial insurance 
also comes into question, but his financial capacity does not allow it given that he has 
to prepare for the dowry expenses of his daughter’s impending wedding. Though 
she works for a foreign enterprise and earns 3000 Yuan a month, her imminent 
marriage would mean that Mr. Xu can no longer ask her to give them her salary for 
family support. Once married, his daughter would have to lead her own household 
independently from her parents’. 
The relatively strong public support of the local pension scheme has generally 
aroused higher expectations among the peasants towards the role of the state. 
Although children are deemed to have the moral responsibility of taking care of their 
parents, their reliability in this respect is gradually put into question. Recognizing the 
growing instability of employment in the labor market, Mr. Xu believes it would be 
more difficult to put the responsibility of elderly care solely on the shoulders of the 
children. The decline of family care should be compensated by the strength of the 
state support. The latter is perceived as indispensable for the rural elderly and 
should play a greater role in this area. 
 
The state is very important, and rural old-age security is important, too. Firstly, the state has 
put forward a series of protection policy. You know, we have already entered the aging 
phase; this is a big social problem. Therefore, the state completes this respect of policy 
because it has already taken into account many problems in the future… People like our 
generation are a bit wealthier, but have fewer children, so we may not do well when we get 
old. (Case 28, 12/05/05) 
 
In his planning, his old-age security would be mainly based on two pillars: public 
support and individual savings, though the former should bear a larger portion than 
the latter. Accumulation of individual wealth is indispensable if one is to lead a 
comfortable life in his old age. “Elderly people have a common thought that one should 
earn money when one is healthy. Most people save the earned money as old-age allowance… 
Although the pensions from the rural scheme are a bit too few, you have at least some from it. 
When falling short of pensions you draw some money from your own bank deposit.” (Case 28, 
12/05/05) Children and private commercial insurance could be possible resources 
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but Mr. Xu would not count on them. His daughter still lives in his household, which 
he regards as positive for mutual care. But when it comes to the future, he does not 
expect her to take care of the parents once she gets married.  
In comparison with rural Beijing, peasants in rural Shanghai are better 
positioned against the problem of old-age security, thanks to the stronger economic 
strength in Shanghai and more financial commitment of village collectives. Given the 
existing pension schemes for rural residents in Shanghai, Mr. Xu thinks he has less to 
fret about the overall public support. When everything keeps its track, he expects to 
have a sound financial condition when he retires. Support of the pension scheme and 
the village welfare benefit has substantiated his biographical perception of stable old-
age security. Here institutional frameworks correspond well with individual 
orientations. In this respect, institutional support has facilitated a positive evaluation 
of the public scheme as well as an active planning of the life course. Though the 
protection level offered by the public pension schemes is below the real need, Mr. Xu 
deems it as a resource with which he can better organize his later life. It is in this 
sense that Mr. Xu has strategically taken advantage of the public pension schemes to 
assure a more secure circumstance for his old age. 
In sum, what characterizes strategic participants with regard to their dealing 
with institutional support and biographical planning? Peasants of this group identify 
the constraint of local socioeconomic development for the economic situations of 
their households. They also recognize the modesty of rural pension schemes in 
providing adequate pensions for their old age. But for all the given unfavorable 
limitation, strategic participants differ crucially from fatalistic and landless peasants 
in that they perceive the status quo not as a worsening trend but as a process to a 
better outcome. In conjunction with the positive outlook is their long-term planning 
for later life phases. A part of the reasons lies in the better conditions under which 
strategic planners have more room for the arrangement of current life and later 
retirement. Growing regional economy and strong willingness of local governments 
to introduce pension schemes have offered local peasants opportunities to prepare 
more for their futures. Strategic participants treat the pension schemes as an option 
that would supplement their existing arrangements for old age or even become a 
main pillar eventually. It is in this point that strategic participants come off 
particularly well. They have recognized the limits of various sources for old-age 
security: the growing burden of children, the modest benefits of rural pension 
schemes as well as the selectiveness of commercial insurance. Yet instead of sitting 
around in despair, strategic participants take advantage of all possible options in 
order to secure a better life in the future. In this sense one can speak of welfare mix 
strategy which this group of peasants is practicing in their planning.  
 
Type 4: Active Planners 
Active planners are those peasants who have benefited a lot from the rapid economic 
growth of rural regions and, consequently, the generous benefits of local pension 
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schemes. Strong local economy has raised the financial capacity of villages as well as 
the average incomes of local peasants. This structural strength has offered habitants 
in these regions a variety of employment opportunities with better salaries. This 
advantage is further flanked by comparatively better welfare programs of local 
governments with sound financial bases. Peasants in these prospering regions can 
thus count on solid pensions granted by local schemes in their retirement. Since 
public pensions can already cover the economic expenses in old age, living with the 
families to gain support has become a custom rather than a necessity. Retirement, 
then, turns out to be a concrete life phase one can previously plan with ease, as there 
is no need to work longer for basic subsistence. In some cases, peasants of this group 
may still intend to work as long as they can, but they do it mainly as a hobby in late 
life instead of working for living maintenance. By means of the fully-fledged 
protection of local pension scheme, active planners have succeeded in making 
optimal arrangements for his current phase and later old-age security. 
Given the regional disparity in rural China, the precondition of strong regional 
economy and local financial strength can only be found in wealthy rural regions. In 
the case of rural pensions this existing structural factor is particularly significant. It is 
thus little wonder that cases illustrated in the following analysis stem exclusively 
from rural Shanghai, where the per capita incomes of peasants outnumber that in 
other regions of field survey. Active planners in rural Shanghai live in a carefree 
condition as they have little to worry about the prospect of their household economy. 
Problems from local pension schemes are rare since they operate in a sound financial 
shape. The introduction of the TIP adds further advantage to peasants who are 
entitled to claim still higher pension benefits. Against the backdrop of strong 
collective support, many peasants in rural Shanghai look with confidence to their 
current livings as well as future old-age security. Biographical dimension of life 
planning is perceived in a positive light. Old-age security has become a concrete goal 
rather than an inaccessible vision. 
Mr. Qian (case 29) in Tanghang village（唐行村）, Huating town（华亭镇）, 
Jiading district（嘉定区）in Shanghai, represents the typical case. Like the majority 
of the peasants in rural Shanghai, he joined the scheme in 1992 with an initial 
premium of 5 Yuan monthly. Soon his parents and wife also became members of the 
scheme. For Mr. Qian, the participation in the scheme was initially an idea to find a 
source in addition to land plowing and family care for his old-age security. “I say it is 
worthy. It means letting them use my money first, doesn’t it? Because we are still young, and 
paying contributions into the scheme to pay for the expenses of the elderly members. When we 
ourselves get old, the money of the younger will be used by us. That’s the same. I think it’s 
worthwhile.” (Case 29, 16/05/05) Similar to strategic participants of type 3, Mr. Qian’s 
initial motivation was to assure an additional pillar that could bolster his economic 
need in later life phase. Though the monthly contribution rate has continued rising 
from 5 to 20 Yuan, the prospect of obtaining more pensions also kept pace with that 
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progress. This makes the scheme attractive to the peasants who plan to make more 
preparations for old-age security. 
Mr. Qian’s membership in the rural pension scheme was replaced by his 
participation in the TIP in 2004. When the district and town governments took away 
large areas of farmland, the production team Mr. Qian belonged to decided to 
register all its members to the TIP.85 By switching to the TIP, Mr. Qian’s resident 
status has also been changed to urban resident (nongzhuanju). The main benefits the 
production team has received since then is a lump-sum compensation for the crops 
(600 Yuan for each mu), as well as a regular rental payment for the seized land 
(yearly 1000 Yuan for each mu). Since the compensation payments fall better than the 
revenues of agricultural harvest, the villagers even welcome large-scale land seizure. 
At the same time, the benefits of the TIP also outstrip that of the traditional rural 
pension scheme: whereas the latter grants a monthly pension of 165 Yuan, pensioners 
of the TIP already receive a monthly pension of more than 500 Yuan. With this sum 
plus the work and rental incomes, Mr. Qian is confident that he does not have to 
worry about any adversity in his old age.  
 
I have already enough money. Honestly speaking, there remain 4 to 5 years before I become 
60 years old. In these 4 to 5 years the average wages in Shanghai are sure to rise 
continuously. Now they (TIP) grant 500 Yuan of pensions for one month, they will certainly 
rise to 600 to 700 Yuan after 5 years. With pensions together with rental income, I think I 
have already enough money. (Case 29, 16/05/05) 
 
Despite the generosity of the TIP, Mr. Qian asks his daughter and son-in-law to live 
in the nearby. For him, reciprocal support between parents and children remains an 
ideal way of family solidarity, which can hardly be replaced by institutional 
arrangements of the state. In consideration of the numerous rural populations, Mr. 
Qian still believes that the dependence of all rural elderly entirely on the state would 
be financially unsustainable. He prefers, therefore, a mixed form of old-age security: 
whereas the TIP should bear the major part of financial responsibility, cohabitation of 
parents and children would bridge the gulf of emotional support and daily care. To 
facilitate the young couple to be able to work full-time, Mr. Qian sends his wife to 
live with them in order to look after the granddaughter and maintain their household. 
In return he expects the young couple to take care of them when they get old. In this 
manner, the family plays a considerable function in raising offspring and catering for 
elderly. Public pensions and family care complement each other in Mr. Qian’s life 
planning of the retirement. It is for this reason that Mr. Qian sees no imperative to 
take up private commercial insurance products as a supplementary protection. The 
stable operation of the public pension scheme has made commercial insurance less 
appealing to him. 
                                                 
85 See also the analysis of Mr. Qian’s case in Chapter 7. 
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In other words, the membership change from the rural pension scheme to the 
new TIP has contributed a lot to the financial stability of Mr. Qian’s future old age. 
The biographical significance of old-age security is corroborated by the strong 
support of the TIP and supplemented by solid family bond. Mr. Qian reckons that he 
can now enjoy retirement in the sense of ceasing to work and depending solely on 
pensions, just as the urban residents do. 
 
I have never dreamt of this. Never! The peasants are expected to plow his fields until their 
old age, always on the fields. But now we are not called peasants, we are also urban 
residents. We can raise our heads. I have never dreamt of this. (Case 29, 16/05/05) 
 
The bright prospect has motivated Mr. Qian to organize his plan of improving the 
economic condition of the household further. Buying real estate is the first step he 
took in recent years to ensure a comfortable living condition. And next he plans to 
breed pigs or chickens in stalls for sale. He wants to do this business well beyond his 
retirement – as a hobby rather than a subsistence necessity. “If you are 60 and remain 
fit to work, then I think you should continue working when somebody needs you for the 
work.” (Case 29, 16/05/05) Retirement means for him a phase of secure economic 
condition in which he can do whatever he wants without any need to worry about 
any contingency. The public pensions are a prerequisite for a reliable retirement that 
makes active planning possible. Here Mr. Qian has developed a concrete 
biographical perspective as regards the order of work and retirement in his life.  
For active planners, a solid pension is the precondition for economic safety in 
old age. Without this financial guarantee from the state scheme, planning activities 
for the old-age phase would be futile since one still has to work even after 60. 
Another case (case 22), Ms. Ge in Cangchang village
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in rural Shanghai, makes this correlation even clearer. Among the interviewed 
persons in the survey, Ms. Ge’s case ranks among the luckiest ones due to her 
participation in the urban pension scheme. Originally, as a member of the rural 
pension scheme in Shanghai since 1992, Ms. Ge changed her job from a collective 
enterprise where she had worked for 8 years to a private Japanese factory. The 
employment in the Japanese company was a watershed for her social protection since 
she was allowed to switch to the urban social insurance scheme. The co-payment of 
contribution by the employer has further improved Ms. Ge’s entitlement for more 
pensions. This record was recognized by the local government when the village 
implemented the TIP. According to the calculation of the responsible agency over her 
insurance record in the previous schemes (rural and urban), Ms. Ge has accumulated 
sufficient pension entitlements in the urban scheme, amounting to 702 Yuan a month.  
When the pension scheme was introduced in 1992, Ms. Ge was working for a 
collectively-owned factory. She was convinced by the campaign of the factory and 
decided to participate in the scheme. Her decision was motivated by the idea of 
accumulating an amount of pensions. “… I was living in this village when it introduced 
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the pension scheme. The contribution payment began in 1992…just like the current pension 
scheme - individuals paid a proportion of the contribution while the village collective also bore 
a proportion.” (Case 22, 28/04/05) The introduction of the pension scheme came to a 
time when she was wondering how to accumulate her pensions. Similar to Mr. Qian, 
the first thought of Ms. Ge was to make preparations for her retirement, a moment 
that she began to pay attention to this problem. By participation in the local pension 
scheme, she came to terms with the biographical dimension of old age.  
 
In the past we didn’t have much money in the village; life was very hard. When you got old 
and failed to work any more, your son and daughter-in-law would give you something to 
eat, but you had no additional money for your disposal. (Case 22, 28/04/05) 
 
On this account, Ms. Ge made up her mind to do as many preparations for her old 
age as possible. Analog to many rural residents, part of her incentives was also to 
relieve the future caring burden of her children. Although cohabitation of 
generations in the family remained the norm in rural Shanghai, she realized that, in 
order to win more sympathy of her children, she needed to retain her financial 
independency. After all, asking children for financial support would definitely 
aggravate their economic conditions, as they also have to raise their children and 
accumulate their own wealth. “You will be happy when you have money in the hand. Then 
I would not come into conflict with my children.” (Case 22, 28/04/05) Taking the 
children’s financial capacity into consideration was for Ms. Ge a crucial way to 
mitigate generational conflict as well as enhance family harmony. Only when the 
elderly lived well with their own pensions could they become a buttress rather than a 
burden of the children. 
The wish not to rely on children for old-age support came true when she 
changed her job to the Japanese company, where she had the opportunity to switch 
to urban insurance scheme. The introduction of the TIP later in 2004 advanced the 
progress as the town government remunerated landless villagers with a lump-sum 
payment of contributions to the scheme. The accumulation of overall entitlements 
made it possible for Ms. Ge to claim the pension benefit when she became 50 years 
old. Benefiting from the quantitative improvement of pension entitlements through 
the combination of membership in different pension schemes, Ms. Ge admires the 
function of public pension schemes. “You don’t have to worry anymore. My son and 
daughter-in-law said happily to me, ‘Mom, you do not need any support from us!’ The 
daughter-in-law is very happy because they don’t have to bear the responsibility.” (Case 22, 
28/04/05) The experience with the administration in charge of the TIP was also 
positive. The previous Japanese employer and the town government responsible for 
the TIP have actively made the best arrangements for her to achieve optimal pension 
entitlements.  
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From her perspective, the TIP itself represents a significant progress towards 
comprehensive social protection of the peasants. Whereas the initial rural pension 
scheme merely provides a saving account based on individual financial ability, the 
TIP envisages more collective responsibility through a larger share of public 
subsidies financed by local governments. For her life planning, the combination of 
entitlements from the urban scheme and the TIP has contributed a lot to her financial 
independence in the retirement. Without the underpinnings of public pensions, she 
would not be able to lead a decent life in old age. In Ms. Ge’s case, the rural pension 
policy has effectively changed the way she perceives her life course in terms of the 
division between work and retirement. Public pensions have also facilitated and 
corroborated the generational relationship in her household. They have replaced the 
economic function of land and family but kept the emotional support of the latter 
intact. 
Now with a pension of over 700 Yuan a month, Ms. Ge has begun enjoying a 
leisured life phase without the pressure to continue working for livelihood. 
Retirement now means an independent living free from economic hardship. At the 
age of 51, Ms. Ge thinks even if she intended to search for a job in non-agricultural 
sectors, it would be extremely difficult since middle-aged workforce is generally 
discriminated due to their age. For this reason, the retirement age set by the TIP is an 
ideal time point to her because she would otherwise have difficulty finding a suitable 
job at the moment. Given this external limitation, however, she has not actually given 
up the idea of working to earn more money whenever possible. The thought of 
disburdening her children is so deeply anchored in her mind that she manages to 
seize every available opportunity. For example, she rents the first floor of her house 
to a telephone shop, and charges 1000 Yuan monthly. She also plants some 
vegetables on her own land plot, though the motivation is not for commercial 
purpose but to keep in exercise.  
 
Rural residents like us would like to work further (after retirement) unless we cannot do it 
anymore. It depends on your health. When someone is less fit then he works less. Anyway, 
in our generation no one likes idleness. Unless you’re weak, then you stay home and do the 
chores for your children, just like housemaid in the cities. (Case 22, 28/04/05) 
 
In sum, rural pensioners like Ms. Ge who receive ample pensions tend to work 
further beyond their retirement age even though the employment itself does not 
entail any economic function. For them, retirement denotes the freedom to choose 
whether to work or not. And in most cases the rural elderly or middle-aged would 
choose working simply because they have got accustomed to the work habit (or 
ethic), and feel uneasy with the thought of ceasing to earn money. Against the 
backdrop of the strong support from public pension schemes, an elementary 
characteristic of this type is a clear notion of life planning and strong confidence in 
the prospect of one’s old-age security. In this sense, how they perceive the retirement 
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phase and arrange retirement activity does not differ much from the urban 
pensioners. Active planners take advantage of all available resources (public and 
private support) to organize their present and future activities, though in most cases 
these plans aim less at making themselves comfortable in retirement phase than 
assisting their children or grandchildren in financial terms. With their active 
planning of work and retirement, peasants in this type succeed in attaching 
biographical significance to their decisions to join local pension schemes and work 
incessantly even beyond “retirement”. 
 
8.2 Individual Retirement Strategies Compared 
The above illustration of retirement types has addressed the dimension of 
biographical orientations of the peasants. By unfolding aspects of their subjective 
perception of individual situations as well as strategic planning of old-age security, 
the analysis has sought to explore the mutual interaction between institutional 
frameworks of local pension schemes and subjective definition of situations. The 
central research question was: how do rural peasants define their situations with 
respect to old-age security in the presence or even absence of local pension schemes? 
The analysis has demonstrated that, while tackling the problem of economic 
insecurity in one’s old age, the peasants are confronted with two tasks. On the one 
hand, peasants need to define and cope with their current situations in the 
biographical sense; on the other hand, they have to pay attention to diverse 
regulations of local pension schemes in order to devise an optimal solution to the 
problem of old-age security. The way in which they come to terms with these tasks 
has been explored above by means of type building, which exemplified the settling of 
biographical, institutional and socioeconomic problems. Four types regarding 
individual retirement strategies were constructed to represent patterns of situation 
definition and problem solving of peasants in rural China. Within the scope of the 
institutionalist life-course approach, the analysis has sought to trace the temporal 
process in which individual peasants cope with the problem of old-age security 
under certain institutional frameworks. 
Fatalists fail to find a proper solution to solve the problem of old-age security. 
Under poverty-stricken circumstances, both in village economy as well as individual 
households, they remain tightly stuck to the conventional production means that 
yield meager profits. Unfavorable economic conditions coupled with poor individual 
qualifications have created an impasse from which peasants in this type can hardly 
escape. In these rural households, there exists almost no possibility to improve the 
status quo with different strategies. Fatalists find themselves locked in a vicious 
circle of poverty trap. The problem of current financial shortage leads to another 
problem of insufficiency in old-age security. Individuals in this type attempt to 
define situations and develop coping strategies in respect to retirement arrangements, 
but end up without success because of external structural constraint and institutional 
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vacuum. Lack of public support in this policy domain adds oil to the flame. As the 
central government leaves local governments solely responsible for their regional 
economy, the already poor regions are suffering continuous underdevelopment that 
further limits the local governments’ financial capacities to offer any significant 
subsidies to the villagers. The establishment of a local rural pension scheme is out of 
question. Given the reluctance of the central government and the incapability of the 
local governments to provide efficient and collective support, rural peasants in this 
type are susceptible to the risk of life contingencies that could easily aggravate the 
already destitute household economy. The laggardness of village infrastructure and 
public investment is perceived by local peasants as a failure of the state to close the 
growing developmental gap between urban and rural residents. Resentment arises 
from individual observation that the state has little interest in making even the 
slightest effort to address these problems. These negative factors altogether have 
dampened subjective expectations of the villagers towards effective aversion of old-
age risk. Retirement is for fatalists a goal they can never reach no matter how hard 
they work for it. Both situation interpretations of retirement and strategic responses 
to old-age risk fail to bring significant biographical meaning in individual life courses. 
Policy losers have much in common with fatalists in that they stand in similarly 
difficult situations generated by the coercive land seizure of the state. Attempts to 
find a proper location of their lives after land loss and efforts to develop personal 
strategies of individual life planning are frustrated by insufficient policy frameworks. 
Directly related to the predicament of policy losers is the fact that they are bluntly 
put into a dead end by the state policy where they have little leeway to work out a 
new map for action orientation. Often landless peasants have little time to prepare 
for the life without land after the announcement and implementation of the new land 
policy. Policy impact leads to biographical and socioeconomic problems confronting 
landless peasants. Especially for middle-aged peasants, land encroachment by local 
governments blows most heavily when no other appropriate compensations or job 
placements are in order. Whereas young peasants can respond to this change more 
flexibly by switching to employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors, elder 
villagers possess of no other qualifications suitable for jobs beyond the husbandry. 
The policy impact on individual households depends on the composition of their 
existing income sources. In some cases the peasants do well because they have long 
found employment in other economic sectors well before land seizure takes place. 
But in most cases the land is taken away from those who remain clinging to it as a 
major means of life subsistence. Temporal stringency compounded with resource 
scarcity has constrained the cognitive horizon of the peasants in search of alternative 
ways. Consequently, policy losers define the overall situation from a pessimistic 
perspective since they have lost the most important pillar of income without 
corresponding substitutes to make up the damage. Peasants view the land loss as a 
serious rupture in their biographical dimension.  
 204 
Even though social security schemes for landless peasants are envisaged or 
established as a buffer to mitigate the pounding of land seizure, they are often too ill-
designed to provide essential protection (Shanghai is rather an exception). For that 
reason, the problem of old-age security weighs heavy in the life planning of policy 
losers since the prospect looks particularly bleak. Many landless peasants endeavor 
to mobilize all possible resources in order to stabilize current economic conditions 
and secure future old-age security. Personal networks often play a crucial role in this 
process. Yet for all the efforts they have made to escape from the policy-induced 
plight, many landless peasants still have to face greater financial risks as a result of 
land loss and incomplete compensation policy. Retirement remains a weak point 
where individual strategies can hardly mend. The circumstances shaped by land 
seizure substantially constrain individual perception of status quo that narrows their 
response strategies to arrange for old-age security in the life course. 
Strategic participants refer to those peasants who can find a compromise solution 
out of a generally moderate circumstance. In this type, peasants define their 
problems of old-age security according to their own village and household situations: 
heavy burden for children’s education, modest collective subsidy or narrow margin 
of household finance. Similar to the first two types of peasants, strategic participants 
also face biographical and socioeconomic problems. However, strategic participants 
differ crucially in that they still own fields on which they can live. Also, their villages 
have introduced local pension schemes (in line with the MOCA guidelines) as an 
option for old-age security. Strategic participants weigh available resources against 
existing constraints in order to seek an optimal solution. Institutional frameworks of 
local pension schemes come into their consideration because these allow flexible 
membership and contribution payment. The participation in local pension schemes 
becomes a strategic response not only to the pension policy of the state but also to 
individual need of securing economic safety in old age. In this sense, strategic 
participants are active social actors taking advantage of all possible social resources 
for their life planning. Aware of the scarcity of existing resources (individual 
household and public pension scheme alike), peasants in this group still perceive the 
whole situation as manageable and expect the overall development to be 
ameliorating in the middle- or long term. The introduction of rural pension schemes 
is viewed by strategic participants as a buttress to brace the weakening capacity of 
land and family in rural old-age security, even though the function of the institution 
remains limited. Despite general skepticism among peasants in this group over the 
given urban-rural divide in the state pension policy, they view the pension schemes 
as a positive political move towards more protection for the rural residents. Modest 
collective subsidy as envisaged in the institutional framework is still perceived with 
delight because it marks a progress in the long-neglected area of public pension 
policy. With their mixed strategy based on different underpinnings, strategic 
peasants mobilize all available means in personal networks in order to overcome 
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given socioeconomic and institutional hurdles, and achieve by this means the 
biographical planning of their retirement.  
Active planners find the best strategy to secure their retirement life. 
Socioeconomic and biographical problems in the initial stage are successfully solved 
with a combination of employment strategy, structural change and personal luck. 
Often active planners begin, in very early life phases, contemplating the issue of old-
age security and seize any opportunity to improve their pension entitlements. It is 
thus little wonder that active planners seldom stay on their fields as pure farmers 
alone, but turn to employment chances in non-agricultural sectors where they can 
achieve better income and social security. In regions with high economic growth, 
active planners attempt to avail themselves of employment vacancies in booming 
industries. At the same time, socioeconomic progress in these regions provides an 
ideal chance for local governments to invest more budgets in infrastructure as well as 
local benefit programs. They also design a fully-fledged social security system to 
meet the need of rural peasants in diversifying local structures. With the assistance of 
upgrading public pension schemes, peasants in these regions (including active 
planners) can take part in the accumulated collective wealth and enjoy much better 
social protection. These favorable circumstances help active planners accomplish 
their own goals of old-age security much easily, though the process may not go very 
smoothly. But even in case of transitions, active planners manage to react flexibly to 
situational changes. In spite of contingencies like drop out of the rural pension 
scheme, change of jobs and pension schemes, active peasants learn or adopt new 
strategies in order to weather the storms. With their active strategies and flexible 
adaptations, active planners are able to benefit from the fruit of local economic 
development and pension policy. Their actions are oriented from the outset on the 
biographical significance of the retirement phase, and stick to this goal throughout 
their life courses. 
In sum, these four types illustrate different patterns of situation perception and 
life planning among Chinese peasants under diverse institutional constraints. The 
construction of the four types demonstrates a strong correlation between institutional 
frameworks and individual abilities in the issue of rural old-age security. Generally, 
the idea of retirement and the willingness to make active arrangements for it depend 
largely on the availability of institutional support of the public schemes and 
individual economic conditions. The institutionalization of the life course, i.e. the 
emergence of a clear demarcation between work and retirement, is directly 
influenced by these two factors. In the cases of fatalist and policy loser, frail 
institutional underpinnings and weak individual resource structures tend to have a 
negative effect on the biographical significance of retirement. Out of poverty, 
peasants in these two types are compelled to squeeze available resources for old-age 
security and shift them to more urgent usage. Crucial for the persistence of the status 
quo are the submissive attitudes of the peasants that tend to accept the outcomes as 
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their own fate. Accordingly, we can label these two types with the concept “passive 
obedience” to characterize their situations. 
By contrast, the cases of strategic participant and active planner exhibit a 
distinctive zeal for arrangements of old-age security, thanks to a strong network of 
institutional support and family economy. Generous subventions of village 
collectives and improving household economy have laid favorable grounds for 
conscious planning for old-age security. Under sufficient material conditions, 
retirement has become a tangible concept in the biographical horizon of individual 
peasants, motivated further by the idea that the elderly should not rely solely on the 
children. Correspondingly, we can characterize these types as “active planning”, as 
expressed in the vigorous planning of individual peasants for their lives after 
retirement. The institutionalization of the life course is taking substantial shape in 
these cases. 
 
8.3 Conceptual Integration: A Typology of Life Course and Retirement  
The above analysis has presented, together with chapter 7, the results of typology 
alongside the two overarching dimensions of the study: life course and retirement. 
While analysis of the first dimension illustrates a variety of pathways into local 
pension schemes, evaluation of the second one explores and categorizes the 
participants’ perceptions of the overall situations of their old-age security as well as 
their strategic responses to cope with biographical problems. The concept of life 
course describes individual experience of the peasants before and after their 
participation in the local pension schemes. The analysis of the interview results in 
chapter 7 has built 7 types in association with different sorts of local pension schemes, 
showing how various local pension institutions have led to very different personal 
experiences with them. Although the benefits and subsidies in pension schemes 
among localities vary with one another, the construction of the 7 types still illustrates 
a scale of benefit levels among them: whereas the type “no pension” refers to those 
cases with no institutional support for old-age security, the type “urban pension” 
stands on the opposite side, as recipients of this pension sort benefit most from the 
public schemes. As the presentation of the interview materials in chapter 7 shows, 
the generosity of the benefit levels and collective subsidy in local pension schemes 
have direct influences on the life course especially when rural households are unable 
to pay the contributions alone. They further determine the outcomes of old-age 
security for the respective scheme participants. 
Nonetheless, the institutional characteristics of the local pension schemes can 
only partially affect the participation experience. Equally essential is the fact whether 
individual peasants are aware of the institutional support and take advantage of it in 
personal life planning. The concept of retirement thus refers to the subjective 
biographical dimension of the peasants with respect to their evaluation of the local 
pension schemes as well as their own life planning for old-age security. The analysis 
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of the interview results in this chapter has constructed 4 types regarding how social 
agents define their circumstances of (future) old-age security and how they respond 
to these biographical problems. Here the types demonstrate a clear distinction 
between two patterns of strategic responses. Types of “fatalist” and “policy loser” are 
characterized by their docile acceptance of the existing fragmentary local safety net 
for the elderly, either caused by paucity of local scheme or implementation of land 
seizure. By contrary, “strategic participant” and “active planner” obviously 
demonstrate a strong willingness to arrange their old-age security with the support 
of public pension schemes. In addition to the better entitlements in the schemes, 
individual peasants attach great importance to the issue of old-age security in their 
whole biographical horizon. 
The discussion of the types as constructed in the dimensions of life course and 
retirement brings us to a crucial point concerning the relationship between them. 
After all, life courses before and after the participation in the local pension schemes 
are closely associated with the subjective evaluations and biographical orientations of 
the peasants. Connecting types between these two dimensions can offer a clear 
picture of the link between institutional arrangements of pension schemes and 
individual organization of (later) life plans. The above discussion suggests that there 
is such a tight link. The following table 8-1 illustrates this relationship.  
 
Table 8-1: Relationship between Life Course and Retirement Planning of Peasants 
Retirement  
Passive Obedience Active Planning 
 Fatalist Policy Loser Strategic 
Participant 
Active 
Planner 
No Pension X    
Village Allowances X    
Land Seizure 
Compensation 
 X   
 Rudimentary 
Institutionalization 
 
Local Pension Schemes   X  
Rural Cadre Pensions    X 
Township Insurance    X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Life Course  
Urban Pensions    X 
    Consolidated 
Institutionalization 
Source: Author’s own account 
 
The “X” symbol denotes a close relationship between the constructed types of the 
dimensions life course and retirement. That is, it is ticked when interview cases are 
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attributed to both corresponding types. For instance, all three cases in the type “no 
pension” are also allocated to the type “fatalist” because their overall views of the 
retirement manifest similar pessimistic opinions about any further betterment in the 
near future. The same relation can be found between “land seizure compensation” 
and “policy loser” as most of the 4 cases express discontentment with the 
undemocratic procedure and insufficient compensation in the process of land seizure 
by local governments. Altogether we can identify the first cluster between “passive 
obedience” and the first three types of life course. In a similar manner, another cluster 
relating “active planning” and the four types of life course emerges since all cases in 
the types “local pension schemes”, “rural cadre pensions”, “township insurance” and 
“urban pensions” are allocated to the types “strategic participant” and “active 
planner”. 
With respect to the core theoretical theme of this study, i.e. the 
institutionalization of the life course, these two clusters reveal some interesting 
aspects. From the discussions in chapter 7 and this chapter, we can infer that the 
financial scopes of peasants in the first cluster are substantially constrained by 
fragmentary institutions of local pension schemes. Incomplete infrastructure, weak 
economic development and financial strength plague those villages in the types “no 
pension” and “village allowances”, and, consequently, the livelihood of their 
villagers. Under these unfavorable circumstances, it is extremely hard for a village 
administration to introduce any kind of generous pension schemes mainly financed 
by the village collective. By the same token, individual peasants in these villages are 
likewise unable to accumulate sufficient pensions for their old age. The vicious circle 
is difficult to break if the household lives only on agriculture incomes because they 
grow very slowly. Only in those cases where peasants find employment in non-
agricultural sectors can they improve their general financial situations. Yet, despite 
the diversification of the employment patterns in rural China, agriculture remains 
the major source of income for many rural households. For them, poverty impedes 
their active engagement with the issue of old-age security even though this lingers in 
their minds. Indeed, many cases show that the individuals do come up with the idea 
of retirement but have to put it aside due to economic hardship. Without the 
institutional support of public pension schemes, many villagers must work further in 
their old age or rely on their family. The idea of retirement is burgeoning yet 
unaffordable under severe circumstances. We can thus characterize this group as 
“rudimentary institutionalization”, in the sense that the life course is moving towards a 
modern form of temporal partition between work and retirement but constrained by 
insufficient provision of the state pension policy. 
By contrary, the situations look better in wealthier regions where villages are 
able to improve their overall economic and financial conditions mostly by industrial 
development. The latter creates not only employment opportunities but also gives 
rise to growing demand for land usage. With land leased to private enterprises, the 
villages benefit from continuous tax revenues and leasing incomes, which enable 
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them to embark on local welfare programs covering all villagers. Meanwhile, 
prosperity of local economy also provides diverse employment opportunities for the 
peasants to increase their incomes. Better economic situations of rural households are 
further bolstered by strong financial strength of village collectives, which lay solid 
grounds for the introduction of generous public pension schemes. Though benefit or 
subsidy levels vary from village to village, better-off villages stand in an 
advantageous position to support their residents in local pension schemes. In 
contrast to their poor fellows, peasants in richer villages benefit both from improving 
individual incomes as well as sound village finances when it comes to preparation 
for old-age security. Little wonder that we encounter “strategic participant” and 
“active planner” in pension schemes with better terms, such as TIP or even urban 
pensions. What emerges in the minds of the participants in these types is a clear 
awareness of what the life after retirement should be and how it is to be financed. 
Contrary to the type of rudimentary institutionalization, we can characterize these 
peasant groups as “consolidated institutionalization” to denote the concrete contour of 
work and retirement in the biographical horizon of the peasants. Institutionalization 
of the life course is taking root and framing the action orientation of social agents. In 
this process, the introduction of public pension schemes has undoubtedly 
contributed to guiding the consciousness of the peasants towards voluntary 
preparation for old-age security because they realize the advantage of living upon 
public pensions instead of family support. 
The institutional conditions of local pension schemes as well as individual 
financial capability also affect the manner how retirement age is defined and 
experienced by individual agency. Among peasants in the type rudimentary 
institutionalization, skepticism about the outlook of old-age security prevails, 
breeding the notion that age limits set by local pension schemes make no real 
difference between work and retirement. Without substantial material basis, the 
quest for leisure activities in one’s old age would be futile. Age limits are at best 
taken as the beginning time for pension benefits. On the contrary, peasants in the 
type consolidated institutionalization appear more optimistic about economic safety in 
their old age, encouraged by the bright local economy and solid pension schemes. 
For them, formal age limits do mark a threshold from hard work to leisure phase, 
whereby they are free to choose recreational activities. Even the decision to continue 
working after retirement is made out of voluntary engagement rather than economic 
necessity. In the horizon of their subjective consciousness, retirement age already 
comes very close to the notion of a demarcation that divides two distinctive life 
phases. 
Given the close link between institutional support of pension schemes and 
biographical orientation of individual peasants, it is important to note that the 
distinction of rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated institutionalization is by 
no means a description of two static situations. The typology is rather of a heuristic 
nature and seeks to emphasize the dynamic interaction between institutional 
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arrangements and individual actions that may change in the course of time. The 
demarcation between the two types is thus fluid, subject to the constellation of 
structural, institutional and individual contexts. For example, peasants in the type 
rudimentary institutionalization may soon actively deal with the idea of retirement 
once they gain additional support, be it through improvement of individual 
economic situations or through generous subvention of local governments. In such 
cases consolidated institutionalization is a more appropriate term to describe the new 
situations because individual retirement planning is taking root, thereby driving the 
life course towards a more institutionalized form. 
Despite the essential distinction between rudimentary institutionalization and 
consolidated institutionalization, there is a commonality among them with respect to 
the generational relationship. While one may suspect that the importance of family 
care may decline as a consequence of the introduction of public pension schemes, the 
empirical finding of this study suggests that the opposite may fit in with the reality. 
Among peasants of these two types, the significance of family solidarity does not 
fade away in view of the increasing institutional underpinnings of public pensions. 
What really divides the two types is less the functional aspect than the contribution 
ratio of family care in the overall old-age security. Whereas the family and children in 
rudimentary institutionalization remain the chief bearers of welfare responsibility, 
pensioners in consolidated institutionalization are able to get along well without the 
support of their families. Nonetheless, co-habitation of two or three generations 
remains prevalent even in the latter cases. Abundant pensions are seen rather as a 
part of the household incomes than as personal budgets of the elderly. Thus, many 
recipients of handsome pensions express in the interviews their joy with the fact that 
they are no more financial burdens for their children, but active givers. What we are 
currently observing in rural old-age security is a reconfiguration process in which the 
family’s economic function has gradually given way to other aspects such as 
emotional support and daily care. This is especially evident in the type consolidated 
institutionalization. In contrast, peasants in the type Rudimentary institutionalization are 
more inclined to view the family as the chief pillar of old-age security in view of the 
feeble public support. 
In sum, the typology of rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated 
institutionalization offers a deeper insight into the relationship between the rural 
pension institutions and the life course. It echoes the theoretical theme of this study 
that the state social policy has a dominant impact on the individual life course, and 
that the latter is the interface between institutional arrangements and individual 
actions. Given institutional circumstances set by public pension schemes often shape 
the perception and orientation of individual agency when it comes to the issue of 
old-age security. Equally essential are the financial situations and socioeconomic 
status of individual peasants, which benefit or constrain their abilities to prepare for 
their old age. The typology of rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated 
institutionalization enables us to conceptualize the trace of changes in the life-course 
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structures. Taken together, these findings enlighten an important aspect of the life 
course with regard to work and retirement, indicating the emergence of the modern 
life course in rural China. 
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9. Conclusions and Further Perspectives 
 
From a life-course perspective, individual actors and institutions need each other in order to 
adapt to the restructuring or transformation of society. (Heinz and Krüger 2001: 40) 
 
Social policy and life course are the two main themes of this study. The whole work 
has sought to highlight an important but little noticed dimension of the Chinese 
society in its modernization process: the link between institutional regulation of 
social policy and life planning of individual agency. In Western welfare state 
research, the molding effects of state social policy on the life course of its citizens 
have been well analyzed. An intriguing insight of the research points to the 
institutionalization of the life course through state intervention and social 
organization, which has become one of the defining characteristics of modern 
Western societies (Leisering 2003; Mayer and Müller 1986; Mayer and Schöpflin 
1989). In current China studies, in contrast, although scholars have made valuable 
contributions to our understanding of the development of Chinese social policy in 
the reform process, the policy’s impacts on the life course of individuals remain 
largely unheeded (but see Zhou 2004; Zhou et al. 1996, 1997; Zhou and Moen 2001). 
This study has attempted to fill this gap by focusing on an important realm of rural 
social policy: pension policy. As social policy for rural China is underdeveloped, any 
innovative steps in this area are an ideal opportunity for scholars to examine the 
institution-building processes as well as their effects on the individuals. Rural 
pension policy is precisely such a case that comes to the fore of this study. From the 
theoretical perspective of this work, the formal start of the rural pension policy in 
1992 gains prominence, as it marks the intervention of the state into the sphere of 
rural old-age security. With the establishment of local pension schemes, work and 
retirement are becoming two essential segments of individual life courses in rural 
China. How the rural pension policy shapes the lives of peasants is the main question 
of the inquiry. 
In terms of the theoretical contribution, this study has made an innovative 
attempt to apply the institutionalist life-course approach to the field of rural China. 
Departing from the assumption that the welfare state institutions shape the features 
of the life course, this study has attempted to explore the link between social policy 
and individual life courses in rural China. The study has developed a theoretical 
framework of the institutionalist life-course approach emphasizing the crucial impact 
of state welfare institutions on individual life courses. As such, this study has made 
contributions both to life-course studies and (rural) China studies. While advancing 
the applicability of life-course theories, which have so far only been used to explain 
dynamics in developed industrial societies, this work has also cast new light on the 
study of Chinese rural social (pension) policy. On the one hand, the theoretical theme 
of the life-course institutionalization stands as the analytical framework in focus. On 
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the other, social policy and life course, as two essential institutional elements in the 
modernization of rural China, gain theoretical and empirical relevance as well. 
With regard to the methodological aspect, this study has also made several 
contributions. The application of qualitative methods has enabled this research to 
explore in depth both the institutional development of the rural pension policy, and 
its conjuncture with the institutionalization of the life course in rural China. 
Applying the methods of document analysis and expert interview, this study has 
shown that the development of rural pension policy manifested a strong residualist 
character. It has highlighted the ideational turn in the course of the 1990s that has led 
to sluggish policy implementation as well as uneven development among rich and 
poor regions. Furthermore, by means of biographical interview and type building, 
this study has constructed 7 descriptive types depicting the diverse pathways of 
participation in local pension schemes, and another 4 retirement types illustrating the 
subjective perception and orientation of the participants with regard to their 
retirement arrangements. By connecting the 7 types of participation paths with the 4 
types of retirement arrangements, this study has further built two types, rudimentary 
institutionalization and consolidated institutionalization, to characterize the differences 
of life-courses institutionalization among peasants under diverse institutional 
circumstances. The analytical results of this study show that, in terms of the 
pathways into local pension schemes as well as the subjective retirement planning 
and arrangement, the rural pension policy of the state has a profound impact on the 
life course of the peasants. This is demonstrated in the nascent awareness of the 
retirement and old-age security among the peasants. Although the socioeconomic 
status of rural households affects the outcomes of individual retirement 
arrangements, the idea of retirement is undoubtedly burgeoning at different rates 
among the various configurations of local pension institutions and individual 
households. 
In order to summarize these themes, the following two sections provide further 
accounts of the main findings of this study with regard to the rural pension policy 
and life course in rural China. The final section discusses some theoretical and 
methodological limits inherent in this study, followed by an overall appraisal of this 
study and a sketch of possible directions for future research. 
 
9.1 Prospect of the Rural Pension Policy  
One of the central questions this study has dealt with concerns the development of 
the rural pension policy in China. The institutional analysis has drawn our attention 
to the ideational conflicts among bureaucrats in the central government. Incongruity 
of opinions with respect to the role of the state in the issue has retarded the whole 
policy progress (Gong 2003; Leisering and Gong 2002; Shi 2006). Whereas advocates 
of more state involvement in the rural pension policy point to the necessity of a 
pension scheme with a greater share of public responsibility, opponents still stick to 
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the idea that traditional means of security (land, family) should remain the main 
bearers of old-age security. The latter opinion is warranted by the belief that self-
reliance is an established tradition of rural welfare. Indeed, on the political agenda of 
Chinese social policy, rural peasants have always had a secondary status inferior to 
that of urban workers, and this political logic has not changed much since the 
economic reforms in 1978. While the state attaches much importance to welfare 
reforms in the urban sector, the development of rural social policy is at best a 
patchwork of fragmentary policy initiatives.  
The slow development of the rural pension policy is an example par excellence of 
this traditional difference. In view of the situation that many localities had already 
built up pension schemes voluntarily, the central government decided to join this 
trend and introduced the policy in 1992. However, the basic idea was that local 
governments and individual peasants should bear the greater part of the financial 
burden. This guideline has since then dominated the developmental direction of the 
rural pension policy – with direct consequences for the whole rural population. Since 
the outset of the policy reform, rural pension schemes in different localities have 
developed at very diverse paces, with wealthier regions outperforming their poor 
counterparts. The analysis of local pension policies in Beijing, Qingdao and Shanghai 
in chapter 6 has shown the uneven development among them in terms of coverage, 
entitlement and benefit levels. Shanghai is the pioneer in this policy realm as they 
have devoted much to the expansion of local pension schemes since 1986. Contrarily, 
developments in Beijing and Qingdao fall behind due to fragmentary institutional 
frameworks and policy instability. Qingdao’s laggardness appears a bit awkward. 
After all, Shandong province was the first region that launched an experimental 
scheme in 1991. Apparently, policy progress has less to do with the timing of the 
introduction than with regional economic development, financial strength and 
political continuity. The analysis of local pension policies in chapter 6 has supported 
this impression. The analysis has further shown that, in Beijing, Qingdao, and 
Shanghai likewise, economic development and financial strength among towns and 
villages vary a lot. These have affected the scope and extent of local pension 
institutions. Even within these regions, the conditions of participation for peasants in 
local pension schemes may differ as well, determined directly by the range of 
subsidies by local governments (district, township, and village).  
The policy principle of self-reliance according to the financial strength of local 
governments has corroborated the existing uneven regional development in the issue 
of rural old-age security. This result precisely manifests the ambivalent character of 
social policy in China. While it is usually assumed to have a positive role in 
mitigating social maladies resulting from the market mechanism, the alleged 
protective function of social policy can soon turn out to be doing the opposite and 
thereby consolidating social inequality. Social policy can both eliminate and produce 
social inequality, depending on its institutional d
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2003).86 The rural pension policy in China is exactly such a case: it is not designed to 
moderate the unequal effect of wealth distribution as a result of the economic and 
social reforms. Quite the contrary, it substantiates the status quo with the principles 
of local self-reliance and self-administration. Both in terms of interpersonal and 
intertemporal aspects of wealth distribution, the rural pension policy is far from 
fulfilling any target of social justice, as neither subsidies for poorer regions nor 
wealth redistribution are envisaged in the policy guidelines. Policy outcomes thus 
largely depend on the willingness and capabilities of local governments to fill the 
vacuum left by the central government. Little wonder that wealthier regions, which 
are better-off both in terms of local subsidy and individual household wealth, 
outpace their poorer counterparts in establishing a safety net for the rural elderly. In 
a nutshell: the rural pension policy reproduces existing social inequality between 
rural regions and households. 
Because there is little sign of active political endeavor on the side of the central 
government to deal with this issue seriously, the outlook of the rural pension policy 
in the near future appears bleak. As chapter 6 has shown, the current policy situation 
can at best be described as stagnation, if not retrenchment. Dissent remains among 
responsible bureaucrats in the central government regarding in which direction the 
whole policy should go. Progress is also thwarted by the irresolution of the top 
leaders, who simply put the issue aside without further directives. In Chinese 
welfare politics, this implies that it could take long before any significant political 
move is taken. In view of the fact that the existing policy guidelines benefit wealthy 
regions and disadvantage poor ones, it is predictable that the disparities of old-age 
security among regions are likely to persist or even worsen. As long as the state 
hesitates to take any corrective measures in the rural pension policy to redistribute 
wealth among individuals or regions, old-age security will remain a privilege for 
well-off peasants. 
 
9.2 The Emergence of Retirement in Rural China: Unequal 
Institutionalization of the Life Course  
This study has sought to answer the second central question regarding the scope and 
extent of biographical orientations of individual agency in respect to his/her life 
planning and retirement notions. This question is related to the theme of the 
institutionalist life-course approach that state social policy has framing effects on the 
temporal course of individual lives, which contributes to a clear chronological 
partition between different phases (institutionalization). Using the biographical 
method and type building, this study has distinguished two major categories of the 
life course in rural China, i.e. rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated 
                                                 
86 That is why Esping-Andersen (1990) chooses the stratification effect as a measurement dimension in 
his comparative study of advanced welfare states. He has shown that different welfare regimes can 
measure quite different stratification effects in their social policy. 
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institutionalization. The concept “institutionalization” used in this work denotes the 
substantiating temporal division of the life course both in terms of institutional 
regulation and the subjective orientation of individual biography. From the 
perspective of the institutionalist life-course approach, it is the result of the interplay 
between social policy institutions and individual biographical orientations. On the 
one hand, institutions regulate the temporal sequence of the life course by specifying 
the age at which individuals are entitled to claim their legal benefits. On the other 
hand, individual experiences span different institutional and social structures, and 
individual choice differentiates the life course, too. Institutional structuring of age 
norm is perceived and weighed by individual agency against other factors in his/her 
biographical orientation, thereby forming individual trajectories of the life course. 
Essential at this moment is the normalization of the temporal partition of the life 
course, both in terms of institutional settings and individual consciousness.  
Seen in this light, life-course institutionalization encompasses two analytical 
dimensions: the individual pathways into local pension schemes and the subjective 
perception of retirement in the personal biography. These have constituted the two 
analytical axes of this study. In the first dimension, the analysis of diverse pathways 
into pension schemes seeks to investigate individual experiences with (non-
)participation in public pension institutions. In view of the variety of local 
institutional regulations, the analysis has made a close examination of institutional 
and personal factors that have shaped peculiar trajectories of individual life courses. 
In the second dimension, this work explores the subjective views of agency in respect 
to the retirement notion and biographical planning. This inquiry discloses the 
conjunction between institutional regulation of pension schemes and individual 
management of old-age security. In the light of these two analytical axes, two 
categories of the life course, rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated 
institutionalization, come into view. These denote the degree of temporal division of 
the life course in rural China, particularly in relation to the introduction of pension 
schemes in the rural localities and their impact on the old-age arrangements of the 
peasants.  
Among the investigated cases, rudimentary institutionalization refers to the life-
course pattern of two types of peasants: those with a vague consciousness of the 
biographical significance of retirement in relation to work; as well as those aware of 
its importance yet unable to achieve substantial economic safety under destitute 
circumstances. While there are various causes for the misery, the field work has 
identified two major factors: backwardness in local economic development and 
inadequate implementation of land seizure. Economic weakness is a common 
problem plaguing many rural regions, resulting mainly from the developmental 
strategy of the central government to let few regions grow and get rich first. As the 
analysis of the interview materials has shown, lack of financial resources is for many 
rural peasants the major cause responsible for their non-participation or low 
contribution payment to local pension schemes. In types such as “no pension” or 
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“village allowance”, the dearth of liquid funds has made poor rural peasants unable 
to make any middle- or long-term preparations for old-age security. Worse still, an 
improvement in the general circumstances can hardly be expected because those 
villages are similarly afflicted with sluggish economic development and feeble 
financial strength – the crucial cause for the underdevelopment of local pension 
schemes. 
Land seizure is of a different nature, emerging as a policy response to the rapid 
industrialization and urbanization that demand more space for expansion. In itself, 
the policy is conducive to rural development because faster urbanization would 
ultimately uplift the prosperity of the outskirt rural regions. Unfortunately, reckless 
policy practice has instead left many peasants in calamity. Often the culprits are local 
governments who have taken the land away without appropriate compensation or 
reallocation programs for the victims. The loss of land has put many peasants in an 
awkward living situation in which they are deprived of the most vital means of 
subsistence. Without sufficient cash compensation or in-kind reallocation assistance, 
landless peasants are virtually destined to live in adversity because their poor 
qualifications are hardly suitable for any other non-agricultural employment. This 
problem hits those middle-aged landless peasants particularly hard as their chances 
of finding new jobs are de facto hindered by their age. In effect, ill-designed local 
policies for land seizure have severely disadvantaged the lives of many peasants, 
making them a new group of vulnerable policy losers in rural China. In view of such 
drastic transitions, landless peasants face the same poverty problem as their fellow 
villagers in the types of “no pension” or “village allowance”. Individual poverty is 
generated and aggravated by the paucity or insufficiency of public support by local 
governments. The overall circumstances have overshadowed the prospect of old-age 
security since these peasant groups have no alternative capacities to avert the risk of 
old age. More exigent for them is to improve current financial situations in order to 
cover daily living expenses. 
The term rudimentary institutionalization characterizes exactly the severe 
situation of the poverty-stricken peasants when it comes to the idea of retirement in 
their minds. These refer mainly to those living solely on agricultural incomes or 
landless peasants. In some cases, the economic situations will only improve 
considerably if members in the households migrate to better-off regions and find 
better jobs in industrial or service sectors. Otherwise the prospect of improving their 
living standard hinges predominantly on the overall regional economic development. 
Generally, peasants in this category have already thought of retirement at certain 
points of time: for some a vague idea, for others a more concrete vision. Aware of the 
mounting burden of their children as a result of the one-child policy, peasants in 
poor villages have become increasingly alert to the necessity of living on their own 
pensions or savings in old age. Yet, they lack all necessary financial resources to 
attain that goal. Without public support and sufficient individual abilities, old-age 
security can only stand on the traditional pillars: land and family. Working in old age 
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is often the only way to sustain the household under constant financial strain. In 
other words, the idea of retirement in the minds of the peasants remains nebulous, as 
it is almost impossible to practice it under current circumstances. By and large, 
peasants in rudimentary institutionalization are ill-equipped to avert the risk of old age 
– a situation virtually in favor of active state involvement in order to underpin the 
fragile pillars of traditional old-age security. Unfortunately, as the policy analysis of 
this study has indicated, the rural pension policy in China is very unlikely to develop 
in this direction. Rather, social inequality will persist well into old-age security, with 
gloomy implications for the afflicted peasants. 
The whole situation looks completely different for the type consolidated 
institutionalization, which refers to the life-course pattern of peasants participating in 
local pension schemes. Common among these cases are the much better development 
of local economies and the salutary financial state of local governments. Although 
benefit levels among local pension schemes still vary a lot, they have generally 
reached a standard that can make up for a certain share of expenses for old-age 
security. In the case of urban pension, cadre pension or Township Insurance Program 
(TIP), participants can even receive or expect handsome pensions. Participation in the 
urban pension scheme or cadre pension scheme is a matter of personal luck, 
depending on the status of village cadres or the regulations relating to certain job 
categories (such as employment in foreign companies). Contrarily, participation in 
the TIP or other local pension schemes in Shanghai or Beijing is a common practice 
because villagers benefit considerably from subsidies of township and village 
administrations. With strong public support, participants of these pension schemes 
are able to claim substantive pensions when they retire. 
These circumstances have availed the peasants in their preparation for old-age 
security. Public pensions have now become the major source of old-age incomes. 
Compared with the cases in rudimentary institutionalization, peasants in consolidated 
institutionalization have a more distinctive consciousness of the biographical 
significance of retirement in their life spans. The generally favorable conditions of 
rural pension schemes have enabled them to plan concrete plans for their life phase 
after work. And, as the interview data have shown, they do. Once the subjective 
anticipation of a carefree old-age phase is fulfilled, the peasants begin to mull over 
more concrete plans in the later life phase. Though many of them tend to choose 
working longer, the rationale behind the decision is rather to maintain social 
connections or assist the family. Many of them think of staying at home in order to 
take care of the grandchildren or do the chores, mainly with the intention to support 
their grown-up children whenever they can. In other words, a manifest long-term 
perspective has emerged in the minds of those peasants with stronger public support 
for their old-age security. Retirement has gained considerable significance in their 
biographical horizon, both in material and psychological terms. While it may be 
disputable to attribute this development solely to the merit of rural pensions, it is at 
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least adequate to say that the institutional support of public pensions has extensively 
contributed to the emergence of long-term biographical views.  
Consolidated institutionalization denotes exactly the situation that state pension 
institutions have framed the way in which Chinese peasants think of and plan for 
their old age – and consequently, direct their life courses towards a clear temporal 
division between work and retirement. For peasants of consolidated institutionalization, 
a stronger role of public rural pensions has also changed the intergenerational 
relationship. In economic terms, public pensions have substituted the family in its 
traditional role both as provider and caregiver of old-age security. Indeed, as the 
interview cases in the TIP and urban pensions have demonstrated, the peasants are 
pleased by the fact that pensioners can live on the income maintenance of public 
schemes without additional need for family support. In the meantime, however, 
mutual help and co-habitation of generations remain the predominant forms of 
support for many rural families – despite the greater financial independence of the 
elderly. Counter to the conventional form of rural old-age security in which children 
support their elderly parents, what we are currently witnessing is an income transfer 
in the reverse direction, that is, elderly pensioners now offer financial support to 
their children. Pensioners of consolidated institutionalization have attained a new status 
as financial contributors rather than recipients in the family. In this respect, we can 
say that the rising significance of rural pensions has indeed replaced the economic 
function of family care provision in rural old-age security, although the fundamental 
basis of family solidarity in emotional and social aspects remains solid. 
It is important to stress that the typology of rudimentary institutionalization and 
consolidated institutionalization is of an explorative nature, which intends to 
characterize the dynamic interaction between structural, institutional and individual 
contexts. In this sense the central thesis of life-course institutionalization is in essence 
a concept which refers to an ongoing process rather than a given result in rural China. 
Crucial in this process is whether the structural background of villages and 
institutional frameworks of their pension schemes can underpin the local old-age 
security. Equally important is the subjective perception of individual peasants 
towards life planning and retirement, as well as their ability to take advantage of the 
available institutional support to achieve this end. Conceiving of the two types 
discussed here merely as a static outcome of social policy development would miss 
this vital point and gain a partial picture. 
In sum, against the theoretical background of the institutionalization of the life 
course, the distinction between rudimentary institutionalization and consolidated 
institutionalization has drawn our attention to both the institutional and biographical 
aspects of individual agency in rural China. By characterizing different types of life 
courses and retirement arrangements, the empirical results of this study have echoed 
and upheld the central idea of the institutionalist life-course approach that social 
policy institutions have a profound impact on the dynamics of the life course, 
especially in respect to the temporal division of different phases. Above all, the state 
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pension institutions play a pivotal role in regulating exit from work through 
statutory age limit, thereby setting a norm for the orientation of human actions in 
biographical planning (institutional time). Meanwhile, human agency is responsible 
for decisions in the context of individual, institutional and social settings, which 
shape individual’s life-course trajectories (individual time). The institutionalization 
of the life course, as investigated in this study, is taking root through the interplay of 
institutional rules and individual life planning. In this process, the extent of state 
pensions gains particular importance when the individual peasant falls short of 
personal network resources (family, neighborhood) for old-age security. Precisely 
this point draws a clear distinction between rudimentary institutionalization and 
consolidated institutionalization, as peasants in the latter category are better positioned 
for their retirement, thanks to the stronger underpinning of local pension schemes. 
The disparity of pension policy development among regions has left its traces in the 
contours of the life course as expressed by the different perception patterns of the 
peasants with respect to their retirement prospects and life planning. The unequal 
institutionalization of the rural life course parallels the uneven development of the 
rural pension policy. 
 
9.3 Perspectives for Future Research 
The above conclusion has elucidated the main contributions of this study both in 
policy analysis and in life-course research. To be sure, one academic research project 
can hardly explore all aspects of the social world exhaustively, and this study is no 
exception. Despite the new findings of this study, it also reveals some important 
aspects that have not been investigated thoroughly. In the first part of the empirical 
analysis, the detailed presentation of the development of the rural pension policy 
excludes the politics of the rural pension policy. With the exception of a few works 
such as Gong (2003) or Leisering and Gong (2002), particularly the role of interest 
constellations in Chinese pension politics falls short. During the field work of this 
study it was impracticable to gather such information mainly due to the opaqueness 
of Chinese politics. The reluctance of Chinese officials to deliver more insight into the 
political process makes a detailed academic inquiry into the political black box 
almost impossible. The paucity of reliable statistical data further precludes a deeper 
investigation. 
For the same reasons, this study has provided few answers to the question 
regarding the relationship between urban and rural pension policy. This aspect would 
be of particular interest for research in Chinese social policy in view of the sheer 
contrast of political significance between the two policy realms. Many scholars have 
indeed explored the dualistic nature of Chinese social policy in detail, pointing to the 
developmental strategies of the CCP to develop urban industrialization first (e.g. 
Chu 1996; Dixon 1981; Wong 1998; You 1995). But in the realm of pension policy, 
there have thus far been few attempts to discuss the urban and rural sectors from any 
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integrated perspectives (but see again: Gong 2003). While the state has been keenly 
embarking on a series of major pension reforms in the urban sector, the rural pension 
policy has in fact come to a standstill, if not retrenchment. A further exploration of 
the political relationships between these two interrelating fields could prove vital to 
the explanation of the pension policy development as a whole. 
As for the second part of the empirical analysis, this study has consciously left 
out the field work on an important group of rural residents: migrant workers. 
Indeed, the desire to improve one’s economic situation has driven millions of young 
or middle-aged peasants to migrate to the cities or well-off rural regions in pursuit of 
better-paid jobs (Solinger 1999; Zhang 2003; Wu 2000). The phenomenon has become 
so acute in recent years that even the legislative body, the People’s Congress, has 
repeatedly pleaded the central authority to take more protective measures for the 
vulnerable mass (see chapter 6). Despite their significance among the rural 
population, attempts to capture their life forms in the empirical study could prove 
complex due to their moving to different cities. A migrant worker from rural Beijing 
could travel to Jiangsu or Zhejiang and stay there working year-round. For practical 
reason, therefore, the study has left this group of rural population out of 
consideration, however, without claiming that it has no impact on the explaining 
power of the whole work. Taking proper account of the migrant workers in future 
research would definitely contribute to a better understanding of the changing lives 
of Chinese peasants. 
In addition, this study has also been confronted with some methodological 
challenges, too. The first one has to do with the selection of field sites, which has 
been elaborated in chapter 4. Limited access to fields was further compounded by 
restricted freedom to achieve better sampling for biographical interviews. The 
presence of local cadres and the arrangement of interviews through them have also 
made the process of data collection susceptible to methodological criticism. 
However, as noted in chapter 4, this is a common problem that perplexes social 
scientists doing research in China. Under the strained circumstance of limited access 
to data, the research could be improved through the development of flexible work 
plans at the field sites in order to better respond to any possible interruptions. 
Longer residence in selected rural areas in order to make frequent contact with the 
local villagers and cadres could prove fruitful. Better acquaintances with the villagers 
would facilitate the field work. Further case studies in the field of rural pension 
policy and life course would shed more new light on this topic. 
Furthermore, studying the rural pension policy and its impact on the lives of the 
peasants would certainly benefit from the use of the quantitative methods developed 
in the tradition of life-course approaches (Giele and Elder 1998). Event history 
method, for example, has been widely applied to measure the relationship between 
variables and offer a more precise explanation of the whole issue. Its explaining 
power lies in its ability to process longitudinal data to trace the dynamic changes of 
life events and trajectories. Yet, the strength of using statistical methods in the case of 
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China research would be partly restricted by the difficulty of data collection. Reliable 
data either do not exist at all or they are hard to acquire from the hands of the 
responsible officials. The collection of longitudinal data in the area of Chinese social 
policy would be a difficult yet fruitful task. Future field works would have to take 
pains to obtain valuable data to enrich the scope and extent of the research in this 
topic. 
This relates to an open question with respect to the dynamic interrelation 
between the institutional evolution especially in local pension schemes and changes 
in individual life courses (see also Elder 1985, 1994; Heinz and Krüger 2001). This 
study has indeed made a preliminary attempt to highlight the institutional impact of 
the state pension policy on the lives of Chinese peasants. Taking advantage of the 
explorative character of the qualitative research methods, this work has entered a 
new research field in the life-course study. Through the lens of the life-course 
approach, this study has unfolded an interesting link between macro (social 
transformation), meso (institutional innovation), and micro (life course) levels 
against the background of the modernization process. But theoretically elaborating 
and empirically examining the link between structures, institutions and agents have 
not yet taken full account of their dynamism (cf. Zhou 2000; 2004; Zhou et al. 1996, 
1997; Zhou and Moen 2001). For instance, the patterns of the life course could well 
change as the life forms of Chinese peasants are pluralized in the context of rapid 
transformation in rural society. Institutionalization of the life course may be 
accompanied by its simultaneous diversification, which in turn questions the 
suitability of the rural pension policy. This also demands the establishment of 
longitudinal data which can reveal more about the dynamic changes of institution 
and agency. The theme regarding mutual congruency of institutions and life courses 
in rural China merits more consideration in future studies. This shows that the 
potential of life-course research in China research has not yet been fully unfolded in 
terms of its theoretical explanation and methodological application, although this 
study has heralded the analytical power of this research approach and pushed the 
whole research agenda ahead. 
To conclude, this study has extended the scope of the life-course approaches 
traditionally applied to Western societies to describe and explore a vital dimension in 
the modernization process of the Chinese society. Through the analytical framework 
of the institutionalist life-course approach, this work has manifested both the power 
of social policy institutions in shaping individual life courses and the biographical 
significance of the institutionalized life course for individual life planning. In the 
Chinese context, the institutionalization process has been shaped largely by diverse 
local economic strength, policy conditions, the local insurance market, and the 
financial capacities of individual households. The interplay of the state (central and 
local), market and family has proven to be a dominant factor for the individual 
retirement arrangements as well as for the generational relationship in the family. In 
this process, the implementation of social policy (rural pension policy) is embedded 
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in local contexts, which also takes effect on how individual agents perceive the given 
policy circumstances and respond to them. The result is an unequal 
institutionalization of the life course as a vivid expression of the interaction between 
state social policies and individual life planning. The fragmentary development of 
the rural pension policy has reinforced the existing social inequality between urban 
and rural sectors that stretches well beyond the work phase of Chinese peasants. In 
view of the potential issues associated with the state and life course in (rural) China, 
this study has made a start in a new agenda which requires more research in the 
future. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Topic Guides for Expert Interview with Government 
Officials 
 
A. Introduction of research project 
Interview background: Dissertation project.  
Aim: understand the development of the rural pension policy introduced since 1991 
as well as the development of local pension scheme 
• Method of the interview: open interview following guiding questions, no 
questionnaire. Interviewees are encouraged to say what they think relevant, 
short or long answers are equally welcome. We want to know what they 
think. 
• Interview data will be only used in scientific analysis of the research project. 
They will be kept anonymous, and names will not appear in any published 
articles. Inquiring the permission to analyze the interview data for the 
purpose of publication 
• Inquiring the permission for recording of the interview process 
 
B. Basic data (national or local) 
• Population (elderly population) ; number of towns and villages 
• Age structure and sex composition 
• Employment structure of the locality 
• Basic economic data: GDP, per capita income 
• Number of children per woman 
 
C. Rural pension scheme 
The rural pension scheme is the first experiment of the public pension policy. I 
would like to know much more about its implementation 
• Please tell me shortly its history and current implementation 
• If a rural pension scheme is implemented here, is it based on the guidelines by 
the MOCA in 1991, or is it a new system? When did you start this scheme and 
why? 
 
D. Implementation details of the scheme 
• How many peasants have participated in the new scheme? And how many 
remain in the old one? 
• Who can participate in the scheme? Can migrant workers participate? Do you 
have any statistics about the sex composition and age structure of the 
participants? 
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• What consists of the contribution? How is the burden distributed among 
township, village and individuals? How is contribution calculated? How long 
should one pay the contribution? 
• Is the benefit related to the paid contribution? Is the scheme financed by any 
other sources? How long can the pensioner receive the pensions?  
• At what age can the peasant claim pension benefit? Is there a minimum for 
pension benefit? What is the minimum age for participation? 
• Which administration is in charge of contribution collection? Will any invoice 
be issued for receipt of contribution? Is there any difficulty with contribution 
collection? 
• Which level of local administration is in charge of fund administration? How 
is the fund invested? What is the interest rate for deposit? How much is the 
administration cost? 
• How did you campaign for the scheme? Is there any consultancy service for 
the scheme participants? 
 
E. Personal evaluation of policy implementation 
• What does this policy imply for the peasants? Do they really retire or continue 
working? 
• In comparison with private insurance or bank deposit, what is the advantage 
of the rural pension scheme? Where do the problems lie? 
• Are there any policy changes or new policies in this realm? 
• Do you think if there should be a unified pension system for urban and rural 
residents? If yes, what do you think should be done in order to achieve this? 
• What do you think are the ideal ways of old-age security? 
 
F. Private commercial insurance 
• What commercial insurance companies are active in this area? 
• Are there any migrant workers or peasants participating in private insurance? 
What are there reasons for participation? 
• How are the contributions calculated and collected? Is there any subsidy from 
the local government? 
• What is the amount of the pension benefit? Is it paid in lump-sum or annuity? 
• Is there any competition between public and private pension insurance? 
• How do these private insurance companies advertise their products? Is the 
business expanding or shrinking? 
• Do you think that private pension insurance is a reliable way? Can it replace 
the function of public pension schemes? 
• What role do you think the government should play in this area? 
Administration, subsidy or supervision? 
 
G. Remaining topics 
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We have already asked questions we had prepared. Are there any other aspects you 
would like to mention which have not yet been talked about? 
 
H. Short questions to personal data  
Personal data (function in the administration, age) 
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Appendix 2: Topic Guides for Biographical Interview with Peasants 
 
A. Introduction of research project 
Interview background: Dissertation project.  
Aim: assess the impact of the pilot pension scheme introduced since 1991 on the old-
age security of the clients, as well as their personal experiences of life planning. It is 
thus vital to inquire the life experiences before 1991 as points of reference 
• Method of the interview: open interview following guiding questions, no 
questionnaire. Interviewees are encouraged to say what they think relevant, 
short or long answers are equally welcome. We want to know what they think 
• Interview data will be only used in scientific analysis of the research project. 
They will be kept anonymous, names will not appear in any published 
articles. Inquiring the permission to analyze the interview data for the 
purpose of publication 
• Inquiring the permission for recording of the interview process 
 
B. Sources of living in old age 
Before talking about the pension scheme, we would like first to ask about your 
(expected) sources of living in old age. This information helps us know your life 
background better. 
• What kinds of support do you have (or expect to have) for the old-age 
security?  
<specify all sorts of support> 
• Could you specify how much you obtain from these sources?  
<N.B. land>  What is the size of the land, if any? 
  How much revenue? Also for commercial sale? 
What taxes and charges are there? 
• Which part plays a greater role? 
 
C. Biography before, in and after the pilot scheme 
The pension scheme is the first public scheme for the peasants in rural China. Thus 
we would like to know more about its effects. Since you are one of the members in it, 
we are curious about your experiences with it. 
• When have you been participating in the pilot scheme directed toward 
peasants? 
• What has motivated you to join it? In what situation have you decided to join 
it? 
• How much contribution do you pay or have paid until now? 
Why this amount? 
Why in such payment intervals? 
• How much pension do you receive now (expect to receive when you retire)? 
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• What is your personal impression of the pilot scheme since you have 
participated in it? 
• Do you think the state has the obligation to establish schemes to secure your 
old-age security or rather it is a matter of family responsibility? 
Why do you think so? 
• If you think that old-age security belongs to the family responsibility, what 
aspects do you think the state should take care of your life? 
 
D. Constitution of retirement 
The pension scheme is designed for the old-age security. Since you are already a 
member of the scheme, we are interested to know how you think about the old age. 
• What activities should one do in his later life?  
What activities are you doing (will you do in this phase)? 
Even when you are already receiving (will receive) pensions, are (will) 
you still working (work) to earn for a living until you can’t anymore? 
Why or why not? 
• What age do you consider to be appropriate time for not working anymore?  
Why that age threshold? 
What do you think about the age threshold set by the pilot scheme? Is it 
too early or too late in one’s life? 
• If you compare the time before your entry into the pension scheme with 
today, what has changed since then? 
Have you become economically better off with the pension you receive? 
(Do you expect to become better off with your pension later?) 
• If you see no differences, why do you still stay in this scheme then? 
 
E. Economic rationalization and the Emergence of a “normal employment 
biography” 
After talking about your view of the old age, we are interested to know how you 
think about work and your later life. 
• Under what conditions have (would) you ceased (cease) working in your later 
life?  
Please describe the experiences in detail if you are already pensioner. (Why 
would you cease working?) 
• In your opinion, how should one finance his own later life? (e.g. work, 
fortune, family etc.) 
Do you think that old age is the time of rest and dependence on the others or 
one should continue working?  
Why do you think so? 
• When older people cease working and obtain supports from various sides, do 
you think that is OK? Why or why not? 
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If young people did the same thing, e.g. they acquired enough fortune 
from parents. Do you think that is OK?  
Why or why not? 
• When you cease working, have (would) you given (give) younger generations 
more opportunities and responsibilities? 
Why or why not? 
• After joining the public pension scheme, have you changed your mind about 
working or not working in your later life? 
Any change in your thought about giving younger generations more 
opportunities and responsibilities? 
• Why or why not? 
 
F. Retirement as a normative order: Models of a good life 
Now we would like to know more about your general attitude towards life as a 
whole. 
• What do you think is a good life? (for example school, work, marriage and 
retirement) Why? 
• What activities or experiences should one have in his life? Why? 
Should all the people live in this way? 
• What about women? What kind of life do you think is normal for women? 
Why? 
What kinds of old-age support should a woman obtain if she is to stay 
at home and take care of household? 
And what kinds of old-age support if she goes out for work? 
• Do you think your children (or parents) will share your view of life?  
If not, why? 
Have you ever disputed about this? 
• If you are receiving (to receive) pensions, are your children still willing to 
support your old age? 
• If not, has anything changed between you and your children since your entry 
of the pension scheme? 
(If not, why don’t you expect your children to support your old age?) 
• Have you ever disputed about this? 
 
G. Retirement as social control (Questions especially for younger people) 
Now we would like to ask your thoughts about the future. It is important for us to 
know how you plan your future as well. 
• Do you consider your future life at times? 
• Do you plan sometimes certain things for your future life? 
For how many years do you plan things in the future? <long view or 
temporary view?> 
Since when have you had these thoughts in mind? 
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What events or experiences had moved you to think so? 
• What kinds of phases do you expect for your life span? And why? (e.g. school, 
work, child rearing etc.) 
• What does the membership in the pilot pension scheme mean for your life 
planning?  
Has the scheme helped you better organize this transition process? (e.g. 
from work to non-work) 
• Have you made economic preparations for other purposes in life?  
Please specify what preparations for what purposes. 
Why have (do) you made (make) these preparations? 
If not, why haven’t (don’t) you made (make) preparations at all? 
 
H. Remaining topics 
We have already asked questions we had prepared. Are there any other aspects you 
would like to mention which have not yet been talked about? 
 
I. Short questions to personal data  
Personal data and brief life histories of the informant (family, job, marriage) 
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Appendix 3: Short Note of the Interviewer after the Interview 
 
A. Short description of the interview 
 
B. Specific circumstances in the interview 
Length of the Interview 
Presence of the third person(s) 
Quality of the interview 
Living conditions 
 
C. Evaluation of the interviewee 
General impression 
Communication skill and willingness 
 
D. Self evaluation 
Overall process of the interview (any interruption?) 
Difficulty in the interview situation 
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Appendix 4: List of Interviews with Officials in Central and Local 
Governments 
 
A. Central government 
1. Ministry of Labor and Social Security: 2 officials in charge of rural pension 
insurance. Conducted 21st September, 2004. 
 
B. Local Government 
1. Beijing Bureau of Labor and Social Security: 1 official in charge of rural 
pension insurance. Conducted 1st June, 2005. 
1.1 Daxing District: 1 official in charge of local rural pension insurance. 
Conducted 12th April, 2005. 
1.2 Pinggu District: 2 officials in charge of local rural pension insurance (group 
interview). Conducted 25th March, 2005. 
 
2. Qingdao Bureau of Old-Age Security: 1 official in charge of rural pension 
insurance 
2.1 Chengyang District: officials in charge of local rural pension insurance (group 
interview). Conducted 22nd September, 2003. 
2.2 Pingdu District: officials in charge of local rural pension insurance (group 
interview). Conducted 23rd September, 2003. 
2.3 Jiaonan District: officials in charge of local rural pension insurance (group 
interview). Conducted 24th September, 2003. 
 
3. Shanghai Bureau of Labor and Social Security: 1 official in charge of rural 
pension insurance. Conducted 26th April, 2005. 
3.1 Jiading District: 1 official in charge of local rural pension insurance. 
Conducted 10th May, 2005. 
3.2 Pudong New District: 2 officials in charge of local rural pension insurance. 
Conducted 9th May, 2005. 
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Appendix 5: List of Biographical Interviews with Peasants  
 
1. Village Houjianping, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 4th October, 2004. 
2. Village Houjianping, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 4th October, 2004. 
3. Village Houjianping, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 4th October, 2004. 
4. Village Beiwu, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 13th October, 2004. 
5. Village Beiwu, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 14th October, 2004. 
6. Village Beiwu, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 14th October, 2004. 
7. Village Beiwu, Tongzhou District, Beijing. Conducted 14th October, 2004. 
8. Village Gongyefen, Pinggu District, Beijing. Conducted 25th March, 2005. 
9. Village Baigezuang, Pinggu District, Beijing. Conducted 25th March, 2005. 
10. Village Miaocheng, Huairou District, Beijing. Conducted 31st March, 2005. 
11. Village Miaocheng, Huairou District, Beijing. Conducted 31st March, 2005. 
12. Village Miaocheng, Huairou District, Beijing. Conducted 31st March, 2005. 
13. Village Haijiaozi, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 7th April, 2005. 
14. Village Haijiaozi, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 7th April, 2005. 
15. Village Liming, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 7th April, 2005. 
16. Village Liming, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 7th April, 2005. 
17. Village Langfasi, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 12th April, 2005. 
18. Village Langfasi, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 12th April, 2005. 
19. Village Langfasi, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 12th April, 2005. 
20. Village Er, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 14th April, 2005. 
21. Village Dongxintun, Daxing District, Beijing. Conducted 14th April, 2005. 
22. Village Cangchang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 28th April, 2005. 
23. Village Cangchang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 28th April, 2005. 
24. Village Cangchang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 29th April, 2005. 
25. Village Tanghang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 10th May, 2005. 
26. Village Tanghang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 10th May, 2005. 
27. Village Wuxing, Pudong New District, Shanghai, Conducted 12th May, 2005. 
28. Village Wuxing, Pudong New District, Shanghai, Conducted 12th May, 2005. 
29. Village Tanghang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 16th May, 2005. 
30. Village Tanghang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 16th May, 2005. 
31. Village Tanghang, Jiading District, Shanghai, Conducted 16th May, 2005. 
32. Village Gongyi, Pudong New District, Shanghai, Conducted 19th May, 2005. 
33. Village Gongyi, Pudong New District, Shanghai, Conducted 19th May, 2005. 
34. Village Shanqian, Jiaonan District, Qingdao, Conducted 27th September, 2003. 
35. Village Dongxinzhuang, Jiaonan District, Qingdao, Conducted 27th September, 
2003.  
36. Village Xingjiatun, Pingdu District, Qingdao, Conducted 28th September, 2003. 
 
 
